A POLISH, EUROPEAN CITY:

STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF POZNAŃ

edited by
PRZEMYSŁAW MATUSIK

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Introduction

Poznań is not only a historic city but also a city of historians. Its origins date back more than a thousand years ago, to the inception of the Piast state, while its evolution followed the bumpy trail of Polish (and, for centuries, also Jewish and German) history. Though certainly present in Poznań before, historians put down more permanent roots in the city with the founding of the University of Poznań in 1919. The first department at the local faculty of history was that of medieval history, chaired by Professor Kazimierz Tymieniecki, one of the founding fathers of contemporary Polish medieval studies. He was soon joined by other researchers and then their successors, who together laid the foundation for the present-day reputation of Poznań as a foremost center of historical research in Poland. The above makes Poznań a fitting venue for the 23rd International Congress of Historical Sciences.

This publication has emerged from the conviction that every historian, by their very nature, wants to learn about the past of their destination. Thus, with the guests of the Congress in mind, we are pleased to present fourteen diverse studies on the history of Poznań, ranging from its origins in the 10th century to the June 28, 1956 revolt as seen through the eyes of Poznanian historians (and an archaeologist).

It is indeed the text by the said archaeologist, Hanna Kóčka-Krenz, that opens our collection, highlighting the foundation of a fortified settlement in the 10th century and its essential importance in the state of the first Piasts. The conclusion to this story, as it were, is the subject of a contribution by Marzena Matla, an expert on Bohemian history who discusses the lamentable and enduring consequences for Poznań brought by the crisis of the Polish state, the Polish-Bohemian rivalry, and the ambitions of a certain Bohemian duke in the 11th century. In turn, Tomasz Jasiński's study addresses the great historical processes of the 13th century that resulted in a crucial breakthrough for the city: the incorporation of Poznań under Magdeburg Law on the left bank of the Warta River. The Polish-Lithuanian Union and the attendant opening of the trade route on the east-west axis, notes Zbyszko Górczak, underpinned the economic strength and wealth of

Poznań in the modern era. These developments were capped with a magnificent specimen of Renaissance architecture, the Poznań Town Hall, whose sophisticated decorations expressive of the European, humanistic horizons of Poznanian elites at the time are explicated by Magdalena Mrugalska-Banaszak. The Golden Age of Poland in the 16th century is contrasted with a bleaker picture of Poznań in the 18th century, painted by Karol Kościelniak, a time that marked a major crisis in Poznań's history, caused among others by the wars that ravaged the city. In 1793, as a result of the second partition of Poland, Poznan came under Prussian rule, interrupted by the entrance of Napoleon's army in 1806. Krzysztof Marchlewicz details the circumstances of Poznań's over century-long reincorporation into the Prussian state after the Congress of Vienna, while Rafał Dobek recounts the unsuccessful attempt to revise this decision on the occasion of the Revolutions of 1848. Prussia's grip over Poznań in the 19th century was best exemplified by a huge fortress that stunted the city's development; its history is outlined by Zbigniew Pilarczyk. The fortress did not prevent the outbreak of the Greater Poland Uprising in 1918, which overthrew German rule: its international circumstances are discussed by Michał Polak. One manifestation of the dynamic growth of Poznań under Polish administration in the interwar period was the its newly formed university, as covered by Przemysław Matusik. The city was denied the opportunity to develop its new capabilities to the fullest due to the outbreak of war and the tragic German occupation of 1939-1945, marked by a national and spatial reconstruction project of exceptional scale. It ended with the capture of Poznań by the Red Army, preceded by months of fighting and resulting in the destruction of a significant part of Poznań's urban fabric, as recounted by Adam Pleskaczyński. The final study in the volume, penned by Piotr Grzelczak, presents the hitherto unknown context of the high-profile Parisian response to the workers' uprising in Poznań on June 28, 1956.

The presented works—different in their respective natures and dealing with landmark events and phenomena of significance to the city—also demonstrate the intersecting planes of European and Polish history and their local manifestations in the capital of Greater Poland. It was not our intention to paint a comprehensive picture of the history of Poznań, but rather to weave a network of distinctive signposts pointing the reader towards further studies, comparisons and analyses.

Przemysław Matusik


MIECZYSŁAW I.
BOLESŁAW I.
CHROBRY.





Ostrów Tumski (Cathedral Island) 11th–12th century

0 150 300 m

1 Cathedral
2 Palatium and chapel
3 St. Nicholas's Church

- Ostrów Tumski and Zagórze
- Embankments
- Roads/squares
- Rivers/streams
- Hills
- Wetlands
- Wooden bridges
- Major structures
- Major structures (hypothetical location)

Hanna Kóčka-Krenz

The origins: Poznań during the early Piast rule

The first mentions of the Poznań stronghold, whose history dates back to the 9th century, only appeared in early 11th-century written sources, and reveal the importance of the settlement as one of the vital centers of the early Piast state. They can be found in Thietmar of Merseburg's *Chronicle*. Under the year 968, the chronicler indicated Poznań as the first bishopric in the Piast state: *...Iordan episcopus Posnaniensis I.*[1] Under the year 1000, Thietmar recounts the foundation of an archbishopric in Gniezno, listing the bishops subordinate to Metropolitan Radim-Gaudentius *...Vungero Posnaniensi excepto.*[2] Thietmar mentions Poznań again in the account of the 1005 military expedition of Emperor Henry II who, while in pursuit of the Polish ruler Boleslaus the Brave, rested in the gord at the request of his dukes, *duo miliaria ab urbe Posnani.*[3] The gord is mentioned for the final time in the description of the death of Bishop Unger of Poznań, who had "fed his sheep" for thirty years, until his passing in 1012: *Eodem die Vungerus Posnaniensis cenobii pastor, consacerdos suus et suffraganeus, XXX. ordinationis suae anno obiit.*[4] In his own chronicle, written century later, the first Polish chronicler Gallus Anonymous made two references to the gord. The first concerns the armed forces of Boleslaus the Brave: "... [he mustered] 1,300 armored troops and 4,000 shield-men from Poznań..."[5] The second passage recounts the outcome of the invasion of Poland by Duke Bretislaus of Bohemia: "It was then that the Bohemians destroyed Gniezno and Poznań, and claimed the body of St. Adalbert. (...). The aforementioned

1 *Kronika Thietmara*, trans. & ed. M. Z. Jedlicki, Poznań 1953, II, 22, pp. 73–74.

2 Ibid., IV, 45, pp. 208–209.

3 Ibid., VI, 27, pp. 352–353.

4 Ibid., VI, 65, pp. 406–407.

5 *Monumenta Poloniae Historica*, vol. I, wyd. A. Bielowski, Warszawa 1960, p. 404; Anonim tzw. Gall, *Kronika Polska*, trans. R. Grodecki, ed. M. Plezia, Wrocław-Warszawa-Kraków 1965, I, 6, p. 27.

cities remained abandoned for so long that wild animals established their lairs in the churches of St. Adalbert the Martyr [in Gniezno] and St. Peter the Apostle [in Poznań]."[6]

The earliest written sources describe Poznań as the seat of a bishopric and St. Peter's Cathedral while also emphasizing the military strength of the gord during the reign of Boleslaus the Brave. However, these texts do not convey any information about the size, fortification and urban development layout inside the gord walls, nor about the changes that took place in the built-up areas. In view of the laconic nature of the written sources, in order to reconstruct the life of the gord, one must depend on the results of archaeological research carried out since 1938 on the river island of Ostrów Tumski.[7]

The Poznań stronghold was founded on the largest of several river islands, elevated slightly above the water level and built of sands, gravels and silts, scattered in the Warta floodplain terraces.[8] The choice of this location was deliberate, as its natural features made it easier for the settlers to defend themselves against attackers, while also enabling contacts with the neighboring areas. As a relatively safe transport route, the river also provided the cheapest route for the freight for various goods, while the ford on the Warta River marked the direction of overland routes used during the early Piast rule.[9] The outline of the elongated oval of Ostrów Tumski and the shape of its surface—in particular the uplifts noticeable on the site of the present-day Church of the Blessed Virgin Mary, the Poznań Cathedral, and the elevation in the area of Zagórze—determined the origins and manner of its settlement (Fig. 1).

Regarding the dating and location of the first fortifications, it should be emphasized that opinions are divided among the archaeologists dealing with this issue. Archaeological research of the last decade carried out around the Church of the Blessed Virgin Mary, supported by dendrochronological analyses, suggests that the area of Ostrów Tumski was first inhabited in the second

6 *Monumenta Poloniae Historica*, vol. I, p. 414; Anonim tzw. Gall, *Kronika Polska*, I, 19, p. 45. For more on the subject, see M. Matla's text published in this volume, *Poznań and the invasion of Bretislaus I of Bohemia.*

7 H. Kóčka-Krenz, *Na wyspie Ostrów, przy której dzisiaj jest Poznań...*, Poznań 2012.

8 A. Kaniecki, *Poznań. Dzieje miasta wodą pisane*, Poznań 2004.

9 Z. i S. Kurnatowscy, *Znaczenie komunikacji wodnej dla społeczeństw pradziejowych i wczesnośredniowiecznych*, [in:] *Słowiańszczyzna w Europie średniowiecznej*, ed. Z. Kurnatowska, Wrocław 1996, pp. 117–123; J. Górecki, *Ostrów Lednicki – rezydencja na wczesnopiastowskim szlaku od Poznania ku Gnieznu*, [in:] *Kraje słowiańskie we wczesnym średniowieczu. Profanum i sacrum*, eds. H. Kóčka-Krenz, W. Łosiński, Poznań 1998, pp. 236–245.

half of the 9th century. Whether the settlement was of a defensive nature from the onset or was preceded by an unfortified structure is a matter of debate. However, it is likely that the first settlement was a small and fortified entity, located on the elevation in the north-western part of the island. It should be noted that due to its low elevation above the water level, Ostrów Tumski was continuously threatened by floods, which made it necessary to erect embankments in order to protect human settlements. The interior with a diameter of about 40 m was surrounded by wooden and earthen ramparts with a stone core, while the architecture inside the ramparts featured wooden houses (a dendrochronological analysis of the remains of the wooden buildings established that the latest logging took place after 892). The remains of pottery, cereal stock (millet, wheat, rye, and barley), spinning wheels, and animal bones found in the buildings suggest that the excavation sites formed a typical settlement.

Fig. 1. Poznań – Ostrów Tumski. Sandy islands in the river Warta valley (A. Kaniecki, *Poznań. Dzieje miasta wodą pisane*, Poznań 2004, p. 105, fig. 30; H. Kóčka-Krenz, *Na wyspie Ostrów, przy której dzisiaj jest Poznań...*, Poznań 2012, p. 8, fig. 3)

The fortified settlement retained its form until the mid-10th century. Soon afterwards, it was systematically expanded as one of the primary centers of the young state ruled by the Piast dynasty. Thus, a two-part stronghold was established in the northern part of the island. The previous fortress was enlarged to the north, covering an area of about 80 × 100 m, intended for the ducal court. From the east, the second part of the stronghold was

added, surrounded by a horseshoe-shaped rampart,[10] whose dimensions are estimated at 130 × 100 m.[11] The new ramparts were also made of wood, stone and earth, and their face was reinforced with hooks and a wide outer embankment. At the same time a defensive settlement was established in Zagórze, constituting a third part of the fortified structure walled by the ramparts running along today's Wieżowa and Zagórze streets. The type of fortification used in the north section, along a swampy ditch, is unclear. On the basis of geological boreholes an idea was put forward[12] that the rampart was shaped like a horseshoe and shielded with a palisade on the side overlooking the ditch. However, it seems unlikely that Zagórze was so poorly protected in this section, since the remaining parts of the settlement were surrounded by solid ramparts with a grid structure, which was 11 m wide at the base. A palisade enclosure would not have provided an effective defense; moreover, it would have been quickly destroyed during high water, floods or ice floe. This question can only be resolved in the course of field research. Nevertheless, the settlement in Zagórze was undoubtedly part of the fortified complex, which was inhabited by a group of people who rendered various services to the duke and his nobles.[13] At the end of the 10th century, the scope of the fortified settlement was once again extended by adding a new section on the northern side (Fig. 2). Its massive ramparts with a width of up to 25 m ran along today's Ks. Posadzego Street and the properties adjoining it from the north.[14] Dendrochronological analyses of the wood used for the construction of the defensive structures indicate that this expansion took place between the 970s and '80s. At the present stage of research it is not yet possible to determine the function performed by this part of the gord. Poznań must have been an important point of support for the first historical Piast ruler, Mieszko I (d. 992), for during his reign the stronghold was intensively enlarged and strengthened, eventually consisting of four separately

10 W. Hensel, J. Żak, *Poznań im frühen Mittelalter*, "Archaeologia Polona" vol. 7, 1964, pp. 258–276.

11 M. Kara, *Początki i rozwój wczesnośredniowiecznego ośrodka grodowego na Ostrowie Tumskim w Poznaniu*, [in:] *Civitates principales. Wybrane ośrodki władzy w Polsce wczesnośredniowiecznej*, eds. T. Janiak, D. Stryniak, Gniezno 1998, pp. 26–29.

12 Ibid., p. 27; see also H. Kóčka-Krenz, M. Kara, D. Makowiecki, *The beginnings, development and the character of the early Piast stronghold in Poznań*, [in:] *Polish Lands at the turn of the first and the second millennia*, ed. P. Urbańczyk, Warsaw 2004, p. 133.

13 M. Kara, *Początki i rozwój*.

14 P. Wawrzyniak, *Badania wykopaliskowe wczesnośredniowiecznych umocnień wałowych przy ul. ks. Ignacego Posadzego nr 5 na Ostrowie Tumskim w Poznaniu w latach 2001–2004*, [in:] *Poznań we wczesnym średniowieczu*, ed. H. Kóčka-Krenz, vol. V, Poznań 2005, pp. 91–110.

Fig. 2. Poznań stronghold at the end of the 10th century (H. Kóčka-Krenz, *Na wyspie Ostrów...*, p. 17; fig. 11)

defended sections. This mighty stronghold was connected with the nearest settlement, most likely the merchant village of Śródka, by a wooden bridge stretching across the narrow valley of the Cybina River, erected in the 970s and '80s,[15] with Śródka serving as a proxy to an entire settler hinterland shaping up along the right-bank tributaries of the Warta.

The characteristic feature that distinguishes 10th-century Poznań from the central Piast settlements of that period, such as Gniezno, is its buildings, especially the monumental architecture erected in the northern part of the stronghold complex. The ducal part hosted a stone residence of the ruler. It was a rectangular building, situated on the north-south axis (Fig. 3). The foundations of its longer walls stretched about 27 m, while the shorter walls measured less than 12 m. The rock material in the lower parts of the foundations was covered with earth with a small addition of raw clay, while the upper rows of foundation materials were bonded with gypsum mortar. The perimeter walls of the building were 1.30 m wide and were built of tiles made of crushed stones, bonded with a thick layer of pure gypsum mortar. The irregular brickwork of the walls was covered with gypsum plaster, both on the inside and outside. The floors of the palatial rooms were also made of gypsum plaster laid on a layer of rock crumbs. The access to the interior was through an annex at the south-eastern corner of the *palatium*, protruding by

15 P. Pawlak, *Relikty wczesnośredniowiecznej przeprawy mostowej na Cybinie w Poznaniu*, [in:] *Poznań we wczesnym średniowieczu*, ed. H. Kóčka-Krenz, vol. VI, Poznań 2008, pp. 29–54.

Fig. 3. Reconstruction of the palace and chapel complex, view from the north-east (Kóčka-Krenz, *Na wyspie Ostrów...*, p. 37, fig. 36)

2.20 m in front of its body, with an entrance of the same width. The southern branch housed a flight of stairs leading to the first floor, as evidenced by a tile of the first step resting *in situ*. The height of the ducal palace may have reached 11 m, given that its overturned relic was identified at exactly this distance from the foundations of the northern wall.

The ground floor of the building contained at least four separate rooms. They were arranged in the following way, from the south to the north: the hallway was adjacent to a room (51 m^2) that preceded the large central hall (102 m^2) with representative functions. The latter was connected with two more rooms through passages in the next partition wall. One was a narrow corridor, only 90 cm wide but 5 m long (4.5 m^2), which possibly served as a treasury. Adjoining the narrow room to the east was the fourth and final room (34 m^2). Its remains held two seal matrices, of which one was made of lead and more worn than the other bronze one. The former contains an indecipherable image, while the latter belonged to Brother Jacob of the Dominican Order. Also found in the room was a lead bull with the inscription DVX BOLEZLAVS,[16]

16 I. Dębska, A. Dębski, M. Sikora, *Wczesnośredniowieczna pieczęć ołowiana odkryta na poznańskim Ostrowie Tumskim*, [in:] *Poznań we wczesnym średniowieczu*, ed. H. Kóčka-Krenz, vol. VI, pp. 99–110.

indicating that the room may have hosted a chancellery in which ducal documents were stored and issued. Based on metric data, the usable area of each floor of the secular part of the residence can be estimated at about 190 m^2. The ground floor rooms had administrative and representative functions, while the first floor likely housed the ruler's private quarters. Dating the wooden beam lodged in the threshold of its entrance to the years after 941[17] suggests that the construction of the stone residence in the Poznań stronghold took place in the early years of the second half of the 10^{th} century, therefore the palace was most likely the first monumental building in the Piast state. Its immediate surroundings were paved with a layer of small stone chips plastered with gypsum mortar. A large area of this hardened surface was documented a short distance from the north-eastern corner of the palace; it may have marked a kind of *pavimentum*, a site where the duke exercised his authority "in the open air." Another integral part of the ducal residence was the palace chapel, whose remains have been preserved in a clearly recognizable state by the southern wall of the presbytery of what is now the Gothic Church of Blessed Virgin Mary.[18] Its origins are linked to Mieszko's wife and Boleslaus's mother, Doubravka of Bohemia who, according to Thietmar and Gallus Anonymous, persuaded her husband to convert to Christianity in 966.

The chapel was located in front of the entrance annex leading to the palatial complex, whose axis extended that of the chapel. The two buildings were not connected at the level of foundations, but stood 2 m apart from each other. However, it is noteworthy that the foundations were laid in a narrow trench of equal width and depth, filled with natural rock and covered with soil. In both buildings, at the same level, the foundation transitions into walls made of stone tiles jointed with richly applied gypsum mortar. Both the walls of the *palatium* and those of the chapel were lined with gypsum plaster on both sides, and their interiors were hardened with gypsum floors laid on a layer of stone chips. Thus, there is no doubt that this was a simultaneous construction project and that the *palatium* and the chapel only constituted a joint complex in the overground part. This conclusion is based on the complete absence of a foundation in the western part of the chapel that would

17 M. Krąpiec, *Wynik analizy dendrochronologicznej i dendrologicznej prób drewna z badań archeologicznych prowadzonych na Ostrowie Tumskim w Poznaniu*, Kraków 2002 (manuscript deposited at the Institue of Archeology of the Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań).

18 H. Kóčka-Krenz, *Posen, vorromanische Kapelle der Fürstenresidenz*, [in:] *Handbuch zur Geschichte der Kunst in Ostmitteleuropa,* I: 400–1000. *Vom spätantiken Erbe zu den Anfängen der Romanik*, eds. Ch. Lübke,M. Hardt, Berlin-München 2017, pp. 520–521.

have connected the ends of its northern and southern walls. Such a connection had to take the form of arches stretching between the upper parts of the walls of the chapel and the entrance annex. This structure served as both a frame for the door leading outside the entire complex and a support for the wooden *empora* (matroneu), accessible from the palatial floor.

The Poznań palace chapel was an aisleless church, enclosed from the east with a deep apse with a clearance of 2.5 × 2.5 m. In the axis of the apse, a sacrificial table was attached to the wall, whose stipes was made of small slab stones joined with gypsum mortar. A detailed inspection of the gypsum mortar surface on the western face of the original altar foundation, performed by a restorer, indicated that it was finished with a lining. The aisle of the chapel was widened on both sides by 1 m with two arms, formed in the foundation walls, which created a space that was 4.5 m wide and 1.70 m long. In the western part, the width of the chapel narrowed to 2.5 m along the length of 1 m. The interior was illuminated by windows placed in the outer walls, along the arms of the temple, at the height of about 0.5 m from the floor. Judging by the outline of the window in the overturned southern wall of the chapel, the openings were about 70 cm wide and 1.30 m high, each fitted with a window sill. Such low-lying windows may suggest that the chapel was illuminated by the upper row of windows, possibly also by an apse window. It has also been established what the chapel's interior was lined with. The floor was made of plaster applied on a layer of small natural stones, preserved in large parts in the apse. The walls of the chapel were covered with a thick layer of gypsum plaster with a thin layer of molding for painting decoration. Its subject matter is unclear today, because the plaster covered with paintings has been preserved in small fragments only. It may have been related to the chapel's patron, given the application of a very expensive dye, azurite, which was used in wall paintings to coat the robes of the Virgin Mary. Moreover, more than 230 glass mosaic cubes and fragments of plaster with their imprints were recovered, including one fragment that still contained one such cube. Thus, there is no doubt that the cubes formed a mosaic image that possibly decorated the apse.[19] These cubes were found in the ground after the destruction of the decoration, in a layer dated to the 11th century, so the mosaic must have been created beforehand, probably at the behest of Mieszko I's son and successor, Boleslaus the Brave, who

19 H. Kóčka-Krenz, *Kostki mozaikowe z Ostrowa Tumskiego w Poznaniu*, "Archaeologia Historica Polona" 15/2, pp. 187–200.

may have hired master craftsmen from Kyiv to decorate the chapel. Its interior must also have been furnished with liturgical objects, of which only the bone linings of a reliquary box have survived. The excavated gemstones: one glass (now unfortunately lost) and another carnelian, bearing the image of a lion (late Roman, ancient), in the grain of those that were used for lining reliquaries, crosses, chalices or lining liturgical books in the early Middle Ages, indicate that the local clergy had at their disposal a number of products crafted by master goldsmiths. According to P. Skubiszewski, the objects of worship came to the Piast state mainly from Germany, either as gifts for the bishop's cathedral or ducal endowments.[20] Although these works have not survived to the present day, the accounts contained in the chronicles of Thietmar of Merseburg, Cosmas of Prague and Gallus Anonymous support the hypothesis that the local churches did not differ much in their furnishings from their Western European counterparts.[21]

The Poznań palace chapel is patterned after a Latin cross, which emphasizes its symbolic dimension. Its shape refers to Carolingian and Ottonian churches, and its relatively small dimensions were adapted to the capacities and needs of the ducal court, initially ensuring the performance of Christian duties for a limited number of followers. The negatives of the deep excavation inside the nave of this church lead one to assume that a person worthy of such a resting place was buried at the foot of the altar, which either fell victim to plunder or—more likely—saw the excavation of the remains of the deceased and their transfer to a new burial place once the palace chapel was destroyed, never to be rebuilt on the surviving foundations. It is possible that the chapel was the burial place of its founder, Doubravka of Bohemia (d. 977), as recorded in the 13th-century *Monumenta Poloniae Historica*,[22] or Bishop Jordan, who died around 984.

The palace chapel was probably the first, but not the only church in Poznań. Another religious edifice, which preceded the construction of the cathedral church, was the building of the missionary station occupied by Jordan, who was appointed bishop of Polish lands in 968. Remnants of this building have survived underneath the nave of the present cathedral in the form of the bottom of a bowl of lime mortar lined over a layer of stone

20 P. Skubiszewski, *Katedra w Polsce około roku 1000*, [in:] *Polska na przełomie I i II tysiąclecia*, ed. S. Skibiński, Poznań 2001, pp. 162, 164, 165.

21 Ibid., pp. 150–151.

22 *Monumenta Poloniae Historica*, vol. III, Warszawa 1961, p. 622; see also J. Nowacki *Dzieje archidiecezji poznańskiej*. vol. I: *Kościół katedralny w Poznaniu*, Poznań 1959, p. 8, footnote 22.

chips, about 4 m in diameter, with a pillar hole in the center, along with remnants of the surrounding walls. These remains are reconstructed as a square building containing a baptismal pool, to which a small sanctuary may have been adjacent to the east.[23] The attribution of baptismal functions to the bowl sparked an ongoing debate. The opponents of such attribution argue that the relic constitutes a fragment of an apparatus for mixing large quantities of mortar used during the construction of the cathedral. However, this is contradicted by the iconographic data indicating that separate small containers were used for this purpose, in which portions of mortar were prepared for direct use.[24]

Poznań owes the construction of the cathedral church to Bishop Jordan's successor, Unger, as the erection of the temple is dated to the final quarter of the 10th century.[25] It was built on foundations of large natural granite boulders bonded with lime mortar, on which walls of stone tiles covered with lime plaster were masoned, while the floor was formed of hard, smooth lime slabs. It was a 49 m long, three-aisle basilica with a main 8.5 m wide nave, and two side aisles, each 4.25 m wide, with a square presbytery capped with an apse and flanked by two annexes, separated from the nave section by a rood (Fig. 4)[26]. The cathedral was crowned with a tower-like western edifice holding two turrets with staircases, which housed an east-facing *empora*, supported by a round pillar. The walls of the church were smooth, plastered and devoid of vertical divisions. The main nave was separated from the side aisles by rows of arcaded pillars, and all three naves were covered with a flat ceiling. The window openings and portals in the northern and southern walls of the building likely featured elaborate reveals.[27] The central part of the building held two rectangular tombs, originally elevated above the floor level. The older one was built of calcareous sinter and limestone chips covered with dark green gabbro stone tiles, and sealed with a false vault. The more recent tomb was built of stone chips lined with limestone plaster; it also had a wooden floor and was fitted with a doorway. These tombs were

23 K. Józefowiczówna, *Z badań nad architekturą przedromańską i romańską w Poznaniu,* Wrocław- Warszawa-Kraków 1963; Z. Kurnatowska, *Początki Polski,* Poznań 2002.

24 *Ornamenta Ecclesiae. Kunst und Künstler der Romanik. Katalog zur Ausstellung des Schnütgen-Museums in der Josef-Haubrich-Kunsthalle*. 1, Köln 1985, pp. 172, 173.

25 Z. Kurnatowska, *Początki Polski*, p. 109.

26 A. Bukowska, *Najstarsza katedra w Poznaniu. Problem formy i jej genezy w kontekście architektury około roku 1000*, Kraków 2013, p. 139, fig. 126.

27 K. Józefowiczówna, *Z badań nad architekturą przedromańską*, pp. 37–98; Z. Świechowski, *Architektura romańska w Polsce*, Warszawa 2000, p. 199.

Fig. 4. Relicts of the earliest cathedral in Poznań (A. Bukowska, *Najstarsza katedra w Poznaniu. Problem formy i jej genezy w kontekście architektury około roku 1000*, Kraków 2013, p. 139, fig. 137)

likely fenced, with an altar erected in between them, presumably of the Holy Cross, usually placed in the heart of the temple as its spiritual centerpiece.[28] Thus, a mausoleum was created at the Poznań cathedral, which arguably served as the resting place of Mieszko I and Boleslaus the Brave.[29] The character of the excavated material supports the late medieval tradition of the Poznań cathedral as the burial place of the Piast rulers.[30]

Apart from secular and sacral monumental architecture, other less spectacular elements of its buildings, necessary for the proper functioning of the manor, testify to the position of the Poznań stronghold. One of such facilities was a goldsmith's workshop located in a wooden building with an area of 12 m^2, directly adjacent to the western wall of the palace. Its interior revealed traces of a burnt working table were preserved, and its vicinity yielded fragments of casting crucibles with drops of gold, gold rivets, numerous gold

28 Por. F. Oswald, *In medio Ecclesiae. Die Deutung der literarischen Zeugnisse im Lichte archäologischer Funde*, "Frühmittelalterliche Studien" vol. 3, no. 1, 1969, pp. 313–326.

29 Z. Kurnatowska, *Archeologiczne świadectwa o najstarszych grobowcach w katedrze poznańskiej*, "Roczniki Historyczne" LV-LVI:1989–1990, pp. 71–84; eadem, *Jeszcze raz o grobowcach poznańskich*, [in:] *Scriptura custos memoriae*, ed. D. Zydorek, Poznań 2001, pp. 503–510; eadem, *Początki Polski*, pp. 109–110; K. Jasiński, *Rodowód pierwszych Piastów*, Warszawa-Wrocław 1992, pp. 61, 83.

30 M. Kara, Z. Kurnatowska, *Christliche Bestatungen*, [in:] *Europas Mitte um 1000. Handbuch zur Ausstellung*, eds. A. Wieczorek, H. M. Hinz, I. Stuttgart 2000, pp. 527–530; H. Kóčka-Krenz, *Königsgräber in Dom zu Posen*, [in:] *Das frühmittelalterliche Königtum*, ed. F.-R. Erkens, Berlin-New York 2005, pp. 359–375.

particles and strands, glass and carnelian beads, three small garnet eyes and small particles of gilded wood (possible remnants of a small chest?; Fig. 5).[31] These findings indicate that the goldsmith working in the Poznań workshop was familiar with ornamental techniques requiring considerable skill—filigree, granulation, and encrusting—while the room itself was built according to the recommendations of the treatise *Diversarum Artium Schedula* by Theophilus Presbyter.[32] Active from the second half of the 10th to the first half of the 11th century (as per dating based on the analysis of stratigraphy and ceramic materials),[33] the workshop crafted gold ornaments for the ducal family, and (possibly) liturgical devices. This also means that the Piast rulers hired highly specialized manufacturers at their Poznań court.

Taking into account the strength of the fortifications, the size and multipartite nature of the Poznań stronghold, and the way it was constructed, one can conclude that the settlement was patterned after Carolingian-Ottonian residences, referred to in German literature with the term "Pfalz."[34] A "Pfalz" was a political and economic entity with a diverse structure that depended on the rank of a given site and the resulting frequency and length of stay of its ruler and his secular and sacred entourage. The most elaborate "Pfalz" structures were those that hosted conventions on the occasion of church festivals (especially Christmas and Easter) and various state gatherings, as well as those adapted to longer stays, e.g. through the winter period. Such places required appropriate housing to provide the ruler with all the necessary amenities, all the more so given that he was usually accompanied by numerous retinue, frequently exceeding several hundred in number.[35] Therefore, the fortified palatial complex held a number of more or less interconnected buildings. According to written sources (*Brevium Exempla*), the complex contained a stone royal house with vestibules and chambers equipped with fireplaces and a wine cellar, loggias, a stone chapel; the courtyard housed other wooden dwellings (including guest quarters), workshops, a women's workroom with an adjacent chamber, a kitchen, a bakery, stables, barns and grain

31 H. Kóčka-Krenz, *Pracownia złotnicza na poznańskim grodzie*, [in:] *Świat Słowian wczesnego średniowiecza*, eds. M. Dworaczyk, A.B. Kowalska, S. Moździoch, M. Rębkowski, Szczecin-Wrocław 2006, pp. 257–272.

32 Teofil Prezbiter, *Diversarum Artium Schedula. Średniowieczny zbiór przepisów o sztukach rozmaitych*, wyd. S. Kobielus, Tyniec-Kraków 1998, pp. 57–58.

33 Por. H. Kóčka-Krenz, *Pracownia złotnicza*.

34 A. Gauert, *Zur Struktur und Topographie der Königspfalzen*, [in:] *Deutsche Königspfalzen*, 2. Göttingen 1965, p. 3ff.

35 G. Binding, *Deutsche Königspfalzen. Von Karl dem Grossen bis Friedrich II. (765–1240)*, Darmstadt 1996, pp. 35–58.

Fig. 5. Poznań – palatial goldsmithery. Fragments of clay crucibles, gold particles and threads, glass and carnelian beads, as well as garnet stones (Photo by Piotr Namiota, UAM)

granaries, as well as an orchard, a fishpond, and a garden.[36] Although the layout of each residence was different and subject to modifications over the course of their use, all of them contained certain fixed elements that were similar in purpose. These included a hall building containing an assembly room for official court ceremonies, a residential part, a palace chapel, and an outbuilding. The adjacent settlement area hosted buildings for court servants, craftsmen and merchants.[37] They had to be equipped with all items and amenities indispensable to daily life, "so that one did not have to request them whenever they were needed."[38]

In the second half of the 10th century, the duke had at his disposal a stone palace with a separate reception room, chancellery and treasury, as well as a stone palace chapel for private worship. Adjacent to the *palatium* was a wooden goldsmith's workshop, i.e. one of the specialized workshops working for the court. The nearby paved square was likely surrounded by other workshops of ducal craftsmen. The second part of the stronghold, adjoining from the east, consisted of the cathedral church and the buildings of the nobility tied to the ruler and performing military and administrative functions on his behalf. The third (northern) segment of the complex was probably intended for economic purposes. The defensive settlement in Zagórze was inhabited by a group of people who rendered various services for the remaining inhabitants of the stronghold.[39] Hence, there is no doubt that Poznań was a powerful fortification defending access to the interior of the Piast state, the residence of the duke and his court, a stronghold with administrative, economic and sacral functions, providing the ruler with the main point of support. As the burial church of the Piast monarchs, the Poznań Cathedral played an important role in the system of assuming and exercising regal power.[40] Religious ceremonies at the royal necropolis reinforced the continuity of the dynasty and its sacred character while also ensuring the prosperity of the state. According to Zbigniew Dalewski, "Thus, through an almost physical contact between the new ruler and his predecessor, continuity of power was ensured. On the one hand, the tradition of the burial

36 W. Metz, *Die Königshöfe der Brevium Exempla*, "Deutsches Archiv für Erforschung des Mittelalters", vol. 22, 1966, pp. 598–617; G. Binding, op. cit., p. 60ff.

37 Ibid., p. 60ff.

38 See W. Metz, op. cit.

39 M. Kara, *Początki i rozwój*, pp. 26–29.

40 See J. Meier, *Ahnengrab und Rechtstein. Untersuchungen zur deutschen Volkskunde und Rechtsgeschichte*, Berlin 1950.

site and the references to the sacred values embedded therein guaranteed the validity of the choice made by the community, supported in a sense by the authority of the buried ancestor; on the other, they bestowed on the newly elected monarch—through participation in the sacred space of the tomb—the ability to effectively exercise his sovereign rights."[41] Consequently, adds Dalewski, "...there is no doubt that Poznań played an important role in the structure of the Piast state, comparable to that of Gniezno. It seems that as a center largely created by the dynasty, Poznań marked the point around which the Piast tradition could be solidified, one that the Piast rulers envisioned to play an important role within the ideological and political structure determining the longevity of their rule, defined by a set of basic administrative and propagandist activities."[42]

41 Z. Dalewski, *Władza, przestrzeń, ceremoniał. Miejsce i uroczystość inauguracji władcy w Polsce średniowiecznej do końca XIV w.*, Warszawa 1996, pp. 33–35.

42 Ibid., pp. 38–39.

Marzena Matla

1039: Poznań and the invasion of Bretislaus I of Bohemia

The Piast dynasty, which entered the historical arena in the mid-10th century, created a resilient state that played an important role in the political space of Central Europe, with the stronghold of Poznań—the seat of the first Polish bishop—emerging as its main center besides Gniezno. The dynasty reached its peak during the reign of Boleslaus the Brave (Bolesław Chrobry) (967–1025)—son of Mieszko I and the Bohemian princess Doubravka—whose troops entered Prague and Kiev, and whose state annexed Lusatia, Moravia and Slovakia, as well as the Cherven Towns, captured from the Ruthenian princes. One important factor that helped elevate the rank of Boleslaus's reign was the cult of St. Adalbert. This prominent member of the 10th-century Church was the Bishop of Prague, descended from the Slavnik dynasty, which had succumbed to the Přemyslids in a rivalry over supremacy in Bohemia. However, St. Adalbert gained the protection of Boleslaus, under whose aegis he began his missionary activity among the pagan Prussians, which culminated in his glorious martyrdom. In 1000, Emperor Otto III travelled to St. Adalbert's grave in Gniezno, which was the main center of the Piast state at the time. The political pinnacle of Boleslaus's reign was his coronation in 1025, which took place shortly before his death. Tradition has it that the remains of the first Polish king were laid to rest at Poznań Cathedral, where his father Mieszko I, the founder of the Piast state had also been buried. Boleslaus's vigorous policy was continued by his son, Mieszko II (990–1034), who was likewise crowned as the King of Poland; it was during his reign, however, that the first Piast monarchy collapsed in the 1030s, which had far-reaching consequences for Poznań.[1] The crisis of the Piast rule was

1 For an overview of the studies see: Z. Dalewski, *The origins of the Piast dynasty and its polity in historiographical perspective*, "History Compass" 2020, vol. 18, issue 12, pp. 1–11, online: https://com-

no doubt triggered by numerous factors, from the external invasions that deprived Mieszko II of a substantial chunk of his territory (Moravia, Slovakia, Lusatia and the eastern borderlands) and the related sources of revenue, to the internal struggles between Boleslaus's sons, peasant revolts, unrest among pagan reactionaries, and the rise of magnate opposition against the royal power. The lattermost resulted in the support of the claims staked by other representatives of the dynasty against Mieszko II, and the short reign of his brother Bezprym, followed by the exile of Queen Richeza and her son Casimir (Kazimierz), heir to Mieszko II's throne. Exacerbating the situation were the separatist tendencies within the state, which resulted in the detachment of Mazovia from the Piast regnum.[2] It is difficult to establish an unambiguous chronology of events after Mieszko II's death, as there are no reliable sources in that regard, but it can be surmised that Casimir came to power soon after his father's passing (1034). It fell to Mieszko II's young successor to quash the peasant uprisings and pagan reactionaries, but another opponent emerged that proved far more dangerous, i.e. the nobility, among whom were the *traditores* (*traitors*), as they were dubbed by the 12th-century chronicler Gallus Anonymus. It was them who, after a short reign, stripped Casimir of power and forced him to flee the country.[3] While the date of Casimir's escape is disputed in the literature, in view of Gallus's late yet plausible account of Casimir's stay at the court of King Stephan I of Hungary (d. August 15, 1038), one may assume the Polish duke fled the country between 1037 and 1038.[4] The time also likely saw the autonomy of Mazovia under Miecław, a former official of Mieszko II.[5] Not much is known about governance in the remaining districts, but it can be presumed that they fell into the hands of rebellious magnates, i.e., descendants of former tribal aristocracy with

pass.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/hic3.12638 [Access 01.06.2022]; G. Labuda, *Święty Wojciech, biskup-męczennik, patron Polski, Czech i Węgier*, Wrocław 2000.

2 For a detailed discussion of the circumstances behind the downfall of the first Piast dynasty, see G. Labuda, *Mieszko II król Polski (1025–1034). Czasy przełomu w dziejach państwa polskiego*, Kraków 1992, p. 93ff.

3 *Galli Anonymi cronicae et gesta ducum sive principium Polonorum*, ed. K. Maleczyński, Monumenta Poloniae Historica nova series (hereinafter MPH sn), vol. II, Kraków 1952, lib. I, 19, p. 41ff; see also H. Łowmiański, *Początki Polski*, vol. VI, pt. 1: *Polityczne i społeczne procesy kształtowania się narodu do początku wieku XIV*, Warszawa 1985, p. 71ff; G. Labuda, *Mieszko II*, p. 129 ff.

4 S. Kętrzyński, *Kazimierz Odnowiciel*, [in:] idem, *Polska X-XI wieku*, Warszawa 1961, p. 410; J. Bieniak, *Państwo Miecława. Studium analityczne*, Warszawa 1963, p. 109 and footnote 277; H. Łowmiański, *Początki Polski*, vol. VI, pt. 1, p. 72ff; G. Labuda, *Mieszko II*, pp. 128, 134, 200.

5 J. Bieniak, *Państwo Miecława*, p. 67ff.

decentralist tendencies[6] or – more likely – that power struggles took place within this group. The eminent historian Gerard Labuda believed that the magnates would not have defied Casimir without external support, and he consequently saw the Bohemian ruler Bretislaus (Břetislav) I as the instigator of the internal upheaval in Poland.[7] Since the fall of the Piast dynasty was no doubt highly advantageous for the Bohemian duke, the above hypothesis cannot be ruled out, however in view of the changes on the Bohemian throne in the early 11th century, independent aspirations of Polish nobility should not be underestimated. It was around mid-1038 that the Piast state, deprived of a ruler and plagued by internal anarchy, stood open to Bretislaus, as Casimir—having failed to obtain help in Hungary—moved to Germany after King Stephen's death (in the second half of 1038), reuniting with his mother Richeza.[8] However, despite the influence of his mother's family—the Ezzonids—the young Piast failed to secure the support of the German ruler Conrad II, and his hopes to quickly regain the Polish throne fell through.

The Bohemian state under Bretislaus I (1035–1055)[9] was in a much more favorable position at that time. Granted, it had seen a crisis of central power and a weakening of the Přemyslids' position, which occurred after 1000,[10] however the first three decades of the 11th century allowed the Přemyslids to take control of the situation. Under the rule of Oldřich (1012–1034) and Bretislaus, the Přemyslids not only managed to improve Bohemia's international position but also strengthened it internally and regained Moravia (around 1029), which had previously been held by the Piasts.[11] However, Bretislaus's plans went further. While still a district prince in Moravia, he ventured to

6 Such an opinion was expressed by R. Grodecki, [in:] R. Grodecki, S. Zachorowski, J. Dąbrowski, *Dzieje Polski średniowiecznej,* vol. I, ed. J. Wyrozumski, Kraków 1995, p. 111ff; J. Bieniak, *Państwo Miecława,* 104ff; H. Łowmiański, *Początki Polski,* vol. VI, pt. 1, p. 72ff.

7 G. Labuda, *Mieszko II,* p. 132. Labuda does not exclude the possibility of the Bohemian invasion being coordinated with the magnate rebellion, and forcing Casimir to flee, ibid. p. 133ff, 190.

8 B. Zientara, *Kazimierz I Odnowiciel*, [in:] *Poczet królów i książąt polskich*, Warszawa 1978, p. 46; H. Łowmiański, *Początki Polski,* vol. VI, pt. 1, p. 78; G. Labuda, *Mieszko II*, p. 192ff.

9 For more on the reign of Bretislaus I, see B. Krzemieńska, *Břetislav I. Čechy a střední Evropa v prvé polovině XI. století*, 2nd ed., Praha 1999.

10 B. Krzemieńska, *Krize českého státu na přelomu tisíciletí*, Československý časopis historický 18 (1970), pp. 497–532; D. Kalhous, *Boleslav III.: kníže na konci časů?*, [in:] *Ad vitam et honorem. Profesoru Jaroslavu Mezníkovi přátelé a žáci k pětasedmdesátým narozeninám*, eds. T. Borovský, L. Jan, M. Wihoda, Brno 2003, pp. 221–229; M. Matla, *Eine "Wirtschaftskrise" und die Staatsbildung der Přemysliden im 10. und in der ersten Hälfte des 11. Jahrhunderts*, [in:] *Wirtschaftskrisen als Wendepunkte. Ursache, Folgen und historische Einordnungen vom Mittelalter bis zur Gegenwart*, eds. D. Adamczyk, S. Lehnstaedt, Osnabrück 2015, pp. 263–288.

11 M. Matla-Kozłowska, *Pierwsi Przemyślidzi i ich państwo* (*od X do połowy XI wieku*). *Ekspansja terytorialna i jej polityczne uwarunkowania*, Poznań 2008, pp. 434–451.

expand his state at the expense of Hungary, and the situation in the divided Poland presented him with far more inviting prospects.

There is no consensus in the research conducted to date as to the exact time of Bretislaus's invasion of Poland. Mentions of the events can be found in Polish yearbooks placing the abduction of St. Adalbert's remains under the dates: 1037, 1038;[12] conversely, Czech sources date the invasion of Bretislaus's and the abduction of the relic at 1039.[13] The course of the expedition is recounted by the Bohemian chronicler Cosmas of Prague, who wrote his work between 1110 and 1125,[14] placing the event in the fourth year of Bretislaus's reign and concluding his account with the information that the Bohemian army returned home and set up camp near Prague on the vigil of St. Bartholomew the Apostle of 1039;[15] this is followed by the annotation: *Facta est autem hec translatio beatissimi Christi martiris Adalberti* (...) *MXXXIX cal. Septembris*.[16] Another source on the subject is the Annalista Saxo,[17] who makes references to the chronicles of Cosmas and the so-called Gallus Anonymus, whose account does not state the year of Bretislaus's raid.[18] Considering these circumstances, some historians have pointed to either 1038 or 1039 as the

12 *Rocznik kapituły krakowskiej*, ed. Z. Kozłowska-Budkowa, [in:] MPH sn, vol. V, p. 47; *Rocznik krótki*, ed. Z. Kozłowska-Budkowa, [in:] MPH sn, vol. V, p. 234; *Rocznik krakowski,* ed. A. Bielowski, [in:] MPH, vol. II, p. 830; *Rocznik małopolski,* ed. A. Bielowski, [in:] MPH, vol. III, p. 144 (code. Kurop.; code. lubiń. without: *per ducem Wratislaum*); *Rocznik Sędziwoja*, ed. A. Bielowski, [in:] MPH, vol. II, p. 873; *Rocznik poznański*, ed. G. Labuda, [in:] MPH sn vol. VI, p. 129.

13 *Letopisy pražské*, ed. J. Emler, [in:] Fontes rerum Bohemicarum (hereinafter FRB), vol. II, p. 377; *Letopisy české,* ed. J. Emler, [in:] FRB, vol. II, p. 381; *Benedicti Minoritae dicti Chronica et eius continuatio*, ed. L. Dušek, [in:] *Franciszkanie w Polsce średniowiecznej,* ed. J. Kłoczowski, vol. I, pt. 2–3, Kraków 1993, p. 337; *Hradištsko-opatovické Letopisy*, ed. J. Emler, [in:] FRB, vol. II, p. 389.

14 Cf. M. Wojciechowska, *Introduction*, [in:] *Kosmasa Kronika Czechów*, translation, introduction and commentary by M. Wojciechowska, Warszawa 1968, pp. 35–48; D. Třeštík, *Kosmova kronika. Studie k počátkům českého dějepisectví a politického myšlení*, Praha 1968, p. 50ff; N. Kersken, *Geschichtsschreibung im Europa der „nationes". Nationalgeschichtliche Gesamtdarstellungen im Mittelalter*, Köln-Weimar-Wien 1995, pp. 573–582.

15 *Cosmae Pragensis Chronica Boemorum*, ed. B. Bretholz, MGH SS n.s., vol. II, Berlin 1923, lib. II, 2-II, 5, pp. 83–91; see *Cosmas of Prague, The Chronicle of the Czechs*, Translated with an introduction and notes by Lisa Wolverton, Washington 2009, pp. 111-120.

16 *Cosmae Pragensis Chronica*, p. 91.

17 *Annalista Saxo*, ed. G. Waitz, [in:] MGH SS, vol. VI, Hannoverae 1844, pp. 683–684; some of the German sources mentioning Bretislaus I's invasion of Poland include *Annales Magdeburgenses*, ed. G.H. Pertz, [in:] MGH SS, vol. XVI, Hanoverae 1859, p. 170 (placing it in 1034, which seems implausible given the estimates made in other source texts); *Brunwilarensis monasterii fundatorum actus*, ed. G. Waitz, [in:] MGH SS, vol. XIV, Hannoverae 1883, p. 131; an outline of sources refering to the event has been penned by B. Krzemieńska, *W sprawie chronologii wyprawy Brzetysława I na Polskę,* Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego, seria I: Nauki humanistyczyczno-społeczne 12 (1959), p. 24ff.

18 *Galli Anonymi cronicae*, lib. I, 19, p. 43ff.

date of the invasion, with others settling for the period from 1038 to 1039.[19] The analysis of source texts, however, leads one to assume that the event most likely took place in the summer of 1039 (as argued by B. Krzemieńska) and was not a lengthy military operation.[20]

The summer of 1039 was undeniably an opportune moment for Bretislaus's enterprise: deprived of its ruler and troubled by internal disturbances, Poland presented easy prey. At the same time in the Reich, Emperor Conrad II, who had been struggling with a burdensome case of gout since his return from an Italian expedition in 1038, died on June 4, 1039.[21] This, too, favored the Bohemian duke, as difficulties were to be expected in the assumption and consolidation of power by the emperor's successor. One should also remember that the emperor did not support the exiled Casimir, who sought refuge in the Reich, and hence Bretislaus could count on the German court's non-reaction to his anti-Polish policy. Also important was the fact that Bretislaus could depend on the support of the new Hungarian king, Peter Orseolo.[22] Was it then that the Bohemian duke entered into cooperation with the Pomeranian prince, or Miecław of Mazovia, or the pagan opponents of the Piasts in Silesia, as some scholars believed? It is impossible to say. They were, by all means, natural allies, interested in the further weakening of the Piast state, however the sources fail to provide any clues in this regard.

We can reconstruct the course of the expedition based on the account of the Bohemian chronicler Cosmas (even if several of its passages raise doubt); the brief mention in Gallus Anonymus's chronicle; as well as archaeological research.

19 For more on the current state of research, see B. Krzemieńska, *W sprawie chronologii*, p. 27ff; G. Labuda, *Mieszko II,* p. 185ff.

20 B. Krzemieńska, W *sprawie chronologii,* p. 30ff; the same estimated date has been proposed by J. Bieniak, *Państwo Miecława,* p. 111ff; W. Dziewulski, *Postępy chrystianizacji i proces likwidacji pogaństwa w Polsce wczesnofeudalnej*, Wrocław-Warszawa-Kraków 1964, p. 115; D. Borawska, *Kryzys monarchii wczesnopiastowskiej w latach trzydziestych XI wieku,* Warszawa 1964, p. 172ff, 193; K. Polek, *Kraków i Małopolska w czasie najazdu Brzetysława na Polskę,* Studia Historyczne 29 (1986), vol. 4, p. 496; E. Rymar, *Prawnopolityczny stosunek Kazimierza Odnowiciela do Niemiec oraz termin odzyskania przez niego Śląska (1041 r.),* "Śląski Kwartalnik Historyczny Sobótka" 42 (1987), vol. 2, p. 143; J. Žemlička, *Čechy v době knížecí (1034–1198)*, Praha 1997, p. 56ff.

21 F.R. Erkens, *Konrad II. (um 990–1039). Herrschaft und Reich es ersten Salierkaisers*, Darmstadt 1998, p. 193ff.

22 M. Lysý, *Politika českého kniežaťa Břetislava I. (1035–1055) voči Uhorsku*, "Historický časopis" 52 (2004), č. 3, p. 461.

In his account of the crisis following Mieszko II's death and the expulsion of Casimir the Restorer[23] (Book I, 19), Gallus Anonymus—who was writing his chronicle in the second decade of the 12th century—begins with a somewhat vague statement: "Meanwhile, the neighboring kings and dukes, each on his own part, tormented Poland, each annexing border towns and settlements to his respective dominion or, having conquered them, razing [them] to the ground." He subsequently reports on the internal turmoil in Poland, adding, "It was then that the Bohemians destroyed Gniezno and Poznań, and claimed the body of St. Adalbert. Those who escaped from the hands of the enemy or fled from the rebellion of their own subjects escaped across the Vistula into Mazovia. The aforementioned cities remained abandoned for so long that wild animals established their lairs in the churches of St. Adalbert the Martyr [in Gniezno] and St. Peter the Apostle [in Poznań]."[24] Gallus Anonymus no doubt exaggerates the scope of the calamity, interweaving topical elements into an outline of the fate of churches in Greater Poland, seeking to sensitize his contemporaries to the consequences of disloyalty to their natural lords, i.e. the Piasts. Nevertheless, his text testifies to the fact that Gniezno and Poznań were objects of the Bohemian invasion.

As opposed to Gallus Anonymus, Cosmas pays more attention to Bretislaus's expedition, albeit with specific goals in mind. On the one hand, the description serves (among other things) to showcase the bravery of his favorite character, whom he dubs the "Bohemian Achilles;" on the other hand, Cosmas depicts the expedition as a means to right the wrongs suffered from the Poles or, more specifically, from Duke Mieszko (Book II, 2); all of the above did affect Cosmas's narrative. It is for these reasons that the chronicler recounts the capture, sack and destruction of Cracow,[25] despite the fact that research to date, including archaeological excavations, seems to contradict such a possibility. On the contrary, Lesser Poland may have been the only Polish region to survive the crisis of the Piast state in the 1030s without

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23 For more on the author, see T. Jasinski, *Czy Gall Anonim to Monachus Littorensis*?, Kwartalnik Historyczny 112 (2005), 3, pp. 69–89; idem, *O pochodzeniu Galla Anonima*, Kraków 2008.

24 *Anonim tzw. Gall Kronika polska,* transl. R. Grodecki, introduction, ed. and footnotes M. Plezia, 7th ed., Wrocław-Warszawa-Kraków 1996, pp. 43–44; see *Galli Anonymi cronicae*, lib. I, p. 42–43.

25 *Cosmae Pragensis Chronica Boemorum*, lib. II, 2, p. 83. *Krakov autem eorum metropolim ingressus a culmine subvertit et spolia eius obtinuit; insuper et veteres thesauros ab antiquis ducibus in erario absconditos evolvit, scilicet aurum et argentum infinitum nimis; similiter et ceteras urbes igne succendit et usque ad solum destruxit.* B. Krzemieńska, *W sprawie chronologii,* p. 34; see also H. Łowmiański, *Początki Polski,* t. VI, pt. 1, p. 74ff and footnote 118; K. Polek, *Kraków i Małopolska,* p. 506; T. Jurek, *Ryczyn biskupi. Studium z dziejów Kościoła polskiego w XI wieku*, Roczniki Historyczne 60 (1994), p. 41.

major losses (such as internal revolts and external invasions). It was for this very reason that Casimir the Restorer chose Cracow as the seat of the reconstructed Piast[26] state after 1039. Nonetheless, after the initial references to the destruction and looting of Polish strongholds—of which only Cracow is mentioned by name—and the story of the fate of the inhabitants of Giecz, the bulk of Cosmas's narrative focuses on Bretislaus's invasion of Gniezno (captured without a fight) and the removal of the relics of St. Adalbert and other martyrs, as well as the decrees issued by the duke on that occasion. In the final section of the chronicle, Cosmas details the loot brought from Poland, especially the relics solemnly escorted into Prague.

It has already been noted that some of the records made in Cosmas's chronicle are unreliable. For example, Cosmas dates the expedition after the death of Casimir the Restorer (Book II, 2), who died in 1058, although he himself cites the year 1039. In another part of the account, quotations taken from the chronicle of Regino of Prüm have been identified (e.g. in the mention of ravaging the Polish lands and destroying its strongholds),[27] which the Bohemian chronicler usually employed as a commentary to the events about which he did not have sufficient details.[28] In so structuring this part of the chronicle, Cosmas can therefore be assumed to have used two types of sources. One of them was oral tradition, the other was likely some sort of a written record (perhaps, as put forward by B. Krzemieńska, the articles of Gniezno drafted by Bretislaus).[29] Pertinently to this study, however, the invasion of Gniezno seems to overshadow Bretislaus's other activities in Greater Poland, including the destruction of Poznań.

This brings us to the fundamental issue, namely the purpose of Bretislaus's raid. There is no consensus on this issue in historiography to date. Some researchers argue the Bohemian duke intended to continue in the footsteps of Boleslaus the Brave, i.e. to unite Western Slavdom by bringing Bohemia and Poland under one authority.[30] According to R. Novy, Bretislaus's

26 B. Krzemieńska, *W sprawie chronologii,* p. 33ff; M. Matla-Kozłowska, *Pierwsi Przemyślidzi*, pp. 466–470.

27 *Cosmae Pragensis Chronica*, lib. II, 2, p. 83: *ac velut ingens tempestas furit, sevit, sternit omnia, sic villas cedibus, rapinis, incediis devastavit, vi municiones irrupit*.

28 B. Krzemieńska, *W sprawie chronologii*, p. 35; see also D. Třeštík, *Kosmas a Regino. Ke kritice Kosmovy kroniky*, "Československý časopis historický" 8 (1960), pp. 564–587, especially p. 571; *Cosmas of Prague, The Chronicle*, p. 112 and footnote 17.

29 B. Krzemienska, *Břetislav I*, p. 216.

30 See among others Z. Wojciechowski, *Początki chrześcijaństwa w Polsce na tle stosunków niemiecko-wieleckich,* [in:] idem, *Studia historyczne*, Warszawa 1955, p. 137; R. Heck, *O właściwą interpretację najazdu Brzetysława I na Polskę*, Śląski Kwartalnik Historyczny Sobótka 21 (1966), p. 255ff.

intention to "transfer the crown" from Poland to Bohemia was supposed to take a symbolic form and involve the relocation of sacral items related to the establishment of *Sclavinia* and kept in Gniezno, i.e. the relics of St. Adalbert and other saints.[31] Another group of scholars has painted a more modest picture of Bretislaus's ambitions, emphasizing his intention to establish a metropolitan see in Prague by acquiring the relics of St. Adalbert, along with his desire to regain the lands lost during the reign of Boleslaus II.[32] There is also no shortage of opinions according to which Bretislaus's invasion was chiefly loot-driven (included therein were the relics of St. Adalbert)[33] rather than motivated by the Přemyslid's ecclesiastical-political aspirations.[34]

However, the course of the expedition as described by Cosmas and the subsequent actions of the duke and the Bishop of Prague seem to indicate that it was not territorial ambitions or the potential loot that was the main goal of the expedition, but rather Bretislaus's far-reaching ecclesiastical plans, namely the establishment of a metropolitan see for Bohemia, which only had two bishoprics at the time, both subordinate to the Archbishop of Mainz. The transfer of St. Adalberts's body to Prague would thus be a symbolic translation of the metropolitan see established over his body: after all, the first archbishop of Gniezno, Radim Gaudentius, was referred to as the *archiepiscopus sancti Adalberti martyris*.[35] Having returned from the expedition, the Bohemian duke immediately sent envoys to Rome.[36] Although nothing is known of the content of this message, the Annalista Saxo notes that the Archbishop of Mainz, Bardo, wanted to sue Bishop Severus not only for

31 R. Nový, *Královská korunovace Vratislava II.*, Numismatické listy 43 (1988), p. 132ff; idem, *Český král Vratislav II.*, [in:] *Královský Vyšehrad,* Praha 1992, p. 14. In a similar vein, J. Žemlička suggests that Bretislaus's overarching goal was to relate to the idea of the *renovatio imperii* principle that guided Otto III's efforts, and to emulate Poland and Hungary around 1000 by establishing an independent Church metropolis and to get the royal crown, see J. Žemlička, *Čechy*, pp. 57–59.

32 J. Dowiat, *Polska państwem średniowiecznej Europy,* Warszawa 1968, p. 169; B. Krzemieńska, *Boj knížete Břetislava I. o upevnění českého státu (1039–1041)*, Rozpravy ČSAV, řada společenských věd, vol. 89, no. 5, Praha 1979, p. 13ff; E. Rymar, *Prawnopolityczny stosunek*, p. 143; T. Jurek, *Ryczyn biskupi,* p. 50ff; M. Bláhová, [in:] *Velké dějiny zemí Koruny české*, vol. 1, Praha-Litomyšl 1999, p. 390; M. Lysý, *Politika českého kniežaťa, p.* 460.

33 Z. Fiala, *Přemyslovské Čechy. Český stát a společnost v letech 995–1310*, Praha 1975, p. 157ff.

34 I. Hlaváček, *Angebliche Versuche der Přemysliden des 11. Jhs. um das Landeserzbistum in Prag*, [in:] *Prusy–Polska–Europa. Studia z dziejów średniowiecza i czasów wczesnonowożytnych.* Prace ofiarowane Profesorowi Zenonowi Hubertowi Nowakowi w sześćdziesiątą piątą rocznicę urodzin i czterdziestolecie pracy naukowej, eds. A. Radzimiński, J. Tandecki, Toruń 1999, pp. 35–44, especially p. 43.

35 It is with this title that Radim Gaudentius was referred to in the list of witnesses to Otto III's document issued for Farfa Abbey, dated 2 December 999, *MGH Diplomata regum et imperatorum Germaniae*, vol. II, 2, Hannoverae 1893, no. 339, p. 769.

36 M. Wojciechowska, [in:] *Kosmasa Kronika*, p. 220; *Cosmae Pragensis Chronica*, lib. II, 7, p. 91.

plundering Polish churches and the transfer of the aforementioned relics but also for his illegal efforts to obtain a pallium from the Pope.[37] Cosmas's description of the expedition also focuses on the transfer of the relics, rendered by the chronicler as an official translation, similarly to other Bohemian source texts.[38] To this end, Bishop Severus of Prague joined Bretislaus's expedition, fasts and prayers were offered by the parties arriving in Gniezno, the Bohemian *comites* pledged to atone for their fathers' wrongdoings against the martyr,[39] and the duke's decrees were promulgated at the martyr's grave, as a response to St. Adalbert's accusations against Bohemians,[40] likely in the hope that the Pope would agree to bestow metropolitan rights on the Prague bishopric.[41] Not without significance, Cosmas also emphasizes the martyr's own consent to have his body returned to his homeland.[42] Bretislaus's undertaking was thwarted by the Holy See, which received reports on the course of his expedition (perhaps from Casimir the Restorer and the Polish clergy), and the presumable counter from the Metropolitan of Mainz, Bardo.[43] However, as noted by Tomasz Jurek, even after the expedition, at one of the synods Bishop Severus of Prague reportedly referred to himself with the title *episcopus sancti A(da)lberti*.[44]

37 *Annalista Saxo*, p. 685 under 1042: *Interim Severus Pragensis episcopus conperit, Bardonem Moguntium metropolitanum sinodali iure eum velle inquietare, eo quod destructor esset eclesiarum Polonie et reliquias sancti Adalberti et aliorum sanctorum ibi quiescentium raptu transtulisset in Boemiam, pallium autem aput apostolicum contra ius et fas sibi usurpare vellet.*

38 B. Krzemienska, *Břetislav I*, p. 214ff.

39 *Cosmae Pragensis Chronica*, lib. II, 4, pp. 85–86.

40 *Cosmae Pragensis Chronica*, lib. II, 4, pp. 86–87. The articles concerned the inviolability of marriages and their conclusion in accordance with the canons, punishments for adulteresses, punishments for murders, organization and keeping of inns, prohibition of Sunday markets and work on Sundays, prohibition of burying the dead in the fields (for more on the"Břetislav Decrees", see V. Hrubý, *Církevní zřízení v Čechách a na Moravě od X. do konce XII. století a jeho poměr ke státu*, "Český časopis historický" 22 (1916), p. 28ff; B. Krzemieńska, *Břetislav I*, s. 221ff; different views as to the articles' character and connection with Gniezno are presented by J. Sláma, *Kosmovy záměrné omyly*, [in:] *Dějiny ve věku nejístot. Sborník k příležitosti 70. narozenin Dušana Třestíka,* Praha 2003, p. 263, M.R. Pauk, *"Ergo meum maximum et primum sit decretum": Prawo kanoniczne i sądownictwo kościelne w tzw. Dekretach księcia Brzetysława I*, [in:] *Pravní kultura středověku*, eds. M. Nodl, P. Węcowski, Praha 2016, pp. 27 - 44.

41 B. Krzemieńska, *Břetislav I.*, p. 216; M. Matla-Kozłowska, *Pierwsi Przemyślidzi*, p. 472.

42 As noted by E. Dąbrowska, a similar testimony can be found in the 11th-century *Historiae libri quinque* of Rudolf Glaber, see E. Dąbrowska, *Cluny a św. Wojciech. Relacja «Historiae libri quinque» Rudolfa Glabera o męczeństwie św. Wojciecha*, Kwartalnik Historyczny 110 (2003), 3, pp. 9–12; Rodulfi Glabri, *Historiarum Libri Quinque,* ed. J. France, Oxford 1989, pp. 22–24; Raoul Glaber, *Histoires*, ed., transl. M. Arnoux, Turnhout 1996, pp. 58–60.

43 S. Kętrzyński, *Kazimierz*, p. 447; B. Krzemieńska, *Boj knížete,* p. 18ff; E. Rymar, *Prawnopolityczny*, p. 143; J. Žemlička, *Čechy*, p. 59.

44 T. Jurek, *Ryczyn biskupi*, p. 51 and footnote 178; idem, *Losy arcybiskupstwa gnieźnieńskiego w XI wieku*, [in:] *1000 lat archidiecezji gnieźnieńskiej*, Gniezno 2000, p. 52ff.

Apart from weakening the Piasts' state and deepening its internal crisis, the expedition also netted Bretislaus territorial gains, mentioned (without details) in *Annales Altahenses*,[45] likely in reference to Silesia.[46] Although the plan to transfer the metropolis to Prague failed, the relics themselves—not only those of St. Adalbert but also of the Five Martyr Brothers and Archbishop Radim Gaudentius—were among the most valuable gains made in the course of the expedition. Cosmas also references the exuberant loot (including a golden crucifix three times the weight of Boleslaus the Brave, along with three golden plates from the Altar of Adalbert, and bells), transported to Bohemia in more than a hundred carts and accompanied by numerous captives.[47]

On the other hand, what did the raid entail for the situation in the Piast state? The Bohemian army must have marched through Silesia,[48] likely destroying Opole[49] and (according to some researchers) Wrocław.[50] Bretislaus's forces subsequently entered Greater Poland, capturing Gniezno and Poznań, as reported by Gallus Anonymus.[51] The stronghold on the isle of Ostrów Lednicki reportedly witnessed a bloody battle, with the stronghold itself destroyed (as indicated by traces of burned embankments) along with the surrounding settlements.[52] However, there were instances in which Bretislaus's army did not encounter active resistance, e.g. the citizens of Giecz (as per Cosmas) surrendered without a fight and voluntarily resettled to Bohemia,[53]

45 In the light of the 1041 resolutions of Regensburg, upon suffering defeat at the hands of Henry III, Bretislaus (...) *nihil plus Bolaniae vel ullius regalis provinciae sibimet submittere, nisi duas regiones, quas ibi meruit suscipere* (...), *Annales Altahenses maiores*, ed. G.H. Pertz, MGH SRG, Hannoverae 1868, a. 1041, p. 30.

46 M. Matla-Kozłowska, *Pierwsi Przemyślidzi*, p. 489.

47 *Cosmae Pragensis Chronica*, lib. II, 5, p. 90.

48 According to B. Krzemieńska, *W sprawie chronologii,* p. 32, the Bohemian army marched along a frequented route through Hradec - Jaroměř - Náchod - Kłodzko - Bardo - Niemcza - Ślęża to Wrocław; see also J. Žemlička, *Čechy*, p. 56.

49 See B. Gediga, *Osadnictwo przedlokacyjne na terenie Opola*, [in:] *Kraje słowiańskie,* p. 169; based on dendrochonological research conducted by M. Krąpc, Gediga suggests that the collapse of Opole's development resulted from the unrest in the 1030s and the Czech invasion of 1038 (1039).

50 J. Kazimierczyk, J. Kramarek, C. Lasota, *Badania na Ostrowie Tumskim we Wrocławiu w 1978 roku*, Silesia Antiqua 18 (1980), p. 157. In general, whenever referring to Bretislaus's military operations in Silesia, one must be aware of the fact that, considering the destruction of some urban centers in the period of pagan reaction (as was the case with Wrocław), it is impossible to determine whether they were indeed ravaged by the Bohemian army.

51 *Galli Anonymi cronicae*, lib. I, 19, p. 43.

52 M. Łastowiecki, *Stratygrafia i chronologia Ostrowa Lednickiego,* Studia Lednickie 1 (1989), p. 29; M. Krąpiec, *Badanie dendrochronologiczne reliktów mostu „gnieźnieńskiego" w Jeziorze Lednickim,* [in:] *Wczesnośredniowieczne mosty przy Ostrowie Lednickim*, vol. I: *Mosty traktu gnieźnieńskiego,* ed. Z. Kurnatowska, Lednica-Toruń 2000, p. 54; Z. Kurnatowska, *Początki i rozwój państwa,* [in:] *Pradzieje Wielkopolski. Od epoki kamienia do średniowiecza,* ed. M. Kobusiewicz, Poznań 2008, p. 373.

53 *Cosmae Pragensis Chronica*, lib. II, 2–3, pp. 83–84.

while the stronghold itself was plundered and burned.[54] The same fate may have befallen the population of Kruszwica, as suggested by some linguistic research,[55] although the stronghold itself seemingly survived.[56] It is unclear what exactly transpired in Gniezno, where no traces of destruction that could be linked to the Bohemian invasion were unearthed in the course of archeological excavations,[57] which may suggest that the stronghold was only plundered, as recounted by Cosmas. Based on archaeological research, Bretislaus I was also credited with the destruction of a number of other strongholds in Greater Poland: Bnin, Kaszów, Ląd, Piaski, and Łobez.[58] Unfortunately, the lack of precise dating of these settlements makes it difficult to reach any definitive conclusions. Perhaps some of the strongholds in the south of Greater Poland collapsed as a result of the attendant crisis of central authority and internal disturbances.[59]

In Poznań, the extent of the damage is difficult to assess accurately.[60] The cathedral was destroyed, including the presumable desecration of the Piast burial sites (a coin of Bretislaus I was discovered in the presumed tomb of Boleslaus the Brave).[61] The ramparts were likely destroyed (as indicated by the traces of burning and scattered bulwark remnants discovered during

54 Z. Kurnatowska, *Początki i rozwój państwa*, p. 373.

55 Cf. V. Šmilauer, *Krusičany v Čechách a Kruszwica v Polsku*, Prace filologiczne 18 (1964), pp. 299–302, especially p. 302. According to J. Nalepa, a similar origin of the settlement may be indicated by the name "Obřany" in Moravia, which, similarly to "Krusičany" and "Hedčany", would denote the people abducted by Bretislaus from the area on the Obra, see J. Nalepa, *Obrzanie – plemię nad Obrą w południowej Polsce*, [in:] *Słowiańszczyzna w Europie*, vol. I, ed. Z. Kurnatowska, Wrocław 1996, p. 67ff.

56 Z. Kurnatowska, *Początki i rozwój państwa*, p. 374.

57 M. Danielewski, *Gniezno od 1025 do 1038 roku*, [in:] *Dzieje Gniezna*, ed. J. Dobosz, Gniezno 2016, p. 51.

58 Z. Hilczer-Kurnatowska, W. Hensel, *Studia i materiały do osadnictwa Wielkopolski wczesnohistorycznej*, vol. 4, Wrocław -Warszawa-Kraków 1972, p. 315; M. Zeylandowa, *Raport z dotychczasowych prac badawczych na grodzisku wczesnośredniowiecznym w Lądzie pow. Słupca*, "Sprawozdania Archeologiczne" 26 (1974), p. 296 and footnote 14; A. Pałubicka, *Grodzisko wklęsłe w Bninie, pow. Śremski*, [w:] *Materiały do studiów nad osadnictwem bnińskim. Grodzisko wklęsłe*, ed. J. Żaki, Poznań 1975, p. 173–175; D. Kosiński, *Osada przygrodowa w Piaskach, gmina Zduny*, [in:] *Słowiańszczyzna w Europie średniowiecznej*, ed. Z. Kurnatowska, vol. I, Wrocław 1996, p. 254, 256; S. Moździoch, *Castrum munitissimum Bytom. Lokalny ośrodek władzy w państwie wczesnopiastowskim*, Warszawa 2002, p. 11; G. Teske, *Łobez – wczesnośredniowieczny gród w dolinie Obry*, [in:] *Słowianie i ich sąsiedzi we wczesnym średniowieczu*, ed. M. Dulinicz, Warszawa-Lublin 2003, p. 418.

59 Z. Kurnatowska, *Początki i rozwój państwa*, p. 373 n.

60 H. Kóčka-Krenz, *Najstarszy Poznań*, [in:] *Civitas Posnaniensis. Studia z dziejów średniowiecznego Poznania*, eds. Z. Kurnatowska, T. Jurek, Poznań 2005, p. 34; eadem, *Najstarsze dzieje Poznania*, [in:] *Tu się Polska zaczęła...*, ed. H. Kóčka-Krenz, Poznań 2007, p. 14.

61 Z. Kurnatowska, *Początki i rozwój państwa*, p. 373; K. Józefowiczówna, *Z badań nad architekturą przedromańską i romańską w Poznaniu*, Wrocław-Warszawa 1963, p. 52.

archaeological excavations),[62] coupled with the shattering of the wooden bridge over the Warta/Cybina, which connected Cathedral Island with the mainland.[63] The hinterland settlements around Poznań suffered to a lesser extent.[64]

Paradoxically, the invasion of Bretislaus I expedited the Piasts' return to power, as Emperor Henry III, fearing an excessive growth of Bohemian power, aided Casimir the Restorer in returning to the country with a detachment of 500 warriors, where he commenced the restoration and consolidation of his authority. Casimir's reign is also associated the reconstruction of Poznań, at least according to the tradition preserved in the 13th-century *Polish-Silesian Chronicle*.[65] In the light of archeological research, the renewal of the defensive walls of Cathedral Island—extended and reinforced with a new stone embankment[66]—took place in the second half of the 11th century; similarly, new fortifications were erected around the suburb of Zagórze.[67] The reconstruction of Poznań Cathedral began around the mid-11th century.[68] In fact, it is difficult to determine the extent to which the reconstruction process was overseen by Casimir the Restorer (d. 1058) and this successor, Boleslaus the Bold (Bolesław Śmiały) (1058-1079).[69]

The destruction of Poznań, together with that of Gniezno, had far-reaching consequences for the subsequent development of Polish statehood, which saw the capital moved to Cracow. During the first Piast monarchy, Poznań and Gniezno were its ideological and political centres, locations in which power was established and various representative functions were performed,

62 P. Sankiewicz, *Wczesnośredniowieczne konstrukcje obronne grodu poznańskiego*, [in:] *Poznań we wczesnym średniowieczu*, ed. H. Kóčka-Krenz, vol. VI, Poznań 2008, p. 23.

63 J. Kaczmarek, *Przemiany osadnictwa wczesnośredniowiecznego na obszarze obecnej aglomeracji Poznania między połową XI a XIII/XIV w.*, [in:] M. Kara, M. Makohonienko, A. Michałowski, *Przemiany osadnictwa i środowiska przyrodniczego Poznania i okolic od schyłku starożytności do lokacji miasta*, Poznań 2016, p. 135ff.

64 J. Kaczmarek, *Przemiany osadnictwa*, p. 136.

65 For more on this account, see T. Jurek, *Nad legendą poznańskiego kościoła Najświętszej Marii Panny*, [in:] *Gemma gemmarum. Studia dedykowane Profesor Hannie Kóčce-Krenz*, ed. A. Różański, vol. I, Poznań 2017, pp. 93–109.

66 M. Kara, *Początki i rozwój wczesnośredniowiecznego ośrodka grodowego na Ostrowie Tumskim w Poznaniu*, [in:] *Civitates principales. Wybrane ośrodki władzy w Polsce wczesnośredniowiecznej*, Gniezno 1998, p. 29; H. Kóčka-Krenz, *On Ostrów Island, nearby which today's Poznań is located...*, Poznań 2012, p. 54.

67 P. Sankiewicz, *Wczesnośredniowieczne konstrukcje*, p. 23.

68 A. Bukowska, *Najstarsza katedra w Poznaniu. Problem formy i jej genezy w kontekście architektury około roku 1000,* Kraków 2013, pp. 143–146, 245, 260.

69 T. Jurek, *Biskupstwo poznańskie w wiekach średnich*, Poznań 2018, p. 131.

while also serving as important religious centers.[70] In the new conditions, they were no longer able to continue as the centers of power, although it was already Casimir the Restorer who sought to revive their former stature.[71] Similarly, the religious function of Poznań, i.e. the activity of its bishopric, ceased for several decades.[72] The key metropolitan cathedral in Gniezno was only consecrated by Boleslaus the Bold in 1064.[73] It remains unknown when the same happened in Poznań, nor when the next Bishop of Poznań resumed office, since according to a letter from Pope Gregory VII to Boleslaus the Bold, dated 1075, the Church structure in Poland was in a state of decline as early as the mid-1030s.[74]

While Poznań's religious function was eventually restored, it must be said that Bretislaus's invasion deprived the stronghold of the leading political role it had played in the monarchy of the first Piasts. In a broader historical perspective, the key factor in this respect was the transfer of the Polish capital to Cracow, which became the seat of Polish monarchs for several hundred years to come. From then on, it was there that key decisions determining the evolution of Polish statehood were to be made. In spite of their historical rank as the cradle of the Piast monarchy, Greater Poland with Gniezno and Poznań were to play a substantially smaller part in this regard.

70 Z. Dalewski, *Władza, przestrzeń, ceremoniał. Miejsce i uroczystość inauguracji władzy w Polsce średniowiecznej do końca XV wieku*, Warszawa 1996, pp. 49, 58; J. Dobosz, *Dziejopisarze o miejscu i roli Poznania w najstarszym Kościele polskim*, [in:] *Archeologiczne tajemnice palatium i katedry poznańskiego Ostrowa*, ed. M. Przybył, Poznań 2016, pp. 9–19.

71 Z. Dalewski, *Władza, przestrzeń,* p. 57.

72 T. Jurek, *Biskupstwo poznańskie*, p. 130ff.

73 The reconstruction of the Church structure in Poland after the crisis of the 1030s is discussed in T. Jurek, *Losy arcybiskupstwa*, pp. 49–72, in this instance, see p. 58.

74 MGH Epistole selectae: *Das Register Gregors VII*, vol. I, ed. E. Caspar, Berlin 1920, no. II 73, pp. 233–235, especially p. 234; see T. Jurek, *Losy arcybiskupstwa,* p. 58ff.



Poznań 11th – 12th

0 250 500 m

1 Cathedral
2 Palatium and chapel
3 St. Nicholas's Church

- Ostrów Tumski and Zagórze
- Embankments
- Settlements
- Roads/squares
- Rivers/streams
- Hills
- Major structures
- Major structures (hypothetical location)

Tomasz Jasiński

The incorporation of the city of Poznań (1253)

Stages of incorporation in Central European cities

To elucidate the incorporation of a city to an educated Pole is a daunting task; still more difficult is to elucidate the concept to a foreigner. I will nonetheless try to undertake this task. Tourist guides and monographs concerning the history of a given city frequently mention that it was incorporated in such-and-such year; in some instances, incorporation is also referred to as the granting of a town charter. For example, one can learn that Poznań was incorporated in 1253 or that it received its charter in 1253. Learning of the fact prompts one to pose the question: was Poznań a village before, and was it not a settlement of urban nature prior to its incorporation? Furthermore, one is tempted to learn what changes followed from Poznań's incorporation and its status as a chartered town?

The emergence of Central European towns is a highly problematic research issue; even in the second half of the 20th century many myths, if not outright scientific preconceptions, could be encountered with respect to this subject.

I have written on many occasions that Central European cities emerged from settlements that rapidly changed their social, spatial and legal forms in the Middle Ages, and that while we are we used to referring to Poznań as a city only from the moment it was granted its charter in 1253, one cannot argue that Poznań was not a city before that. As early as the 10th century, Poznań was already known in Polish as a "miasto-miejsce" (city-place), i.e. a special type of "place," as indicated by the etymology of the word in Polish (and in Latin, as a matter of fact, given that Central European cities were initially referred to with the word *locus* (place).

It was not until 1970 that the German historian Karlheinz Blaschke provided a proper solution to the above problem.[1] According to Blaschke, the formation of Central and Eastern European cities should be seen as an evolutionary process. Blaschke saw the incorporation as one of the stages of urban development. Among the stages preceding the formation of a chartered town ("Rechtstadt"), Blaschke lists a gord (Burg), a craft settlement (Suburbium), a "Marktsiedlung," i.e. a market settlement, and finally a "Kaufmannssiedlung," i.e. a merchant settlement. In his discussion, Blaschke underscores the importance of the merchant settlement not only in the establishment of the city, but in the development of the Central European city in general. In other words, according to the German scholar, the emergence of the first towns in Central and Eastern Europe was primarily the result of the development of long-distance trade. Thanks to trade, settlements were established by foreign merchants, spurring the emergence of Central European chartered towns.

Śródka and St. Gotthard's merchant settlement

When investigating the conditions for the incorporation of Poznań, one can notice that it developed in a textbook fashion, as if an illustration for Blaschke's theory. It originated as a gord and suburbium, followed by the subsequent stages of development, capped by the incorporation. Towards the end of the 10th century, the island of Ostrów Tumski already housed four gords, which formed a single settlement complex: three fortified settlements connected by ramparts and a fortified settlement in Zagórze, across the thoroughfare.

By the mid-12th century, two settlements were established on both banks of the Warta, opposite the settlement complex on Ostrów Tumski: a market settlement in Śródka and a merchant settlement on the site of the subsequent chartered town, near today's intersection of Szewska and Dominikańska Streets. The market settlement provided services to the merchants travelling along the long-distance trade routes from Germany to Russia. It was host to various types of market facilities, such as butcheries and food stores, shoemaker's and (subsequently) clothier's shops; the local taverns and inns offered merchants a chance to rest before continuing

1 K. Blaschke, *Altstadt-Neustadt-Vorstadt. Zur Typologie genetischer und topographischer Stadtgeschichtsforschung*, "Vierteljahresschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte" 57 (1970), pp. 350–362.

their journeys and allowed them to make the necessary repairs to their wagons. The immediate vicinity of the market settlement was occupied by a marketplace; the Polish name of the settlement indicates that the weekly market fell on Wednesdays (*środa*). It was then that foreign merchants, after the obligatory exchange of money at the minter's or bailiff's, were free to sell and buy goods. The urban development of Poznań was especially influenced by the merchant settlement named after St. Gotthard; today, thanks to the latest research, we know that a section of the overland trade route connecting Hellwegian towns with Russia ran through Hildesheim, Brandenburg, Lubusz, Poznań, Kruszwica, and Włocławek. The route was probably established at the end of the 11th century, and reached its peak in the 1120s. The towns located along the route—Lubusz, Włocławek and Kruszwica—became the new bishoprics of the Polish state; Poznań did not need to establish a bishopric as it already had one, which had functioned—with a short intermission caused by the so-called pagan reaction—since 968. As far as St. Gotthard's settlement is concerned, one should stress its exceptionally favorable location on the Warta river (*super litus Warte in Poznan*) at the mouth of the Bogdanka; it was here that the trade routes converged, not only from distant Westphalia but also from Western Pomerania (Szczecin) and Silesia (Głogów and Wrocław).[2]

Therefore, there is no doubt that by the 1120s, conditions occurred for the establishment of a permanent settlement of foreign merchants (*colonia mercatorum*) in Poznań. If, on the other hand, one sought to determine the time when the St. Gotthard's route began to decline, one should look into the history of the bishopric of Kruszwica. Its downfall took place in the 1160s, when the bishopric of Kruszwica was merged into one entity with the diocese of Włocławek. This was also undoubtedly the period when the development of Poznań came (at least to an extent) to a long halt. The crisis was caused by the emergence of a rival sea trade route (St. Peter's route), opened at the behest of Hellwegian towns, specifically Dortmund and Soest, which connected Bruges with Veliky Novgorod via the ports of Hamburg, Lübeck and Visby.

The marginalization of St. Gotthard's overland route to Ruthenia—which, as noted above, took place in the 1160s—must have curtailed Poznań's opportunities for development.[3] It was not until the establishment of the Teutonic

2 Z. Kaczmarczyk, *Przywilej lokacyjny dla Poznania z r. 1253*, "Przegląd Zachodni", no. 6–8, 1953, p. 156.

3 I should stress that there was another overland trade route to Ruthenia that ran through Poland (among others via Wrocław and Kraków) and competed with St. Gotthard's route, see. T. Jasiński, *Handel miedzią węgierską a restytucja rządów Władysława Łokietka w Polsce (1304–1312)*, "Roczniki Historyczne" 84 (2018), p. 123.

State in the 1230s that new perspectives were opened for Poznań. Encouraged by envoys of the Teutonic Knights, scores of settlers from Thuringia, Upper Saxony and Lower Silesia made their way to Chełmno and Prussia in search of a new homeland; initially, they mostly headed for the newly founded towns in Chełmno Land, namely Toruń and Chełmno, both incorporated by the Teutonic Knights under Magdeburg Law on December 28, 1233.[4] The settlers were immediately followed by German merchants from eastern Thuringia and Upper Saxony, who were seeking new outlets and suppliers in Chełmno Land and Prussia. It was important for those merchants to reach the Vistula river with their goods, because even at that time merchant ships from Lübeck—whose merchants had direct contacts with Bruges and Rus—sailed past Chełmno and Toruń.

The importance of the new trade route from Halle (Saale) to Toruń for the incorporation of Poznań.

The trade route leading from eastern Thuringia and Upper Saxony was most frequently used by merchants from Halle (Saale), who traveled through Gubin, Zbąszyń, Poznań, Gniezno, and Inowrocław before reaching Toruń with their goods. The route, especially the activity of Halle and Toruń merchants it attracted, opened new development opportunities for Poznań. It was to this trail that the city of Poznań owed its incorporation; numerous perturbations in its functioning of the route, as well as political conflicts between the dukes of Greater Poland, significantly delayed the incorporation of Poznań, which did not take place until 1253. It is worth examining the functioning of the route, as well as the disputes between Przemysł I and Boleslaus the Pious, two full brothers who jointly granted Poznań its charter in 1253, having reconciled their differences. Tracing these events allows one to understand the many turbulences that accompanied the incorporation of Poznań.

To comprehend the development mechanisms of Poznań at the time, it is necessary to analyze two agreements between Greater Poland and the Teutonic Order, concluded in 1238 and 1243, respectively.[5] The first was concluded by Władysław Odonic, while the second was signed by his sons, the aforementioned Przemysł I and Boleslaus the Pious, and their mother Jadwiga. The conclusion of both agreements resulted from the need to regulate

4 It cannot be ruled out that these town charters were granted a year earlier (e.g. if *stilus a navitate* was used for drafting the respective documents, see e.g. the recent paper by M. Dorna, *About the Date when the Foundation Privilege was Granted to Chełmno and Toruń*, "Zapiski Historyczne" 80, 2015, 4, p. 86ff.).

5 Preußisches Urkundenbuch (hereinafter PUB), vol. I, pt. 1, Königsberg 1882, nos 127 and 141.

the customs provisions for German settlers coming from eastern Thuringia and Upper Saxony to Chełmno Land and Prussia. It was evident that the dukes of Greater Poland were unable to enforce the regulations concerning merchants with respect to the aforementioned settlers. It was easy for the Order to reach an agreement with Odonic, and subsequently with his sons, as contacts between Odonic and the Teutonic Knights were established even before the latter arrived in Chełmno Land.

Duke Władysław Odonic, who at the time (i.e. in 1238) ruled over central and eastern (to the Warta river) Greater Poland, had special ties with the Teutonic Order. Firstly, on September 5, 1224, in Nakło, before the arrival of the Teutonic Knights in Chełmno Land and Prussia, Duke Władysław bestowed upon the Order 500 fees of land near Lake Pile (*Hisbitsma*) and the River Piława (*Pila*).[6] Secondly, Duke Władysław's wife, Jadwiga, whose origins continue to be disputed by scholars, was closely related to one of the most important brothers of the Teutonic Order, Poppon von Osternohe, who appears as a witness in the charter document of Chełmno and Toruń of 1233.[7] One may recall that, from 1240 onwards, von Osternohe was the master of the Teutonic Order in Prussia, eventually serving as its Grand Master between 1253 and 1356.[8] He also contributed to the restitution of Nakło to the dukes of Greater Poland.[9]

It was possibly Poppo von Osternohe who headed a Teutonic Knights' delegation that held negotiations with Władysław Odonic in Gniezno in 1238 concerning transit and customs duties along the trade route from Germany to Chełmno Land and Prussia. Władysław Odonic mentioned numerous complaints concerning undue customs duty collection (*super exactionibus theloneorum indebitis*) in his land—which were lodged primarily by the venerable brethren of the German House—as the reason for issuing the document in 1238. The duke exempted the crusaders (*peregrini crucesignati*) who were traveling to Prussia and Chełmno Land from paying the customs duty, issuing similar exemptions with respect to the burghers of the Teutonic state who were transporting essential items, i.e. equipment for their homes (known

6 PUB I/1,109. *Słownik historyczno-geograficzny ziem polskich w średniowieczu*. Poznań, part III, vol. 3, compiled by K. Górska-Gołaska, T. Jurek, G. Rutkowska, I. Skierska, ed. A. Gąsiorowski, Poznań 1997, p. 664 ff. While the objections raised in the latter publication as to the date (1224) of the document issued by Władysław Odonic have been refuted by now, the actual date of issue does beg further investigation.

7 PUB I/1, 105. See the following footnote.

8 M. Dorna, *Die Brüder des Deutschen Ordens in Preußen. Eine prosopographische Studie*, Wien–Köln–Weimar 2012, p. 326.

9 Ibid., pp. 39–41.

today as "resettlement property"). As far as merchants were concerned, they were supposed to pay duties in Poznań and Gniezno, in the amount of two *szkojec* coins for each draft horse. Merchants were also supposed to pay one cubit of cloth and a fine of pepper for quality cloth (scarlet). When transporting salt, merchants were required to pay a duty in the amount of one riddle of salt *cum cumulo* per each horse. However, in the case of herring freight, merchants paid six spits of herring for each draft horse pulling a Polish wagon, and nine spits for each horse pulling a German wagon. Moreover, Duke Władysław ruled that if anyone carrying the aforementioned essential items carried up to 10 bales of cloth for sale, they were bound to pay two Toruń denari for each bale. Based on the first agreement, it is difficult to make any conclusions about the trade route, since the document mentions only two customs chambers, one in Poznań and another in Gniezno.

More information on this subject can be found in a document issued by the Dukes of Greater Poland to the Teutonic Order on March 22, 1243.[10] The said document was signed by the Greater Polish dukes Przemysł and Boleslaus, sons of Władysław Odonic, who died in 1239. They issued it together with their mother Jadwiga. The brothers stated that their decision concerning customs duties etc. was made following the advice of *our nobles, as well brother Dietrich, the former marshal*. The latter was a well-known dignitary of the Teutonic Order, who was killed by Lithuanians in the Battle on Rządz shortly thereafter, along with the new marshal Berlewin von Freiberg.[11] The battle, including the preceding argument between the old and new marshal, was described by their contemporary, the Teutonic priest Gotfried von Mühlhausen, whose chronicle perished in the Middle Ages. Excerpts from this account survived in several subsequent source texts; I recall von Mühlhausen's battle description because of his respect for the old marshal, whom he likely accompanied in the latter's journey to Gniezno, perhaps drafting Przemysł and Boleslaus's document on customs duties. This is all the more probable given that the text is written in impeccable Latin and demonstrates an excellent command of advanced rhythmical forms.

10 PUB I/1, 141.

11 It was once commonly assumed that the Teutonic Knights fought the battle against Prussians, who were allied with Świętopełk; for a refutation of this theory, see T. Jasiński, *Bitwa nad Jeziorem Rządzkim. Przyczynek do dziejów pierwszego powstania pruskiego i wojny Świętopełka z zakonem krzyżackim*, "Roczniki Historyczne" 62 (1996), pp. 49–71; idem, Język dokumentów w Kronice Piotra z Duisburga. Przyczynek do poznania zaginionych zabytków historiografii pruskiej, [in:] *Venerabiles, nobiles et honesti. Studia z dziejów społeczeństwa Polski średniowiecznej. Prace ofiarowane Profesorowi Januszowi Bieniakowi*, Toruń 1997, pp. 493–505. See also M. Dorna, *Die Brüder*, p. 122ff and 136ff.

In the document, the Greater Polish dukes upheld the earlier privileges granted to the Teutonic Order; all movables of both Teutonic brethren and their servants were exempt from customs duties; additionally, all Teutonic Knights heading for Prussia, as well as those returning therefrom, were exempt from all customs fees, including duty and toll. On the other hand, merchants were obliged to pay customs duty in three places only: Gniezno, Poznań and Zbąszyń. Thus, a new customs chamber was added that had not been featured in the previous document of Duke Władysław Odonic, namely the one in Zbąszyń. Customs duties may have been collected in this locality earlier, i.e. in 1238, however the Zbąszyń chamber is not mentioned in the document issued by Władysław Odonic that same year, since Zbąszyń was not part of the duke's dominion at the time, but remained under Silesian rule. This situation continued until the Battle of Legnica in 1241, which led to the collapse of the monarchy of the Silesian Henries, as a result of which the Dukes of Greater Poland regained the western part of their domain.

The 1243 document allows one to fully reconstruct the trade route connecting Germany with the Teutonic State. The document states that the road *ducit a Wladizlauia versus Gubin*. In 1938, Stefan Weymann identified the aforementioned *Wladizlauia* as Włocławek. For this reason, Weymann suggested that the final stretch of this important route *led from Gubin, through the old customs chambers at Krosno, Zbąszyń, Buk, and Poznań, where, after crossing the Warta, it continued via Gniezno, Trzemeszno, Wielatowo, Mogilno, and Strzelno to the bridge over the Noteć River in Kruszwica. From there, it reached its final destination, i.e. Włocławek, likely via Radziejów and Brześć*.[12] Eight years earlier, the German scholar Arthur Semrau argued in a similar grain that the appellation *Wladizlauia* designated the city of Włocławek.[13]

As it turned out, both researchers could not be more wrong. It is known that in medieval sources Włocławek was referred to as *Antiqua Wladislauia*, while the name *Wladislauia* without the prefix almost always denoted Inowrocław.[14] This identification is further corroborated by the fact that the road from Greater Poland to Chełmno Land led through Inowrocław rather than Włocławek. Therefore, the road connecting the Teutonic State with Germany led through Inowrocław, Gniezno, Poznań, Zbąszyń and Gubin. It is evident

12 Ibid., s. 105.

13 A. Semrau, *Thorn im 13. Jahrhundert*, "Miteilungen des Coppernicus Vereins für Wissenschaft und Kunst", H. 38 (1930), p. 40.

14 See among others KDW VI, nos 127, 139 and many other; conversely, see also no. 188.

that, having reached Inowrocław, the trail continued to Toruń, which—as evidenced by the mention of Toruń denari in Władysław Odonic's document of 1238—played a key role in the trade and transit with Germany. The money used by the merchants operating along the route were Toruń denari, which started to be minted in Toruń shortly before 1238 on the basis of the Chełmno privilege (1232/1233).

As mentioned above, from Gubin the route led westwards to Halle (Saale). This fact was escaped both A. Semrau and S. Weymann. However, we do know from Winfried Schich's excellent 1985 article that Gubin was not an independent trading center, but rather a trading post of the Halle (Saale) merchants; in this respect, it resembled a small German island amidst a Slavic sea.[15] As an important center for salt extraction at the time, Halle was the main population reservoir for German colonists in Silesia, Greater Poland, and the Teutonic State towards the mid-13th century.[16] At that time, Gubin saw dozens of wagons loaded to the brim with salt arrive daily from Halle. Once in Gubin, most of them were loaded onto ships that sailed up and down the Oder, reaching as far as Szczecin on the one hand and the Cistercian town of Lubiąż in Silesia on the other. However, some of the carts—as per the agreements of 1238 and 1243—headed to the Teutonic State via Zbąszyń, Poznań, Gniezno and Inowrocław. The export of salt was mostly the domain of the burghers of Halle, who at the time constituted the main group of colonists in the newly founded towns in Prussia (possibly in Greater Poland, too). In 1253, Greater Polish dukes Przemysł and Boleslaus entrusted the incorporation of Poznań to Tomasz of Gubin, i.e. a representative of Halle's trading post. The role of the inhabitants and settlers from Halle in mid-13th century in Toruń and Chełmno has been the topic of a number academic publications.[17]

I believe that the role of Halle in the development of Silesian, Teutonic and Greater Polish cities is yet to be examined. First mentioned in 806 as the

15 W. Schich, *Guben und das schlesische Zisterzienserkloster Leubus*, "Gubener Heimatkalender" 29, 1985, pp. 58–64.

16 T. Jasiński, P*oczątki Torunia na tle osadnictwa średniowiecznego*, "Zapiski Historyczne" 46, 1981, vol. 4, pp. 534; idem, *Uwarunkowania lokacji Poznania*, [in:] *Civitas Posnaniensis. Studia z dziejów średniowiecznego Poznania*, eds. Z. Kurnatowska, T. Jurek (Poznańskie Towarzystwo Przyjaciół Nauk, Wydział Historii i Nauk Społecznych, Prace Komisji Historycznej, t. 62), Poznań 2005, pp. 163–172; K. Zielińska-Melkowska, *Zagadnienie proweniencji elit mieszczańskich w ziemiach: chełmińskiej, lubawskiej i michałowskiej w XIII i XIV wieku*, [in:] *Genealogia. Rola związków rodzinnych o rodowych w życiu publicznym w Polsce średniowiecznej na tle porównawczym*, Toruń 1996, p. 284ff.

17 See the footnote above.

site of a Frankish castle erected by Charles, the son of Charlemagne, Halle owed its development to its extremely efficient saltworks.[18] The stem *hal* is of Proto-Indo-European origin and simply means "salt." St. Nicholas's Church of the Halle merchant settlement was first mentioned in 1116, while the new market settlement at the intersection of five major trade routes was first documented in 1151.[19] Halle was fortified with city walls and incorporated under the Magdeburg Law before 1200. The fact that a trade route had run from Halle to central Greater Poland for a long time is evidenced by the fact that it was here that Emperor Frederick I gathered his army in 1157 for an expedition against Poland.[20] However, before that came to pass, Halle was visited by Polish messengers.[21] In 1185 the Mazovian Voivode Żyro submitted the Church of the Blessed Virgin Mary in Płock under the spiritual authority of the famous Novi Operis monastery in Halle.[22] Halle was also the starting point of the first Teutonic Knights' mission to Konrad Mazowiecki in 1228.[23] It was undoubtedly the Halle commandery that recruited the first settlers for the Teutonic State, who arrived in the first Teutonic towns of Toruń and Chełmno via Gubin, Zbąszyń, Poznań, Gniezno and Inowrocław. The share of these settlers no doubt increased after the Mongol invasion of Silesia. It should not be forgotten, however, that the Silesian burghers, who constituted a significant portion of the first residents of the Teutonic towns, originated mainly from the area of Magdeburg and Halle.

Having reconstructed the trade route from Halle via Poznań to Toruń, we should inspect the goods hauled along this trail. As per the 1238 document, the main commodities included salt, cloth (including scarlet), and herring. How does this list compare to the 1243 document? Without dwelling on the customs duties paid, one can quickly establish that the staple goods transported along the route spanned plain cloth, fine cloth (including *brunetum*, green cloth and scarlet), as well as salt, herring (thirty pieces per spit, i.e. likely smoked herring rather than salted herring, as was the case

18 *Annales regni Francorum, Scriptores rerum Germanicarum in usum scholarum*, ed. F. Kurze, Hannover 1895, p. 121.

19 *Urkundenbuch der Stadt Halle, ihrer Stifter und, Klöster (hereinafter USH)* I, ed. A. Bierbach, Magdeburg, Halle a. d. Saale 1930, no. 15d.

20 USH I, no. 50.

21 USH I, no. 51.

22 USH I, no. 99.

23 PUB I/1, no. 65.

subsequently).[24] The 1243 document lists wine and linen as new goods. It is much more difficult to establish where these goods were transported from and where they were headed. There is no doubt about the salt, which was certainly extracted from the Halle saltworks and exported—as mentioned above—to Gubin and then further east via Zbąszyń, Poznań, etc., all the way to Toruń. During the annual distribution of the saltworks, the residents of Halle used a very ingenious record keeping system. Every year, the new saline distribution breakdown was registered in triplicate on designated wax tablets, kept in three different locations. In the course of my research on ancient and medieval was tablets, conducted with Janusz Tandecki, we dubbed this record-keeping system a parallel system.[25] Each entry was recorded at least twice or, as it was the case in Halle, even three times, on separate tablets or polyptychs. This system, which dates back to ancient times, was particularly suitable for the administration of saltworks in the Middle Ages. It was used continuously until 1812 in the saltworks of Schwäbisch Hall, and it is known to have been employed in the saltworks of Halle (Saale) between 1477 and 1783.[26] These years are mentioned directly; in fact, the origins of this system in Halle must have gone back to the early Middle Ages. Together with the first settlers from Halle, it made its way to the Old Town of Toruń, where municipal taxes were recorded using the same method, evidently from the 14th century until 1530, when the monetary reform of King Sigismund I the Old prohibited further use of the tax system recorded on wax polyptychs. It is possible that the same system was also introduced in Greater Polish towns,

24 KDW XI, no. 1808, containing a letter drafted by the councilers of Poznań around 1400, in which they notified their counterparts in the Old Town of Toruń of a fraud involving barrels of salted herring, committed by a Toruń-based marchant: Den erbirn, weyzen rathmannen czu Thoren, unsern lieben vrunden, d(an)d(um). // Dinstlichin grus czuvor. Liebin hern! Uns hat Mertin des briffes / czeigir vorgele(g)t, das ein Paschke euwer meteburgir habe czw / tonnen newis heringis vorkauft, des qwomen vor uns / unser brekere und bekanten, das in denselbigin tonnen was alth hering von undene eyngelet und mit newin heringe von obene czugedekt und den egenanten hering der vorgeschreben Mertin muste czu czwenczik scotos gebin. Betten euwer erbirkeit dinstlichin, das ir den vorbenumeten Paschken und andir kauflewte undirweisit, das si uns sulchin hering nichten senden und das ouch deme Mertin gleich vorungleich gesche, das wellen wir ummb euch vordinen. Gegeben am senthe Michels tage. Rathmannen czu Pozenaw.

25 T. Jasiński, J. Tandecki, *Literowy i równoległy system kancelaryjny na starotoruńskich poliptykach woskowych*, Studia Źródłoznawcze, Commentationes, 28 (1983) [printed in 1984], pp. 105161; T. Jasiński, *Tabliczki woskowe w kancelariach miast Pomorza Nadwiślańskiego*, Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu, Seria Historia no. 154, Poznań 1991, passim.

26 W. Wattenbach, *Die Hallische Lehntafel, Neue Mittheilungen aus dem Gebiet historisch-antiquarischen Forschungen* 11 91865), pp. 444–460; idem, *Die Wachstafeln Salzsieder zu Schwäbisch-Hall*, Anzeiger für Kunde der deutschen Vorzeit. Organ des Germanischen Museums 13 (1866), no. 2, p. 95ff and no. 9, p. 312; T. Jasiński, *Tabliczki*..., p. 61ff. (including a more extensive list of references on the subject).

including Poznań; however, since no municipal wax tablets have been preserved in the region, these are mere speculations.

As for cloth, it is difficult to settle in which direction this most important commodity of the Hanseatic trade was transported. Halle was already a vital hub for Flemish cloth trade in the early 12th century. Sources from the period indicate that scarlet cloth, *brunetum*, etc., which undoubtedly came from Flanders, were supplied to Central Europe via Halle.[27] How come so much Flemish cloth was sold in Halle? Until the end of the 12th century, merchants from Flanders exported their cloth to the East themselves. They usually reached the mouth of the Elbe, from where the cloth was delivered upstream and along the length of its tributary, the Saale. However, merchants from Halle very quickly reached the Flemish city markets themselves. Interesting information on this subject can be found in one 1281 document.[28] Namely, when in 1280 the Lübeck-led Hanseatic cities moved their representatives from Bruges to the nearby Aardenburg, in an attempt to punish Bruges for persecuting Hanseatic merchants, the merchants of Halle admittedly accepted the fact that *generalis sedes et depositio mercationum existat in Ordenborg*, however not without informing Lübeck that they would not refrain from calling in at other Flemish ports and cities. Thus, it seems that while the interests of the main Hanseatic cities in Flanders until 1280 were concentrated in Bruges, the merchants of Halle had already established a much more intricate trading relationship with all of Flanders.

It was likely Halle that initially served as a transit point for the shipments of cloth to Prussia via Greater Poland. We know, however, that by the time the Teutonic Knights negotiated the customs terms with the dukes of Greater Poland in the 1240s, the Lübeckian had already had their vessels sailing up the Vistula.[29] A few years later Toruń merchants also reached Flanders. In 1259, cloth halls were erected in Toruń, and for the most part this investment was not based on the transport of Flemish cloth from Halle, but

27 Herbord, *Dialog o życiu św. Ottona biskupa bamberskiego*, lib. I cap. 36, lib. III cap. 1, wyd. J. Wikarjak, Monumenta Poloniae Historica, series nova, vol. VII, ot. 3, Warszawa 1974, pp. 39ff, 147ff.: *Nosti etenim nobiles, puros et preciosos pannos, in terra Pomoranorum caros, frugi mercatu Halle inveniri. Igitur quicquid ex prefata pecunia fustani et purpure, brunati, fristali quoque, seu alterius cuiuslibet optimi generis vel coloris pannorum coemere poteris, in sacmas concludes. Aliasque species, gloriolas et res pulchras emens, omnia his iumentis in Pomoraniam diriges, partim dona maioribus, reliqua vero, cauta vendicione habita, precium captivis, quos in barbaras naciones abductos constiterit.* For more on the subject, see T. Jasiński, *Uwarunkowania*, p. 163ff.

28 USH I, no, p.368.

29 Bericht Hermann von Salza's über die Eroberung Preußens, Th. Hirsch, *Scriptores rerum Prussicarum*, vol. V, Leipzig 1874, p. 165.

rather on direct contacts of Toruń and Lübeck merchants with Flemish cities. It is therefore difficult to establish unequivocally the exact transit route of Flemish cloth before it made its way to the trail linking Toruń and Halle. The same is true of wine and linen, which was most likely first imported from Halle and subsequently from Toruń. As for linen, it seems that for a long time it was imported from Germany, perhaps hauled in by German merchants, among others from Halle, where it was delivered from the already renowned linen trading center, Salzwedel.[30] For a long time, linen was sold in Toruń by "ladies" (*dominae*), i.e. patrician wives. According to the Toruń rent sources, these *dominae* traded cloth *in consisterio*, i.e. in the same venue that hosted the meetings of the Toruń city council.[31] The original arrangement was likely that the councilors traded in Flemish cloth at the merchant guild, while their wives dealt with linen.[32] As far as wine is concerned, it is known that Halle lay next to a noted wine-growing region on the Unstrut and Saale rivers ("this wine road" stretches for about 50 kilometers east of Memleben). Wine-growing in the region went back at least to the 10th century. Very early on, its inhabitants brought their viticultural traditions with them when settling in Prussia, thus turning 14th-century Toruń into the wine-growing capital of the Teutonic State.[33] However, there is no doubt that herring was imported from the Baltic Sea and transported via Toruń, Greater Poland and Poznań to Gubin and probably further west to Halle. As mentioned above, the herring in question were smoked, as evidenced by its transport on spits (*veru*), and not salted herring in barrels, which later became a major export commodity for Toruń, with Greater Poland among its destinations.[34]

30 For more about the role of this center in the linen trade throughout Germany, see A. Huang, *Die Textilien des Hanseraums. Produktion und Distribution einer spätmittelalterlichen Fernhandelsware, Quellen und Darstellungen zur hansischen Geschichte*, N/ F. Bd. LXXI, Köln–Weimar–Wien 2015, p. 90ff.

31 Wykaz czynszów Starego Miasta Torunia z lat około 1330, wyd. T. Trzebiński, Zapiski Towarzystwa Naukowego w Toruniu 10, vol. 5–6 (1936), p. 195: "*Nota, quod loca dominarum, que incidunt telam in consisterio, solvunt annuatim per fertonem et semel mittunt sortem et solvunt Michaelis*". See also *Tabliczki woskowe miasta Torunia, ok. 1350 – I poł. XVI w.*, wyd. K. Górski, W. Szczuczko, Fontes 69 TNT, Warszawa–Poznań–Toruń 1980, sp 13.

32 Had linen been a local product, it would be difficult to imagine that it was sold by the patrician women of Toruń. As for the role of linen production in Chełmno Land, one should remember the tribute levied on Polish knights and their subjects in the form of flax quotas as early as in the times of Hermann von Balk: *ouch sovil flachses, als eyn twitich* [=wad] *polnisch ist genannt* – PUB I/2, 366.

33 Die ältesten Zinsregister der Altstadt Thorn, ed. v. F. Prowe, Mitteilungen des Coppernicus-Vereins für Wissenschaft und Kunst zu Thorn, 39 (1931), p. 168: (one of the first mentions of a vineyard in Toruń): idem Johannes 1 f. de quadam vinea. In the subsequent years, the area of grapevine cultivation in the Old City of Toruń alone amounted to over 210 hectares, see T. Jasiński, *Przedmieścia średniowiecznego Torunia i Chełmna*, Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu, Seria Historia no. 97, Poznań 1982, p. 118.

34 See down, footnote 46.

The most numerous among the first settlers in the Teutonic State, especially after the Mongol invasion in 1241, were the merchants and burghers of Halle; they settled not only in Toruń and Chelmno, but undoubtedly in Poznań and Gniezno.[35] When the merchants from Halle reached the Vistula River in Toruń and Chełmno, they established contacts with the Lübeck traders who had settled in Gdańsk by the early 13th century at the latest. As I have noted above, mentions of the Lübeck merchants sailing their ships up the Vistula date back to the 1240s.[36] What goods they exchanged in Toruń and Chełmno with the merchants from Halle before taking them home via Gniezno and Poznań is difficult to establish. However, as I noticed many years ago,[37] it is telling that the fate of the city of Poznań was surprisingly dependent on the fate of the Pomeranian-Teutonic war. As soon as Świętopełk of Pomerania managed to block the river route on the Vistula, the foundation of Poznań ground to a halt. So important was the matter of unblocking the route on the Vistula for the dukes of Greater Poland that they decided to come to the aid of the Teutonic Knights. In early spring of 1243, right after concluding a customs agreement with the Order, the forces of the Teutonic Order and Great Poland, supported by Duke Kazimierz Kujawski, conquered Wyszogród (today's Fordon) near Bydgoszcz and Nakło, and subsequently raided Pomerania, burning the infrastructure and killing the population.[38] Only women and children were spared and taken into captivity. Unable to

35 The first burghers of Chełmno to arrive from Halle are mentioned in documents dated 1248, 1252 and 1253 (PUB I/1, no. 206, 257, 272), respectively. See also footnote 35. A significant share of Halle burghers among the first citizens of Toruń and Chełmno was first recorded by K. Zielińska-Melkowska, *Pierwotny i odnowiony przywilej chełmiński (1233 i 1251 r.)*, Toruń 1984 (Biblioteczka Toruńska 2), p. 69–72. According to Zielińska-Melkowska, almost all the burghers of Toruń and Chełmno featured in the renewed Chełmno privilege originated from Halle. Although many of Zielińska-Melkowska's identifications are mere conjectures, one can nonetheless agree with her view "that in both translocated towns [Chełmno and Toruń] the [local] elite consisted of settled newcomers from Halle and its surroundings, and it was them who were the main beneficiaries of the renewed Chełmno privilege of 1251." As one can easily notice, the renewed Chełmno privilege was issued two years before the incorporation of Poznań. It can be assumed that Poznań" own burgher elite at the time of the city's incorporation originated from Halle. Some of these burghers, after a temporary stay in Gubin or Poznan, migrated further east to Toruń and Chełmno, as evidenced by some of the oldest names of Torunian burghers: *Conradus dictus de Poznan* (1257), Heinrich von Gubin (councilman, 1262), see. T. Jasiński, *Początki Torunia*, p. 29.

36 *Bericht Hermann von Salza's über die Eroberung Preußens*, ed. Th. Hirsch, Scriptores rerum Prussicarum, t. V, Leipzig 1874, p. 165.

37 T. Jasiński, *O soli, szkarłacie i księciu Świętopełku*, "Gazeta Wyborcza" no. 80 (3988), Poznań, April 5, 2002, pp. 14–15.

38 *Bericht Hermann von Salza's*, p. 161 ff.; Petri de Duisburg Chronicon terre Prussiae, M. Töppen, Scriptores rerum Prussicarum, vol. I, Leipzig 1861, p. 71ff.

resist, Świętopełk was forced to accept the Teutonic Order's peace terms in late spring 1243.

The victory of the Teutonic Order and Greater Poland over Świętopełk allowed the former to reopen the Vistula for navigation. The trade route running through Greater Poland, including Poznań, was revived. Cognizant of the importance of the route, Duke Przemysł even built a castle in Zbąszyń in 1243 to protect the route before proceeding to grant Poznań its charter.

The search for a site to incorporate Poznań

Środka

There are many indications that Przemysł's permission for the burghers of Gubin and Halle to "settle" in the market village of Środka before 1244 was granted. However, this site was too inconvenient in both spatial and legal terms for the final incorporation of Poznań. This was confirmed by the events of 1245, when a dispute broke out between the "people" or, as some accounts put it, "townsmen" of Środka and the Bishop and Chapter of Poznań over a local plain. It was likely even before the said dispute broke out that Przemysł had already realized that Środka was not a suitable site for the eventual incorporation of Poznań. The first symptom of the duke's shifting views was the fact that, as early as 1244, the duke acquired land on the left bank of the Warta River and had the Dominican Order relocated there from Środka. The transfer of St. Gotthard's Church to the Dominicans in Poznań is reminiscent of a similar event in Gdańsk in 1227. Shortly before the incorporation of Gdańsk, Świętopełk transferred St. Nicholas's Church—which formerly served as the church of the merchant settlement in Gdańsk—to the Dominicans. It seems that a similar scenario unfolded in Poznań. shortly before the planned incorporation of Poznań, the Dominicans were granted the church of the merchant settlement. The move of the Dominican Order to the left bank of the Warta in 1244 can be considered the first harbinger of the incorporation of Poznań, one which unexpectedly did not come to fruition.

What prevented it from happening? The trade route running through Greater Poland was again strained as a result of events in the Teutonic State. In September 1244, a powerful Lithuanian army, joined by the Yotvingians and Prussians, rather unexpectedly raided Chełmno Land. In a major two-stage clash at Grudziądz, the Lithuanians routed the combined forces of the Teutonic Knights and the burghers of Chełmno and Toruń mobilized for the battle. On hearing about the defeat of the Order, Świętopełk immediately

blocked navigation on the Vistula at several points and launched military operations against the Teutonic Knights. This time, besides the blockade of shipping, it was the physical extermination of the townsmen of Chełmno and Toruń that posed the greatest threat. Contemporary sources mention it *expressis verbis*, also informing that trading operations had to be taken over by women. According to the Teutonic account of these incidents, *landt dennach krangk worn von leuten*, with the Teutonic Knights forced to borrow grain from a certain townswoman *der ysth yr man ym streite erschlagen*.[39] The Chronicle of Peter of Duisburg recounts that the situation was so dramatic that the Bishop of Chełmno, fearing *negocium fidei*, or rather *negocium mercatorii*, ordered the widows to marry their servants. Duisburg then recounts the story of how two widows took a liking to one handsome young man, who was a servant *natus fuit de Hallis, et adeo honestus et sapiens fuit, quod in Prussia parem in virtutibus non habebat*.[40] This local legend indicates where the first burghers of Chełmno came from.

Incorporation of Buk instead of Poznań?

It would be a gross exaggeration to posit that the fate of Poznań depended on the handsome servants from Halle, yet there is no doubt that the future development of Poznań was dependent on the stability of the Teutonic State in Prussia. The Teutonic Knights concluded a peace treaty with Świętopełk in 1248, followed by an agreement with Prussia in 1249.[41] Poznań did not receive its charter until 1253. The eventual date of incorporation was conditioned by the events of the war between the Teutonic Knights and Świętopełk. After 1249, Świętopełk renewed the persecution of the Lübeck merchants, and then, having reached a peace agreement with them, in spring 1252 he moved against Order again.[42] It was not until the second half of 1252 that Lübeck's ships were able reach Chełmno and Toruń, where they were awaited by the merchants operating along the Prussia-Halle trade route. It was only now that Poznań's charter could finally be issued.

It turns out that the postponement of the incorporation of the city of Poznań and the issue of its charter until 1253 was not only caused by political instability, largely attributable to the endless wars waged by Świętopełk.

39 *Bericht Hermann von Salza's*..., p. 163.

40 Petri de Dusburg Chronicon, p. 74.

41 PUB I/1, nos 213, 218.

42 Pommerellisches Urkundenbuch, M. Perlbach, Danzig 1882, no. 133; PUB I/1, no. 259.

Another factor that contributed to the delay was the violent conflict between Przemysł I and his younger brother Boleslaus the Pious, which took place at the turn of the 1240s and '50s. These events significantly impeded the incorporation of Poznań. Moreover, the desperate Przemysł resorted to two surprising measures. First, with the dukes' mother Jadwiga still alive, he elected to withdraw from Poznań and found its "alter ego" by granting a charter to the nearby town of Buk, envisioned as a "substitute Poznań." However, after Jadwiga's death, Przemysł simply imprisoned his younger brother Boleslaus and seized control of the entire city on both banks of the Warta. One can reconstruct these events upon closer inspection of pertinent documents, in particular those concerning the incorporation of Buk, which assumed a number of Poznań's commercial and urban functions.

In order to reconstruct these events, we must at least briefly examine the situation in Greater Poland, immediately after Przemysł I's death in 1257. That same year, Duke Boleslaw the Pious issued a document in Poznań, in which he approved the last will of his elder brother, Przemysł I, who according to other sources died on June 4, 1257.[43] In another document issued shortly thereafter, Boleslaus reports that his brother Przemysł (by virtue of his last will?) granted *pro suorum etiam peccaminum remedio et parentum nostrorum* to the custodia of the Poznań Cathedral Church *the [ducal] village of Buk, including the town and church and all of his subjects living therein, throughout its boundaries, [including] outbuildings and adjacent land, with [the right to mint] coins, [the right to collect] customs duties, with taverns, and with full rights and authority.*[44] In the said document, Boleslaus explicitly stated that the rights granted to the Custodia of the Poznań Cathedral with respect to Buk were to be identical with the rights enjoyed by his brother Przemysł in the town (*in eadem civitate*).

In the aforementioned act of incorporation—which is the first written source to mention Buk—casts the town as an important economic and commercial center. The term *civitas*, which appears four times throughout the document, leaves no doubt that Buk had the status of a chartered town. This status is also confirmed by the fact that the town of Buk (*civitas*) was contrasted with the village of Buk (*villa*) in the document. The municipal status

43 KDW I, no. 357.

44 Ibid.: *villam suam que Buk vocatur integraliter cum civitate et capella et cum omnibus hominibus ibidem habitantibus sibi obnoxiis, et cum omnibus terminis, attinentiis, utilitatibus, cum moneta, theloneo, et cum tabernis, et cum pleno iure et dominio quod noster frater prefatus dux habuit in eadem civitate.*

of Buk is also confirmed by the fact that it had the right to mint coins and collect customs duty. The existence of a church (*capella*) and inns (*tabernae*) in Buk at that time also speaks of the town's importance. The latter, which mostly constituted ducal property, often accompanied newly incorporated towns in the 13th century. This is most clearly demonstrated by the charter granted to the city of Płock in 1237.[45] The reference to the functioning of a customs chamber in Buk at that time leaves no doubt that the town was situated on a trade route, i.e. the aforementioned route linking Halle and Toruń. Although Buk is not mentioned in the documents of 1238 and 1243, a glance at the map as well as a survey of the old roads leaves no doubt that Buk was located on the road from Zbąszyń to Poznań. It was an important stopover along that section of the trade route; before reaching the capital of Greater Poland, travelers heading from Buk to Poznań had to surmount transit obstacles in the form of Lake Niepruszewskie and the surrounding marshes. The course of the fords and roads around the lake was most likely subject to constant changes, and so merchants would bypass the lake from the north or the south, depending on the time of the year and other perennial variations.

Buk was the last station along the road leading west to Poznań. Buk's location on an important trade route was most certainly the cornerstone of its development. When and why was the town incorporated? When did it start to collect customs duties and mint coins? One may assume the year 1257 as a *terminus ante quem*, since it was then that Duke Boleslaus the Pious issued a document transferring the town of Buk and its surroundings to the Custodia of the Poznań Cathedral. Since then, despite mentions of the townsmen and the town of Buk, no sources make any mentions of the customs house in Buk or the local mint. Everything seems to indicate that upon incorporation of Poznań in 1253, the importance of Buk for the aforementioned transit route began to decline. This important urban center was transferred to the Church in 1257, and the main task of its residents was tend to the Poznań Cathedral, including the tomb of Duke Przemysł I. It is almost beyond any doubt that the incorporation of Buk and related investments (customs house, mint, church) must have preceded the incorporation of Poznań. After 1253, there was no need to grant a charter to the town of Buk or erect such a church, a mint and a customs house there. As per

45 K. Buczek, *Studia z dziejów ustroju społeczno-gospodarczego Polski piastowskiej*, vol. I, Societas Vistulana, Kraków 2006, p. 242.

T. Jurek's findings, Poznań had already been *de facto* incorporated in 1249.[46] However, I think that the date proposed by Jurek seems too premature. After all, Poznań as a chartered town was situated on the left bank of the Warta. According to the Przemysł I's 1257 document, issued for the Dominicans, this area was owned by Boleslaus the Pious between 1244 (which saw the transfer of the Dominican Order from Śródka to St. Gotthard's change) until June 1250, when Przemysł I imprisoned Boleslaus.[47] Thus, Przemysł was unable to operate freely in the area of today's chartered city in 1249, and when he did attempt to do so, it must have provoked a reaction from Boleslaus the Pious. It is possible that the disputes surrounding the incorporation of Poznań were one of the reasons for Boleslaus's imprisonment. Significantly, one of the first joint steps of the reconciled dukes after Boleslaus's release on Easter 1253 was the issue of Poznań's charter. Why did the dukes issue the document together, since under the new divisions the area of the future city was to remain under the sole jurisdiction of Przemysł I? The joint issue of the charter by both dukes may have been required by the founder, Tomasz of Gubin, and the future burghers of Poznań, for fear that the legitimacy of the charter issued by Przemysł could be negated in the future by Boleslaus, the rightful owner of the domain under previous regulations.

It can therefore be assumed that by 1250, when Przemysł I in openly pushed for the takeover of the left-bank of Poznań, likely in order to build his new residence and incorporate the city there, the incorporation of Buk had already become a forgone conclusion. It can be assumed that the location of Buk by Przemysł I took place somewhere between 1243 and 1249. I think that this first date can still be moved to the year 1245, or even after 1247. The former (1245) saw the protest of the Bishop of Poznań and the local chapter, which we mentioned earlier, when the Bishop and Chapter of Poznań denied the "people of Śródka" (*homines de Srodka*) access to the nearby pastures. This protest must have made Duke Przemysł realize that, as we have already noted above, the chapter of Śródka would leave the future town with inadequate conditions for development. The second date, 1247, marked the last division of land between the two brothers before the death of their mother Jadwiga. As part of this division (unfortunately, the exact course of the territorial borders remains unknown), the site of the subsequent chartered town most

46 T. Jurek, *Przebieg lokacji Poznania*, [in:] *Civitas Posnaniensis. Studia z dziejów średniowiecznego Poznania*, eds. Z. Kurnatowska, T. Jurek, Poznań 2005, pp. 173–191.

47 KDW I, 352, see also a discussion of the 1257 document in T. Jurek, *Przebieg...*, p. 173ff.

likely fell to Boleslaus. It was likely for this reason that Przemysł decided to withdraw from Poznań and incorporate Buk. The latter, however, must have taken place after 1249, given that in June of 1250, several months after Jadwiga's death, Przemysł imprisoned his brother Boleslaus.[48] This step was probably tied to Przemysł's plans to incorporate Poznań on the left bank of the Warta, which came to fruition only after the brothers reconciled in 1253 and a new division of Greater Poland was drawn up.

Thus, it can be assumed that Buk was incorporated in the years 1247–1249, after the customs house and the mint were moved there from Poznań. That period also likely saw the construction of a local church (*capella*) started. The reconciliation of the brothers in 1253 and the incorporation of Poznań on the left bank of the Warta that same year certainly impeded the development of the town of Buk. From that moment on, the customs duty and the mint returned to Poznań, presumably followed by the relocation of many townspeople of Buk to Poznań. Although the town of Buk did not collapse completely, subsequent sources never once mention Buk's customs house or mint. According to those subsequent sources, market duties were still collected there, but there is no mention of collection of customs duties from merchants traveling the Halle-Toruń route. As it seems, some of the investments in Buk were completed despite the incorporation of Poznań in 1253. We know from subsequent accounts that the church in Buk was dedicated to St. Stanislaus, who was canonized in May 1254 in Cracow, with many Piast dukes in attendance, including Przemysł I and Boleslaus the Pious. Thus, most probably, it was under the influence of the announcement of the canonization at that convention that the church in Buk received the *patrocinium* of St. Stanislaus.

Finally, a few words about the village of Buk, or the subsequent Wielka Wieś, which, as we read in a document from 1257 Boleslaw, was inhabited by *homines in eadem illa sibi* [i.e. Przemysł I] *debiti*. The said people dependent (*debiti*) on Duke Przemysł—by virtue of the ducal will, validated by his younger brother Boleslaus—were to become sextons of the Poznań Cathedral after Przemysł's death, likely to protect his burial site. The dual designation of these people in the document as dependent (*debiti* and *obnoxii*) on the duke suggests that in the village of Buk their main task was to serve Duke Przemysł in various ways. It was possible that the duke had his court nearby the town of Buk, where he was attended to by servants who pursuant to his will,

48 MPH sn. VI, p. 28; MPH sn. VIII, p. 95 (cap. 91).

continued to serve him after his death, no longer in the said court but in the Cathedral where Duke Przemysł was buried.

Thus, in the years 1247–1249, the Buk was incorporated as a charter town and saw the foundation of a ducal residence, as the town assumed the functions of the capital city of Poznań. It was for this reason, as well as the fact that in 1249 Duke Boleslaus—by all indications the holder of the left bank of the future city of Poznań—was free, that Tomasz Jurek's hypothesis of the incorporation of the city of Poznań in the said location as early as 1249 seems untenable. It was not before June 1250, when Przemysł I imprisoned his brother Boleslaus, that the incorporation of Poznań on the left bank of the Warta could take place; towards the end of 1252, Przemysł reached an agreement with the Bishop of Poznań, Boguchwał, and his reconciliation with his brother Boleslaus and the release of the latter on Easter 1253 finally paved the way for the charter of Poznań. Although, by virtue of new divisions and agreements between the brothers, the area designated for Poznań's incorporation came under the exclusive rule of Przemysł, the new charter was issued by both brothers. As one can guess, this solution was adopted at the request of the founder of the newly located city, Tomasz of Gubin and his burgher subordinates in Poznań, because such a step prevented future protests from Boleslaus.

The charter of Poznań in 1253

As per Tomasz Jurek's findings, the charter was drafted at the turn of 1252/1253 and eventually published after its release on Easter 1253. The original draft has not survived; its content is known from two copies. The incorporation of a city in the mid-13th century entailed granting its inhabitants administrative, judicial and economic self-government; the incorporation document for the city of Poznań regulated these issues in detail. As far as administrative and judicial self-government was concerned, it was still fairly limited at that time. The dukes entrusted the administrative and judicial powers to an alderman appointed by the duke; the alderman was usually the founder who brought settlers, most frequently Germans, to the newly chartered town. As noted above, in the case of Poznań they came from the region of Halle (Saale) and the nearby Magdeburg. The name of the founder of the newly chartered city of Poznań is also known: it was Tomasz of Gubin, a trading settlement found by the Halle merchants. This does not mean, however, that Tomasz and his descendants were to exercise exclusive authority in

Poznań. The privilege states that the alderman exercised some of his functions together with the townsmen, whom we can consider as the herald of the future city council and jurors in the Poznań courts.

The regular structure of Poznań's development proves that before the newly arriving colonists settled in the city, the site for the future chartered town had been meticulously marked out by surveyors. According to the Yearbook of the Chapter of Poznań, the majority of the settlers were burghers of Śródka. In 1253, "Przemysł at the request of a certain burgher of Gubin moved his burghers from the town located in the area called Śródka, near St. Margaret's Church, to the other side of the Warta near St. Martin's Church, where first a second town was stake out, which the duke ordered to be fortified with moats and blanks." This fact proves that despite moving some administrative and customs functions to Buk, a small community of German townsmen still existed in Śródka. It can also be assumed that in 1253 not only those merchants from Śródka but also many from Buk moved to Poznań, as evidenced by the decline in Buk's prominence after Przemysł's death in 1257.

The incorporation of the new town is already mentioned in the 1252 document. The area was acquired by the duke from the Bishop of Poznań as early as in 1252, with the explicit intention of chartering a town: "And because our venerable Father, Bishop Boguchwał together with the chapter ceded to us [land] from the estates of St. Martin and St. Adalbert, on which we decided to erect and charter a town (...)."

Dukes Przemysł I and Boleslaus the Pious granted the alderman Tomasz [of Gubin] permission to found the town by granting him eight years of exemptions from customs duty, tribute and other fees; after the expiry of the exemptions, the townsmen would be obliged to pay only half of the customs duties. Moreover, the citizens of Greater Poland who came to Poznań in order to trade were also exempted from customs duties and tribute money. What is interesting, also foreign merchants were exempt from customs duties and tributes, except for the customs duties payable outside the borders of Greater Poland (*hospites vero extra terminos terre nostre solvant!*).

The dukes established an annual fair and announced the erection of a merchant house, which was presumably intended as a cloth-selling venue; the income generated by the merchant house was reserved for the duke himself, with the exception of two chambers, reserved for the alderman.

The town received a copious endowment of landed estates and the right to utilize the Warta for the length of a mile. The townspeople were allowed

to fish along this stretch of the river without any restrictions, and they could also fully exercise the right to build water mills, a privilege usually reserved for feudal lords. The lone right reserved for the ruler in the foundation document issued by Dukes Przemysł and Boleslaus was the ducal right to own one mill. A similar privilege regarding the right to build mills was enjoyed by Poznań's burghers throughout the 17 villages that were granted to the town. The rulers only pointed out that one of the mills was reserved for the local Dominicans, and the mill of the former village leader Henryk was to become the alderman's property. Of the 17 villages granted to the city, most can be identified as present-day districts of the city of Poznań, such as: Rataje, Piotrowo, Zegrze, Starołęka, Wierzbice (Wilda), Jeżyce, Winiary, Umultowo. In these villages, the future mayor of the city received 30 fees of farmland (*pro agris seminandis*), and the townspeople were granted twenty fees for pastures. The duke also pledged that once the Germans were summoned to and settled in these villages, the alderman would receive every fifth fee of land in return for a tithe in the amount of half a fine of silver. Within the bounds of these villages, the townsmen were granted the right to catch wild game, while also being allowed to utilize the forests both inside and outside the district for building houses and other purposes.

By virtue of the location privilege, the townspeople of Poznań were granted extensive administrative and judicial self-government according to Magdeburg Law. In relation to the burghers of Magdeburg—as in the case of the Silesian cities and Toruń and Chełmno—the privilege provided for the reduction of court fines by half. All Germans within the dominion of Duke Przemysł could only enforce their rights in the city of Poznań. No one acting on behalf of the duke or ducal castellan was allowed to act to the detriment of the city court, which convened three times a year and was presided over by the alderman with the townspeople of Poznań. During these court sessions, the alderman was to receive 8 solids for each adjudged sentence, and in major cases the convict was to pay 30 solids; a fee of 6 denarii was introduced for each oath sworn.

The charter granted the city of Poznań full judicial freedom. The dukes additionally forbade their subjects to sue the citizens of Poznań outside the city limits, and considered any such courts or verdicts to be invalid. In order to avoid any doubts, the privilege stated that cases such as arguments, fights or strangulations involving the German and Polish population were also to be settled by the Poznań alderman. The alderman was to receive every third denar of the total court fees.

The townspeople were supposed to pay half a silver *szkojec* for each plot of land and garden developed within city limits, as well as each market stall therein after the expiry of the incorporation charter. All revenue from plots of land, gardens and stalls collected by the duke was transferred to support the city. The alderman and the burghers were to establish a measure for beverages and bread, and half of what would be adjudged due to false measures was to be paid to the city.

With the permission of Bishop Boguchwał, the townspeople were allowed to erect parish church and celebrate liturgy there, as well as participate in processions.

While the burghers were bound to defend Greater Poland, they were exempted from participating in military expeditions outside its borders. To increase the city's security, the dukes pledged to field four guards and two crossbowmen at their own expense.

According to Tomasz Jurek's findings, the newly incorporated city initially faced numerous economic problems, caused mainly by the decline of the Halle-Toruń route in favor of the Wroclaw-Toruń route that bypassed Poznań. The foundation of St. Mary Magdalene Parish Church did not take place until 1263, not at the initiative of the city, but of the Poznań chapter; a year later the Bishop of Poznań founded Holy Spirit Hospital.[49] These facts, as well as the mention of the burning of Poznań by the Brandenburg forces in 1274, prove that in the period following its incorporation, the city faced serious adversity. It was only the subsequent decades, in particular towards the end of the 14th century, with the Polish-Lithuanian Union, that saw a rapid development of Poznań.

49 T. Jurek, *Przebieg*..., p. 186–187.



Poznań 2nd half of the 15th century

1. Cathedral
2. Church of the Blessed Virgin Mary
3. Bishop's Palace
4. Canonry
5. Tower Building
6. West Gate
7. East Gate
8. Town Hall
9. Weigh House
10. Dominican Church and Monastery
11. St. Mary Magdalene's Parish Church
12. St. Stanislaus's Church
13. Dominican Church and Nunnery
14. Wroniecka Gate
15. Wielka Gate
16. Mostowa Gate
17. Wodna Gate
18. Ciemna Bramka Gate
19. Wrocławska Gate
20. Priests' Mill underneath Castle Hill

0 250 500 m

- Cathedral Island and the Old Town
- Urban settlements
- Settlements/villages
- Walls and gates
- Roads/squares
- Rivers/streams
- Hills
- Major structures
- Major structures (hypothetical location)

Zbyszko Górczak

How Poznań became a European trading emporium thanks to the Union of Krewo

Since time immemorial, the development of trade and exchange of goods has been an underlying factor for the emergence and successful evolution of urban centers. Craft production has also played an important role in this respect, but it was not until the Industrial Revolution in the 18th and 19th century that industry came to the fore as the leading factor for urban development. The critical importance of trade was particularly evident in the history of medieval and early modern European cities. It was thanks to the revival of the money-and-goods economy in 11th- and 12th-century Europe that urban life, which had declined after the fall of the Roman Empire, was revived. Towns were recovering and regaining their importance, and new ones were founded *in cruda radice*, around markets that were host to the exchange of goods and thus became the focal point and indispensable component of every urban settlement. The marketplace usually served the immediate rural surroundings, attracting local peasants to sell their produce, and supplying them with the products of the town's craftsmen or, less frequently so, with 'exotic' goods brought from more distant lands. Covering a radius of 15–20 km (a distance that enabled a trip there and back in one day by a horse-drawn cart), this local form of trade underlay the functioning of thousands of small European towns in the Middle Ages and the early modern era.

Conversely, larger cities of supra-regional importance owed their prosperity and wealth above all to long-distance trade, which was often conducted over hundreds and thousands of kilometers, across the entire continent and beyond, reaching the distant lands of the Orient, India, Africa, and the Far East. Given the transport capacities at the time, when trading over such long distances it was most profitable to import or export expensive and luxurious

goods whose weight and volume were relatively small, such as spices, furs, wax, high quality cloth and metal products. Whether a given city was able to attract this type of long-distance trade was determined not only by its own economic potential, regional prominence or protection extended by feudal lords, but above all by its geographical location and the course of major trade routes. The latter were subject to changes over decades and centuries, depending on oft-distant political and economic events. While such developments remained outside of the influence of individual urban centers, it was the entrepreneurship of their residents, the energy and foresight of their municipal authorities and, ultimately, the effective support of monarchs that made it possible for cities to seize the day whenever Fortune presented them with untapped possibilities. In the case of Poznań, the most important (albeit not only) such possibility was the signing of the Union of Krewo in 1385 and the resulting establishment of a permanent union of Poland with Lithuania and its subordinate Ruthenian lands.

Until then, Poznań and Greater Poland remained on the sidelines of major European trade, as the main exchange routes bypassed the region. Generally speaking, in the first centuries of its existence, the entire Piast state did not play a prominent role in continental trade, since the large overland and maritime transport routes ran beyond its borders. In our part of Europe, the most important waterway was the one along the southern coast of the Baltic Sea, originally used by the Scandinavian Vikings, and eventually captured in the 13th century by the Hanseatic League, an association of North German trading cities centered around Hamburg and Lübeck. The second important route led from the North to the South along the great rivers of the Russian plains (the Daugava, the Volkhov, the Dnieper, and the Volga), connecting Scandinavia with Constantinople and the Middle-Eastern Arab and Persian trading centers. In the early Middle Ages, it was used by the Scandinavian Varangians. Large-scale trade bypassed Polish lands until the 13th century, when the situation changed in the aftermath of the Mongol conquests. The enormous empire that formed in their wake spanned the vast areas of Eurasia, fostering long-distance trade and offering safe passage to merchants travelling from China to the ports on the northern coast of the Black Sea, where factories of Italian cities, Venice and Genoa were soon established (mainly in Crimea). This enabled the opening of a new import route for highly sought-after Eastern goods (mainly silk and spices), which now bypassed the troublesome and costly intermediation of Middle Eastern Muslim traders from the North. Most of the goods imported from the East using this route

were then transported by Venetian and Genoan ships by sea from the Black Sea via Constantinople to Italy. However, an overland extension of the Far Eastern route was also established, leading through Ruthenian and Polish lands via Lwów, Cracow and Wrocław to Germany and further to Western Europe. Thus, Poland found itself for the first time within the reach of great transit trade, although it was mainly the cities in the southern part of the country, especially Wrocław and Cracow, that benefited from this state of affairs. Cracow also profited from the discovery and extraction of gold and copper deposits in the then northern Hungary (currently Slovakia). These ores, along with Hungarian wine, were shipped north to the Baltic ports (primarily Gdańsk), conquered by the Teutonic Order in the early 14th century, with salt, salted and dried fish, and cloth from Western Europe imported from the opposite direction. Situated at the intersection of two great trade routes, Cracow benefited from the economic boom in the 14th and 15th centuries, competing fiercely with Wrocław, which built its own stature thanks to the boom in 13th- and 14th-century Bohemia, which saw the discovery of rich silver deposits and the development of the cloth industry.

However, important as they were for the southern Polish lands, these changes largely bypassed Greater Poland and Poznań. Although from the onset of the Piast state onwards Poznań was situated on an old trading route leading through Międzyrzecz and Lubusz (later Frankfurt on the Oder) into Germany, there was little traffic along this trail until the 15th century. The conquest of the Prussian lands by the Teutonic Order in the 13th century launched another transport route from central Germany through Gubin and Zbąszyń or Głogów, and then Poznań, Gniezno and Toruń, reaching the monastic state in the North-East. In view of the deterioration of the Polish-Teutonic relations in the 14th century, however, the route gave way to an alternative trail through the West Pomeranian principalities, and consequently failed to retain major trade traffic. At the same time, the conquest of Prussia by the Teutonic Knights led to the development of another route, this time connecting the Order's domain with Silesia and Bohemia. This was facilitated by favorable political relations between the two countries and the aforementioned overall economic development of Bohemia. Salt and fish were shipped from the North, and cloth was transported in the opposite direction. The route, which had several branches, led from Toruń through Konin, Pyzdry and Kalisz to Wrocław in Greater Poland. While situated beyond its main thread, Poznań profited from the attendant revival of trade conducted via the route that led from city through the towns of Śrem

and Poniec towards Wrocław, and another one leading to Głogów via Kościan and Wschowa. As we shall see, it was specifically the latter branch that was destined for a great future. To the north, Pomerania and Prussia were also connected to Poznań by two routes: an older one connecting it with Toruń via Gniezno and Inowrocław, and a newer one leading through Nakło and Tuchola to Gdańsk.[1]

The described trade connection between Bohemia and Silesia and the lands of the Teutonic Order was of tertiary importance in Europe and did not rank among the most significant routes. However, it turned out to be important for the 13th century towns in Greater Poland, as it contributed to the establishment and development of many towns in the era of the first charters granted under German law.[2] Nevertheless, the share of the urban centers of this district in long-distance trade remained small, and their existence was mainly determined by local trade and craft products intended for the local market. This also applied to Poznań—chartered in 1253—where the first mentions of guilds date back to 1280 (butchers, bakers, shoemakers and furriers).[3] Headlining these guild lists were food producers, who operated on the local market by necessity. Furriers at the time processed furs of local origin, however their craft was to become one of the most important in Poznań. The first records of the weavers' and cloth cutters' (cloth merchants) guilds in the city come from a later period, namely from 1344.[4] They, too, were to gain more importance over time.

Chartered in the era of the Duchy of Greater Poland, Poznań was developing relatively well in the second half of the 13th century under the rule of the local dukes, and this development was based primarily on local crafts and trade that catered to the needs of the surrounding villages and rural population. The city did not play a major role in European trade. The situation of Poznań and other urban centers of Greater Poland worsened at the time of the unification of Poland and the newly formed united Kingdom of Poland. The political upheaval after the 1296 assassination of Przemysł II, the last Piast ruler of Greater Poland, did not serve Poznań well. It was sparked by the city elites' turning against the future king Ladislaus I the Short, who

1 For a detailed discussion of the layout of trade routes in medieval Poland, with particular emphasis on Greater Poland and Poznań, see L. Koczy, *Handel Poznania do połowy XVI wieku*, Poznań 1930, pp. 11–22.

2 Z. Górczak, *Najstarsze lokacje miejskie w Wielkopolsce (do 1314 r.)*, Poznań 2002, pp. 85–122.

3 *Kodeks dyplomatyczny Wielkopolski*, vol. I-IV, ed. I. Zakrzewski, Poznań 1877–1881, vol. V, ed. F. Piekosiński, Poznań 1908 [hereinafter abbreviated as KDW], see: KDW I, nos 321, 494.

4 KDW II, no. 1233.

took hold of the region at the turn of 1313/1314. Led by alderman Przemko, the citizens of Poznań put up armed resistance to the knights supporting the duke, but were warded off by the duke's forces. This so-called 'rebellion of alderman Przemko' hindered the evolution of the city for several decades. Przemko and the city elites supported the current rule of the Głogów dukes due to personal and commercial ties to Silesia. Having offended Ladislaus the Short (1320–1333), Poznań was subjected to repressive measures, e.g. the liquidation of the hereditary rank of the alderman's office. The new ruler, who was not very friendly towards the burgher class (which also took up arms against his rule in Cracow) and did not care much about urban centers and their needs, did not bestow special privileges upon them. This policy was only changed by Ladislaus the Short's son and successor on the Polish throne, Casimir the Great (1333–1370). While interested in the economic development of Polish towns, he did not restore their former independent political position. In addition, the general economic situation in Greater Poland deteriorated under the united Polish state. Moreover, the highest-ranking church officials of the district (the Archbishop of Gniezno and the Bishop of Poznań) were more inclined to reside at the royal court in Cracow or at least in their own estates located closer to Lesser Poland (e.g. the Sieradz-Łęczyca estate owned by the Archbishop of Gniezno). Conflicts and wars with both the Teutonic Order and Bohemia further limited the traffic along the traditional trade route from Prussia to Silesia, which was essential for Greater Poland. It was slowly revived only upon regulation of mutual relations in the first decade of the reign of Casimir the Great. Extensive damage was also done by the bilateral invasion of Greater Poland by the armies of the Teutonic Order and Bohemia in 1331, although Poznań itself withstood the siege of the Bohemian army at the time. The times of Casimir the Great marked a gradual recovery of the city, however Poznań's prospects remained rather bleak.

The situation was to change dramatically as a result of political and economic events of pan-European stature that, while outside of Poznań's control, were nonetheless exploited by the city. The most important among them was the formation of the Polish-Lithuanian Union in Krewo in 1385 and its direct consequences: the marriage of Queen Jadwiga of Anjou to Grand Duke Jogaila of Lithuania, along with his assumption of the Polish throne (1386), Christianization of Lithuania, and the lasting bond between the two countries. The far-reaching consequences of these events for European and Polish trade were to manifest themselves gradually, aided by other political and economic transformations on a continental scale.

At the very beginning of his long reign, Ladislaus Jagiello (1386–1434) turned his attention to Poznań and granted the city special privileges. With the Teutonic Order's control over Gdańsk Pomerania and the lower Vistula impeding and limiting the growing export of Polish grain to Western Europe (for which the most convenient export route was the Vistula and the Baltic Sea, with a natural trading hub in Gdansk), the monarch strove to revive an alternative route for the export of agricultural produce via Szczecin. It was here, *en route* to Szczecin, both by land and water—via the Warta and the Oder—that Poznań was located. Ladislaus Jagiełło intended the city to play the role of a staging area for grain trade. In order to increase its role, he decided to grant Poznań the so-called right of storage in 1394. It was an important privilege that obliged foreign merchants carrying goods to put them up for sale (which was often combined with a ban on further trading journeys in general) in the city that was granted such a right. Thanks to this privilege, local businessmen were able to step in as intermediaries, join commercial traffic and profit from it. The 1394 privilege ordered all newcomers to Poznań to put up their goods for sale for a period of three days.[5] The right of storage struck at the interests of all foreign merchants, and as such it remained a subject of continuous wrangling, bargaining, and conflict. Territorial rulers, who were the only ones in a position to grant it and enforce its subsequent observance (by forbidding merchants to bypass a privileged center when on a trade journey), granted it infrequently; in the territory of the Kingdom of Poland, the right of storage had been previously granted to Cracow, which had received it from Casimir the Great as part of his support for the city's traders against the merchants of the then Bohemian city of Wrocław.

Somewhat paradoxical was also the fact that the restrictions on the right of storage were suspended for the duration of great annual fairs. At that time, the majority of fees, tributes, and various restrictions on trade in goods were not enforced, which obviously attracted merchants from near and far. Thus, the movement of goods congested in selected weeks of the year. Towns sought permission to hold annual fairs as hard as they did to obtain the right of storage, rightly assuming that it would breathe new life into a given town and its commerce. The first annual fair in Poznań was established as early as in 1253 in the charter deed passed by Duke Przemysł

5 A. Gąsiorowski, *Rzemiosło i handel*, [in:] *Dzieje Poznania*, vol. I, pt. 1, ed. J. Topolski, Warszawa–Poznań 1988, p. 280.

I, and subsequently confirmed by his son Przemysł II in 1280.[6] By the 15th century, the city had the right to hold as many as three annual fairs: one of them began on the first Sunday of Lent and lasted four weeks; the second one opened on St. John's Day (June 24) and lasted for five weeks (the latter event, known as St. John's Fair, is still celebrated today in the form of a city festival); the third one, which also spanned five weeks, began on St. Michael's Day (September 29).[7] In total, fairs were held in Poznań for fourteen weeks annually, which amounted to a quarter of the year. In anticipation of the projected grand career of the city, it is worth noting at this point that the lion's share of long-distance trade traffic reportedly passed through Poznań during fairs, and it was then that the majority of transactions were concluded, the scope of which encompassed the entire continent between the 15th and 17th century. It was most likely for this reason that mentions of the actual enforcement of the right of storage in Poznań are relatively scarce.

Regardless of the aforementioned evidence of favoritism on the part of King Ladislaus Jagiello, the plans to direct Polish grain exports to the West through Poznań failed and were abandoned. The natural waterways of the Vistula basin offered much more convenient transport opportunities, and the Prussian cities with Gdańsk and Toruń lobbied with the Teutonic Knights authorities to lift politically motivated restrictions on grain trade; the reluctant stance of the Order contributed decisively to the repudiation of allegiance and the subsequent open revolt of the Prussian states in 1454. At that time, Prussia subjected itself to the authority of the Polish king, and the Polish rule over Gdańsk Pomerania and the Vistula estuary was eventually confirmed by the Second Peace of Toruń in 1466. Under new circumstances, grain exports naturally gravitated towards Gdańsk, with Poznań and the projected Szczecin route reduced to local and secondary importance. However, a large part of trade in oxen, herded in great numbers from Polish lands to Germany and further to Western Europe, passed through Greater Poland. However, in the late Middle Ages and the early modern period, it was Gniezno that emerged as the main center of this activity.

Despite the plans and efforts undertaken by King Ladislaus Jagiello, Poznań failed to establish itself as a hub for the export of Polish grain. However, the very creation of the Polish-Lithuanian union laid the foundation for the expansion and prosperity of Poznań's trade, although the

6 KDW I, nos 321, 494.

7 A. Gąsiorowski, *Rzemiosło i handel*, p. 280.

contemporaries of the Union of Krewo might not have been aware of this fact and only lived to see the onset of Poznań's prosperity. Ladislaus Jagiello's accession to the Polish throne, along with the attendant Christianization of Lithuania and its union with Poland opened new perspectives for Polish and, by extension, European trade. Lithuania and its Ruthenian subordinates, as well as the territories further to the east that were being united by the Grand Duchy of Moscow were extremely attractive for commercial penetration. They provided valuable woodland commodities in huge quantities, above all many species of high quality furs, valued and long sought after in Western Europe, as well as wax for candle manufacturing. In turn, the said lands themselves were an excellent and receptive market for craft goods: high and low quality cloth, ready-made clothing or small iron items (knives, sickles, scythes, clasps, fittings). The latter were known in the late Middle Ages as 'Nuremberg goods,' after the southern German city that specialized in their manufacture. The mutual demand for the above goods and the ability to supply them on both sides ensured high profits for enterprising businessmen. This form of trade with the Lithuanian and Ruthenian lands had been flourishing for a long time, but it mainly took place along the Baltic Sea axis, and from the 13th century onwards it was virtually monopolized by the Hanseatic League, i.e. the aforementioned association of North German merchant cities. The main centers of this trade were located in Veliky Novgorod (where the great Hanseatic trading post was located) and in the Baltic cities associated in the Hanseatic League: Narva, Revla (Tallinn), Riga, Königsberg and Gdańsk. Using convenient waterways along the coast and the great rivers of the East European Plain: the Volkhov, the Dvina, and the Nemunas, Hanseatic merchants ventured deep into Lithuania, Ruthenia, and Muscovy, importing their goods and purchasing large quantities of furs and wax. Pressured by the growing Baltic nation states (Denmark in particular), the Hanseatic League began to lose its dominant position in the Baltic. The Lithuanian state and the Grand Duchy of Moscow, which was uniting Rus' further to the east, also grew in strength. In 1478, the duchy subjugated the Novgorod Republic with its vast forest-covered territories of northeastern Rus, a great purveyor of all kinds of quality furs. Lithuanian and Muscovite rulers were reluctant towards the Hanseatic League monopoly and sought to curtail its position. In 1494, Ivan III, Duke of Moscow, forced the closure of the trading post in Novgorod, and in the 15th century successive Jagiellons regulated the trade relations between Riga, located at the mouth of the Daugava River, and Polotsk (a city in the upper reaches of the river under

their rule). This resulted in essentially denying Hanseatic merchants access to Muscovy as well as Lithuanian and Ruthenian lands.[8] At the same time the traffic on the traditional Black Sea route, which could possibly provide an alternative route for the trade conducted in the Lithuanian and Ruthenian lands, also collapsed. This was due to the progressive Turkish conquests in the Black Sea basin, spearheaded by the capture of Constantinople in 1453. Turkish presence in the region entailed the imminent collapse of the Genoese factories in Crimea.

The closing of the Baltic and Black Sea maritime routes created a vacuum in eastern trade that could be filled by overland routes. This was facilitated by the fact that the goods involved (furs, wax, cloth, metal products) presented considerable value at moderate volume and did not pose insurmountable transport difficulties. However, a significant role was also played by the changing economic situation in the west of the continent, especially in Germany. In the latter country, the economic importance of southern German cities, especially Nuremberg (a major center of metal production) and Augsburg, which emerged as an international financial center, grew steadily from the 14th century onwards. Robust businessmen, merchants, and shortly thereafter bankers from both these urban centers manifested a keen interest in eastern trade, which opened up the prospect of large profits, from which they had been cut off by the dominance of the Hanseatic League. They were thus actively seeking alternative overland routes for their own expansion. This combination of pan-European political events and economic transformations created an opportunity for Poznań. On the one hand, South German merchants were paving their way to the East, on the other hand the Union in Krewo secured an overland route eastwards via Poland, with the Lithuanian and, to some extent, Muscovite princes eager to see this as an alternative to the inconvenient Hanseatic monopoly. The question that remained, however, was if Poznań would be able to take advantage of these changes.

It was in particular Leipzig in Saxony that became a major staging point for the new trade traffic. It was there that the merchants of Nuremberg and Augsburg arrived, and it was there that they procured Lithuanian and Ruthenian goods. But how could these goods have reached eastern Germany? Wrocław, which remained under Bohemian rule from the first half of the 14th century onwards, played the traditional role of an intermediary and staging

8 For more on the gradual decline of Hanseatic trade in the East, see: P. Dollinger, *Dzieje Hanzy*, Warszawa 1997 (2nd edition), pp. 255–265, 279–280; L. Koczy, *Handel Poznania*, pp. 71–72.

point connected with the Crimean route. Its monopolistic aspirations to dominate trade with the East, however, had long aroused resentment among German merchants, the merchants of Cracow, and the kings of Poland. Disputes over this issue dated back to the reign of Casimir the Great in the 14th century. Leipzig-based merchants were equally reluctant to see the Lower Silesian capital as an intermediary, and to this end they could count on the support of the Saxon princes who strove to ensure the growth of Leipzig and granted it numerous privileges. A sharp and long-standing conflict with Wrocław began at the turn of the 15th and 16th centuries, largely due to the growing importance of Lithuanian trade.[9] In this situation, the converging interests of Saxony and Poland led to an economic rapprochement, which materialized in the form of the treaty concluded in 1512 in Wschowa. The treaty plotted, by mutual agreement, the most convenient route to the East, leading from Leipzig through Głogów to Poznań.[10] The new trail partially employed one of the old branches of the ancient route between Silesia, Pomerania and Prussia, which bypassed Wrocław. It also became the most important route for Poznań's own trade, which is reflected in the historic name of the main street heading southwards from the city center, namely Głogowska Street (its name is still in use today). The second albeit less frequented route connecting Leipzig with Poznań led through Berlin, Frankfurt (Oder) and Międzyrzecz, and its substantial chunk overlapped with the old route dating back to the early Middle Ages. The consolidation of these trade routes ultimately ruined Wrocław's chances and opened up excellent prospects for Poznań. Connected to the great East German emporium in the rapidly developing Leipzig, and by extension linked to Nuremberg, Augsburg, and Frankfurt (and even the then centers of European and global trade: Antwerp and, later on, Amsterdam), the capital of Greater Poland put itself on the economic map of Europe. Poznań became the starting point (or—from the eastern perspective—the destination point) for two routes leading to Lithuania and Ruthenia, towards Vilnius. Initially, it was the southern route to Lublin via Łęczyca and Radom that was of greater importance. Over time, however, the traffic on the northern route passing through Warsaw gradually increased.

Lublin is an example of another Polish city whose political and economic career was catapulted by the Polish-Lithuanian Union (it is no coincidence

9 For a detailed discussion of the 'trade war' with Wrocław, see: L. Koczy, *Handel Poznania*, pp. 161–179.
10 Ibid., pp. 204–207.

that the most important agreement between the two countries was signed in the city in 1569). Conveniently located and endowed with privileges by King Ladislaus Jagiello, who opened the lands of Lithuania to the merchants of Lublin, the city benefited greatly from eastern trade. Initially, Lithuanian goods were sent to the West mainly through Cracow. However, this trend was soon reversed and the aforementioned links with Poznań rapidly gained new importance. The growing presence of merchants from the capital of Greater Poland and their increasing share in the transactions concluded in Lublin is presented in a detailed study devoted to the trade of this Lesser Polish city, penned by Henryk Samsonowicz.[11] The author also notes that, in the following decades of the 16th century, the Lublin route was gradually superseded by the Warsaw route in terms of Lithuanian trade.[12] This was not only caused by geographical factors, as the route from Poznań through Warsaw to Vilnius was shorter, but also by economic (declining importance of the route via Cracow and Wrocław) and political reasons (direct incorporation of the Duchy of Mazovia into the Kingdom of Poland in 1526). The growing role of Warsaw in Lithuanian trade was acknowledged in the literature on the subject, but at the same time it was noted that for a long time Warsaw merchants were unable to take control of the turnover and gave way to Poznań merchants in this respect.[13] There were even some authors who saw the rise of Warsaw's position along the trade route from Poznań to Vilnius and the fact that the Mazovian city eventually outpaced Lublin as a possible reason for moving the capital of the Kingdom of Poland from Cracow to Warsaw rather than Lublin (whose importance and convenient location rivalled Warsaw at the time).[14] This hypothesis was seriously considered by other scholars.[15]

As mentioned above, the lion's share of Poznań's long-distance trade fell during fairs when foreign merchants were exempted from most of the regular restrictions and tributes. The most profitable eastern fur trade was conducted in two annual rounds. The predominant yield of the spring fairs

11 H. Samsonowicz, *Handel Lublina na przełomie XV i XVI wieku*, "Przegląd Historyczny" 59 (1968), vol. 4, pp. 612–628.

12 Ibid., p. 622.

13 M. Bogucka, *Podstawy rozwoju Warszawy*, [in:] *Dzieje Warszawy*, vol. II, ed. S. Kieniewicz, Warszawa 1984, p. 50. For more on the significance of Warsaw and the 'Warsaw' route to Lithuania, see J. Topolski, *Rola Gniezna w handlu europejskim od XV do XVIII wieku*, "Studia i Materiały do Dziejów Wielkopolski i Pomorza" vol. 7 (1962), no. 2, pp. 1–78.

14 J. Deresiewicz, *Poznań w okresie wielonarodowościowej i folwarczno-pańszczyźnianej Rzeczpospolitej Szlacheckiej 1466–1648*, [in:] *Dziesięć wieków Poznania*, vol. I, ed. K. Malinowski, Poznań-Warszawa 1956.

15 H. Samsonowicz, *Handel Lublina...*, p. 622.

comprised of unprocessed furs obtained in Lithuania and Muscovy over the winter, i.e. those of the highest quality. The autumn fair was dominated by ready-made fur products, stitched in the East.[16] The prominent role of furriers among Poznań's craftsmen naturally stemmed from the fact that they also used Eastern raw materials, processing them for the needs of the local elites and with further export to Western Europe in mind.[17] Fur trade was conducted on a huge scale, with hundreds of thousands of fur coats, martens, ermine, weasels, dormice and hamsters imported to Poznań each year. Estimates in this respect can be conducted based on the more or less fragmentary records from the registers of the customs chambers located on the Vilnius-Poznań route. They can also be corroborated by similar calculations made for Gniezno, whose fairs were a stopover for a large part of the goods imported from the East.[18] Among others, the volume of turnover achieved as early as the mid-15th century is attested to by the record of a contract concluded in 1439 for the sale of 10,000 skins,[19] as well as the 1459 privilege issued by Casimir IV Jagiellon for the protection of the local retail merchants that stipulated the minimum quantities of goods involved in wholesale transactions concluded in Poznań and Gniezno by out-of-town traders. Among the various goods (roots, cloth, wine, herrings) listed in the said document were weasel furs, with the minimum transaction volume set at one hundred *soroks*, or 4,000 items. In the case of particularly valuable sables, wholesale transactions could be conducted from four *soroks*, or 160 items upwards.[20] The *sorok* was a unit of measurement derived from the number forty in Ruthenian, traditionally used to calculate the number of furs, and its widespread use at the time clearly demonstrates where the goods originated. The aforementioned royal privilege of 1459 was issued jointly for Poznań and Gniezno, which confirms the participation of the latter city in transit trade. It is interesting to note that furs were transported in barrels to protect them from damage, animals, insects and unpredictable weather conditions.

Another important commodity imported from the East was wax, which was required in high volumes for the manufacture of candles. Similarly to

16 This pattern is discussed by J. Topolski, *Rola Gniezna*, p. 51–52 also with reference to the annual fairs of Gniezno.

17 A. Gąsiorowski, *Rzemiosło i handel*, p. 280.

18 For detailed estimates and calculations in this regard, see L. Koczy, *Handel Poznania*, pp. 339–349 and J. Topolski, *Rola Gniezna*, p. 49–57.

19 A. Gąsiorowski, *Rzemiosło i handel*, pp. 278–279.

20 *Kodeks Dyplomatyczny Wielkiej Polski*, ed. E. Raczyński, Poznań 1840, no. 130.

furs, wax was also supplied by the forests and beehives of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and Muscovy. One significant problem for wax trade turned was the dishonesty of many merchants, who habitually adulterated the goods on a large scale by adding less valuable and lower quality admixtures. These frauds were especially frequent in wholesale trade, which involved large lumps of the raw material. The inspections administered by municipal authorities and the successive kings of Poland and Grand Dukes of Lithuania, produced limited results (lumps had to be broken, which could in turn lower the quality of the inspected goods). Over time, these forgeries contributed to a reduction in the volume of trade.[21]

On the other hand, the export of the Polish cochineal declined relatively quickly. Dried and powdered larvae of this insect species, found in abundance in Poland and Lithuania and Rus, were used to produce dye in the Middle Ages. The development of the Western European cloth industry increased the demand, but this market sector, too, was not immune to attempts to substitute inferior quality Mazovian cochineal for the more valuable goods from Lithuania and Ruthenia. Cochineal trade was mainly conducted by the Poznań-based Jewish traders. However, the discovery of the New World and the more efficient dye obtained across the ocean from the American cochineal, dealt a decisive blow to the importance of cochineal trade in the city. By the middle of the 16th century, the American cochineal virtually supplanted both the Polish and Lithuanian variants from the market. The commonplaceness and historical economic importance of this insect is now reflected by the Polish word for the month of June (*czerwiec*), derived from the insect's name.[22]

Among the commodities that passed through Poznań in the opposite direction, i.e. to the East, through Warsaw or Lublin to Vilnius, and partly further to Moscow, the most important ones were cloth, clothing items, and metal products. Various kinds of cloth were exported, both those of high quality (initially from Flanders, and subsequently from England), medium quality (cloth from Lusatia and Silesia) and cheaper produce manufactured by local craftsmen in Greater Poland and Poznań. The enormous and continuous demand for this commodity on the part of eastern merchants became one of the main drivers for the dynamic development of sheep breeding and cloth manufacture in Greater Poland. Among ready-made garments,

21 L. Koczy, *Handel Poznania*, pp. 328–339.

22 Ibid., pp. 352–357.

Lithuanian and Ruthenian customers especially enjoyed hats, which were often purchased in batches of several thousand pieces. Other popular items included belts, socks, stockings, etc. Similarly to cloth, these articles were partly imported from Germany and Silesia, and partly sewn locally. As mentioned earlier, metal products in the late Middle Ages were a specialty of Nuremberg. Nurembergian sickles, knives, scissors, fasteners, etc. found an almost unlimited outlet in the East. Metal goods also made it to Poznań and Gniezno fairs from Bohemia and Silesia.[23]

While discussing the position of Poznań in the European transit trade of the late Middle Ages and early modern period, one should also mention the role of Gniezno, an urban center in the vicinity of and close cooperation with Poznań. Underestimated for a long time, the trade conducted in Gniezno at the time has only been properly researched and acknowledged in recent historiography, in particular by Jerzy Topolski, an outstanding expert in economic history of the early modern era. Topolski contended that the three annual fairs in Gniezno were a type of supplement to Poznań's own fairs (they were organized on complementary dates), with merchants from one city frequently attending the other's events, and a large part of trade traffic generated along the Poznań-Warsaw route passing through Gniezno. Nonetheless, Gniezno failed to reap benefits comparable to those derived by Poznań, according to J. Topolski mostly due to the fact that, unlike its larger neighbor, it did not develop a robust crafts sector and remained a mere transit point, a meeting place for foreign merchants. As the economic situation began to weaken in the mid-17th century, Gniezno found itself unable to find alternative sources of prosperity.[24]

The heyday of eastern trade, or more specifically the substantial role played in it by the overland route and the city of Poznań, came to an end in the mid-17th century. This state of affairs was a byproduct of a variety of factors, which were once more independent of the city itself or even the Kingdom of Poland as a whole. The wars that ravaged the German lands and Poland in that period (the Thirty Years' War in Germany 1618–1648 and the Swedish Deluge in Poland 1655–1660) caused great damage and disorganized commercial traffic, which was particularly evident along the overland routes. Moreover, the very idea of fairs fell out of fashion. Fairs used

23 For detailed information on goods exported to the East, see L. Koczy, *Handel Poznania*, pp. 282–322; J. Topolski, *Rola Gniezna*, pp. 37–44.

24 See J. Topolski, *Rola Gniezna*, pp. 5–78 (in particular Topolski's conclusions, pp. 74–75).

to attract merchants with concessions and exemptions offered individual towns holding those events. However, the days of this kind of trade organization gradually waned away. Instead of granting protections and privileges to one center or another, modern states began to pursue a comprehensive and conscious economic and trade policies. As a result, fairs lost their status as the most attractive transaction venues, and trade was more and more often conducted outside of their confines. The decisive role in the transformation of the eastern trade routes, however, was played by the growing Russian state and its active search of alternative routes to the West that bypassed the Lithuanian and Polish intermediaries. As early as the mid-16th century, Tsar Ivan IV the Terrible ventured to secure a 'window to the Baltic' for Russian trade by capturing Livonia and its ports (the so-called 'Narva shipping,' directed to Narva, which was temporarily occupied by Muscovy). While the attempt was ultimately unsuccessful, the reign of Ivan the Terrible saw the opening of the Russian port of Arkhangelsk on the White Sea to western sailors. Despite difficult climate and rough sailing conditions, prospects of handsome profits attracted more and more ships of the new maritime trading powers—the Netherlands and England—up north from the 17th century onwards. The victory of Peter I in the Great Northern War (1700–1721) and the permanent opening of the Russian state to the Baltic heralded a new era in eastern trade. The movement of goods once again shifted to the Baltic Sea, albeit under completely different conditions than during the medieval Hanseatic League. Polish trade, including that of Poznań, suffered greatly from these changes. It took a long time before the city found a new basis for prosperity and development. Nevertheless, it was during the several centuries of the late Middle Ages and the early modern period that Poznań saw its first period of splendid growth, along with a position of a great trading emporium connecting the East and the West, a position the city enjoyed for two centuries.

Magdalena Mrugalska-Banaszak

Three degrees of initiation: on the 16th-century decoration of the Poznań Town Hall

On Monday, March 3, 1550 Giovanni Battista di Quadro, a builder from the Lugano area, signed a contract with the councilmen of Poznań for the redevelopment of the Town Hall, the seat of the municipal authorities. Erected in the years 1306–1310 and subsequently reconstructed, the building was in poor condition. Particularly alarming was the state of its "wobbly" tower.[1] The contract stipulated that not only was master Quadro supposed to address the tower issue but also expand the Town Hall westwards and add another story to the building. The designed makeover and the projected course of construction works satisfied the city decision-makers so much that in 1552 Quadro was appointed the city architect. It was him who would turn the Town Hall into a municipal palace, and its interiors into an urban parlor. According to the majority of researchers, the reconstruction of the Town Hall was conducted in two main stages. The first lasted until 1555, while the second presumably took another five years.[2] However, this was not a definitive end, since for many years after 1560 various works on the building were still in progress, as evident from the municipal accounts, which should not come as a surprise given the large scale of the project. The times were favorable for the new investment. The 16th century marked the golden age of Poznań. The city's prosperous economic situation, established in the previous century, as well as lively cultural and trade contacts with Europe, fostered the development of education, printing and the arts. The Lubrański Academy, founded in 1518 and named after its founder, Jan Lubrański, the humanist Bishop of

1 A. Warschauer, *Historische Beiträge zur Wiederherstellungsfrage des Posener Rathauses*, "Historische Monatablätter für die Provinz Posen", vol. IV, June 1903, no. 6 p. 114.

2 For more on this subject, see the upcoming monograph on the Poznań Town Hall.

Poznań, became a "window on the world" where young people from bourgeois and noble families studied humanities, often continuing their education at the universities of Cracow, Padua or Bologna. The image of Poznań began to change. Its medieval character was slowly giving way to new artistic trends. Local decision makers were predominantly enlightened, educated and wealthy people, aware both of their position and the impact they had on the development of Poznań. They were intent on giving their residence a new Renaissance appeal, so that its architecture would command admiration and become a symbol of the city's power for all visitors and residents. Was this intention achieved?

I.

The most spectacular part of Quadro's masterpiece is the façade added to the eastern wall of the late-Gothic Town Hall, using the existing five-bay galleries. The façade of the Town Hall is unusually rich in both architecture and ornamentation. The space between the two outermost avant-corpse buttresses contains a three-story loggia set on a high base and supported by pillars and Doric and Tuscan semi-columns supporting the entablature. The shallow loggia interiors open towards the Market Square with five arcades on the first floor and the second floor, and double the number of arcades on the third floor. At the attic level, the corner buttresses transition into octagonal turrets. The third, central turret is hexagonal and taller than the other two. Between the outermost turrets rises a tall attic with "wavy" volute-palmetto ridges. This is the façade we see today, however it is not the one the citizens of the city saw once the second stage of reconstruction of the "City Palace" was completed. The passing of time brought further modifications, the most significant of which were introduced during the Prussian conservation of 1910–1913, when all three floors of the loggia were dismantled and then faithfully and carefully reconstructed.[3] The present appearance of the façade was also influenced by the works connected with the reconstruction of the town hall after the war damages in 1945. Thus, we are not dealing with a Quadro original, but with a copy that was supplemented in the following

3 T. Jakimowicz, *Ratusz poznański. Dokumentacja historyczna wykonana na zlecenie Wojewódzkiego Konserwatora Zabytków w Poznaniu na prawach rękopisu*, Poznań 1993, p. 80; W. Bettenstaedt, *Ratusz w Poznaniu i jego przebudowa w latach 1910–1913*, trans. M. Mikołajczak, introduction J. Skuratowicz, "Kronika Miasta Poznania" [hereinafter: KMP] 2004, no. 2, pp. 283–286; J. Mulczyński, *Malowanie ratusza, czyli jak Prusacy odnowili siedzibę magistratu w latach 1910–1913*, KMP 2004, no. 2, p. 291.

years. However, we may assume that what we see today corresponds to what Quadro designed, or at least is very close to the original (Fig. 1).

How does one "read" the façade of Poznań Town Hall? The subject has been covered by numerous researchers to date.[4] There is no doubt that when creating his *capolavoro* (masterpiece), Quadro relied on the treatise *Architettura* by Sebastiano Serlia, whose respective books were published starting from 1537. Some scholars also point to other possible sources of inspiration, e.g. the vault of the Renaissance Hall being patterned after the Palazzo del Té and Ducale in Mantua and the Pallazo Imperiale in Genoa.[5] As far as the loggia is concerned, similarities have been found between the Poznań Town Hall and other Polish designs, e.g. the galleries of the Wawel Royal Castle in Cracow, which may have directly or indirectly (see the façade of Villa Decius in Wola Justowska near Cracow, erected in the years 1530–1540) inspired its design.[6]

Let us begin our "reading" of the façade's programmatic agenda from the lintels of the first floor's five arcades, which are filled with ten paired personifications of virtues in the form of winged women with fair hair, blue eyes, and carmine lips, dressed in short red tunics. The values they represent are expressed by the attributes and majuscule inscriptions in wrapped, elongated cartouches. Thus, from the left we see Patience (PACI/ENCIA) with Prudence (PRUD/ENCIA), next to Love (CHAR/ITAS) and Justice (IUST/ICIA), Faith (FID/ES) with Hope (SP/ES), both with golden diadems on their heads. Fortitude (FORT/ITUDO) is juxtaposed with Temperance (TEMPE/RANCIA). In the last bay of the right arcade, Lucretia (LUCR/ECIA) neighbors with Cleopatra (CLEA/PARTI). The former was the wife of Tarquinius Colatinus; raped by the king's son, she confessed the truth to her husband before stabbing herself in the heart.[7] Suicide was also the fate of the Egyptian Queen Cleopatra following her defeat to Octavian Augustus in the Battle of Actium in 31 BC.

The women depicted in the archivolts of the first floor loggia personify both the cardinal virtues (Prudence, Justice, Temperance, and Fortitude) and divine theological virtues (Faith, Hope, and Love), complemented by Patience, a virtue indispensable to all human endeavors. More surprising

4 The most exhaustive analysis has been carried out by J. Kowalczyk, *Fasada ratusza poznańskiego. Recepcja form z traktatu Serlia i antyczny program*, [in:] "Rocznik Historii Sztuki", t. VIII, Warszawa 1970, pp. 141–173.

5 *Sesja naukowa Oddziału Poznańskiego Stowarzyszenia Historyków Sztuki poświęcona renesansowej sztuce Wielkopolski 10–11 marca 1967 roku*, ed. T. Rudkowski, [in:] "Biuletyn Historii Sztuki", no. 1, vol. XXX, Warszawa 1968, pp. 124–133, p. 131 (statement by Anna Rogalanka).

6 *Sesja naukowa*..., op. cit., p. 129 (statement by Feliks Markowski).

7 Ibid., p. 145.

are these ancient suicide victims. Both Cleopatra and Lucretia represent honor, courage, and fortitude, with Lucretia as the paragon of marital fidelity. From this accumulation of virtues emerges the image of the ideal citizen of a city and state, which can also be found in the northern part of the vault of the Renaissance Hall.

This image is further enhanced by winged figures placed in pairs in the arcades of the second story loggia. Until now, all authors dealing with the town hall have seen in them genii,[8] i.e. tutelary deities personifying the vital force of a man. They were attributed to every man, city and society.[9] These rearrangements correspond to the personifications of the virtues in the first floor logia,[10] with the exception that only one male figure (above the last arcade on the right) can be found in the arcade lintels; the others are winged women, or junos, the female counterparts of the male genii, and in the middle perhaps two victorias, personifications of victory, provided that the wreaths they hold were made of laurel rather than maple leaves. Each of these deities holds in one or both hands attributes ascribed to them in iconology: cornucopias symbolizing birth, fertility, happiness and blessing, bunches of grapes representing fertility, abundance and resurrection, as well as flowers signifying hope, virtue, innocence, marriage, birth, goodness.[11] The wreaths held by the central characters are problematic: if they are made of laurel leaves, they symbolize victory and power; if they are maple wreaths, they would simply be attributes of the genii or junos and their power.[12] The message behind the figures visible above the arches of the second floor loggia arcades seems obvious: every inhabitant of Poznań at that time had his or her deity, his or her guardian angel, as did the city itself, which was part of a great and invincible state.

Directly above these representations are medallions with images of figures from the ancient world, which, however, were placed on the façade of the Town Hall only in 1954.[13] In keeping with the spirit of the era, they depict ancient rebels, alongside scholars and artists: the brothers Gracchus and

8 See among others J. Kowalczyk, op. cit., p. 165.

9 A. Osiński, *Słownik mitologiczny: z przyłączeniem obrazu-pismu (iconologia)*, vol. II, Warszawa 1808, p. 149.

10 J. Kowalczyk, op. cit., p. 165.

11 W. Kopaliński, *Słownik symboli*, Warszawa 1990, pp. 184, 361, 468.

12 A. Osiński, op. cit., p. 149.

13 A. Rogalanka, *Dekoracja malarska Ratusza poznańskiego 1954 roku*, KMP 1997, no. 2, p. 394; The figures represented on the medallions were picked by Dr. Hanna Ziolkowska, the first director of the Town Hall - Museum of Poznań.



Fig 1. Town Hall's façade after the restoration works held between 1999 and 2001
1. Paired personifications of cardinal virtues in arcade lintels; from the left:
PATIENCE – PRUDENCE; LOVE – JUSTICE; FAITH – HOPE; FORTITUDE – TEMPERANCE; LUCRETIA – CLEOPATRA **2.** Winged junos **3.** Attic strip with representations of kings

Brutus, Archimedes and Vitruvius, Virgil and Homer, Justinian and Horace, and finally, Spartacus and the tyrant slayers Harmodios and Aristogeion. What Quadro envisaged in this section of the façade remains unknown. Perhaps it held the coats of arms of the Republic of Poland, the Jagiellonian dynasty, and the city itself? During the renovation of the Town Hall carried out in the 18th century under the auspices of the Commission of Good Order, it was here that the emblem of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and coats of arms were placed (Fig. 2) that may have referred to the solutions proposed by Quadro himself or his successors.

In Quadro's days, the façades of the Town Hall were also covered with polychromes and inscriptions[14] whose fragments were revealed by the research conducted by the German scholar Julius Kohte, and described in a paper published in 1910.[15] The best preserved part featured an inscription on the north wall which read: HOC OPUS ARTIFICIS JOHANNIS BABTISTAE [ITA]LICUIUS... ("this is the work of Master John Baptist the Italian"),[16] under which there was a cartouche with what was undoubtedly the architect's mark, and on the sides a compass and a triangle (identical to those in the Renaissance Hall). The second inscription, known today only from a poor quality photograph, was found on the frieze of the attic, also on the northern façade (Fig. 3).[17] Among the illegible elements, the image of an eagle and the coat of arms of Rogal, belonging to Mayor Kasper Goski, are clearly visible, which has led some researchers to conclude that it was Goski himself who had designed the façade's decorative themes.[18] The inscription indicates that the entire attic was filled with inscriptions of this type, blocked in eight or nine verses, and incomplete lines were complemented with ornaments. The text occupied the upper half of the attic's height, while the remaining half was taken up by an unidentified linear decoration.

The contract stipulated that Quadro would "plaster and dress" the walls of the Town Hall. And so it was done. According to the restorers' research conducted in 2000, he used the sgraffito technique to cover the walls of the

14 A. Rogalanka, *Źródła do zagadnienia malarskiej dekoracji fasad ratusza poznańskiego w epoce renesansu (streszczenie referatu)*, [in:] "Biuletyn Historii Sztuki", no. 2, vol. XVII, Warszawa 1955, p. 278.

15 J. Kohte, *Die Bemalung des Rathaus In Posen*, [in:] "Monatsblätter fűr die Provinz Posen", XI, 1910, 8, pp. 116–120.

16 J. Wiesiołowski, *Inskrypcje renesansowe na Rynku poznańskim*, KMP 2003, no. 2, pp. 139–140.

17 M. Owsiński, R. Rolewicz, *Ratusz w Poznaniu. Analiza fragmentu renesansowej dekoracji sgraffitowej na fragmencie fryzu attyki nad elewacją północną w oparciu o fotografię zamieszczoną w „Das Rathaus zu Posen ..." W. Bettenstaedta 1913* r., *(dokumentacja)*, Kraków 2001, snlb.

18 J. Wiesiołowski, op. cit., p. 138.



Fig. 2. Józef Mielcarzewicz, a view of the Town Hall (fragment), lithography, 1812, from the collection of Town Hall – Museum of Poznań

building with rectangular, light-colored bossage separated from one another by light brown strips of grout carved in the plaster.[19]

Thus, in Master Giovanni's time (and at his behest), the Town Hall was very colorful, if not flashy. Renaissance art was fond of intense colors and their juxtapositions. It was especially visible on the representative front, where figural representations in the arcade lintels and colorful architectural elements contrasted with the bright, bossaged façade. The impression of colorfulness was intensified here by the figural representations in the attic strip and in the blind arcades on the right and left side of each loggia. Unfortunately, little is known about them. According to Kohte, beneath the cornice girdling the single-pitched roof there were inscriptions from the second half of the 16th century referring to Casimir IV Jagiellon, Sigismund the Old and Sigismund Augustus.[20] This suggests that their images were placed in the attic strip, between the two outermost turrets. In total, as it is assumed, the façade carried eight "images of the Jagiellons, all crowned

19 *Dokumentacja powykonawcza prac konserwatorskich prowadzonych w latach 2000–2001 przy elewacji południowej Ratusza staromiejskiego w Poznaniu, Firma Konserwatorska Piotr Białko*, Poznań February 2003, vol. I, snlb

20 W. Bettenstaedt, *Das Rathaus in Posen und seine Herstellung in den Jahren 1910–1913*, Posen 1913, p. 80.

Fig. 3. A fragment of the inscription on the southern elevation of the Poznań Town Hall, in: W. Bettenstaedt, *Das Rathaus in Posen und seine Herstellung in den Jahren 1910–1913*, Posen 1913

representatives of the dynasty."[21] This is hardly surprising. Coats of arms or images of kings placed on the façade or inside the building sent a clear and transparent message: Poznań belonged to the Kingdom of Poland, and "the Town Hall was [and is] always dependent on the castle,"[22] i.e. the seat of the representative of royal power, namely the starost general. It was him who, on behalf of the king, selected the councilmen from among the submitted candidates, and had a say in decisions concerning urban management.

Both the façade and the other elevations had to be "read" as a whole, and this consisted of the representations on the façade, the inscriptions on the attics wrapped carpet-like "around" the building, and the architecture itself. An inquisitive viewer would learn about civic virtues (in the ancient, or more precisely Roman, edition), which—as one can easily guess—ought to be displayed by every model resident of a city/state. The inscriptions likely instructed one about one's duties to the city/state, as well as—beyond any doubt—just courts. That the latter were placed on the Town Hall beyond any doubt is ascertained by a pertinent fragment of the inscription, identified by Kohte on the frieze above the ground floor.[23] In turn, the king's proper exercise of power over his subjects, his honesty and moderation were described in two inscriptions referring to Aristotle's *Politics*, recorded at the end of the 16th century by the German traveler and humanist Nathan Chytraeus.[24] On the other hand, a symbol of the security that every citizen was supposed to be provided by his city was the attic with its three towers, treated as a *corona muralis*: an image of *civitas*, the city and its legal values. And so, after a "comprehensive reading" of the façade, the viewer reached the first level of initiation.

II.

A semi-circular staircase, directly borrowed from Serlia, led to the interior of the Town Hall. Today, the second floor of the building can be reached by a staircase built during the renovation after World War II. Previously, one

21 Z. Ostrowska-Kębłowska, *Architektura i budownictwo w Poznaniu w latach 1780–1880*, Poznań 2009, p. 101; The author does not provide the source of this information. She was certainly inspired by the inscription on Mielcarzewicz's drawing; see fig. 2.

22 P. Matusik, *Historia Poznania,* vol. I, Poznań 2021, pp. 145–146.

23 J. Kohte, op. cit., p. 117; NEC POTCIA TURPITER NEC METU RECTUM JUDICIUM REFRIGATUR.

24 J. Kowalczyk, op. cit., p. 166; see J. Wiesiołowski, op. cit., p. 145 for a Polish translation thereof: TYRRANUS FACIT QUOD PLACET, REX QUOD HONESTUM EST ("A tyrant does as he pleases, a king what is just"); UBI EST TEMPERATA POTESTAS, IBI REGNUM EST DIUTURNAUM ("Where there is moderate power, royal reign is durable").

had to turn right or left, right behind the door, in a rather narrow hallway, before taking the next staircase leading outside, to the loggia of the second floor. Here, one had to decipher the second step of the initiation, which was completely illegible to the modern audience, and even Quadro's contemporaries might have had a lot of problems in this regard. Currently, on the frieze of the second floor loggia—both on the outer wall of the building and opposite the viewer, above the loggia arches—one can see a set of 18 cartouches (completely reconstructed during the Prussian reconstruction) of two basic types: oval ones, including some with emblems or coats of arms of their owners, and rectangular ones, which are completely blank.[25] The shape of the cartouches and the choice of the ornamentation are reminiscent of Erazm Kamień's mold, and it is likely it was precisely him who designed them.[26] (Fig. 4). What one sees is a heraldic gallery, deciphered by Jacek Wiesiołowski's insightful analysis.[27] He identified the house marks/coats of arms of two mayors, Jan Kośmider and Kasper Goski, placed in oval cartouches, as well as six councilors and the alderman, who were members of the city council appointed on September 25, 1555 by Janusz Kościelecki, starost general of Greater Poland, after the mysterious and hasty dismissal of the previous council. We do not know what happened in 1555, as the city clerk did not care to spare a single word on the subject, and the accounts from the years 1549–1559, from the time of the Town Hall's reconstruction, have been lost, a fact recorded as early as in 1654.[28] Why was the city council abruptly dismissed, and did the "disappearance" of the bills have anything to do with it? The new council governed Poznań for two terms, that is, until September 21, 1557, which enables one to determine more precisely when the loggia was built. Everything indicates that in the second stage of the reconstruction of Quadro's Town Hall, the loggia was completed in the fall of 1557, and for the next two years works were conducted on the decoration of the façade and the remaining elevations.

25 T. Jakimowicz, op. cit., p. 81.

26 J. Kowalczyk, op. cit., p. 171.

27 J. Wiesiołowski, *Galeria heraldyczna ratusza poznańskiego*, KMP 1997, no. 3, pp. 337–354. Prior to Wiesiołowski's study, only the Rogal coat of arms of the aforementioned Kasper Goski had been recognized, see J. Kowalczyk, op. cit., pp. 169–173.

28 W. Maisel, *Zabudowa wewnętrzna rynku poznańskiego w wieku XVI*, [in:] "Przegląd Zachodni" 1953, no. 9–12, p. 107; according to Maisel, the bills from the years 1551–1560 are missing. Zofia Wojciechowska of the State Archives in Poznań established that the missing bills covered the period between November 1, 1549 and August 27, 1559.

Fig. 4. The front page of the pattern book by Erazm Kamień, photograph from the collection of Town Hall – Museum of Poznań

From the second floor loggia, two authentic 16th-century portals lead to the Renaissance Hall. Quadro transformed the design of Serlia's Doric portal and added some Mannerist features by placing solid, life-sized male heads on the tympana: a young man on the left, and an old man on the right one (Fig. 6, 7). Kohte saw analogies here with Donato Bramante's life-sized heads in the sacristy in the church of Santa Maria Presso San Satiro in Milan.[29] Some less remote examples include the heads placed on the ceiling of the Envoy Hall, one of the most representative interiors of the Wawel Royal Castle in Cracow.[30] Both the portals and the heads are very vivid and painted with the same color shades as the façade. The two heads are most certainly tied to the decorative themes of the Poznań Town Hall; in Renaissance decorations and representations, everything had a "second meaning," referred to something and meant something. Maybe they, too, are genii,

29 J. Kohte, *Verzeichniss der Kunstsenkmäler der Provinz Posen*, Berlin 1896, p. 76.
30 K. Kuczman, *Renesansowe głowy wawelskie*, Kraków 2004, pp. 11, 25, 34, 76–77.



Fig. 5. An identification of heraldic cartouches by Jacek Wiesiołowski, in: "Kronika Miasta Poznania" 1997, no. 3

admittedly lacking their attributes: the youth may stand for the genius of good, while the old man for that of evil.[31]

III.

One of the portals of the second floor loggia leads to the Renaissance Hall, where the third level of initiation awaits. The work on its vault was completed in 1555, as indicated by the date repeated as many as four times.[32] The vault and its decoration have been a source of admiration since their inception, and this admiration continues to this day. Despite the fact that the vault has been the subject of many academic studies,[33] several fundamental questions have remained unanswered: who designed the decoration, what message does it convey and, finally, whose work is it? The vault spans the entire width of the building and has the shape of an elongated rectangle (measuring 11x15 m). The size and shape of the room led to its division into two parts (north and south) along the axis of the entire building. Each of them was covered with a sail vault with lunettes. Thus, two naves were cre-

31 A. Osiński, op. cit., p. 149.

32 Dates are visible in the three following places: in the north part, under the coat of arms of Poznań and near the depictions of David; in the south part, next to Christ's head.

33 T. Jakimowicz, *Ład kosmosu, ład państwa, ład miasta. Dekoracja sklepienia Sali Renesansowej Ratusza*, KMP 2004, no. 2, pp. 81–98; see also earlier literature on the subject.

Fig. 6. An old man's head over a portal leading from the loggia to the Renaissance Hall, photo by Grzegorz Dembiński

ated, separated by three spans of arcades stretched between the pillars and pilasters supporting the vault.

The line of pillars determines the compositional axis of the interior, in which the viewer's attention is drawn to the vault. In both naves the central point is a coffer in the form of an even-armed cross that determines the symmetrical arrangement of the other coffers. Four hexagonal coffers were placed on the east-west axis and three on the north-south axis in two rows, with the central coffers larger than the others (and placed at the intersection of both axes). The remaining space is complemented by octagonal and cross coffers, in an alternating arrangement. While the latter organize the vault decorations, the octagonal ones provide a strong accent that rounds off the entire composition. All coffers are filled with figural and floral decorations made of polychrome stucco, with the basic motif of an acanthus, held together by a *kimathion*, i.e., a braided ornament executed in the sgraffito technique, and each of its folds is accentuated with a rosette. The coffers also feature winged putti, skulls and human heads draped with fancifully knotted scarves, caps and crowns. Given their realistic features, it is possible

Fig. 7. A young man's head over a portal leading from the loggia to the Renaissance Hall, photo by Grzegorz Dembiński

that some portrayed real-life individuals. Similarly to the arrangement of the coffers on the vault, the organization of the decorative elements is governed by a uniform and consistently followed compositional principle, which is also an exponent of the vault's substantive agenda.

And what did the person stepping into the Renaissance Hall see on its vault? Let us remember that one entered the room from the loggia rather than through the staircase leading up to the first floor. Let us assume that the visitor's first steps were directed to the northern section of the room (Fig. 8, 9). The next item that emerged in front of the visitor was the coat of arms of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in an oval cartouche, topped with a closed crown (reserved for kings and emperors) supported by two putti. The torso of the eagle is encircled by a royal cypher: the letters SA (Sigismundus Augustus). Next to this coat of arms is the Eagle of the Polish Crown (the coat of arms of Sigismund the Old), with the putti holding a shield rather than a crown. Next sits the coat of arms of the Sforza family, with two herms on the sides, one male and one female. On the eastern wall, one can see the full coat of arms of the city of Poznań, with acanthus tendrils

penetrating the folded edges of cartouches; the shield is held by a pair of putti. In the cross-shaped coffer, above Poznań's coat of arms, there is a ram's head bearing the date "1555" underneath. Next to the cartouche, to its left, in a hexagonal coffer, in the midst of floral ornaments, sits an owl, while the opposite coffer bears initials in the form of two superimposed letters ("HW") and crossed stonemason's tools: a round hammer and a chisel. The central part of the vault is decorated with the coat of arms of the Habsburg dynasty (with Quadro's mark right below it), which neighbors with the White Knight of Lithuania and King Sigismund Augustus; in this case, the coat of arms is held by two squires wearing short tunics and calpacs. Below this coffer, a small-sized coat of arms of the city of Poznań was added. This heraldic gallery is a concise history lesson: Poznań was cast as part of the Commonwealth of Poland and Lithuania, even though the two had not yet formally united (that would only come to pass in 1569). At the time of Quadro's makeover of the Poznań Town Hall, Poland was reigned by Sigismund Augustus, son of Sigismund the Old and Bona Sforza, married to Catherine of Austria.

The central coffer with a rosette is surrounded by four octagonal ones with moving figurative scenes. According to the inscription, the first one (on the western side) features Marcus Curtius (MARCUS CURCIUS), a Roman soldier and hero. When in 362 BC a huge chasm opened in the Roman Forum, Curtius sacrificed himself by jumping into it on horseback, which caused the gap to close.[34] Another character is the Old Testament's Samson (SAMSON), depicted killing a lion with his bare hands. Opposite Marcus Curtius is David (DAWIT), who is about to slay the giant Philistine warrior Goliath with a slingshot. The final figure is Hercules (HERCULES), who while performing his tenth labor, en route to retrieve the oxen from the monster Geryon, erects columns commemorating his journeys.[35] The prototype of this representation can be found in the 1545 copperplate *Hercules setting up the gates of Gades* by Hans Sebald Behem.[36] According to the German researcher Hans Wispler, the copperplate was a direct inspiration for the Poznań piece, and in fact it would be difficult to argue otherwise.[37]

Conversely, in the southern part of the room, (Fig. 10, 11) the central coffer features a female head with a crown and acanthus leaves on both

34 R. Piętka, *Herakles i Kurcjusz na sklepieniu Sali Renesansowej*, KMP 2004, no. 2, p. 107.

35 R. Piętka, op. cit., p. 103.

36 J. Banach, *Hercules Polonus. Studium z ikonografii sztuki nowożytnej*, Warszawa 1984, p. 27.

37 H. Wispler, *Über die Stuckbilder an den GewÖlben des Posener Rathauses*, Lissa 1912, p. 23, fig. 25.



Fig. 8. A layout of depictions in the northern section of the Renaissance Hall:
1. Coat of arms of the Polish and Lithuanian Commonwealth; **2.** Engraved date: 1555; **3.** Vytis, the coat of arms of Lithuania and King Sigismund Augustus; **4.** David and Goliath; **5.** Eagle, the coat of arms of the Crown and King Sigismund the Old; **6.** Engraved date: 1555. **7.** Hercules; **8.** Samson; **9.** Coat of arms of the Habsburgs; **10.** Marcus Curtius; **11.** Coat of arms of the Sforzas; **12.** The Owl; **13.** HW initials **14.** Ram's/billy goat's head; **15.** Coat of arms of Poznań



Fig. 9. Coat of arms of Poznań on the vault of the Renaissance Hall, photograph by R.S. Ulatowski, late 1920s, from the collection of Town Hall – Museum of Poznań

sides. On the vault, one can see the personifications of Ptolemy's seven planets,[38] with the stationary Earth at the center of the Universe (represented by the central cross-shaped coffer on the vault), and seven celestial bodies revolving around it, placed in octagonal coffers with their corresponding zodiac signs.

The first among them is the Moon (LUNA), signifying the secret facets of Nature, love and constancy, but also its opposites, nobility and purity;[39] it is pictured as a young woman in airy vestment, holding a javelin and the moon, with the zodiac sign of Cancer at her feet. Behind her stands Mercury (MERCURIUS), the guide of human souls,[40] dressed in Renaissance robes, with a winged hat on his head, a caduceus in his left hand and a horn in the other. At the bottom, one can identify his zodiac signs, the Twins and Virgo. Venus (VENUS), depicted with flowing hair, is seen slightly from behind. She holds a burning heart in her left hand and an arrow in her right. Her accompanying signs are Libra and Taurus. The Sun (SOL)[41] is presented as a man with a dark beard, with a crown on his head. The man carries a torch in his raised left hand, while in his right hand he wields a shield with the image of the Sun, resting it against his foot. He is accompanied by Lion. The Sun is a symbol of infinity, heaven, new beginnings, light and fire.[42] In the Christian religion, it symbolizes immortality and resurrection.[43] Next in line is Mars (MARS), the god of war, with a long spear (his attribute) in his right hand; and Aries and Scorpio alongside him. Jupiter (IUPITER), the god of the sky, ruler of the earth and "father of the gods," is seen with a bared sword. At his feet are Sagittarius and a siren akin to Virgo at the feet of Mercury. The last planet is Saturn (SATTURNUS) symbolizing time, "greedily devouring all life, all its creations: beings, things, thoughts, feelings;"[44] he is depicted raising a naked child towards his open mouth with his left hand and holding a scythe—a symbol of death—in his right hand. Saturn's accompanying zodiac signs are Aquarius and Capricorn.

38 T. Jakimowicz, *Ład kosmosu*, p. 86.

39 W. Kopaliński, op. cit., pp. 179–181; J. E. Cirlot, *Słownik symboli*, Kraków 2007, pp. 211–213.

40 J. E. Cirlot, op. cit., pp. 251–252.

41 According to a 1903 photograph and the records of the Prussian conservation, the original inscription read: SUNA.

42 W. Kopaliński, op. cit., pp. 387–390.

43 M. Battistini, *Symbole i alegorie,* Warszawa 2005, p. 192.

44 J. E. Cirlot, op. cit., p. 361.

The planets are accompanied by creatures from the world of fantasy and by exotic animals full of symbolic significance, placed in octagonal coffers. On the western side, there is the Eagle (AQUILA), which is a symbol of the heavens, the Sun, fire, the beginning and omnipotence of God, the power of faith, and longevity.[45] The next animal is the Leopard (LEOPARTUS); placed on the volute, it signifies speed, merciless strength, ferocity, pride and courage.[46] The Leopard is situated next to the royal animal, i.e. the Lion (LEO), a symbol of wisdom, courage, victory, fortitude, masculinity, but also cruelty and bloodthirstiness.[47] Next to the lion is the flying Pegasus (PEGASUS), considered the patron of fine arts, but also a symbol of the transformation of evil into good.[48] In its vicinity, one can spot the Griffin (GRYPHUS), a predatory, winged hybrid creature combining the head, wings, and talons of an eagle with the torso of a lion, which has many radically different undertones ranging from courage, perseverance, vigilance and prowess to greed, pride and vengeance. Since the 14th century, the Griffin has also been featured as a sign of the dual (human and divine) nature of Christ.[49] Then there is the Elephant (ELEPHANTUS), symbolizing wisdom, longevity, piety, prosperity, luck, strength, power and pride.[50] Rounding off this bestiary is the Rhinoceros (RENOCRUS), standing sideways in between the trees, and signifying constancy, prosperity, and peace.[51]

The flattened hexagonal and cross coffers are filled with floral ornaments, two of which are unique. The first is located between the Sun and Venus; at the crossing of the arms, one can notice the head of Christ wearing a crown of thorns surrounded by a laurel wreath, and above it the letters IHS. On the horizontal arms of the cross there is the date "15–55," and below Christ's head one can notice a pair of crossed stonemason's tools, the hammer and chisel, mirroring those on the coat of arms of the city of Poznań. As per some accounts, Quadro had himself portrayed on the vault, with his face modelling for that of Christ.[52] On the other hand, the opposite coffer features the face of

45 W. Kopaliński, op. cit., pp. 284–287.

46 J. Tresidder, *Słownik symboli. Ilustrowany przewodnik po tradycyjnych wyobrażeniach obrazowych, znakach ikonicznych i emblematach*, Warszawa 2005, p. 107.

47 W. Kopaliński, op. cit., pp. 194–196; J. Tresidder, op. cit., pp. 109–111; M. Battistini, op. cit., p. 106.

48 J. E. Cirlot, op. cit., pp. 303–304.

49 J. Tresidder, op. cit., pp. 59–60.

50 W. Kopaliński, op. cit., pp. 385–387; J. Tresidder, op. cit., pp. 196–197.

51 J. Tresidder, op. cit., p. 141.

52 Z. Zaleski, *Przewodnik po Ratuszu Poznańskim*, Poznań 1929, p. 25; M. Wicherkiewiczowa, *Z dawnych dni Poznania. Cienie Ratusza*, "Dziennik Poznański" no. 87, 12 IV 1937.



Fig. 10. A layout of depictions in the southern section of the Renaissance Hall:
1. The Eagle; **2.** Jupiter; **3.** The Sun; **4.** The Rhinoceros ; **5.** Mars; **6.** Christ's head, engraved date: 1555, stonemason's tools; **7.** The Leopard; **8.** Saturn; **9.** Venus; **10.** The Elephant; **11.** The Pegasus; **12.** The Lion; **13.** The Moon; **14.** Mercury; **15.** The Griffin

Fig. 11. The Renaissance Hall, photograph, 1954, from the collection of Town Hall – Museum of Poznań

an old man emerging from acanthus leaves and surrounded by golden rays; it is believed to depict Moses, the iconic protagonist of the Old Testament.[53] In short, the designers of the vault's decorations embedded the ancient/pagan universe in the Christian world. A clear message was created: Christ guards the cosmic order in a specific time (the year 1555) and place (Poznań's coat of arms). Thus, a finite composition was attained, in which the cosmos was seen as the perfect work of God, present in a specific historical time.

How should one read the vault in its decorative layer, and what message does it convey? The heraldic coffers in the northern part of the Renaissance Hall refer to the state and the ruler, as well as municipal power. As in the façade, the four depictions of ancient and biblical heroes relate to civic duties and virtues. They all embody courage, bravery, male prowess. Apart from those, Marcus Curtius conveys the supreme sacrifice of life for the city/homeland; David, also understood as a prefiguration of Christ, symbolizes wisdom; Hercules is an allegory of the victory of good over evil, and perhaps

53 T. Jakimowicz, *Ład kosmosu*, op. cit., p. 89.

also a symbol of long-distance trade, which may refer to Poznań's patricians, the majority of whom were merchants.[54] It is on the traits represented by the figures depicted in the vault state power, symbolized by the coats of arms of the Commonwealth and the Jagiellonian dynasty, should be founded; so should the prosperity of the city whose coat of arms appears in the coffer in the eastern section of the vault. Also not without significance is the owl sitting on a scroll of paper slightly above the coat of arms, evocative of the knowledge and wisdom of the residents of Poznań and, above all, those of its authorities. In a nutshell, the decorations in the northern section of the vault portray an ideal, perfect, exemplary citizen of the state and city.

The decoration of the vault in the southern section, somewhat chaotic from today's point of view, tells a multi-thread story about the position of humans in the universe, yet it is not detached from the narrative that the viewer "read" while gazing at the ceiling of the northern nave, since it concerns precisely those to whom the message contained in those coffers was addressed. It is a peculiar entrustment of a citizen of the city/state "into the care of the almighty forces of heaven."[55] Mysterious as it may seem to us, the residents of Renaissance Poznań (especially educated ones) had no problem deciphering the message. Back then, astrology was omnipresent in everyday life, and so were the stories of biblical and ancient heroes.

In the mid-1960s, Zdzisław Kępiński interpreted the images on the coffers in a different way, perhaps from a new perspective, tracing them to a broad spectrum of "16th-century historical and astronomical (pre-Copernican!) knowledge" and relating the decorations to the political and social situation of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Poznań.[56] According to him, in the Renaissance Hall "the planetary world and the world of society, the physical cosmos and the social cosmos are shown in tandem, with Jagiellonian Poland cast as the model of social structure, with a clear agitation in favor of the stability of the dynasty and against the parliament of nobles. Needless to say, the bourgeois element and the role of cities within the commonwealth is represented by Poznań. (...)."[57] This "bourgeois element" was also strongly reflected in the decoration of the Red Room of the Gdańsk Town Hall, added at the turn of the 16th and 17th century, which defined the "position of the

54 R. Piętka, op. cit., p. 105.

55 T. Jakimowicz, *Ład kosmosu*, op. cit., p. 91.

56 Ibid., pp. 82, 89; see also for more on Zdzisław Kępiński's interpretation of the coffers.

57 Z. Kępiński, *Wprowadzenie*, [in:] E. Iwanoyko, *Apoteoza Gdańska*, Gdańsk 1976, p. 8.

city in relation to the superior royal authority," emphasizing that "the city authority has no right to bow down even to the king whenever the interests of the urban community are at stake."[58]

Kępiński interpreted the southern part of the vault in a particularly interesting way. He argued that it could be decoded on three levels. He noticed the depictions of four elements, distributed concentrically around the central cross coffer: Pegasus referencing air, Venus representing water, Mars signifying fire and Saturn symbolizing Earth. The vault also shows the four temperaments of man (according to Hippocrates): the sanguine is represented by Jupiter, the choleric by Mars, the melancholic by Saturn, and the phlegmatic by the Moon. The third and last level, likely the most important one, denotes the transience of human life, from birth (the Moon), through youth (Venus), maturity (Mars), to old age and its end, i.e. death (Saturn). According to Teresa Jakimowicz, this ambiguous interpretation of the performances in this part of the Renaissance Hall "is in agreement with elementary >rules< and concepts of astrology. Also, given the multiplicity of symbolic meanings of individual representations, it exposes an adequately trained reader to almost infinite possibilities of deeper interpretation that draws on symbolic foundations."[59]

Who designed the decoration of the Renaissance Hall? This question has been troubling researchers for years, with no consensus on the subject.[60] Two names have been suggested; Józef Struś and Kasper Goski. I would also like to mention Walenty Reszka. Struś, the most eminent Polish physician at the time, was born in Poznań in 1510, attended the Lubrański Academy, and in 1531 received his Master of Liberal Arts degree at the University of Cracow, after which he went to Padua. In 1535, he received a doctoral degree in medicine and was commissioned by the Venetian senate as an associate professor of theoretical medicine. He was physician to Princess Isabella, daughter of King Sigismund the Old, and also treated his son and heir Sigismund Augustus, eventually becoming his personal physician.[61] He practiced medicine in

58 E. Iwanoyko, op. cit., p. 32.

59 E. Piętka, op. cit., p. 99; T. Jakimowicz, *Ład kosmosu*, op. cit., p. 89. It is also worth mentioning Tadeusz Doktór's interpretation published in 1986; Doktór rather arbitrarily assumes the image of Mars as the focal point of the decoration, concluding that the representation expresses the horoscope of Poznań for the year 1555, see. T. Doktór, *Astrologiczne treści dekoracji sklepienia Ratusza w Poznaniu*, [in:] "Biuletyn Historii Sztuki", no. 2–4, vol. XLVIII, Warszawa 1986, pp. 215–216.

60 T. Jakimowicz, *Ład kosmosu*, op. cit., p. 82.

61 B. Bujałowska, *Józef Struś z Poznania w 400 rocznicę śmierci lekarza i uczonego epoki Odrodzenia. Przewodnik wystawy*, Poznań 1968, pp. 21–35; M. J. Mika, *Doktor Józef Strusiek i jego ród*, KMP 2001, no. 1, pp. 41–55.

Poznań, where he returned in 1543, also serving as the city mayor between 1557 and 1559.[62] He gained great fame and recognition after the publication of his opus *On Pulse* in Basel, which he took 20 years to research. He died between July 27, 1568 and January 2, 1569, succumbing to bubonic plague that ravaged Poznań.[63]

Kasper Goski first studied the Lubrański Academy, and between 1541 and 1547 he continued his education at the University of Cracow; after receiving his master's degree, he spent a short time working at the university while at the same time serving as the rector of the parish school at St. Anne's Church. In 1547, he returned to Poznań before heading for Padua two years later. In 1551, he received his doctoral degree in medicine and a year later he settled in Poznań. His career in the municipal authorities with the post of mayor in 1555, followed by six more terms in office.[64] Most important for the Renaissance reconstruction of the Poznań Town Hall was his interest in astronomy and astrology. He became famous for his prognostication, which he began to work on towards the end of his studies in Italy. He was most widely known for predicting the victory of the Venetians over the Turks in the bloody Battle of Lepanto in 1571. Goski died in 1576.[65]

Last but not least, there was Walenty Reszka, or rather Walenty of Stargard (Gdański), subsequently dubbed Reszka. In the context of Quadro's redevelopment of the Poznań Town Hall, Reszka tends to be an unfairly overlooked figure, who may have significantly contributed to the realization of the project as we know it. This is a mere hypothesis not supported by sources, but it may be substantiated by the person of Reszka himself, as well as his life and achievements. In 1499, Walenty enrolled at the University of Cracow, in 1511 he obtained the title of Doctor of Philosophy and Medicine in Bologna (where he also studied astrology), and continued his education towards a doctorate in both laws. Having established ties with Paweł Holszański, Bishop of Łuck, he travelled a lot, among others to Rome, Cracow, and Lwów. Walenty settled in Poznań by 1520 at the latest, serving five terms as a member of the city council (1528–1536) and holding the mayoral office eleven times (1527–1555).[66] In 1522, he purchased the tenement at Stary Rynek 43 (expanding his

62 *Władze miasta Poznania*, vol. I 1253–1793, eds. J. Wiesiołowski, Z. Wojciechowska, Poznań 2003, pp. 113–114.

63 M. J. Mika, op. cit., p. 48.

64 *Władze miasta Poznania*, op. cit., pp, 112–115, 122, 126, 130, 135, 138–139.

65 J. Wiesiołowski, *Diariusz studencki burmistrza Goskiego*, KMP 1999, no. 1, pp. 68–69.

66 J. Wiesiołowski, *Młode lata doktora Reszki, burmistrza poznańskiego*, KMP 2001, no. 1, p. 32.

property in 1526 to include the neighboring one at Stary Rynek 42),[67] which was pivotal for his alleged involvement in the renovation. Why was that? Both tenements stood opposite the Town Hall and Reszka saw the seat of the city authorities from the windows of his house every day. For a man of the world, familiar with the architecture of Italian cities, the view of the late gothic structure with its "wobbly" tower was likely far from pleasing to the eye. One more crucial issue, which proves Reszka's aesthetic sensitivity, is the decoration of the tenement house at Stary Rynek 43. The chamber in the back passage of the second floor was lined with a coffered ceiling, which was filled with 99 wooden tondos with semi-plastic busts of men and women in Renaissance costumes and headgear, of which 12 have survived till the present day. Contemporary researchers believe that the ceiling decorations in Reszka's house, dated around 1550, are unique for Poland of his era. Some compare them to the famous headed ceiling of the Envoys' Hall at the Wawel Royal Castle.[68] In turn, the walls of the tenement house were covered with paintings and Latin inscriptions.[69]

Reszka's education, which "stood out from that of his peers,"[70] his stay in other cities and in Italy, along with his possession of a "serious library,"[71] and his sensitivity to the aesthetic values of his surroundings, incline one to conclude that that he was not indifferent to the preparations for the redevelopment of the Town Hall; more than that, he may have influenced those preparations. As was the case with his successors in the city council and, at the same time, his "colleagues," Józef Struś and Kasper Goski. Three eminent (if not the most eminent) representatives of the Poznań patriciate. Who among them, then? Or was it all three, or perhaps someone different altogether?

The identity of the builder of the vault remains unresolved, too. The architecture of the Renaissance Hall is undoubtedly the work of Giovanni Battista Quadro, who relied on the models from Sebastian Serlia's treatise. The Palazzo della Cancelleria (the Chancellery Palace) in Rome, built between 1496 and 1496, is also worth mentioning on account of being the first building

67 Based on "Kartoteka właścicieli kamienic przyrynkowych w Poznaniu" [Owners' directory for tenements around the market square in Poznań], compiled by M. J. Mika (see the Archives of the Town Hall – Museum of Poznań); Reszka purchased the tenement at Stary Rynek 42 until 1549; P. Korduba, *O kamienicach przyrynkowych*, KMP 2003, no. 2, pp. 95–101.

68 A. Kuczman, op. cit., pp. 106–108; *Atlas architektury Poznania*, ed. J. Pazder, Poznań 2008, p. 277.

69 W. Gałka, *O architekturze i plastyce dawnego Poznania do końca epoki baroku*, Poznań 2001, p. 191.

70 M. Wicherkiewiczowa, *Rynek poznański i jego patrycjat*, Poznań 1998, p. 66.

71 M. Wojciechowska, *Z dziejów książki w Poznaniu w XVI wieku*, Poznań 1927, pp. 97, 106.

in the Eternal City designed according to the new Renaissance style by an unknown architect.[72] The arrangement of the ceiling coffers in the antechamber of the Roman palace and the one in the Renaissance Hall of the Poznań Town Hall is the same. The Poznań work of Master Giovanni has been "signed" with his mark, i.e. a triangle and a compass (e.g. on the northern elevation), visible under the Sforza coat of arms. Another mark was placed on the opposite side underneath the Habsburg coat of arms; is it the letter "A" and a reversed "J?" On the other hand, under the coat of arms of Poznań, one may find the initials "HW," referring to an artist who was certainly not only a stucco worker but also a stonemason, as indicated by two tools embedded in the vault: a chisel and a hammer (nearby Poznań's coat of arms and Christ's head).[73] According to Teresa Jakimowicz, when creating his work, the artist initialed "HW" must have made use of Andreas Alciat's *Emblematum Libellus*, the first book of emblems, whose first edition was published in 1531 in Augsburg, and whose copy was found in Poznań's book collections.[74] Jakimowicz does not preclude the cooperation of the "HW" monographer with a prominent representative of Poznań patricians, a long-standing elder of the goldsmiths' guild, Erazm Kamień (Kamyn),[75] the author of a book of patterns published in 1552, which was used by goldsmiths, stucco workers, etc. He must have known Giovanni Battista Quadro, and in turn the latter must have been privy to his pattern book, which was the first publication of this kind in Poland at the time.[76] It cannot be ruled out that it left its mark on the architect and prompted him to recommend, or even order, "HW" and the stonemasons working in the Renaissance Hall to use it as a reference.

The completion of the vault did not mean that the entire Renaissance Hall was finished. The work continued, although an analysis of the surviving clearly indicates that the pace slowed down. In 1563, the Renaissance Hall

72 K. Ulatowski, *Architektura włoskiego renesansu*, Warszawa 1964, p. 119; W. Koch, *Style w architekturze. Arcydzieła budownictwa europejskiego od antyku po czasy współczesne*, Warszawa 1996, p. 309.

73 In the subject literature, a hypothesis was once put forward (and quickly refuted) that the artist initialed "HW" was Hans Walter; see T. Jakimowicz, *Wielka Sień Ratusza poznańskiego. Dokumentacja historyczna,* Poznań 1978, pp. 52–55.

74 M. Kramperowa, W. Maisel, *Księgozbiory mieszczan poznańskich z drugiej połowy XVI wieku*, [in:] "Studia i materiały do dziejów Wielkopolski i Pomorza", vol. 6, no. 1, 1960, pp. 264, 265, 291, 293, 294.

75 T. Jakimowicz, *Ład kosmosu*, op. cit., p. 94. For more on Erazm Kamień's guild functions, see *Spis złotników poznańskich od XV do XVIII wieku wg Tadeusza Nożyńskiego. Materiały do dziejów złotnictwa poznańskiego* compiled by Z. Dolczewski, KMP 2000, no. 1, pp. 17–18.

76 T. Jakimowicz, *Sztuka renesansu i manieryzmu w Poznaniu*, [in:] *Dzieje Poznania*, vol. I, pt. 1, ed. J. Topolski, Warszawa-Poznań 1988, p. 589.

saw the painting of the decorative frieze below the line of the vault,[77] and more paintings were added in 1588.[78]

Let us recapitulate the findings concerning the entire decorative scheme of the Poznań Town Hall. The contents of its iconographic agenda refer to the city and the state, and to the duties and virtues of their citizens. It is a philosophical and moral story about an ideal human being, which can be read from the façade of the Town Hall (cardinal and theological features) and the northern part of the vault, supplemented with a cosmological and planetary layer in the neighboring section of the vault and with inscriptions in the attic. The substance of the decorations also includes the metaphysical aspect of human life dependent on objective astral forces, as well as the ethical dilemma of humans, who by force of their will make choices between good and evil. A clear moral message of work and sacrifice for the city/state is conveyed by the decoration of both the façade and the Renaissance Hall. It corresponds with the function of the building as the seat of the city authorities and its official parlor. The content of the Town Hall decorations intertwines three motifs: antique, biblical and astrological ones, which link two worlds: pagan and Christian, as undeniably proved by Christ's head placed in the southern part of the vault. In short, the building is a testament to the Christianization of antiquity and, at the same time, to Christianity succumbing to the pressure of pagan, ancient and classical ethics, so characteristic of the Renaissance. Finally, the decorations determine the position of the human being in the world of ancient mythology and biblical accounts, translated into their position in the earthly community. One is tempted to argue that the decor of the Town Hall manifested the Renaissance attitude of *joie de vivre* preached by the humanists, who, referring to the world of mythology, deeply believed in one God that combined all positive features of pagan deities and planets.

Another important feature in the decorative agenda are the royal and state coats of arms and the figures of the kings themselves represented on the façade. Perhaps the authors of the concept intended them as a visual panegyric in honor of King Sigismund I and his son Sigismund Augustus, an apotheosis of the monarchical unions of the Jagiellons, Sforzas and Habsburgs, and all the people (including the citizens of Poznań) united under their scepter.

77 W. Maisel, *Sądownictwo miasta Poznania do końca XVI wieku*, Poznań 1961, p. 249; T. Jakimowicz, *Ład kosmosu*, op. cit., p. 81.

78 W. Maisel, *Sądownictwo*, op. cit., p. 249 (the said paintings were done for a fee of 4 florins).

Yet another interpretation would have one decipher the façade decoration as a social macrocosm, and the vault representations in the Renaissance Hall as a microcosm of the human individual in two aspects resulting from the bipartite nature of the interior. In the southern one we deal with a bestiary showing the fate of humans determined by the planets and the attendant. In the northern part of the interior, on the other hand, one can "read" how to shape one's fate (originally determined by the stars) based on the cardinal virtues. The two male heads in the tondos placed above the portals leading to the Renaissance Hall may be a combination of macro- and microcosmic content: "the head of a young man on the side of pre-determined fate and the head of an old man, which would represent mastery over the forces of nature."[79]

The analysis of the decorations on the façade of the Poznań Town Hall leads one to conclude that it was the antique (Roman) world that provided inspiration for the city as far as its political system was concerned; clearly visible in the façade is the concept of the city-republic as a *polis*. First accentuated on the eastern wall, the emphasis on "antiquity as a model for the city and its citizens found an excellent continuation in the thematic design of the Renaissance Hall decorations. The realization of such an interesting and ambitious ideological and artistic design was possible thanks to the fact that the Poznań patriciate embraced the new humanistic culture, and the positions of mayors and aldermen were routinely filled by thoroughly educated individuals."[80]

79 *Sesja naukowa*, op. cit., p. 131 (statement by Anna Rogalanka).
80 Ibid., pp. 127–128 (statement by Jerzy Kowalczyk).


POSNANIA
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Karol Kościelniak

The impact of the Seven Years' War on Poznań in the 1750s and 1760s

The 18th century, especially the years 1715–1789, witnessed a number of wars triggered in a very special way by rational economic calculations. Economic considerations were at the heart of European politics throughout the century. In line with the principles of mercantilism, European states began to prioritize the growth of wealth, emphasizing the need for economic self-sufficiency and seeing their advantage in selling rather than buying, since the latter enabled them to accumulate resources and fill the war treasury. In this dimension, war became a means for one side to make a profit, however for this to happen, the other side had to lose. England and France became new leading players, vying among others for the Caribbean sugar islands, Canadian fur trade, and the riches of India. Conversely, in Central Europe the Prussian king strove for self-sufficiency and envisioned the stimulation of domestic industry and the conquest of Silesia as a means to make his country more prosperous and stronger. These issues were at the root of the conflicts that ultimately reshaped the international situation. One should emphasize that they not only affected the countries involved in the conflicts but also had an indirect and often direct impact on other states, including cities, villages, and their respective populations. One such example was the city of Poznań, located in Greater Poland and incorporated in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, which did not participate in the Seven Years' War. And yet, the conflict of 1756–1763 left an indelible mark on the city. One is tempted to inquire about the ways in which interstate antagonisms affected Poznań. The first half of the 18th century was one of the darkest period in the city's history. Poznań was marked by wars, natural disasters, and—last but not least—epidemics, which all contributed to its decline and thwarted its prospects for development. The local population dwindled to ca. 3,000, which constituted a mere 10% of Poznań's population

at the time of its peak development. An increasing number of properties in the city were taken over by the nobility and clergy, which diminished the its assets and income. Therefore, in the years 1730, 1745, 1747 and 1750, Poznań put in place a number of economic reforms, including the abolishment of serfdom and the transition to renting in the villages owned by the city, first to German colonists, then to Polish peasants, followed by the eventual parceling of the city manors.[1] But could these changes be sufficient in the face of a storm brewing just beyond the western and southern borders of the Polish-Lithuanian state, one that was to affect not only Poznań but the entire Republic of Poland? The war in question triggered a series of events that took a toll on Poznań.

At the end of his life, Emperor Charles VI of Habsburg made a number of deals to ensure the succession of his daughter, Maria Theresa. All of them proved to be unsustainable and the young empress had to fight for her rights, among others with Bavaria, Saxony, France and Prussia. In the course of the war Frederick II occupied Silesia, 'winning' the undying enmity of Maria Theresa in the process: "If one were to sum it up in a sentence, one could conclude that his goals and conquests were limited, while her hatred proved boundless."[2] The conflict between Frederick II and Maria Theresa contributed to that between France and England (France supported Prussia, whereas England backed Austria). It is worth noting that the French-English rivalry had already emerged as one of the continuous threads of European politics after 1688, as a result of which by the mid-18th century the French and the British were fighting each other all over the world. In the course of this conflict, Britain won the supremacy of the seas. This translated into the British economic victory in the 18th century, since the party ruling the seas was also the one dealing the cards in overseas trade. It should be noted that in their 18th-century wars, the British followed a firmly established pattern of "limited military engagement on the continent, aiding its continental allies through overseas trade, and using naval supremacy to control the waters surrounding Europe and prevail in the race for colonies and commercial gains."[3] For France, bound by an unusual alliance to its long-time enemy—the Habsburg Austria—the European phase of the Seven Years' War was a 'strange' contest, waged with great determination and little success.

1 A. Kaniecki, *Poznań. Dzieje miasta wodą pisane*, Poznań 2004, p. 209.

2 *Historia sztuki wojennej. Od starożytności do czasów współczesnych*, ed. G. Parker, Warszawa 2008, p. 202.

3 Ibid., p. 202.

While France admittedly had little to win or lose in Europe, its stake in the overseas territories were immense.

In America, 18th-century European wars had a very different character. Although both the French and the English made considerable use of Native American tribes as their respective allies, in fact the latter played a secondary role in the struggle. In North America, the long-standing French-British hostility led to a decisive confrontation during the French and Indian War (1754–1763). The arrival of British forces led by Generals Jeffrey Amherst and James Wolfe at Louisbourg in June 1758 heralded a quick British victory. Having captured Louisbourg, Wolfe headed for Quebec. After a battle for the city, lost by the French and due to the lack of supplies, the French surrendered Quebec on September 18.[4]

Meanwhile, in India, the English East India Company supplanted the French Compagnie des Indes. The war in India, similarly to that waged in North America, had its own dynamics only partially dependent on the developments in Europe. In 1756, the Nawab of Bengal occupied the British trading station at Calcutta. Shortly after New Year's Day, Robert Clive recaptured the city and continued his march inland with 1,100 Europeans and 12,100 sepoys, dealing a decisive blow to the nawab's 50,000-man army at Plassey on June 23. Clive owed this victory more to the desertion of allies and the nawab's commanders than to the battlefield prowess of his own troops. In 1760, the French surrendered Pondicherry, and although it was later returned to them under the Treaty of Paris, they never again regained their former position in India. On October 23, 1764, the Company's troops under Hector Munro inflicted irreparable damage on another Indian army at Buxar. As a result of this hard-fought battle, the East India Company was awarded the rich provinces of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa: a foothold that would be instrumental in controlling the entire Indian subcontinent.[5]

Thus, France suffered severe losses in the colonies, even if its defeat was not decisive. The elimination of France from North America in the long run proved dangerous for England itself, because the dynamically developing English colonies lacked the so-called 'natural enemy' that would render them dependable on the metropolis for military aid. Soon, the colonists'

4 B.W. Sheehan, *Wojny imperialne*, [in:] *Historia Stanów Zjednoczonych Ameryki*, vol. I, 1607–1763, eds. M.J. Rozbicki, I. Wowrzyczek, Warszawa 1995, pp. 289–322.

5 *Historia sztuki wojennej. Od starożytności do czasów współczesnych*, pp. 208–209.

momentum, unhampered by Canadians and Indians, was to turn against Great Britain.

It is believed that in 1755, in connection with the development of oceanic trade, colonial conflict for the first time became the spark that ignited a European war, since it was the French-English conflict in America that triggered the Seven Years' War in Europe. At the same time, it can be argued that the era of mercantile warfare culminated in the Seven Years' War, a genuine global conflict with long-term consequences for Europe, North America and South Asia. But was the English-French conflict the cause, or rather the background, of what transpired in Europe?

In 1756, King Frederick II of Prussia attacked Saxony, which was united by a personal union with the Republic of Poland in the person of Augustus III, and which he intended to incorporate into the Prussian war economy. In seizing Saxony, Frederick II considered economic aspects in addition to strategic ones. The conquest of prosperous Saxony was to allow Prussia to harness its abundant human and material resources, while also contributing to a significant enlargement of Prussia's military potential.[6] This was duly accomplished. After seizing the mints of Dresden, the Prussians began to counterfeit the Polish coinage, exploiting it to their enormous profit. The influx of large quantities of foreign counterfeit coins, particularly strong in the second half of 1761 and at the beginning of 1762, must have affected Poznań, driving up the prices. Anticipating the imminent decline in the value of money, vendors doubled prices for each item.[7]

In 1757, Frederick accomplished his greatest military feat. A large French offensive launched against him collapsed on November 5 at Rossbach, where the King of Prussia conquered a French-German force twice the size of his own army.[8] However, while Frederick was busy in the west, the Austrians entered Silesia. In the face of the Habsburg menace, the Prussian army left Leipzig a mere week later, covering the distance of 300 kilometers separating it from Prochowice (Prochwitz) in 16 days. From there, Frederick marched his army of 36,000 to meet an Austrian force of 80,000 led by Charles of Lorraine, whom he beat decisively at the Battle of Lutynia (Leuthen).[9] Despite this victory, the following months and years showed that,

6 *Prusy w okresie monarchii absolutnej (1701–1806)*, ed. B. Wachowiak, Poznań 2010, p. 262.

7 *Dzieje Poznania*, vol. I, pt. 2, ed. J. Topolski, Warszawa-Poznań 1988, p. 777.

8 F.A.J. Szabo, *Wojna siedmioletnia w Europie 1756–1763*, Oświęcim 2014, pp. 80–84.

9 Ibid., pp. 88–91.

in terms of available resources and ingenuity, Frederick was thoroughly outmatched by his enemies, and despite his military genius, he suffered an almost complete defeat.

As I have already mentioned, the Seven Years' War of 1756–1763 heavily affected Greater Poland and Poznań, despite the fact that the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth did not participate in the conflict. The weak democracy of nobles was exploited without scruples by the conflicted Prussia and Russia. Thus, Greater Poland was frequently ravaged by Prussian and Russian armies. In 1758, a joint anti-Prussian offensive of the Russian and Austrian armies caused the theater of warfare to shift near to the Prussian borders, among others to the bordering region of Greater Poland and its capital city of Poznań, which neighbored with the Hohenzollern state. The armies entered Greater Poland on July 1, 1758, setting up their headquarters in Poznań.[10] Commanded by general Willi Fermar, a force of 8,000 men was deployed behind the southern walls of the city, around the Church of Corpus Christi, becoming a heavy burden for both Poznań itself and the residents of the surrounding settlements.[11] Under the circumstances, Frederick II was preparing to cross the Oder and attack General Fermar's army, assuming that if he could defeat it, the Russian garrison and warehouses in Poznań would be left supportless and easy to capture. However, it turned out that the Russians outpaced Frederick and approached and destroyed Kostrzyn (Küstrin). In the end, the two combatants squared off at the Battle of Sarbinowo (August 25, 1758), which was tactically unresolved yet exhausted both sides,[12] prompting the Russians to retreat to Greater Poland for the winter.

With the dynamically evolving situation during the Seven Years' War, the Russians left Poznań at the turn of 1758 and 1759. They were replaced by a Prussian army of 6,000 men, which entered the city on February 28, 1759.[13] They treated Poznań as a spoil of war, taking over the warehouses left by the Russians and imposing tributes on the city. Their stay in Poznań did not go beyond only several days. The main Prussian forces camped around Poznań at that time, while the officers were stationed in quarters in the city.[14] After

10 *Prusy w okresie monarchii absolutnej (1701–1806)*, p. 267.
11 K. Olejnik, *Z wojennej przeszłości Poznania*, Poznań 1982, p. 157.
12 F.A.J. Szabo, *Wojna siedmioletnia w Europie 1756–1763*, pp. 126–127.
13 Z. Boras, L. Trzeciakowski, *W dawnym Poznaniu*, Poznań 1971, p. 199.
14 K. Olejnik, *Z wojennej przeszłości Poznania*, p. 157.

the Prussians left Poznań, 4,000 Russians took over the city and caused significant damage to both Poznań and in its surroundings.[15]

In the middle of 1759, the Austrian and Russian commanders planned a major offensive in which Poznań would also play its part. According to the plan, the main forces of the Russian army were to approach Poznań in May and June 1759, and then, following a feigned offensive on Pomerania, head for Silesia and join up with the Austrians. At the end of May, the first Russian troops started to arrive in Poznań.[16] In June 1759, the Russian forces encamped around Poznań increased to tens of thousands, led by Field Marshal Pyotr Saltykov, who arrived in the city on July 5, 1759.[17] It was then that the Russian army held training maneuvers in preparation for their upcoming battles against the Prussians.[18] The Russians stayed in Poznań until August 24, 1760. On that day, they left the city, entrusting a few detachments of Cossacks to guard the supply depots. The Prussians took advantage of the situation and attacked Poznań. They plundered the supplies, destroying some and distributing the rest to the citizens before withdrawing from the city.[19]

In 1761, seeing no way out for himself, Frederick II holed up in Berlin in "utter despair." He was saved by the death of his implacable enemy, the Russian Empress Elizabeth, in January 1762. Her successor, Peter III, who favored the Prussians, withdrew Russian troops from the war, and even put some of them at Frederick II's disposal.[20] In June 1761, Russian forces under the command of Field Marshal Alexander Buturlin set up camp near Poznań. According a chronicler of the city's history, "this army caused unprecedented damage to the city. In the suburbs, it demolished fences, burned shutters, doors, stairs, and even pulled down entire houses for firewood. It did no less damage to the Jews, tearing down their fences, two buildings in their cemetery, and wooden butcher shops."[21]

The Russian army withdrew from Greater Poland only in September 1762, when Catherine II decided to uphold Peter III's order to cooperate with Prussia. The Russian withdrawal created virtually unlimited opportunities

15 Z. Boras, L. Trzeciakowski, *W dawnym Poznaniu,* p. 199.

16 F.A.J. Szabo, *Wojna siedmioletnia w Europie 1756–1763*, p. 169.

17 Ibid., p. 211.

18 K. Olejnik, *Z wojennej przeszłości Poznania*, pp. 157–158.

19 Z. Boras, L. Trzeciakowski, *W dawnym Poznaniu,* pp. 199–200.

20 *Historia sztuki wojennej. Od starożytności do czasów współczesnych*, p. 207.

21 J. Łukaszewicz, *Obraz historyczno-statystyczny miasta Poznania w dawniejszych czasach*, vol. II, Poznań 1998, p. 316.

for the Prussians to plunder Greater Poland. As soon as at the turn of 1762 and 1763, the nobility was forced to sell food supplies to the Prussian warehouses at greatly lowered prices and, in some instances, carry the purchased grain as far as Wrocław and Brzeg. It soon turned out that this was only a prelude to a broader operation known as the *Retablissement*, which envisioned the repopulation of Brandenburg and its post-war reconstruction. The effects of these actions were to be felt in Poznań as early as at the beginning of 1763. General von Lossow entered Greater Poland and ordered to collect 90,000 bushels of rye and 260,000 bushels of oats from the provinces of Poznań and Kalisz. Officially, the purchases were to be made at little more than a tenth of the market value. In practice, even those official prices were halved because the outstanding amounts were seized by Prussian officers. In addition, the grain was paid for with counterfeit coins, which exacerbated the already staggering losses. As early as January 1763, one of the units of Lossow's corps under the command of colonel Wilhelm von Reitzenstein entered Poznań and made forced purchases of food, paying for it with counterfeit money. When the townspeople refused to accept them, Reitzenstein forced them to deliver the food for free and pay a contribution of 10,000 Polish zlotys, which the city authorities paid by taking out a loan for this purpose.[22] Apart from requisitioning grain, Prussian troops carried out a campaign of abducting settlers together with their families and all moveable belongings, followed by forced settlements within the borders of Brandenburg. The official explanation for this policy was that they were considered fugitives from the Prussian state during the Seven Years' War. In reality, this status only referred to a marginal part of the abductees, while the vast majority were Polish peasants.[23] This activity was mainly the domain of Captain Paszkowski, who also stationed in Poznań in 1763 and commanded a troop of Prussian dragoons. During his two-month stay in Poznań, roughly 30,000 Polish peasants and their families were forced to resettle from Greater Poland to Brandenburg, coupled with the imposition of a tribute of several million Polish zlotys.

For the duration of several days in 1763, Poznań was also burdened with feeding the Austrian prisoners returning home from East Prussia. Thus, in spite of the formal end of the Seven Years' War, the year 1763 was extremely

22 *Dzieje Poznania*, vol. I, pt. 2, p. 777.
23 Ibid.

difficult for Poznań, with Prussian plundering significantly worsening the prospects for its rapid post-war reconstruction.[24]

In the 18th century, Poznań lost its importance as a center of international trade. Contacts with Wrocław, Leipzig, and Nuremberg, once vibrant, were now weakened, with Frankfurt (Oder) gaining the upper hand in trading with German cities. Commercial exchange with Frankfurt, which accounted for almost 37% of Poznań's foreign contacts, increased thanks to customs privileges granted by Frederick II. Moreover, the operations were not subject to harassment, contrary to the transit trade. The intention of Frederick II, who bestowed numerous privileges on Frankfurt, was to weaken the importance of Leipzig as the leading trade center in Central and Eastern Europe. In the case of the western lands of the Polish and Lithuanian Commonwealth, this policy produced the desired effect, as most of Poznań's merchants preferred to trade with Frankfurt rather than incur additional costs in the form of high transit duties in direct trade with Leipzig.[25] Frederick II succeeded in achieving this goal because Poznań's international commercial exchange focused on Frankfurt and Szczecin, without excluding other centers.

The destruction of the city as a result of marches, attacks and the stationing of foreign armies left Poznań severely strained; nevertheless, trade-wise, it turned out that Poznanian merchants increased their turnover and, consequently, their income. Of course, the turmoil of war also entailed some leaner years, but overall, the city retained a positive balance of trade. Records from the years 1740–1764 indicate a significant dynamization of trade in Poznań. The quantities of various goods imported to Poznań increased manifold. The rate of growth in the following years was not only maintained, but significantly increased. This is evidenced by the data showing the overall dynamics of trade exchange in Poznań in the entire 1740–1792 period. In total, the turnover in said period increased several times. In the decade 1750–1759, the increase with respect to the base years 1740–1749 amounted to approximately 60%, while in the following decades it reached 125% (1760–1769), 382% (1770–1779) and almost 1,300% (1780–1789), respectively.[26]

One very interesting example of the development of trade in Poznań was the import of Russian vodka, which during the Seven Years' War increased

24 Z. Boras, L. Trzeciakowski, *W dawnym Poznaniu*, p. 201.

25 *Dzieje Poznania*, vol. I, pt. 2, p. 867.

26 Ibid., p. 863.

from 262 barrels in 1740–1752 to 3,555 barrels in 1753–1764.[27] Breaking this figure down into individual years, the 1756 saw 147 barrels of Russian vodka delivered to Poznań; in 1757 the number rose to 167 barrels, dropping to 132 barrels in 1758 before rising to 795 barrels in 1759, followed by 778 barrels in 1760, 696 in 1761, 432 in 1762, and 194 barrels in 1763.[28] Vodka played an important role in the city's economic and social life. Like beer, it was supplied to the market from three main sources: outside shipments, local distillation, and illegal deliveries. Russian vodka was then exported west to Frankfurt, with Poznanian merchants also distributing it to Russian army camps across Greater Poland. After the end of the war or, to be more precise, in 1766, deliveries of Russian vodka ceased and were subsequently supplanted by locally distilled vodka.[29]

At the same time, the city saw an increase in the consumption of wine. If we assume the year 1750 as a point of reference (100), then by the end of the century the level of wine consumption increased by 90% in total, including a 171.2% increase for Hungarian wine and a 221.5% rise for French wine. Such a high consumption of very expensive wine, especially Hungarian wine, is undoubtedly a testament to the affluence of at least part of the city's population. On the other hand, the high regard for French wine, lighter than its Hungarian counterparts, may suggest the changing tastes among the wider population, as well as a shift in trade patterns.[30] These, too, were the results of the Seven Years' War.

In the mid-18th century, the importance of the foreign goods market for the development of trade in Poznań decreased due to intensified contacts with the Szczecin market, which was increasingly becoming the principal buyer of regional goods, and supplied a small share of luxury goods, especially chocolate, tea, coffee, and spices. A full range of overseas goods was now available in Poznań stores. Despite the infighting between England and France, merchants worked relentlessly to supply overseas goods to Europe. Thanks to Britain's victory, it was English entrepreneurs who emerged as the biggest winners. For example, Spanish or American tobacco was brought to Poznań via Szczecin.[31] In 1756, seven cartloads of tobacco were brought to

27 Ibid.
28 K. Kuklińska, *Handel Poznania w drugiej połowie XVIII wieku*, Warszawa-Poznań 1976, p. 85.
29 Ibid., p. 146.
30 Ibid., p. 177.
31 Ibid., p. 77.

Poznań, followed by 6 in 1757, 12 in 1758, 35 in 1759, 22 in 1760, 26 in 1761, 6 in 1762, and 28 in 1763.[32]

To sum up the discussion on the influence of the Seven Years' War on Poznań, it should be stressed that, in fact, it was two countries that became its principal victims, i.e. Saxony and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Seven years of Prussian plunder left Saxony's economy in tatters. Human losses are estimated at between 90,000 and 100,000, with domestic animals disappearing almost completely. Cities were devastated and land lay fallow. Prussia collected 50 million thalers for the war in Saxony, and the damages caused by their own army exceeded 100 million thalers.[33]

While the Commonwealth theoretically abstained from participation in the war, it also paid a heavy price. The country was greatly affected by Frederick II's counterfeiting policy. In March 1761, agents of the Prussian king estimated the gross profit from this activity at 25 million thalers. As a result, confidence in the Polish zloty collapsed, leading to chaotic price fluctuations and postwar economic chaos. Even worse for the future of Poland were the winter camps and warehouses established on Commonwealth territory by the Russians.[34] The Seven Years' War exhausted all of the states involved in the conflict. Prussia lost about 500,000 people in the war, and spent 139 million thalers on military operations. It is worth noting, however, that surviving the most dire crisis in the history of Frederick II's reign was possible thanks to the resources of Silesia, Saxony and the Commonwealth, at the expense of monetary fraud.[35] The Seven Years' War made Frederick II's Prussia the fifth great power in Europe, with Greater Poland and Poznań playing their respective roles in the process. As a result of the war, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth found itself in a perilously difficult international situation.

The end of the Seven Years' War, along with Stanisław August Poniatowski's ascension to the Polish throne postponed this threat for a few years. The *Boni Ordinis* commission appointed by the king was of great importance for Poznań; among others, the institution regulated the city's income, allocating its portion for the reconstruction of the city fortifications.[36] Several decades of relative relaxation allowed Poznań to recuperate. The city suffered great

32 Ibid., p. 79.
33 F.A.J. Szabo, *Wojna siedmioletnia w Europie 1756–1763*, p. 321.
34 Ibid., p. 321.
35 *Prusy w okresie monarchii absolutnej (1701–1806)*, p. 274.
36 K. Olejnik, *Z wojennej przeszłości Poznania*, p. 160.

material and human damage during the war, but despite the cyclical plunder at the hands of the Russian and Prussian armies, it was especially the local merchants managed to increase their trade balance, supplying the inhabitants and the surrounding nobility with basic and even luxury overseas goods. This goes to show that while war is a destructive venture, one branch of the economy, namely trade, can nonetheless fare very well despite these circumstances, as was the case in Poznań. It should be noted that Frederick II himself strengthened his cities to become trade centers and eliminate external competition, such as Leipzig.

To a large extent, the Seven Years' War was a reflection of an era in which governments adapted to military necessity and wars determined the fate of European states, in turn expanding and defining European dominion in other parts of the world. After 1763, however, the nature of European conflicts was to change: the wars of dynastic states were to give way to wars of nations waged with greater ferocity and ever newer means.


BONIN
Bogdanka
URBANOWO
Wierzbak
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KUNDORF
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Cybina
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WILDA
RATAJE
CHARTOWO
GÓRCZYN
ŻEGRZE
DĘBIEC
Warta
ŻABIKOWO
LUBOŃ
16°44'E
17°04'E
52°31'N
52°31'N
52°18'N
52°18'N
16°44'E
17°04'E
Poznań mid-19th century
0
1
2
3 km
Settlements
Urbanized Poznań
Green areas
Bamberg settlements
Walls and gates
Roads/squares
Rivers/streams
Hills

Krzysztof Marchlewicz

On the scales of European balance: Poznań and Greater Poland in the diplomatic games of the great powers in 1813–1815

Although after Leipzig's 'Battle of the Nations' the body of Prince Józef Poniatowski was soon washed up by the Elster, his posthumous journey to Poland did not begin until July 1814. Having obtained special permission from Tsar Alexander I, Polish troops returning from Western Europe collected the embalmed remains of the fallen commander in a triple coffin and set off from Leipzig towards the east. As per a "Gazeta Poznańska" report from Kargowa, published on Tuesday, July 26, 1814, "The Polish Guard of Honor under the command of General Sokolnicki reached the border of the Poznań Department, set to lay the body of His Late Excellency Prince Józef Poniatowski, thus far buried in foreign soil, to rest in the bosom of his homeland."[1] On July 31, the coffin with the prince's body arrived in Poznań via Kopanica, Wolsztyn, Grodzisk and Konarzewo. Once in the city, it was exhibited in the cathedral and accompanied by several days of tributes. It was not until August 6, 1814 that the funeral escort took it to Warsaw.[2]

As the people of Greater Poland welcomed, commemorated, and bid farewell to Prince Józef, the subsequent political fate of their province was not yet decided. The prefect of the Department of Poznań was Count Józef Poniński, and military affairs were managed by a veteran of the Kościuszko Insurrection and Napoleonic campaigns, General Jan Nepomucen Umiński.[3] As part of the Duchy of Warsaw, Greater Poland remained the 'native land'

1 "Gazeta Poznańska", no. 61, July 30, 1814, p. 743.

2 "Gazeta Poznańska", no. 63, August 6, 1814, pp. 761–768.

3 See B.J. Umiński, *Generał Jan Nepomucen Umiński 1778–1851*, Wrocław 1999, p. 123.

for Poles in every sense of the word, with many of them hoping that this state of affairs would remain unchanged.

The future of Poznań, Warsaw and Cracow had already been in doubt for several months prior. Although the first Treaty of Paris, signed on May 30, 1814, settled the victorious powers' accounts with France, many other European issues remained the subject of complicated diplomatic disputes. They were still pending final decisions from monarchs and politicians. They were to be decided by a special congress, expected to begin in July 1814.

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All these events and dilemmas would not have taken place if not for the failure of Napoleon's Russian expedition of 1812. This failure was twofold, because in addition to the near-complete annihilation of the *Grande Armée*, it provoked the desertion of the reluctant allies from the French Emperor's camp.[4] After the eager departure of the Prussians, the Austrians followed suit. The two joined the Sixth Anti-Napoleonic Coalition, rounded off by Russians, the British, Swedes, Spaniards and the Portuguese. This alliance was united primarily by a shared hostility towards and fear of Bonaparte's France, as its members differed profoundly on many issues. Not everyone envisioned the pieces toppled by Napoleon back in the same squares on the European chessboard. This was especially the case with the Polish question, which had clearly impeded the political cooperation between the Russians, Prussians and Austrians from the beginning of 1813 onwards. The British had their own opinion on the subject, and another was entertained by the representatives of Bourbon France. In the words of Henry Kissinger, "Thus began the contest over Poland, which was not to end for two years and which nearly embroiled Europe in another war."[5]

The main axis of this dispute—of which the subsequent fate of Poznań became an integral part—was outlined almost immediately after the Russian army entered the territory of the Duchy of Warsaw. Although the French had left the garrisons in Gdańsk, Toruń, Modlin, Zamość and Częstochowa, they did not undertake to defend either the Vistula or the Oder lines, and so the Russian advance was relatively swift. In mid-January 1813, King Joachim Murat of Naples set up quarters Poznań, but by January 17 there was

4 For a vivid account of these events, see A. Zamoyski, *Moscow 1812: Napoleon's Fatal March*, New York 2004.

5 H.A. Kissinger, *A World Restored*, Gloucester 1973, p. 48.

no longer any trace of his troops in town.[6] It became increasingly clear that it was Tsar Alexander I, leading the Russian Army himself, who would have the final say in Polish affairs.

Who was this monarch that took the key to the future of Poland from Napoleon's hands? Sir Harold Nicolson described the Tsar's state of mind and his outlook at the time in the following words: "The Emperor Alexander (...) was a schizophrenic, and as such sought to conceal the contradictions of his split personality in a cloud of mystification which before long became a fog of mysticism. On the one hand he saw himself as the conqueror of the greatest military genius of all ages; as the soldier-Tsar who, by the might of his armies and the tenacity of his own leadership, had rendered Russia the dominant physical force upon the continent of Europe. From this aspect he desired to create an enlarged Kingdom of Poland which, being wholly subservient to himself, would extend the boundaries of Russia to the very banks of the Oder. On the other hand he saw himself as the evangelist of progress, as the great Christian Liberator who, in the very plentitude of his power and renown, would as a "moral duty" recreate the Polish nation and restore to suffering Poland her ancient liberties and independence."[7]

Despite doubts about his intentions at the moment when the Polish hopes for Napoleon were shattering, Alexander I seemed to be the only monarch sympathetic to Poland among the powers prevailing over France. Thus, the circle focused around Prince Adam Jerzy Czartoryski, who was once a friend of the Tsar, turned to the Russian ruler. This circle was banking on winning him over to the idea of rebuilding the Kingdom of Poland. Already at the beginning of January 1813, Alexander I assured Prince Adam of his desire to create an autonomous Polish state under his own scepter. However, due to the necessity of binding Austria and Prussia firmly to the anti-Napoleonic coalition, the Tsar wished to keep the plan secret.[8] He rightly anticipated that the idea of bringing together all Polish lands under one state, including those claimed by the Prussians and Austrians, would not meet with a favorable response in Berlin and Vienna. Time proved how strongly the other powers were opposed to such a solution.

6 "Gazeta Poznańska", no. 5, January 16, 1813, p. 37 and no. 6, January 20, 1813, p. 47.

7 H. Nicolson, *The Congress of Vienna. A study in Allied Unity: 1812–1822*, New York 1965, p. 149; see also the remarks on the subject by W. Zajewski, *Sprawa polska na Kongresie Wiedeńskim*, "Czasy Nowożytne", 2009, vol. 21, pp. 35–36.

8 J. Skowronek, *Adam Jerzy Czartoryski 1770–1861*, Warszawa 1994.

It is clear that Alexander I found the negotiations with the Prussians and Austrians much more important than his contacts with Czartoryski, who was no partner of equal stature. In January 1813, King Frederick William III of Prussia fled from French-occupied Berlin to Wrocław. Once there, he sent an offer of an anti-French alliance to the Tsar, in return for which he demanded the restoration of Prussia's territory from before 1806 (including Polish lands with Poznań and Warsaw) and additional territorial acquisitions in Germany.[9] Negotiations on the subject were continued in February in Kalisz. Alexander I made no secret of his intention to restore the Kingdom of Poland, giving up a mere fraction of Greater Poland from the Russian-occupied Duchy of Warsaw in favor of Prussia, so as to improve its connection to Silesia. As compensation, the Tsar indicated that Berlin would annex Saxony. Prussians did not exclude this solution, and since it was paramount for both sides to defeat the still-dangerous Napoleon, the alliance agreement was successfully concluded, with the Polish question deliberately included therein in a rather enigmatic fashion. The treaty did not guarantee Prussia the reinstatement of the pre-1806 borders, however it provisioned that the kingdom would be restored to its former glory.[10]

Thus, who would become the master of Poznań and Greater Poland remained unclear. There was no doubt, however, that the Russian plan to retain Polish control over the entire territory of the Duchy of Warsaw aroused resentment and deep concern among the other coalition partners. Rightly or wrongly, they doubted the Tsar's liberalism and generosity towards the Poles, and the project to restore an autonomous Kingdom of Poland encompassing Poznań and Galicia was seen as part of a scenario designed to bolster Russia's influence in Central Europe. Even indirect Russian control over Poznań, Toruń and Kalisz could have rendered Prussia hostage to Russia. In turn, the indemnities offered by Alexander I to Berlin in the form of new German territories threatened Austria's position with respect to Germany. It was especially in the British concepts of the European balance of power that a large Kingdom of Poland, stretching far to the West yet dependent on Russia, was seen as a destabilizing factor and a serious threat to the continental order.[11]

9 H. Nicolson, *The Congress of Vienna*..., p. 26.

10 See E. Wawrzkowicz, *Anglia a sprawa polska 1813–1815*, Kraków 1919, p. 29; J. Willaume, *Stanowisko Prus wobec sprawy polskiej na kongresie wiedeńskim*, "Przegląd Zachodni", 1950, vol. 1–2, pp. 3–4; H. Nicolson, *The Congress of Vienna*..., pp. 27–28.

11 H.A. Kissinger, *A World Restored*..., p. 91.

When the official accession of the Austrians to the anti-French coalition was being negotiated in June 1813, the Tsar and his Polish supporters were faced with the unfavorable position of London, Vienna, alongside the not-quite-convinced Berlin. The British envoy, Sir Robert Wilson, told Prince Adam Czartoryski in Reichenbach (present-day Dzierżoniów) that he should not count on the support of Great Britain, which did not favor Russia and wanted no part in its enlargement.[12] It was already then that Great Britain expressed the position which it would firmly stand by at the Congress of Vienna. Its diplomatic leaders believed that, given the impossibility of rebuilding a sovereign Polish state, it would be best to restore the status quo as it stood in 1796. The idea to restore the course of the Russian-Prussian-Austrian border from the period after the Third Partition of Poland was also supported by the Austrians, since leaving Poznań and Greater Poland in Prussian hands would deprive Berlin of the arguments supporting its claims to Saxony.

In Reichenbach, Alexander I took a step back and, in order to win over Austria, reluctantly agreed to the liquidation and partition of the Duchy of Warsaw.[13] This implied that the Tsar would most likely not retain all of Polish territory in his hands, although the exact course of borders in this part of Europe remained an open question. The September 1813 Treaty of Töplitz stipulated that the future of the Duchy would be decided by means of an amicable agreement between the Eastern European powers.[14] Although the treaty did not settle anything, it acknowledged the existence of serious obstacles to the realization of the Tsar's Polish plans and the need to seek a multilateral compromise in this matter.

The subsequent months saw the prolonged agony and decline of Napoleonic France. The Emperor's staunch resistance was a factor in consolidating the anti-French coalition and fostering a convergence of positions among its members. In March 1814, fresh from Napoleon's several minor victories in the so-called French Campaign (including those at Saint-Dizier, Brienne, Champaubert and Montmirail), Alexander I confided in Czartoryski that he would probably have to cede "most of Greater Poland" to the Prussians.[15] In a memorial drafted around the same time, Prussian Chancellor August von

12 E. Wawrzkowicz, *Anglia a sprawa polska*..., p. 35.

13 H. Nicolson, *The Congress of Vienna*..., p. 167; E. Wawrzkowicz, *Anglia a sprawa polska*..., p. 30.

14 J. Willaume, *Stanowisko Prus*..., p. 4.

15 M. Handelsman, *Adam Czartoryski*, Kraków 1948, vol. 1, p. 99; see. A. Zahorski, *Historia dyplomacji polskiej 1795–1831*, [in:] *Historia dyplomacji polskiej. T. III. 1795–1918*, ed. L. Bazylow, Warszawa 1982, p. 117.

Hardenberg firmly demanded that the Prussian border be established on the Drwęca, Vistula and Warta rivers.[16] This would leave Poznań in Prussian hands, and was also in line with the expectations of the British and Austrians.

According to Sir Harold Nicolson, in the spring of 1814 Alexander I made mistakes that ultimately prevented him from fully attaining his Polish objectives. These mistakes included approving specific decisions concerning the defeated France, expressed in the provisions of the First Treaty of Paris, concluded on May 30, 1814. On the one hand, this ensured that the other superpowers would no longer have to strive for Russia's favor in French affairs. On the other hand, it entailed the return of Bourbon France to the international stage, where French diplomacy led by Prince Charles Maurice de Talleyrand would skillfully seek to amplify the rifts between the victorious coalition partners. In turn, the simultaneous resolution of several British demands (e.g. the future of Antwerp, colonial affairs) meant that Great Britain no longer had any reason to give way to Russia on other contentious issues.[17]

As they prepared for the announced peace congress in Vienna, both the Tsar of Russia and Prince Adam had not yet given up hope of realizing their far-reaching plans. The Tsar, who was entertaining in London, declared boisterously, "I have captured the Duchy of Warsaw and have 480,000 men to defend it."[18] In a congressional instruction issued to Karl von Nesselrode in August 1814, Alexander I referred to the Duchy of Warsaw as his spoil of war and denied the other powers the right to interfere in its future.[19] Drafting his own negotiations strategy for the congress, he wrote down, "For Russia the Duchy of Warsaw. As a last resort, I shall give up Poznań to the line stretching from Toruń to Pyzdry and from there, along the Prosna River, to the border with Silesia." [20]

Meanwhile, Adam Jerzy Czartoryski made feverish efforts to convince the British to the idea of creating a large Polish Kingdom. However, Prince Adam's ideas collided with *"the most ruthless and coarse state egoism"* and "*thoroughly realistic considerations*" that guided the British according to Eugeniusz Wawrzkowicz.[21] The head of British diplomacy Robert Stewart, Viscount Castlereagh, abided by the opinion that, by keeping the Polish territories

16 E. Wawrzkowicz, *Anglia a sprawa polska*..., p. 89.
17 H. Nicolson, *The Congress of Vienna*..., pp. 103–104.
18 Qtd. [in:] E. Wawrzkowicz, *Anglia a sprawa polska*..., p. 92
19 M. Handelsman, *Adam Czartoryski*..., vol. 1, p. 105.
20 Qtd. [in:] H. Troyat, *Aleksander I. Pogromca Napoleona*, transl. B. Przybyłowska, Warszawa 2007, p. 211.
21 E. Wawrzkowicz, *Anglia a sprawa polska*..., p. 43.

including Greater Poland, Russia would drive a wedge into the center of Europe and threaten the security of German states. France soon adopted a similar stance. As stated in the royal instruction for Paris's delegates to the Congress of Vienna: "In the first place, [...] Russia does not wish for the re-establishment of Poland in order to lose what she has acquired of it: she wishes to as to acquire what she does not possess of it, to increase its population to 44 million in Europe and to extend her frontiers to the Oder, [which] would mean creating so great and imminent a danger for Europe that [...] if the execution of such a plan could only be stopped by force of arms, not a single moment should be lost in taking them up."[22] This fear resonated perfectly with the concerns of the British.

Delayed for many reasons, the congress sessions commenced in the Austrian capital in the second half of September 1814. Thus began a time of festive banquets, balls, concerts, opera performances, fireworks displays and amorous courtship, during which—as put by Karl von Nostitz, a Saxon officer in Russian service—"Hiding behind velvet and purple robes, hostile spirits fight one another with the daggers of intrigue."[23] It could be said without exaggeration that the Polish question became one of the key areas of this fighting. Most of the players joined it with their views clearly defined. Alexander I strove to establish a Polish kingdom that would stretch as far to the west and south as possible while remaining firmly and irreversibly bound to Russia. Because of its own Polish interests in Galicia, Austria opposed the idea, at the same time trying to prevent Prussia from swallowing Saxony. Its efforts were aided by Great Britain and France, the former chiefly in the name of the balance of power principle, the latter also in order to re-establish itself among major European decision-makers. Prussian Chancellor Karl August von Hardenberg counted on potential bilateral benefits under this arrangement. With the support of Russia, he intended to acquire Saxony, using Great Britain and Austria to retain a large part of the Polish lands. Prussian military officers, led by Karl Friedrich von dem Knesebeck, also insisted on strategically optimal borders in the East, preferably along the Pilica, Vistula, Narew and Niemen rivers.[24]

22 Qtd. [in:] W. Zajewski, *Kongres wiedeński i Święte Przymierze*, [in:] *Europa i świat w epoce restauracji, romantyzmu i rewolucji 1815–1849*, ed. W. Zajewski, Warszawa 1991, vol. 1, p. 38. See also H. Nicolson, *The Congress of Vienna*..., p. 155.

23 Qtd. in D. King, *Vienna 1814: How the Conquerors of Napoleon Made Love, War, and Peace at the Congress of Vienna*, New York 2008 (e-book), p. 116.

24 J. Willaume, *Stanowisko Prus*..., p. 7; see J. Feldman, *Bismarck a Polska*, Katowice 1938, p. 130.

In the first stages of the Vienna negotiations, Alexander I seemed to bring matters to a head, without a slightest hint of compromise. He told Talleyrand that he would "keep what he occupied," citing his right as conqueror and the 200,000 Russian soldiers stationed on the Vistula as the mandate to execute his Polish agenda.[25] However, the Tsar had quite a few players staked against him, whose positions on Poland's future were almost unanimous. Metternich, Castlereagh, Talleyrand: each of them would be an extremely difficult opponent on his own, but working together and backed by the powers behind them they made a formidable opponent. By mounting objections, difficulties, and counterproposals—including Castlereagh's spectacular yet empty proposal to recreate a fully independent Poland within its pre-1772 borders—they prevented Alexander from proclaiming himself as the sole owner of all departments of the Duchy of Warsaw.

The Tsar was gradually running out of options. After unsuccessful overtures of agreement with Emperor Francis I of Austria behind the back of his influential minister, Alexander attempted to corrupt Metternich himself. The gift of 100,000 pounds sterling did not sway the Austrian politician, however, and his relations with the Tsar, which were also strained in private (*cherchez la femme*), remained extremely tense.[26] The Russian ruler had better success in reaching a common position with the Prussians, although this very success ruined the chances for all of Poznania to be included within the borders of Polish autonomy. As a result of Alexander's talks with Frederick William III, the King of Prussia disavowed the projects promoted by his generals, who sought the restoration of the 1796 borders in the east. In return, the Prussian monarch received Russian support for the idea of ceding all of Saxony to Berlin. This was the map of Central Europe that the Tsar posed to the Congress in November 1814, agreeing to give up the Podgórze district to Austrians and neutralize Cracow, and to hand over part of Greater Poland to Prussians, up to the line of the Prosna and Warta rivers.[27] This *de facto* sealed the subsequent fate of Poznań, although the conflict around the Polish question was far from over and done with.

On Wednesday, December 21, 1814, "Gazeta Poznańska" described the atmosphere in Vienna at the beginning of that month in the following words:

25 H. Troyat, *Aleksander I*..., p. 211; J. Willaume, *Stanowisko Prus*..., p. 7.

26 E. Wawrzkowicz, *Anglia a sprawa polska*..., p. 170; see *Memoirs of Prince Metternich 1773–1815*, R. Metternich, transl. A. Napier, London 1880, vol. 1, pp. 325–329.

27 M. Handelsman, *Adam Czartoryski*..., vol. 1, p. 107.

"The universal uncertainty as to the final settlement of Polish and other interests has hitherto been the same, much like the daily wait for an official solution of all these as yet unsolved questions."[28] However, breaking the gridlock by leaving most of the Duchy of Warsaw in Russian hands and satisfying the Prussian claims by annexing the Kingdom of Saxony was unacceptable to the three remaining parties to the concert of powers. Castlereagh stood by his earlier opinion, arguing that offering the Tsar the lion's share of the Polish lands would hand him a tool to dangerously influence the policies of Austria and Prussia, not to mention the power that not even Napoleon had possessed.[29] Equally serious reservations of the French, British and Austrians were aroused by the projected absorption of all of Saxony by Prussia. In view of the above, the future of western and central Polish lands became even more important. Completely disregarding their history, ethnic structure and will of their inhabitants, Castlereagh, Talleyrand and Metternich strove to tear as much as possible from the Russian hands in favor of Prussia. This was to weaken Berlin's moral title to the Saxon territories. In the opinion of the representatives of the Western powers and Austria, this was the most appropriate way to even the scales of European balance.[30]

At the end of 1814, the dispute over Poland and Saxony severely strained the relations between the main participants in the Congress of Vienna. It even threatened its very sessions. Alexander I tried to break by the stalemate by resorting to more explicit means of pressure. In November the Russian occupation authorities in Saxony handed over the control of its territory to the Prussians. On December 11, 1814, a proclamation was issued to the soldiers of the Polish army now commanded by Grand Duke Constantine, demanding their readiness to "defend the Fatherland and maintain its political existence."[31] The moves of Russian troops near the Galician border suggested that Prussia and Russia were ready to back their claims with force.[32] The three remaining powers responded by strengthening their cooperation, which took the form of a secret alliance treaty signed on January 3, 1815 in Vienna by the delegates of Great Britain, Austria, and France. The signatories

28 "Gazeta Poznańska", no. 120, December 21, 1814, p. 1211.

29 *The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy 1783–1919*, eds. A.W. Ward, G.P. Gooch, Cambridge 1922, vol. 1, p. 471; H. Nicolson, *The Congress of Vienna*..., p. 169.

30 See H.A. Kissinger, *A World Restored*..., pp. 160–161.

31 Qtd. [in:] W. Zajewski, *Kongres wiedeński*..., p. 44.

32 E. Wawrzkowicz, *Anglia a sprawa polska*..., p. 238.

declared their readiness to field armies of 150,000 troops each and stage a joint defense against attacks by other European powers.

Although the signatories lacked the determination to seriously consider the possibility of confrontation with Russia, their solidarity forced the Russian-Prussian side to make certain concessions. Alexander I had no desire for war himself. Contrary to what has sometimes been suggested—namely, that it was only Napoleon's return from Elba that prompted the architects of the Viennese order to soften their positions and reach a number of compromises—a breakthrough in Polish and Saxon affairs was made as soon as January 1815, with the most important decisions taken by February 21. The core provision of the agreement (figuratively speaking) was to swing the pendulum of Prussian and Russian influence back east. Despite the continued resistance of the Prussians, who were particularly keen on Leipzig, the possibility of their annexation of all of Saxony was ruled out. In the end, Prussia received about two fifths of its territory, which included the economically and militarily important fortresses of Torgau and Erfurt. The Tsar was to retain most of the Duchy of Warsaw, ceding Greater Poland (without Kalisz), Bydgoszcz and Toruń to the Prussian king. On top of the above, Cracow would become an autonomous Free City overseen by the three eastern powers.[33]

One lingering question was the internal organization of the Polish provinces, both those that remained under Russian rule and those returned to Prussian and Austrian jurisdiction. Prince Adam Czartoryski, who to the very end canvassed persistently yet fruitlessly for the transformation of the entire Duchy of Warsaw into an autonomous Kingdom of Poland, now fought for the best possible constitution for the Kingdom and for "the guarantee of nationality for the Polish provinces under different governments."[34] He found an unexpected ally in the British foreign secretary, who wrote the following in a circular letter to the Eastern monarchs, dated January 12, 1815: "Experience has proved that it is not by counteracting all their habits and usages as a people, that either the happiness of the Poles or the peace of that important portion of Europe can be preserved. A fruitless attempt so long persevered in by institutions foreign to their manners and sentiments, to make them forget their existence and even language as a people, has been sufficiently tried and failed. (...) The Undersigned, for these reasons, [...] ardently desires that the illustrious Monarchs, to whom the destinies of the

33 M. Handelsman, *Adam Czartoryski*..., vol. 1, pp. 109–110.

34 Qtd. [in:] J. Skowronek, *Adam Jerzy Czartoryski*..., p. 198.

Polish nation are confided, may be induced, before they depart from Vienna, to take an engagement with each other, to treat as Poles, under whatever form of political institution they may think fit to govern them, the portion of that nation that may be placed under their respective sovereignties." [35]

Although Czartoryski correctly assumed that Castlereagh's initiative was not so much guided by his sympathy for Poland as by his desire to permanently defuse the situation in Central Europe, it still counted for something. On January 30, 1815, Chancellor Hardenberg responded to Castlereagh's note by assuring him that Prussia would protect Polish national life in Greater Poland. In February, a similar statement was made by the Austrians.[36] What helped the Poles the most in turning these vague declarations into a treaty provision was Napoleon's return to France, which forced the congress participants to abruptly conclude their negotiations and deliberations that had been dragging for months. On the same day that Napoleon's brother-in-law Joachim Murat clashed with the Austrians at Tolentino (May 3, 1815), the Russian-Prussian and Russian-Austrian treaties were signed, and their provisions were subsequently included in the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna of June 9, 1815. Drafting the new course of national boundaries in the Polish lands, the document stated that "as subjects of the states of Russia, Austria and Prussia, Poles shall have representation and national institutions arranged after the fashions of the political entities deemed useful and appropriate by their respective government."[37]

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On May 15, 1815—before Tsar Alexander I proclaimed the establishment of the Kingdom of Poland—King Frederick William III of Prussia, who was in Vienna, declared that he would assume control over the western territories of the Duchy of Warsaw. "Gazeta Poznańska" included the royal patent in a supplement to its 42nd issue, published on Saturday, May 27, 1815.[38] The document was not a bolt from the blue for Poznanians, if only because on May 17 the same newspaper reprinted a letter from Tsar Alexander I, dispatched

35 Qtd. in *The Cambridge History*..., vol. 1, p. 483.

36 J. Willaume, *Stanowisko Prus*..., pp. 12–13; E. Wawrzkowicz, *Anglia a sprawa polska*..., pp. 258–259.

37 *Akt Końcowy kongresu wiedeńskiego z 9 VI 1815 r.*, [in:] M. Sobańska-Bondaruk, S.B. Lenard, *Wiek XIX w źródłach*, Warszawa 1998, p. 73.

38 *Patent tyczący się zajęcia w posiadanie przypadłey znowu Prussom części Xięstwa Warszawskiego*, supplement to "Gazeta Poznańska", no. 42, May 27, 1815, p. 521.

on April 30, 1815 from Vienna to Tomasz Ostrowski, President of the Senate of the Duchy of Warsaw. In the said letter, the Russian ruler informed Ostrowski about the end of negotiations concerning Poland and explained that by accepting the title of the King of Poland he wanted to "satisfy the will of the people (...). If the grand cause of universal peace prevented all Poles from being united under one scepter, I have at the very least used all my efforts to sweeten, as far as may be, the unpleasantness of such separation between them, and to ensure that they retain their proper nationality wherever they shall remain."[39]

The details of this "separation" and "peaceful retention of nationality" concerning the people of Greater Poland were provided in the documents issued by the King of Prussia. The aforementioned royal patent already specified the extent of the Prussian acquisitions made at the expense of the Duchy of Warsaw, and proclaimed their incorporation to the newly established administrative unit known as the Grand Duchy of Posen. At the same time, Frederick William III issued an address to the citizens of the newly created Duchy. "You shall be incorporated into My Monarchy," promised the Prussian king, "without having to renounce your nationality. You shall partake of the constitution that I intend to pass for My faithful subjects; you shall receive, as have other provinces of My State, a provincial government. Your religion shall be preserved, and all decent subjects shall be duly provided for (...). Your language shall be used side by side with the German language in all public transactions, and each of you, in accordance with your abilities, shall have open access to the public offices of the Grand Duchy, and to all offices, honors and dignities of My State. My Governor, who shall be your compatriot, shall live among you (...)." Frederick followed up the above pledges with this reassuring declaration, "It is My sincere will to commit the past to oblivion. My sole care concerns the future."[40]

In the days that followed, many citizens of Greater Poland must have pondered over the sincerity of these words as witnesses to the deeds of the new Prussian administration and its abuses, for example when demarcating the border with the Kingdom of Poland. Before the formal demarcation was made, the Prussians seized parts of the Powidz, Pyzdry, Odolanów, and Ostrzeszów counties, and it was only after lengthy negotiations that they

39 "Gazeta Poznańska", no. 39, May 17, 1815, p. 474.

40 *Do mieszkańców Wielkiego Xięstwa Poznańskiego*, supplement to "Gazeta Poznańska", no. 42, May 27, 1815, p. 522.

returned part of the illegally seized territories to the Kingdom.[41] In May and early June 1815, one could also wonder to what extent the magnanimous announcements made by Friedrich Wilhelm III had been dictated by his good will rather than his concern for Polish loyalty in the face of another confrontation with Napoleon. Not quite agog about the Prussian monarch's gentleness, some readers of "Gazeta Poznańska" hopefully and attentively followed the reports from France, where new Napoleonic corps were gathering and the coalition armies were advancing. However, in view of the Emperor's defeat in the dramatic Battle of Waterloo, nothing could change the decisions concerning the future of Poznań, Warsaw and Cracow made by the leaders of the Great Powers meeting in Vienna, guided by cool calculations and their own interests.

41 W. Trzebiński, A. Borkiewicz, *Podziały administracyjne Królestwa Polskiego w okresie 1815–1918 r. (Zarys historyczny)*, Warszawa 1956, p. 5; see also J. Willaume, *Stanowisko Prus*..., p. 13.

Rafał Dobek

Paris and Poznań in 1848

On February 22, 1848, a revolution that was to be known as the February Revolution broke out in Paris. Over the course of two days, it swept Louis Philippe from the throne along with the entire Orléans dynasty, and proclaimed France a republic. The underlying causes of this event were manifold and spanned political, social, and economic grounds. On January 27, 1848, less than a month before these events, Alexis de Tocqueville delivered a prophetic parliamentary speech, stating that, "As far as I am concerned, let me openly confess before the Chamber that, for the first time in fifteen years, I feel anxious about the future (...) My deepest conviction, gentlemen, is this: I believe we are presently sleeping on a volcano. I am deeply convinced of this (...) Do you not feel, by a sort of instinctive intuition that defies analysis yet stands beyond doubt, that the ground in Europe is once again trembling? Do you not feel—how shall I put this?—a wind of revolution in the air?"[1] The anxiety referred to by the author of *Democracy in America* stemmed primarily from the internal problems diagnosed in the speech: the corruption of political elites and the related ideological confusion in the lower social strata. However, the spiritual and mental state of the French was also undeniably influenced by international developments that they followed closely, including—likely to a minute extent—the events that took place in Greater Poland in 1846 and—to a much greater extent—those that transpired in Lesser Poland and Cracow in 1848. Poznań was featured by French newspapers between February 22 and 24, 1846. On February 22, "Le Constitutionnel" reported, based on correspondence sent 8 prior to the publication date, on the arrest of several dozen young Polish noblemen, as well as the closing of the city gates and occupation of some buildings by the Prussian army.[2] On the following

1 A. de Tocqueville, *Recollections: The French Revolution of 1848 and Its Aftermath*, transl. A. Goldhammer, Charlottesville and London, 2016, p. 53.

2 "Le Constitutionnel", no. 53, February 22, 1846, p. 2.

day, the same newspaper released a short note reporting that among those arrested in Poznań was "one of conspiracy leaders and emissary of [émigré] propaganda from Paris" (the person in question was most likely Mierosławski, who was in fact arrested on February 12), and that the Prussian authorities intercepted the insurgents' funds in the total amount of 60,000 thalers.[3] It should be emphasized that, when reporting on Polish issues, both "Le Constitutionnel" and other French newspapers relied on reprints from German newspapers, especially the "Allgemeine Zeitung" and "Kölnische Zeitung." This inevitably entailed delays in the flow of information, numerous repetitions, and the risk of misrepresentations. Thus, for example, "Le Siècle," the newspaper with the largest circulation, as well as the influential conservative "Journal des Débats Politiques et Littéraires," used the same reprints from the "Allgemeine Zeitung" as "Le Constitutionnel" (although "Le Siècle" failed to cite it as a source).[4] In turn, the Catholic "L'Univers" relied on the "Kölnische Zeitung."[5] In most cases, these reprints concerned only general information about the arrests. Unfortunately, in some instances the French did not exercise the necessary caution and restraint in the face of German reports, as was the case with the journalists of "Journal des Débats" or "Le Siècle," who in early March reported on the alleged arrest of the Auxiliary Bishop of Gniezno, Dąbrowski.[6] In fact, the man in question was Count Bronisław Dąbrowski (son of General Jan Henryk Dąbrowski), who was involved in an independence conspiracy and upon its discovery turned himself in to the Prussian authorities. The error likely stemmed from the fact that the Auxiliary Bishop of Poznań, whose freedom was never in jeopardy throughout the discussed period, was named Jan Kanty Dabrowski.[7]

However, while in the case of Dąbrowski one could speak of a simple mistake without significant consequences, slip-ups in the French press also resulted from reprinting texts that were clearly biased against, or lying about, Poles in Poznania. Thus, on February 25, "Le Constitutionnel," which was otherwise favorable to Poles, reported that "Mr. Mierosławski was appointed Field Marshal of the Poles. Their intention was to poison the

3 "Le Constitutionnel", no. 54, February 23, 1846, p. 2.

4 "Le Siècle", February 23, 1846, no. 54, p. 2; "Journal des Débats Politiques et Littéraires", February 22, 1846, p. 1.

5 "L'Univers", February 24, 1846, no. 1174, pp. 2–3.

6 "Journal des Débats Politiques et Littéraires", March 2, 1846, p. 3; "Le Siècle", no. 3618, March 3, 1846, no. 62, p. 2.

7 This information was corrected in the March 7, 1846 issue of the "Journal des Débats Politiques et Littéraires" (p. 1).

Prussian garrison. Poisoned loaves of bread were found in the barracks and hospitals. The conspirators also resolved to plunder the houses of Germans and rich Israelites, and, in case of resistance, to murder them."[8]

Describing the events in Poznań, the French also inquired about their causes. "Le Constitutionnel" traced them primarily to the long-lasting conflict between Polish nobles and the German administration, as well as a peculiar Polish chauvinism, since "a Pole considers himself better than a German with respect to nationality."[9] The author of the above article also emphasized the Polish plans to unite the lands of the three partitions; at the same time, however, he added that the dream of uniting all Slavic peoples was not without significance itself. In turn, "Le Siècle" argued that, "one may consider it a certainty that Russia and Austria contributed to this movement [of Poles – RD] in order to dissuade the King of Prussia from the project of granting a constitution."[10]

More important than the newspapers' outlooks, however, was the government's interpretation of the Poznań events. The latter was offered during a parliamentary debate by François Guizot, Minister of Foreign Affairs and a key political figure of the July Monarchy. On March 13, 1846, Guizot stated, "Everybody knows that the condition of peasants in Prussia, both the peasants of the Grand Duchy of Posen, and those in the rest of the Monarchy (for there are none in the administration of the Prussian provinces), everybody knows that the condition of peasants has improved considerably. They have become proprietors; they have been brought under regular public jurisdiction; they have been freed from feudal oppression and abuse. Thus, they did not take part in the conspiracy and attempted uprising against the Prussian authorities in the province. These people, fearing the return of the system from which they had been delivered, and finding their present condition superior to that which they remembered from the past, did not succumb to the provocations of which they were the targets."[11]

In essence, Guizot clearly sided with the Prussian authorities, emphasizing their civilizational achievements. In order to understand the French minister's attitude, it is necessary to bear in mind the events taking place

8 "Le Constitutionnel", February 25, 1846, no. 56–57, p. 2. The information was, once more, reprinted from the "Allgemeine Zeitung."

9 "Le Constitutonnel", February 28, 1846, no. 59, p. 2.

10 "Le Siècle", March 3, 1846, no. 3618, p. 2.

11 *Chambre des Députés, Séance du 13 mars,* "Journal des Débats Politiques et Littéraires", March 14, 1846, p. 2.

in Galicia at the time, i.e. the failed attempt to stage an uprising and the attendant peasant revolt. In fact, as early as the first days of March 1846, news from Poznań started to give way to coverage from Galicia. What is more, while press reports from Greater Poland were of secondary importance for the French reader (these news were usually brief notes on the second or third page), reports on the Galician uprising came as a real shock. It was the latter that forced Guizot to react, and his discourse on the Cracow events largely corresponded with his statements on Greater Poland.[12] As explicitly pointed by Guizot's biographer, the minister's reaction to the news from Poland was directly related to his Spanish policy, which pulled him into sharp conflict with Great Britain and forced Paris to seek an alliance with Vienna.[13] The problem was that no one in Paris was convinced by Guizot's attitude, which additionally exposed the helplessness of Louis-Philippe's government in the face of events in Poland and towards the partitioning powers. This helplessness was made evident later, above all in November 1846, when the liquidation of the Free City of Cracow clearly took France by surprise; moreover, faced with a clear breach of the Vienna Treaties, Paris (much like London) had to limit itself to symbolic protests, which were completely ignored by Vienna, Petersburg and Berlin. This failure was, of course, duly noticed by the representatives of the parliamentary opposition. Marie d'Agoult quotes Alphonse de Lamartine's words uttered at the time. This outstanding Romantic poet and politician aptly addressed Guizot when he noted that, "From the day you engaged in Spain, your entire policy has been fraught with contradictions. France, in deference to her traditions, in deference to her interests, has turned Ghibelline in Rome, clerical in Bern, Austrian in Piedmont, Russian in Cracow, French nowhere, counter-revolutionary everywhere."[14] Lamartine could well expand this list to account for France's pro-Prussian attitude in the matters of Poznań and Greater Poland. In turn, Odilon Barrot, one of the leaders of the French parliamentary opposition, later recalled that the Polish question clearly demonstrated that, "the powers that forced us into the treaties of 1815 approached them in a cavalier

12 Ibid. Nonetheless, the question of peasant revolt did come to the fore again. Guizot was forced to address it once more in July 1846 at the Chamber of Peers. However, he chose to hid behind the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of another state, and thus effectively quashed the discussion (*Chambre des Pairs. Séance du 02 juillet*, « Journal des débats politiques et littéraires»Journal des Débats Politiques et Littéraires », July 3, 1846, p. 2).

13 G. de Broglie *Guizot*, Paris 1990, p. 332.

14 D. Stern (b. M. de Flavigny, Countess d'Agoult), *Histoire de la Révolution de 1848*, Paris 1869, p. 35.

fashion, painstakingly reminding us of their provisions whenever we made the slightest move to renege on them, and yet the same treaties became null and void whenever it favored their own interests."[15] Importantly, the plights of French diplomacy were also noted by a significant portion of the public. Lamartine's and Barrot's sentiments concerning France's international decline and its dwindling importance were shared by many of their compatriots, contributing to the outbreak of the Revolutions of 1848.

On February 22, 1848 the first barricades were raised in the streets of Paris. On February 23, the universally hated Guizot was dismissed. However, this was not enough to save the monarchy: on February 24, King Louis-Philippe abdicated and announced the second republic in French history from the Hotel de Ville Lamartine. These events quickly reverberated in the distant Poznań. On March 2, 1848, "Gazeta Wielkiego Księstwa Poznańskiego" reported, "Revolution in Paris. - Republic has been proclaimed. (...) Tuileries captured by people, throne burned in courtyard. - Royal family flees. - Republic has been proclaimed. - Provisional government has been formed."[16] The rendition of the revolutionary events in the cited text was near-apocalyptic: "The palace was completely destroyed, the throne was dragged to the Tuileries' courtyard and burned, with all furniture smashed into pieces. Shortly thereafter, the rebels headed for palais-royal, the king's private property. The royal chambers were set on fire and burned down completely. The palace of the minister of internal affairs was likewise burned down. (...) Paris presents a picture of pitiful desolation. The streets and boulevards are crawling with corpses. The boulevards trees were all felled. Barricades have been raised every hundred steps, manned by people who only let single individuals pass."[17]

In the subsequent correspondences, the newspaper depended on the French press, including the radically revolutionary "La Réforme" and the bulletin of moderate republicans, "Le National." As a result, the coverage of the revolution changed dramatically. "How great was the goodwill of the people after some of them were admonished for donning Louis Philippe's liveries embroidered with pure gold, and submitted them under the ordinance of the authorities. Moreover, earlier today fifty citizens deposited

15 O. Barrot, *Mémoires posthumes de Odilon Barrot,* vol. 1, Paris 1875, p. 442.

16 "Gazeta W. Xięstwa Poznańskiego", March 2, 1848, no. 52, p. 1.

17 Ibid. Although the revolutionaries did indeed ransack the Tuileries and Palais-Royal, reports of fires were clearly exaggerated, as were the allegations of a great number of deaths, which totaled 350.

the valuables seized in the Tuileries and palais royal at the mayor's office of the third arrondissement,"[18] wrote a reporter on the very people who had just plundered the royal palaces. Those same people reportedly donated the entirety of a large money found at the Tuileries to the new republic.[19] In the end, "Gazeta" conveyed to the people of Poznań a rather positive image of revolutionary France: united around the republic and the republican triad of "liberty, equality, fraternity;" France governed by the aforementioned good people, at peace with the rest of Europe.[20] Successive March issues drew a picture of a cheerful, orderly, almost joyful country in the aftermath of the revolution. The press quoted consecutive proclamations of the Provisional Government, circulars of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as articles from Parisian newspapers, both the more conservative ones, such as the "Journal des Débats," and the liberal or left-leaning ones, such as "La Réforme." As a result, the tone of these reports remained rather formal, but at the same time factual and balanced.

The newly established "Gazeta Polska" took a completely different stance on the Paris events. Michał Słomczewski began the editorial of the newspaper's first issue with the following words: "The revolution was accomplished in a few days in Paris, despotism collapsed, violence and deceit gave way to love and justice: freedom and brotherhood, which soared amongst the barricades of the grand first French revolution, proclaimed and acknowledged by Christ as the emblem and ideal of humanity, triumphed today, triumphed today, the people won and took it upon themselves to rule and reign in the spirit of *liberty, equality and fraternity.*"[21] He then argued with overt optimism that "Poland's future is already decided: the establishment of the Republic in France, founded on the rule of the people, proclaimed the principles of justice and humanity, namely that all men are equal, and hence all must be free." Słomczewski's editorial—naïve, extremely one-sided (for it is difficult to regard the July Monarchy as despotic and founded on violence and deceit)—was nevertheless an important testimony to the era, not only because of its peculiar religious rhetoric, references to Hegel or Saint-Simon[22] but also

18 "Gazeta W. Xięstwa Poznańskiego", March 3, 1848, no. 53, pp. 2–3.

19 "Gazeta W. Xięstwa Poznańskiego", March 6, 1848, no. 55, p. 1.

20 "Gazeta W. Xięstwa Poznańskiego", March 10, 1848, no. 59, pp. 1–2.

21 M. Słomczewski, *Polska zmartwychwstaje!*, "Gazeta Polska", March 22, 1848, no. 1, p. 1. Although the text is unsigned, the author's name was revealed by Marceli Motty in *Przechadzki po mieście* (vol. I, Warszawa 1957, p. 140).

22 For more on Słomczewski's text, see P. Matusik, *Wprowadzenie do „Polska zmartwychwstaje"*, "Kronika Miasta Poznania" no. 1, 2008, pp. 38–39.

due to its fixation on Paris and the conviction (typical of many democrats)[23] that it was in France where the global political and moral revolution was to commence, one that would reinstate Polish independence.[24] As noted by Stefan Kieniewicz, from the moment the first news from Paris reached Greater Poland, rumors about the approaching war and the arrival of the French began to spread.[25] These rumors seemed to be confirmed by the actions of the Prussian authorities, who called up reservists to arms. Leaflets urging the population to support the French also appeared in Greater Polish towns. Kieniewicz recounts the one that was most widely circulated:

"Więc nasi tam z Francji tak do nas kazali,
Żebyśmy tu wszyscy w pogotowiu stali,
A jak nam znać dadzą, więc zaraz do broni!
Łączyć się pod znakiem Orła i Pogoni!"[26].

[And so from France came the command,
For us o'er here ready to stand.
And when they signal, so shall we fight!
Led by the eagle and the white knight.]

The Paris revolution of February 1848 thus heightened tensions in Greater Poland. Of course, this was neither the only nor the main cause of this upsurge. Moreover, the tendency was mostly limited to Poles. As clearly indicated by Jerzy Kozłowski, the German inhabitants of the province remained completely passive during this period, despite the news coming not only from Paris but also from western Germany.[27]

It goes without saying that, for the citizens of Poznań, the capital of Prussia and the changes taking place therein were much more important than Paris. It was only upon news of a revolution on the Spree that, on March 20, 1848, the National Committee (subsequently transformed into the Central

23 Michał Słomczewski (1818–1893) was a member of the Poznań Committee associated with the Polish Democratic Society. He cooperated with Walenty Stefański and Edward Dembowski, among others. Arrested by the Prussian authorities in 1846, he was acquitted by a Berlin court in 1847. After returning to Poznań, he immediately resumed his conspiratorial activities. After the fall of the 1848 uprising, he was arrested again, expelled from Prussia and likely spent the rest of his life in France. (S. Kieniewicz *Michał Słomczewski,* [in:] *Internetowy Polski Słownik Biograficzny,* https://www.ipsb.nina.gov.pl/a/biografia/michal-slomczewski [accessed January 16, 2020]). Motty also notes that Słomczewski was regarded at the time as "a profound politician of extreme democratic sentiment" (M. Motty, *Przechadzki*..., op. cit., p. 140).

24 For a similar opinion on Słomczewski's manifesto in "Gazeta Polska", see Z. Grot, *Hipolit Cegielski*, Poznań 2000, p. 121.

25 S. Kieniewicz, *Społeczeństwo polskie w powstaniu poznańskim 1848 roku*, Warszawa 1960, p. 134.

26 Ibid., p. 135.

27 J. Kozłowski, *Niemcy w Poznańskiem wobec Wiosny Ludów (1848–1850),* Poznań 2009, pp. 82–83.

National Committee) was established, whose first proclamation, published by the "Gazeta Polska," was also primarily concerned with the developments in Berlin."[28] The events in Paris and Poznań each took their respective courses, albeit they did remain intertwined.

During this period, the French were yet again keeping a close eye on Poland. Without knowing about the uprising that had already broken out in Greater Poland, on March 20, 1848, the Republican-leaning "Le National" wrote the following: "And you, Poland, let your pale spirit come out of the midnight tomb! You dearly departed! The hour of your resurrection is nigh (...)."[29] Although these words were first and foremost addressed to the citizens of the Kingdom of Poland, they concerned all Poles. The newspaper further argued that an independent Poland was an essential piece of the European puzzle: "...Poland is our remote sentinel; Poland is a prerequisite complement to the defensive system of the great [democratic – RD] Western federation." Like many French revolutionaries, the newspaper's editors were evidently convinced that, as in the case of the 1830 uprising, the Polish revolution of 1848 would be a logical consequence and continuation of the French revolution. It was in particular in April 1848, at a time when a war between revolutionary Prussia and Nikolai's Russia was a possibility,[30] that Poles were counted on. As per "Le Constitutionnel," "It is on the banks of the Vistula that the fate of the new religion, guided by the motto: liberty, equality, fraternity, will be decided; it is there that fanaticism, despotism and hatred between nations have hoisted their last banners in Europe. The soul trembles at the thought of the blood sacrifice indispensable for the triumph of a good cause, however great results can only be achieved by great sacrifice."[31]

The actions of Poznanians and the policy of the government in Berlin were closely scrutinized not only by the newspapers but above all by the French ministry of foreign affairs, headed by Lamartine. The poet is said to have met with a group of Poles as early as March 11, 1848, at the apartment of Félicité de Lamennais, where he reportedly declared that, "due to its temporary situation [the French Republic] is in no position to start a fight with foreign powers, but should Poles stage a revolution, France shall support it by providing weapons, ammunition, capable officers and money."[32] Even if

28 "Gazeta Polska", March 22, 1848, no. 1, p. 2.

29 "Le National", March 20, 1847, p. 2.

30 For a short period of time, this concept was being seriously considered in the government circles in Berlin.

31 "Le Constitutionnel", April 16, 1848, no. 107, p. 2.

32 Qtd. in: J. Feldman, *Sprawa polska w roku 1848*, Kraków 1933.

such words were indeed uttered, they resulted from the internal situation in Paris, applied only to the Russian partition, and did not correspond with the French minister's true mindset.[33] For Lamartine's primary concern was to avoid war. A few days earlier, on March 5, the press had published his circular addressed to the French diplomatic corps in Europe, which included the following words: "The French Republic will not declare war on anyone. (...) It is the opinion of the French Republic that the treaties of 1815 are no longer legally binding; however, the territorial clauses contained therein are a fact that she accepts as a basis and vantage point in her relations with other states."[34] Moreover, while as late as March 11, 1848 the French could still theoretically fear a coalition of European monarchs against France, after the revolutions in Vienna and Berlin it became clear that such a scenario was highly unlikely. For this reason, during his subsequent meeting with the Poles on March 26, Lamartine chose his words much more carefully. There was no longer any talk of arms or money, but only of "restoring Poland to her rightful position under the sun, amidst other nations," yet at an unspecified time and "without aggression and bloodshed."[35] Thus, it became clear that France would in no case provide Poland with any sort of military aid.

This was particularly true of the Prussian partition. For some reason, Lamartine placed exceptional hopes in Frederick William IV. In his *History of the Revolution of 1848*, published a year after the events, he described him as a "liberal erudite" through whom the cause of peace and humanity had triumphed in the Hohenzollern monarchy. He even went so far as to say that the Berlin Revolution was in fact redundant and dangerous, as it could divert this extraordinary ruler from his path.[36] The poet was anxious about a possible Prussian-Russian war that would involve France. He watched the columns of Polish emigrants leaving Paris with both hope and fear, urging the Poles to return to their homeland, because this would enable him to remove

33 Feldman quotes the words of the Austrian informer Zygmunt Sawiczewski, who in fact did not attend the meeting with Lamartine in person. It is certainly true, however, that Lamartine, who was not personally fond of most Poles, had to reckon with their political importance on the Seine. As he later wrote in his Memoirs: "It was Poles, an expatriate nation that has adopted the world as its homeland, and brought to its adoptive homelands all of the virtues and vices of that grand and miserable tribe: heroism, unruliness, and anarchy, who have stirred the population of Paris to the point of madness." (A. de Lamartine, *Mémoires politiques*, [in:] „Oeuvres complètes de Lamartine" t. XXXIX, Paris 1863, s. 141). In view of said agitation, Lamartine could not afford to completely disregard the Polish postulates.

34 A. de Lamartine, *Circulaire du ministre des affaires* étrangères *aux agens diplomatiques de la Républque française*, « Le National », March 5, 1848, p. 1.

35 A. de Lamartine *Histoire de la Révolution de 1848*, vol. II, Paris 1859, p. 213.

36 Ibid., p. 146–147.

them from Paris. However, Lamartine did not intend to arm them, since, as he convinced the Polish delegation, "The nations of Germany that sympathize with your cause; the King of Prussia who opens the gates of his citadels to your martyrs and exiles; the liberated Cracow; the Grand Duchy of Posen once more in Polish hands: behold these weapons, which we have delivered to you in the course of but one political month. Ask not for other weapons from us."[37] As noted by Sławomir Kalembka, the French continued to encourage Polish emigrants to leave for a long time, even after the eventual collapse of the revolutions in Berlin and Vienna. In the end, a total of 19 emigrant columns left Paris.[38]

Lamartine's attitude to the Poles is not particularly surprising. Firstly, he clearly regarded them as a dangerous element destabilizing the internal situation in Paris, and so he was willing to send as many Polish insurgents as possible (primarily those affiliated with the Polish Democratic Society) outside the borders of France as swiftly as possible. However, he could not predict where the exiles would wind up: in Poznań, Cracow or perhaps Warsaw. No European government was likely to send an armed detachment of troops without being sure of the column's final destination. Secondly, as rightly noted by Jerzy Zdrada, Lamartine did not want to upset France's relations with any of the partitioning powers. Even if he knew of the Poles' destination, he would nonetheless not have supplied them with weapons. He simply wanted to avoid a *casus belli*. Thirdly, Lamartine's thinking about the Poles was significantly influenced by his Berlin ambassador, Baron de Circourt. The conservative Circourt, who was friends with the French minister, had an equally critical opinion of the Poles. His memoirs of the Berlin mission included the following words: "Suicide is the political maxim *par excellence* for the Poles. The Commonwealth effectively killed itself, and even in 1790, when it exhausted all poisons available, it still found a way to kill itself with a cure. Between 1846 and 1849, Poznań and Cracow accomplished on a smaller scale what the whole Commonwealth had done on a larger scale in the years 1694–1794."[39] Circourt was equally enamored with the figure of Frederick William IV. As a result—according to his biographer—he "fully subscribed to the views of the King and Baron von Arnim on the reorganization

37 Ibid., p. 214. It was not only the Poles themselves who implored Lamartine to arm them at the time but also some of the more revolutionary newspapers intervening on their behalf.

38 S. Kalembka, *Wielka Emigracja 1831–1863,* Toruń 2003, p. 304.

39 A. de Circourt, *Souvenirs d'une mission à Berlin en 1848,* Paris 1908, p. 416.

of Poznania," and subsequently defended, using arguments "scooped out from the historical abysses," the idea of dividing the Grand Duchy into two territories: German (with Poznań) and Polish (with Gniezno).[40] Moreover, he was completely incapable of understanding the Poles who did not share his views. Like Lamartine, Circout was averse to Polish emigrants whom he accused of aggravating the situation in the Grand Duchy and attempting to provoke a war with Russia.[41]

The ambassador and the minister were exceptions to the rule, however, as the vast majority of the French public favored the Poles. Its attitude was well reflected by Gustave Flaubert in *Sentimental Education*, in which young friends of Frédéric Moreau repeatedly discuss the Polish question, and after the outbreak of the February Revolution Dussardier, one of the most vivid characters in the novel, exclaims joyfully, "The Republic is proclaimed! We'll be happy henceforth! Some journalists, who were talking just now in front of me, said they were going to liberate Poland and Italy! No more kings! You understand? The entire land free! the entire land free!"[42] In addition, in April and May 1848, the newspapers were again replete with reports from Poznania. However, they clearly overestimated the forces of the Polish insurgents and exaggerated the significance of the uprising itself. At the same time, the tone of these press reports was again quite similar, regardless of the political line of the paper. At the beginning of April, the centrist "Le National" wrote of a Polish troop of 12,000.[43] Conversely, the conservative "Journal des Débats" wrote of thousands of peasants supporting the insurgents in a report that was as picturesque as it was fabricated. "Here is how Poles assemble great masses of men armed with scythes (scythemen). A peasant, without a saddle and without a bridle, gallops on horseback through the middle of a village or field. He shouts to the first person he meets: They are murdering our brothers out there!, and rushes on. The message is transmitted with lightning speed; and within moments the entire male population is on its way to the meeting place."[44] In turn, the revolutionary "La Réforme" alarmed that, "The last war for independence

40 J. Huber-Saladin, *Le comte De Circourt, son temps, ses* écrits*, madame De Circourt, son salon, ses correspondances: notice biographique offerte à leurs amis*, Paris 1881, pp. 80–81.

41 A. de Circourt, *Souvenirs*..., op. cit., p. 420.

42 G. Flaubert, *Sentimental Education: The Story of a Young Man,* Book II, New York 1922, p. 11. (https://archive.org/details/sentimentaleduca00flauiala/page/n5/mode/2up, accessed January 7, 2021).

43 Stanislas P. *Pologne. Correspodance particulière* "Le National", April 15, 1848, p. 2.

44 "Journal des Débats Politiques et Littéraires", May 13, 1848, p. 2.

has broken out. (...) Mierosławski has brought about an uprising in all of the province, and the entire district of Buk is already under arms. It is said that everyone, men and women, is coming to Miłosław and Pleszew. (...). A rumor has been spreading that the insurgents want to try to take Poznań. Let us have no illusions: if this is the case, a call to arms or cry of despair will be uttered in the direction of France. Rest assured, all will fall under Prussian bullets (...) if republican France remains as impervious as the monarchical and corrupt France of Louis XV and Louis Philippe."[45] The lone title that covered the events in Greater Poland in a clearly negative light was "La Presse." The newspaper suggested that Poles were murdering Germans and Jews,[46] and considered the entire uprising immoral.[47] However, even Émile de Girardin, the founder and owner of this influential newspaper, who was not fond of Poles himself, likely feared the reaction of his readers and wrote little about Polish affairs.

The French perspective on the 1848 uprising in Greater Poland was, of course, significantly influenced by Polish émigrés. Some of those who had left Paris were now returning to the city. As Marie d'Agoult later recalled, their stories had a powerful effect on the French: "One was moved at the sight of their misfortune, listening to the tales of their suffering, of burnt and plundered towns and villages, of murdered inhabitants; the walls of cities were covered with appeals for the brotherhood of peoples."[48] As a result, wrote Liszt's beloved, "No cause has ever been so popular in France as the Polish cause."[49]

One should also be reminded that it was Poznanians themselves, too, who tried to affect the attitude of the government and voters in Paris. As Motty noted subsequently, the citizens of Poznań soon realized that Lamartine, "venerated at first by the enthusiasts of freedom, was not overly kind to us."[50] Therefore, the people of Greater Poland decided to send their own representative to Paris in March. The choice fell on Teofil Zakrzewski, whose goal was, among others, to induce an interpellation of the National Assembly.

45 "La Réforme", May 8, 1848, p. 1.

46 "La Presse", May 12, 1848, no. 4382, p. 3.

47 On May 16, the newspaper wrote, "Above all, it would serve everyone well if this war founded on murder ended. Poland's rights, or any other rights for that matter, must not be vindicated by war and bloodshed." ("La Presse", May 16, 1848, no. 4386, p. 3).

48 D. Stern *Histoire de la Révolution de 1848,* op. cit., p. 359

49 Ibid., p. 356.

50 M. Motty, *Przechadzki...*, op. cit., p. 58.

Although Zakrzewski's mission was a failure,[51] the desired interpellation was submitted at the National Assembly, albeit independently from his efforts. The problem was that it only happened in the middle of May (when the uprising in Greater Poland had already collapsed), and had much more influence on France than on the Polish cause.

May 1848 by all means saw the peak of popular interest in Poland and Poles on the Seine. However, it was soon followed by a marked decline, caused primarily by the failure of the uprising. News of its collapse reached the French capital in mid-May 1848, and although some newspapers had faith in the possibility of another insurrection,[52] reports from Poland simply disappeared from the press.

The attempted leftist coup d'état of 15 May 1848, related to the aforementioned interpellation, also contributed to the decline in the interest in Greater Poland and Poland in general. On that day, Ludwik Wołowski[53] was to submit a petition in defense of Polish nationality at the National Assembly. This was exploited by the leaders of the French extreme left, who sought to overthrow the moderate Assembly. People such as Louis Auguste Blanqui were well aware of the emotional overtones of the Polish cause and its impact on the Paris public. Blanqui himself, the most famous revolutionary radical at the time, said that "the word Poland is magical and incites the people of Paris."[54] Blanqui, along with the other radical leaders: Armand Barbès, Aloysius Huber, and François-Vincent Raspail, intended to take advantage of the Polish (Poznanian) question, the uproar in Paris upon news of the defeat of the uprising in Greater Poland, and the announcement of Wołowski's interpellation in order to draw the people of Paris into the streets and overthrow

51 Motty argued that, upon his arrival in France, Zakrzewski joined the socialists and the extreme left. As a result, he lost the ability to exert any influence on the representatives of the parliamentary majority and the government. (Ibid.)

52 On May 22, 1848, "Le National" reported on another near-certain uprising, this time in Cracow.

53 Ludwik Wołowski (1810–1876) was born to a family of polonized Frankists. He was a November insurgent, and then emigrated to Paris, where he completed his law studies. In 1834 he was granted French citizenship. He quickly made a name for himself as an excellent lawyer and economist, which allowed him to be elected to the National Assembly in 1848. After Louis Napoleon Bonaparte's coup d'état, Wołowski withdrew from politics but continued to lecture on economics (he was a member of the Academy of Moral and Political Sciences, and lectured at the Collége de France). He was also one of the founders of the Crédit Agricole bank. A prolific author, he resumed his parliamentary career after the fall of the Second Empire, and in 1876 he became a senator for life. Associated with the Hotel Lambert circles, he was one of the most influential Poles in France (P. Markiewicz, *Louis Wolowski, un intellectuel et un représentant du libéralisme en France au milieu du 19 siècle,* unpublished doctoral dissertation defended in November 1993 at the University Paris X - Nanterre).

54 Ph.Vigier *La Seconde République,* Paris 1967, p. 36.

the authorities of the Second Republic. Initially, it seemed that the plan was close to fruition. On May 15, ca. 150,000 people did take to the streets to demonstrate their support for the dying Poles. The demonstrators burst into the Assembly in the midst of Wołowski speech. The Pole had managed to call on the French authorities to take a tougher stance against the Prussians when the demonstrators appeared in the hall.[55] The entire scene was described, among others, by the prominent conservative politician Charles de Rémusat, who wrote the following in his Memoirs: "Wołowski began his speech, stiff as usual, which this time, however, at least conveyed an impression of courage, when we heard an indefinable noise from the outside. I went out immediately and from the northern peristyle saw a long procession of people, variously dressed, but mostly workers, approaching in a wide column from Madeleine and the Louis XV Bridge. (...) Soon the entire hall was filled with a crowd, which obstructed any movement. The attackers mingled with us and sat in our benches wherever they could find room (...) Raspail read out his petition for Poland, which was neither offensive nor threatening, but mentioned the war for Polish independence in the concluding passages. (...) But with Blanqui in attendance, this was not enough. I have not seen him since the days of July [the July Revolution of 1830 - RD] at the editorial office of the Globe. Weary and worn out by passion, he grew old and hateful; in a sharp, characteristically morbid tone, he complemented his appeal for Poland by conveying the discontent and demands of the workers."[56] In the midst of this unspeakable chaos, Huber called for the dissolution of the Assembly, and the rioters marched toward the Hotel de Ville, in keeping with revolutionary tradition. In the meantime, however, troops of the National Guard, loyal to the government, had already assembled and quickly dispersed the now considerably thinner crowd. The attempted coup failed. Huber, Raspail and Blanqui were arrested and sentenced to life imprisonment shortly thereafter.

Thus, regardless of the intentions of the Polish insurgents, the events of Poznań influenced French politics in 1848, contributing to the weakening of the radical wing of the Revolution. Significantly, the majority of the French who were critical of the coup attempt did not associate it with Poland. The essence of the events of May 15 was perhaps best captured by Tocqueville, who wrote, "(...) It was in any case an equivocal undertaking of the sort one

55 *Assemblée nationale, Séance tumultueuse du 15 mai*, "Journal des Débats Politiques et Littéraires", May 16, 1848, p. 3.

56 Ch. De Rémusat, *Mémoires de ma vie*, t. IV, *Les dernières années de la monarchie. La Révolution de 1848. La Seconde République (1841–1851)*, Paris 1958, pp. 300–302.

sees so often in times of popular agitation, in which the promoters themselves are careful not to spell out any precise plans or goals in advance so that they can either stop at a peaceful demonstration or push on toward full-scale revolution."[57] Thus, it was perfectly clear to Tocqueville, as it was to most of the public, that Poles were in no way responsible for the actions of Blanqui or Barbès.

In the aftermath of the May events, the French lost sight of Poznań for a long time. However, this does not change the fact that the years 1846–1848 poignantly demonstrated the strength of the links between the capital of Greater Poland and other parts of Europe, in this case primarily Paris. Europe in the middle of the 19th century was already a network of interconnected vessels, and Poznań was part of this network, much like Paris or Berlin. This network was host to a flow of news, people and ideas. As evidenced by the Spring of Nations, this flow was uneven but not one-sided. The events in the French capital echoed in the Grand Duchy of Posen, while the uprising attempts in Poznań found some resonance on the Seine. In the texts of "Gazeta Polska," one could find references to the ideas originating on the Seine or Loire, while the stories of Polish sacrifice and devotion to the idea of freedom touched the French deeply, and pushed them to action, albeit not always well thought out. Thus, Poznań clearly found its place in the complex puzzle of the European events of 1848.

57 A. de Tocqueville, *Recollections*, op. cit., p. 134.




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Zbigniew Pilarczyk

The Poznań Fortress: a European monument of defensive architecture

The strategic location of Poznań has long been recognized and appreciated. In the early Middle Ages, the river island of Ostrów Tumski became host to a mighty castle unrivalled in the Piast state. In turn, the 13th century saw the development of a splendidly designed defensive perimeter protecting the left bank of the Warta River. The dynamics of political events in Poland at the time thwarted the projected construction of a modern fortress, whose traces can only be found in numerous surviving designs. In 1793, the Prussian army marched into Poznań, thus beginning the period of Prussian rule over the city, briefly interrupted by the Napoleonic Wars.

The Congress of Vienna brought about a new division of Europe, which unfortunately consolidated the decisions of the partitioning states in relation to Poland. Poznań and Greater Poland were once again annexed to Prussia. The new division of Europe also meant that Poznań found itself only a few dozen kilometers west of the Russian border and, more importantly, deprived of any fortifications. Despite their seemingly good relations at the time, Prussia and Russia realized that this state of affairs would not last long and saw it as necessary to prepare for a future war. The defense systems of European states at the time—which had not changed since the turn of the 17th and 18th century—were based on large fortresses known commonly as polygonal forts. Prussia was no exception to this tendency in adhering to a similar plan of territorial defense. In this regard, it was its eastern border that called for the most significant fortification, given that it virtually lacked any significant defensive complex. Poznań almost instantly became an integral part of the new defensive concept. The idea to provide Poznań with new fortifications was promoted by the then Chief of the Prussian General



Fig. 1. Grolman's sketch presenting the distribution of fortification works in Poznań, made in 1823. Courtesy of the Museum of the History of the City of Poznań, file no. VII/320

Staff, General Karl von Grolman.[1] Initially, i.e. between 1816 and 1817, he envisioned the erection of new fortifications in four sections of the city, the first of which was located on the right bank of the Warta. The defenses were to include Ostrów Tumski; a nearby hill with the buildings of the Reformed Franciscan monastery; and St Roch's Hill. On the left bank of the Warta, the suburb of St. Martin and St. Adalbert's Hill were to be fortified as well. The axis of these fortifications would be delineated by the Warta, whose waters would be dammed up if necessary. Interestingly, back then Grolman was against fortifying Winiary Hill. Everything seems to indicate that a few years later, in 1823, Grolman changed his mind about the new defenses of the city. This is evidenced by the general sketch of the future fortress he drew on the then city plan (Fig. 1).

1 J. Biesiadka, A. Gawlak, Sz. Kucharski, M. Wojciechowski, *Twierdza Poznań. O fortyfikacjach miasta Poznania w XIX i XX wieku*, Poznań 2006, p. 19.



Fig. 2. City map of Poznań, drafted in 1833. Author: unknown. Courtesy of the National Museum in Poznań, file no. 1268 (excerpt)

After a long intermission, the construction design was drafted in 1827 by Major Johan Leopold Ludwig Brese, head of the Engineering Department of the Ministry of War. It spurred the decision that approved the erection of the Poznań Fortress, dated April 14, 1828. The earthworks commenced on Winiary Hill on une 23, 1828. Despite the ongoing construction works, discussions on the final shape of the fortress continued, as evidenced by several preserved plans from the early 1830s (Fig. 2)

Eventually, a decision was made to stick with the design comprised of a three-component fortress. As I have already mentioned, the earliest construction works involved laying the foundations for a citadel, projected to literally and metaphorically tower over the entire city and its surroundings.



Fig. 3. Winiary Fort in its final shape. Source: Plan von der Stadt und Festung Posen. Courtesy of the Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preussischer Kulturbesitz. Berlin – Dahlem

Similarly to the other elements of the fortress, the Citadel was designed in several variants. Eventually, a plan was approved that made it the largest work of its kind on Polish soil.[2] The first segment to be erected was the so called *Kernwerk*, or the Barracks Redoubt. Its shape resembled a trapezoid with a massive entrance caponier. In principle, the *Kernwerk* was a defensive complex of barracks buildings. The buildings were three-storied and tailored for defensive purposes. The complex was complemented by a large defensive perimeter around the fort. Its basic element was an earthen rampart enhanced with defensive works. The southern part included four redoubts, while the northern was fitted with three bastions, four caponiers, and four ravelins (two full and two half-ravelins). The northern section comprised the front of the citadel. The entire structure was surrounded by a wide dry moat (20 m). A sheltered road with blockhouses and gun emplacements ran along the counterscarp. The construction of the citadel lasted from 1828 until 1842 (Fig. 3).

2 J. Bogdanowski, *Architektura obronna w krajobrazie Polski. Od Biskupina do Westerplatte*, Warszawa -Kraków 1996, p. 141.

Fig. 4. Design of the left-bank defense ring of the Poznań Fortress, drafted in 1840. Author: Johann Leopold Ludwig Brese. Courtesy of the Geheimes Staatarchiv Preussischer Kulturbesitz. Berlin – Dahlem

The second element of the fortress was a ring of fortifications surrounding left-bank Poznań. The basic elements of this part featured redoubt works shielded by an earthen rampart in the form of a bastion. The earthen rampart also bundled the redoubts into a single, compact system. As the city had to function normally, fortified city gates were situated in several places around the defensive perimeter (Fig. 4).

As the Poznań Fortress was to shield the city from a possible Russian attack, its designers also accounted for strengthening the right bank of the Warta River. The fortifications of Ostrów Tumski, also known as the Tumski Citadel, were intended as the cornerstone of the right-bank defenses. Further to the east, a near-textbook example of crownwork was situated, featuring the Cybina Lunette as its centerpiece. The outermost sections of the crownwork were reinforced with two twin forts: St. Roch's Fort and Reformed Franciscans' Fort. Another important addition to the city defenses in this part of Poznań was the Cathedral Lunette. Hydrotechnical structures complemented the fortifications of direct combat value. Even though the fortress was situated on the Warta and Cybina rivers, their respective width in this area did not pose a significant obstacle to a potential enemy. Therefore, extensive hydrotechnical works were undertaken to raise the water levels in a relatively short period of time, mainly in the Warta and Cybina rivers. Numerous weirs, sluices, and culverts were to create wide flood plains making it difficult for the enemy troops to approach the fortress area directly (Fig. 5).

The Poznań Fortress was an exemplary implementation of the principles of the New Prussian fortification school, which itself was a variant of the polygonal defensive system. In this case, the polygonal system consisted of ramparts, redoubts and caponiers. The main advantage of this system was the use of a polygonal outline, extremely flexible and thus adaptable to complex terrain conditions. The arrangement of individual elements resembled the old bastion fortresses. An important difference between them was the possibility to increase the number of artillery positions in the New Prussian fortresses.

It is assumed that the construction of the fortress concluded in 1869. The result was a great stronghold, classified as a 1st class fortress, built mainly of stone and brick, which burdened the Prussian state budget with the grand sum amounting to 11,400,000 thalers.[3] Thus, following strenuous efforts and considerable expenditure, a complex of fortifications was erected in Poznań that remains perhaps the best manifestation of defensive thought in mid-19th century Europe (Fig 6).

Paradoxically, however, by the time its construction was completed, the Poznań Fortress had already become outdated, mostly due to the rapid modernization of artillery.

3 J. Biesiadka, A. Gawlak, Sz. Kucharski, M. Wojciechowski, *Twierdza Poznań*..., op. cit., p. 29.

Fig. 5. Map of floodland areas around the Poznań Fortress, based on a plan drafted in 1862. Author: Z. Pilarczyk.

The second half of the 19th century brough about a number of circumstances that necessitated changes in fortifications both on a macro and micro scale. The establishment of the German Reich in 1871 required that political and military authorities of the country remodel its defense strategy. First of all, the German state had to account for the possibility of a two-front war. As a result, both the western and eastern front had to be reinforced. In the case of the former, the situation became favorable especially after the capture of Alsace and Lorraine. The prospects of effective defense along the eastern border were not as favorable. Despite the efforts undertaken in the previous period, it was an open frontier with only a handful of fortified defense points, one of which was Poznań. Nonetheless, German war theorists were well aware that, in reality, a two-front war was unfeasible.

The search for new and more effective defense measures continued. However, the factors that precipitated significant changes in fortification strategies were the emergence of rifled artillery and the development of railroads,

Fig. 6. Final shape of the polygonal Poznań Fortress, drafted in 1871. Courtesy of the Geheimes Staatarchiv Preussischer Kulturbesitz. Berlin – Dahlem

which allowed the transport of guns and ammunition of even the heaviest calibers to almost any location with unprecedented speed. The guns manufactured at the time had a maximum range of up to 8 km.[4] The accuracy and power of artillery fire also increased significantly. However, the importance of the fortress still prevailed in all concepts. The only changes concerned its size and, above all, its layout. First of all, theoreticians and practitioners agreed on the need to disperse the hitherto compact fortress structure,

4 K. Kleczke, W. Wyszyński, *Fortyfikacja stała*, Warszawa 1937, p. 20.

which was supposed to make it more difficult for the besiegers to destroy individual elements of the fortress. This, in short, is how the idea of the ring fortress was conceived.[5]

It should be emphasized that, despite the evolving concepts of border defense, the strategic role of Poznań did not deteriorate, which in turn ensured the city its prominent position as an important link in the German defense system. The decision to build, or rather expand, *Festung Posen* was made on June 24, 1872. As in the previous case, the shape of the fortress was a subject of years' long disputes. In principle, the one assumption that did not cause much controversy was the consensus about an artillery fort as the linchpin of the fortress. The concept proposed at the time provisioned the erection of an outer perimeter around the city, consisting of eleven forts. This idea was modified in 1875 in favor of nine outer forts and three intermediate structures. Thanks to the surviving cartographic materials, we can trace the evolution of the Poznań Fortress project rather precisely. All the works were located about 8 km from the city center. An important element guaranteeing the proper functioning of the fortress was the projected rocade in the south-western section of the city foreground, which, in my opinion, was purposely connected to the newly planned railroad lines. Eventually, between 1873 and 1875, several projects were developed that consistently included the preservation of the citadel as the final point of defense. Construction of the fortress began in the fall of 1876 (Fig. 7).

Eventually eighteen forts were erected, including nine main forts and nine intermediate forts (*Zwischenwerk*). The distances between the forts varied, ranging from one to three kilometers. It is perhaps reasonable to believe that such a skeletal layout of the fortress was a byproduct of the shortage of funds at hand and the projected expansion of the fortress in the next stage of its construction.

Prussian defense engineers were cognizant of the pressing need to fortify the entire Reich with nearly a hundred stronghold at a rather short notice. Thus, it was necessary to design a type of defensive work that could be universally applied to all fortresses. As a result, a standard fort design was created in 1871. In fact, it was a fort design for the Strasbourg Fortress, which

5 The size of this text does not allow for an in-depth analysis of all determinants and organization principles of German fortification architecture in the 2nd half of the 19th century. The complexity of these structures suggests that the tasks set before them were extremely serious in nature. See: P. Jurkiewicz, *Twierdza fortowa Poznań 1876–1914*, Poznań 2002, pp. 67–110. (manuscript kept by the Department of Military History of the Institute of History, Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań).



Fig. 7. Poznań Ring Fortress. Final shape of the ring fortress as per a 1910 plan. Courtesy of the Geheimes Staatarchiv Preussischer Kulturbesitz. Berlin – Dahlem

was the first one on the list of defensive works earmarked for modernization. It was redesigned by Major General Hans Alexis von Biehler, working in the 3rd Division of the Engineering Committee of the General Inspectorate of Fortresses. The design was so attractive and suitable for the needs of its time that it became a model for other fortresses that followed. The literature on the subject emphasizes the fact that Biehler referenced 15th-century designs, which should not come as surprising since early modern fortification schools used the fort very commonly. 'Biehler's Fort,' as this new fortification soon came to be known, was designed as a typical artillery fort. The entire length of the rampart in the fort was planned as a line of artillery emplacements towering over the rest of the fort to provide the defenders with an overview of the foreground. In fact, two types of forts were designed that differed in size. The first type had a front span of 260 m and was fitted with 28 artillery positions. Barracks were placed under the artillery rampart. The second, smaller type had a span of 230 m and 22 artillery positions along the

ramparts. In the latter case, the barracks were located in the gorge. As it was to be expected, the model of the fort designed by Biehler failed the test of war, and so modernization works had to be carried out. The smaller fort turned out to be more amenable to these procedures, and it was this model that was approved for construction in Poznań on November 18, 1875. It was designed as a pentagon, or more of a trapezoid, with the base withdrawn inwards. The fort was of the single-rampart type, surrounded by a dry and escarped moat. The Poznań forts followed a symmetrical layout, where the right flank was a mirror image of the left one. The inner space of the moat was to be defended by three caponiers and two bunkers located in the bends of the gorge barracks. Additionally, three sections of counterscarp shooting galleries were used to defend the moat, which in a way reinforced the firepower of the caponiers. The escarpment on the face and flanks was supplemented by a Carnot wall, which was intended to protect guards' routes. The crew could get there by means of outlets situated in the posterns next to the caponiers. An important element of the fort were the gorge barracks, the most visible part of the fort. It was a two-story structure, with four rooms on each side of the entrance gate on the upper level, in the central part of the structure. On top of that, there were five rooms and latrines in each of the wings, to the left and right of the central section. The main postern, protected by a massive traverse dividing the entire inner space in half, ran along the fort axis, from the entrance gate to the frontal caponier. Underneath the rampart of the front section, large single-story front barracks were erected. Exits from the barracks block led to the left and right courtyard. The corners of the courtyards held entrances to the posterns, which led to the flank caponiers and powder magazines. The ramparts were equipped with open artillery stations separated by thirteen traverses. Fortunately, the accessories used in these stations survived in several forts (e.g. Fort VII), allowing for their accurate description. The three traverses above the frontal block housed emergency shelters. The other sections of the rampart were host to artillery shelters, i.e. gun shelters. In the flank sections of the rampart, the shelters were limited to the part below the middle traverse. The rampart routes were protected by a scarp that protected the crew from the enemy's infantry fire. Artillery equipment was transported from the courtyard to the battle stations using two ramps. The entrance to the fort was preceded by a triangular place-of-arms shielded by a high wall, additionally reinforced from the inside with an infantry rampart. Access to the fort was possible using a two-winged, armored gate with embrasures, located in the arm of the place-of-arms

triangle. In turn, the base of the place-of-arms triangle housed steel gates leading to a covered passageway on the counter slope of the moat. In the corner of the place-of-arms, a blockhouse was raised to protect the approach to the entrance gate. From the place-of-arms, one could get directly inside the fort through a bridge over the moat. Additionally, the gorge barracks sections were extended to include entrenchments, which could serve as battle stations for small-size external connected batteries.

One important reinforcement of the ring fortress was the addition of interfield shelters. In January 1887, the Engineering Committee was commissioned with designing these structures. The designs were created expeditiously, and the construction works commenced that same year. The interfield shelters were divided into three types: infantry, artillery, and ammunition shelters. By 1914, a total of forty-three shelters had been built, seventeen of which were for intended for infantry, twelve for artillery, and fourteen for ammunition. To fulfill their protective function, these structures consisted of three layers and were additionally covered with soil, with each structure partially sunk in the ground. It is worth noting that the 'standard Biehler fort' described above provided the basis for the construction of some of the Poznań forts, which are classified as infantry structures. Forts II, III, V, VII and IX were built according to the same scheme. Forts of the second type, that is nos. I, IV, VI and VIII, saw a slightly different layout of individual elements. These forts had a somewhat 'sharper' front and base angle. It was set a 130 degrees, which necessitated changes in the trace of the barracks. In order to retain the possibility of shooting through the moat in the gorge, the central part was pulled back and narrowed. Therefore, it only hosted four rooms, while the wing sections held ten each. Other differences concerned the flanks of the artillery rampart. The shelter in the traverse faced the axis of the fort. A tall earthen embankment was built between its facade and the rampart. The reason behind employing two types of main forts in the Poznań Fortress was the desire to tighten the fortification ring around the city (Fig. 8, 9).

The existence of intermediate works in the Poznań Fortress—also referred to as the *Zwischenwerk* (intermediate forts) in source texts and the literature on the subject—was envisaged almost from the onset of the design works. In this case, too a standard work was designed that could be adapted to different forts. The design was created in 1874 and was projected as an auxiliary component of the Strasbourg Fortress. The first execution of the *Zwischenwerk* took place in Cologne. The layout of such a standard fort preserved in



Fig. 8. Poznań Ring Fortress. Fort V. Fort of the first type. Original document: Geheimes Staatarchiv Preussischer Kulturbesitz. Berlin – Dahlem



Fig. 9. Poznań Ring Fortress. Fort VIII. Fort of the second type. Original document: Geheimes Staatarchiv Preussischer Kulturbesitz. Berlin – Dahlem

the surviving literature is very similar to those constructed in Poznań. They had a trapezoidal trace, with a reclining base section. The entire structure was surrounded by a wide dry moat (9 m wide and 6 m deep). The counterscarp of the moat in the front and flank sections was escarped. These very sections were also equipped with a Carnot wall. On the outside, the front section of the fort was defended with an earthen rampart, which hosted the entrance to the stronghold. The inner space of the moat was defended by three escarpment caponiers, which were armed with small arms. The caponiers placed in the corners of the front and flank sections were asymmetrical. One was double-sided and the other was single-sided. The third caponier was set up to defend the gorge section and the entrance gate. An important element protecting the fort was a 2.5 m steel fortress fence. Outside the fence, there was a 20–30 m wide glacis with a rocade. Four earthen traverses were set up on the rampart, of which two were placed in the front part, which also hosted two artillery depots. The flanks were fitted with one traverse each. Artillery positions (4–6) were placed between the traverses. In the central part of the fort, another embankment was mounted that housed the powder and ammunition magazine. It was from here that artillery was rolled out on ramps and moved to the battle stations. These premises were connected to the barracks block with a short postern. The ends of the barracks block wings featured exits to the courtyard for the infantry. The barracks contained soldiers' rooms, officers' rooms, a field hospital, a powder magazine, a kitchen, a food storage, an ammunition magazine, and a guardhouse. Interestingly, only one of the intermediate forts (VIa) differed from the others. It was slightly larger than its counterparts. The axial embankment was larger and was moved towards the rampart of the front section, which offered an additional traverse. As it was the case with the main forts, the intermediate forts had to be modernized (or, in some cases, supplanted by new forts) between 1887 and 1890. These modernization efforts yielded six new forts (Ia, IIa, IIIa, Va, VIIIa) (Fig. 10, 11).

These forts were intended for infantry, each manned by a company of infantry. Practice showed that, despite the introduction of intermediate forts, the space between the forts was too large and there was a potential possibility of a besieger breach between them. The forts of the new type were equipped with light artillery, mainly for interfield shelling. They were modern constructions, resistant to demolition missiles. They had a trapezoid shape surrounded by a wide dry moat. The moat's counterscarp was laid with bricks on the front and flanks. Similarly to the older model, the



Fig. 10. Poznań Ring Fortress. Intermediate fort of the old type (Fort IXa). Original document: Geheimes Staatarchiv Preussischer Kulturbesitz. Berlin – Dahlem

front was defended by an earthen rampart with a low inner wall. The moat was defended by three caponiers. As in earlier constructions, one of them was a frontal caponier. In the new forts two counterscarp caponiers were used, located in the frontal corners. Additionally, the moat was protected by a high fence (fortress lattice) placed along the edge of the escarpment. Five traverses were added on the fort's rampart, separating six artillery stations. The location of the traverses and flank shelters was typical of this type of fort. One novelty was the fact that the traverses contained three-story shelters connected to the underground network of the fort. One should also note that the underground parts in the intermediate forts of the new type were designed and constructed completely differently than it was the case with their predecessors. In this case, they featured two sections connected by a wide corridor. A relatively small barrack block with an entrance gate was placed in the front. The main barracks were located under the frontal rampart. They contained six soldiers' rooms, the commander's room, kitchen, well, and storerooms. Such intermediate forts had only one wing. Another novelty were the infantry shooting positions in the front part of the rampart. The layout of intermediate forts reflected one of two mirror-image variants.



Fig. 11. Poznań Ring Fortress. Intermediate fort of the new type (Fort Ia). Original document: Geheimes Staatarchiv Preussischer Kulturbesitz. Berlin – Dahlem

Surprisingly, much like in the case of the polygonal fortress, the Poznań Fortress failed to meet the defenders' expectations upon its completion. This finding resulted in the need for its modernization, which was carried out in the respective forts on a continuous basis, starting from the end of the 1880s and continuing until 1914.[6]

Similarly to the first stage, the second stage of construction of the Poznań Fortress was influenced by the changes in military technology. First of all, it concerned the invention of smokeless gunpowder and the introduction of demolition bullets. Both these inventions forced the fortification constructors to develop much more resilient defensive works. The surprise and helplessness were so great that it was even proposed to abolish permanent fortresses as too expensive and essentially useless. Fortunately for the

6 For detailed accounts of these modernization works, see: P. Jurkiewicz, *Twierdza fortowa Poznań 1876–1914*, Poznań 2002 (manuscript kept by the Department of Military History of the Institute of History, Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań) and J. Biesiadka, A. Gawlak, Sz. Kucharski, M. Wojciechowski, *Twierdza Poznań*..., op. cit.

subsequent functioning of permanent fortifications, the idea was abandoned. To neutralize the artillery impact, three-layer structures were to be built, i.e. fortification shields consisting of a brick vault, a layer of sand (gravel), or the so-called 'sand cushion,' and a concrete slab. In Prussian fortresses, this type of construction was first introduced around 1886–1887. It was still impossible to close the gaps in the large interfields, which were susceptible to a quick breach following a swift and efficient assault. In the course of debates, the construction of additional intermediate works between forts, as well as interfield shelters or even field fortification works was approved. An important impulse to introduce changes in the previous way of fortress construction and layout was provided by the ongoing changes in siege tactics. Until then, the principle of regular siege had been used to capture fixed points of resistance. As the method did not always deliver the expected results, the so-called shortened attack tactics were proposed, which consisted in overpowering forts with intensive artillery fire, seizing poorly defended interfields with infantry troops, and attacking fort structures from the rear.[7] This called for drastic measures to be taken. Technically, the construction works extended all the way until 1914.

Infantry shelters were designed for one company, i.e. 250 soldiers and 4 officers. The shelters consisted of five rooms for soldiers and one for officers. The rooms were equipped with benches arranged in four rows, as well as shelves for equipment suspended under the ceilings. In the outer wall, along the axis of the rooms, there was a window secured with an iron shutter. Each room also featured an iron stove. Air exchange was to be ensured by gravitational ventilation. Depending on the type of a given shelter, they were provided with three, five, or seven entrances each. In most cases, wells were dug in front of the shelters, and at times the water source was located inside (Fig. 12).

Artillery shelters were mainly built in the northern section of the fortress, between forts IV and VIa. An analysis of these structures allows one to distinguish between two types of shelters. The first one was intended for crews of two batteries and was composed of three rooms (two large rooms for soldiers and a smaller one for officers). The shelter had two entrances located in the rear wall, which was additionally fitted with three windows. The second type of shelter was larger, as it could accommodate crews of four batteries. It had five rooms of the same size, one of which was intended for

7 P. Jurkiewicz, *Twierdza fortowa Poznań 1876–1914*, "Kronika Miasta Poznania" 2005, no. 1, p. 32.

Fig. 12. Poznań Ring Fortress. Infantry shelter with a removed earthen cover, Dworska Street. Photo by Z. Pilarczyk

officers. The shelter had three entrances and five windows in the rear wall. Artillery shelters were also equipped with wells. Assuming that at the time of construction a battery consisted of 54 soldiers, the shelters could accommodate between 110 and 220 soldiers each (Fig. 13).

Ammunition shelters served as ammunition magazines, mostly for artillery munitions. They came in three sizes, and consisted of six, ten or twelve rooms. The first variety was the most common. Three rooms on the right side of the shelter had separate entrances and vestibules. The left side of the shelter had three more rooms, two of which were connected to each other. This section was accessible through one larger entrance with a vestibule (Fig. 14).

It is worth noting that the shelters were not evenly distributed among all the eighteen interfields. Some had no shelters whatsoever, while others saw them in great density. This was particularly visible in the aforementioned northern section of the fortifications. This fact also seems to indicate the anticipated direction of enemy assault.

Fig. 13. Poznań Ring Fortress. Artillery shelter, Lechicka Street. Photo by Z. Pilarczyk

Even an abridged picture of Poznań Fortress would not be complete without mentioning several elements whose importance was equal to the combat facilities. I am thinking of the traffic network, already mentioned above. The rocades formed a peculiar bloodstream of the Poznań Fortress. They ensured that, in the event of a battle alert, the fortress crews could move as quickly as possible from their barracks to their respective battle stations. During combat operations, the rocades also served as supply routes. Thanks to the surviving fortress blueprints, the course of these roads can now be comprehensively reconstructed. Nowadays, some sections are included in the city's transport infrastructure. Unfortunately, they are more and more often subject to rebuilding, which quickens their disappearance from the city landscape. Greenery was an important supplement of both forts and traffic routes. It played a significant role as an integral part of camouflage. Fortress greenery did not grow accidentally. The planting was planned very meticulously. On one occasion, I took the liberty of dubbing the Poznań

Fig. 14. Poznań Ring Fortress. Ammunition shelter, Marcelińska Street. Photo by Z. Pilarczyk

Fortress "a fortress fragrant with acacia," given the predominance of black locust—popularly known as acacia—on the embankments of the city's forts.[8]

The combat facilities of the fortress could not function without institutions and buildings that constituted an essential supplement of the fortress as a whole and guaranteed its efficient functioning. A number of buildings of military importance were erected in the city. These were the headquarters of the command, barracks, warehouses, etc. It is estimated that as of the end of the 19th century a total of about 70 such buildings existed in Poznań, many of which have survived to the present day.[9]

However, it should be stressed that the establishment and existence of the fortress, especially in the polygonal form, had a significant impact on the city itself, severely impeding its development. On the one hand, the fortifications constrained Poznań with a rigid corset, preventing it from

8 The problem of fortress greenery has been the subject of long-standing work conducted by Agnieszka Wilkaniec. See: A. Wilkaniec, *Zieleń fortyfikacji poznańskich*, "Kronika Miasta Poznania" 2005, no. 1, pp. 44–63.

9 Z. Pilarczyk, *Pozdrowienia z twierdzy Poznań* oraz *Budownictwo wojskowe w dawnym Poznaniu*, "Kronika Miasta Poznania" 2005, no. 1, pp. 7–26 and 372–398.

extending its boundaries to meet the needs of a rapidly growing urban center. Similarly, the military purposes of the fortress also overrode the local building regulations, and hence hindered urban development not only in the suburbs but also in some districts of the city itself. It was only in the 1890s that Richard Witting, the vigorous mayor of Poznań at the time, managed to overcome the resistance of the military and convince the authorities in Berlin to dismantle most of the by then useless (from the military point of view) fortifications. The act was based on a cabinet order issued by Emperor Wilhelm II, who broke the news to Poznanians during his visit to the city on September 2, 1902. In the following years, the demolition of the fortifications was accompanied by a construction boom, projected to turn Poznań into a proper metropolitan area.

Apart from the above changes, the Poznań Fortress survived in good condition until the restoration of Poland as an independent state, which in the case of Greater Poland was principally the result of the victorious military uprising. During the Second Republic of Poland, the fortification facilities were used by the Polish Army. Some maintenance work was conducted with respect to individual structures, however the only new elements introduced were minor shelters built just before World War II. Unfortunately, due to the decision forfeit the city, they were not used in September 1939.

Time and the subsequent owners of the Poznań Fortress did not the surviving facilities of the stronghold, both the polygon and the fort, all too well. As a result of decisions made by Prussian authorities at the beginning of the 20th century, most of the elements of the polygonal fortress were removed from the cityscape. The worst fate, however, befell the Citadel, which was systematically dismantled after 1945. Today, only single fragments of the original fortifications remain. Aside from those, the blockhouse of the Colomb Bastion (Powstańców Wielkopolskich Street) and part of the redoubt of Fort Roon have survived, too. The ring fortress enjoyed somewhat better luck, although it also suffered from the warfare of 1945, and continued to dilapidate after the war. This is not to say, however, that the original shape of the fortress cannot be reconstructed. Individual forts have survived in various condition. Fort I was a second type fortification, constructed in the years 1878–1880. Today, almost 90% of the original structure remains intact. Fort Ia, an intermediate structure of the new type, was approved for construction in 1889. Due to the high level of groundwater, it has no posterns underneath the moat that would connect the escarpment caponiers with the barracks block. The facility has survived in a very good condition. Overseen

by one of the local re-enactment groups, it is gradually regaining its original appearance. Fort II, erected in the years 1878–1882, housed aviation works during the Nazi occupation, and had the moat roofed for industrial purposes; its condition is very good, too. Fort IIa was another intermediate structure of the new type, erected between 1887–1896 Despite being partially flooded with water, its condition is good, with a completely preserved ammunition lift. Fort III was one a main fort of the first type. Its construction began in 1877. The moat is partially roofed. At present it is located within the confines of the Zoological Garden. Partially destroyed, the facility is used by the Poznań Society of Friends of Fortifications. It is open to visitors. Fort IIIa, an intermediate structure of the new type, was constructed in 1889. Its counterscarp features a shelter for the anti-storm squad. The architecture has been partly repurposed and currently houses a municipal crematory. Fort IV, a main structure of the second type, was built between 1879 and 1884. It was frequently modernized and became the best fortified structure of Poznań Fortress. After World War II, it was completely demolished. Fort IVa was an intermediate facility of the old type. It was constructed between 1878 and 1881. In the years 1913–1914, and then again in 1939, it was supplemented with concrete shelters. After the war, it was partially demolished. As of now, roughly 40% of the original structure remains. The facility is open to the public. Fort V was another main fort of the first type, built after 1881. It was frequently modernized, including the removal of the frontal caponier in favor of a new one, located on the counterscarp. After the war, the facility was partly demolished, with around 40% of the original structure surviving to this day. Fort Va was an intermediate fort of the new type. Built between 1889 and 1895 and modernized in 1913–1914 to add a double shelter on the counterscarp for the anti-storm squad. In 1939, a concrete observation pillbox was added.

After the war, FortVa was systematically vandalized but remains well preserved. Fort VI was yet another main for of the second type. Erected between 1879 and 1883, it was frequently modernized; among others, the frontal caponier was replaced with a new one on the counterscarp; also, an artillery observer's post (P.B.St.87) was installed on the frontal rampart, and large connected batteries with shelters were built on both flanks; last but not least, two additional concrete battle-observation shelters were mounted in 1939. As of now, Fort VI is the best preserved fortress structure with the richest and original equipment. Fort VIa was the only intermediate fort with a pentagonal outline. Built in the years 1879–1882, it was subsequently

modernized (among others, its flank caponiers were removed in favor of counterscarp caponiers). In 1914, a shelter was added on the counterscarp, and in 1939 three small battle-observation shelters were placed on the rampart. During the war, the fort was partly destroyed; after the war, it was dismantled. Fort VII was a main fort of the first type. Built between 1876 and 1880, it was modernized by adding wing batteries, counterscarp shelters, and observation domes. During the Nazi occupation of Poland, the fort was host to one of the first concentration camps. The second part of the facility held a production plant, hence the moat was partially covered. After the war, a museum of martyrdom was set up in the left wing of the fort. After the right wing was vacated by the army, it was taken over by the Wielkopolska Museum of Independence and is currently undergoing a thorough renovation. Fort VIIa was an intermediate structure of the new type, designed in 1898 and modernized several times under Prussian rule. Battle and observation shelters and two observation domes were added in 1939. After the war, the fort briefly hosted an air force reserve command post was established. It has survived in a very good condition. Fort VIII was a main fort of the second type. Built in the years 1876–1882, it was subsequently modernized by Prussians and, later on, by Poles in 1939. Due to the high level of ground water, the facility was continuously plagued by flooding. Nowadays, the facility constitutes a private property and is host to numerous reconstructions degrading the military objects within. Nonetheless, it is preserved in a very good condition. Fort VIIIa was an intermediate fort of the new type. Erected between 1887 and 1896, it is the lone link in the chain of fortifications where the access road was camouflaged with a high rampart. In 1939, three battle and observation shelters with observation domes were added to the structure, which has survived in a very good condition. Fort IX was erected as a main fort of the first type. The oldest object of the fortress, it was built between 1876 and 1880, and was subsequently 'enriched' with many additional items. In 1881, two 150 mm (15 cm R.K.) naval gun stations were mounted. In the years 1887–1888, the attached batteries were mounted, followed by the installation of two infantry observation posts (W.T.90) in 1892. In 1914, two battle shelters were built on the counterscarp, and 1939 saw the addition of two battle and observation shelters. In 1944 the moats were roofed. The facility is preserved in a good condition. Fort IXa was an intermediate fort of the older type, built between 1877–1880 and subsequently modernized, including the addition of two infantry observation posts (W.T.90) in 1892; five concrete shelters in 1914; a battle and observation shelter in 1939.

In 1940–1941, due to the modernization of the railroad line, almost the entire right flank of the fort was demolished. The remainder has survived in a good condition.[10]

This very brief overview of the history and current condition of the respective components of the fortress seems to indicate that, despite the fact that Poznań and its growing infrastructure has inexorably encroached on the fortress zone, the forts continue to 'defend themselves' and can yet become an important feature of the modern-day cityscape. For many years now, various circles and institutions have endeavored to preserve the military architecture in the city. More and more premises of this type are being seized by the people who love and respect military architecture. A case in point has been the thorough renovation and restoration of the right wing of Fort VII, where a visitor's path will soon be available. Poznań has all the potential to become a place whose forts—properly prepared and adapted for military tourism—will attract enthusiasts of 19th-century fortifications from all over the world. That the idea is worth pursuing is best evidenced by the experiences of other cities with similar historic infrastructure.

10 In 2010, at the request of the Poznań City Hall, a team of authors led by Maciej Małachowicz drafted a report titled *Diagnoza stanu istniejącego zespołu 18 fortów zewnętrznego pierścienia fortyfikacji w Poznaniu.*


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Michał Polak

Greater Poland Uprising 1918–1919 as seen by the Western powers

World War I re-established the Polish question as an important issue in European politics. Significantly, by 1915 the Central Powers—Germany and Austria-Hungary—had successfully pushed deep into the Russian heartland, capturing the Russian-occupied Polish territories. This gave the Central Powers a clear advantage over the Entente states in playing the Polish card, which they eagerly capitalized on. One expression of these efforts was the so-called Act of November 5, 1916, in which the emperors of Germany and Austria-Hungary proclaimed the establishment of the Polish state. In the following years, the actual formation of Polish state structures began, giving impetus for the emergence of an independent Poland with its capital in Warsaw in the fall of 1918. It was led by Józef Piłsudski, a prominent pro-independence leader and former commander of the 1st Brigade of the Polish Legions, which fought against the Russians alongside the Austro-Hungarian army. The independent Polish state comprised the territories of the former Russian and Austrian partitions, with the Prussian partition and the city of Poznań remaining outside of its confines. The fate of the latter territory was to be decided by the Greater Poland Uprising, which broke out in Poznań on December 27, 1918. The insurrection fulfilled Greater Poland's aspirations for self-determination and reverberated throughout the international community. Thus, the uprising changed the perception of Greater Poland—thus far seen as part of Prussia—towards an ethnically conscious and determined, integral part of Polish territory. It should also be noted that Poland's return to the map of Europe became a painful experience for its former partitioners, who were struggling at the time with the threat of the communist revolution. The majority of leading politicians in the global superpowers, especially the British, were distrustful of and unenthusiastic about the rebirth of Polish statehood, perceiving Polish aspirations as a further weakening of Germany.

In view of these circumstances, Greater Poland's success in manifesting its desire to join the newly formed Polish state (a mere 1.5 months after its restoration) should be considered all the more significant.

The path to this success was not easy. Despite the Prussian policy of Germanization and colonization, as of 1918 the population of Greater Poland was ready to put up a fight thanks to its ability to self-organize, undertake grassroots initiatives (the so-called organic work), and cultivate the national tradition. What it still needed was a favorable turn in international events that would boost its chances of success. What, then, were those events?

One important albeit subsequently downplayed signal was President Woodrow Wilson's address to Congress, delivered on January 8, 1918, in particular its 13th point, vital for the Polish cause.[1] However, it was only the defeat of Imperial Germany in the Great War and the armistice signed at Compiègne, as well as the revolution in Germany and the violent fighting it entailed, that took German politicians by surprise and triggered a reconfiguration caused by the imminent threat of the Bolshevik Revolution. At the same time, it was impossible to determine whether the resurgent Polish state would manage to prevent the Bolshevik march westward. The formal and legal situation of Greater Poland and the city of Poznań did not change. Polish demands were not included in the terms of the armistice, negotiated during the Paris talks on November 2–4, 1918. As per those talks, the fate of the Polish lands under Prussian rule would be settled at a separate peace conference. The negotiations concerning the armistice and the eventual peace with Germany revealed two distinct positions, one taken by the British, the other by the French, with the U.S. assuming the role of mediator. Poles could *de facto* count on a single ally, namely France and its armed forces. Aware of the chaos in Russia, the French were aware of Poland's position as a bridge in Central Europe, as well as the country's importance in the postwar anti-German alliance.

A completely different approach was presented by British politicians. The first Polish researchers who reached British archives examined British political documents, verifying the previous assertions of the Polish

1 For a detailed discussion of the circumstances surrounding the inclusion of the 13th point in Wilson's address, see Z. Wygocki, *Wilsonowskie pojęcie Polski*, "Przegląd Zachodni" (Londyn), no. 1–3/1981, pp. 27–30; idem, *Jeszcze o wilsonowskim pojęciu Polski*, "Przegląd Zachodni" (Londyn), no. 1–3/1982, pp. 8–11. The author established that the original expression "An independent Polish state must be erected" was softened at the very last moment to "An independent Polish state should be erected." In addition, each of the points covered in Wilson's address was supplemented with a semi-official commentary that blunted the meaning of the President's words and left room for divagations.

historiography of the Greater Poland Uprising. For example, in an article published in 1987,[2] Professor Witold Mazurczak analyzes the documentation concerning the origins of Ignacy J. Paderewski's and the British mission's arrival in Poznań of December 1918. Mazurczak emphasizes that Great Britain never treated the potentially existing Polish state as an equal partner in international relations. Emerging from captivity and strengthened by the additions of Greater Poland, Gdańsk Pomerania and Silesia, Poland's resurgence was unacceptable to British diplomacy. It would upset the balance of power in Europe, weakening Germany excessively. Polish affairs were hitherto considered as an internal matter of Germany and Russia. It was paramount for Britain to steer clear of any involvement in European disputes and antagonisms, since peace guaranteed the prosperity of the British Empire and international trade, of which London was the center at the time.

As already mentioned, in November 1918, Józef Piłsudski seized power in Poland and appointed a government headed by socialist activist Jędrzej Moraczewski. Meanwhile, Poland was represented in Paris by the Polish National Committee, which had been established in 1917 and was headed by the leader of the national democratic movement, Roman Dmowski. Due to its ties with France, the Polish National Committee was disapproved of by Great Britain. Fearing the extension of French influence over Warsaw, Prime Minister Arthur Balfour backed Ignacy Paderewski, who arrived in Liverpool on November 23, 1918. An outstanding virtuoso and advocate of the Polish cause, he was regarded as an alternative to Dmowski.

Balfour urged Paderewski to head for Poland and unite the clashing political forces in the country. The British Foreign Office gave Paderewski permission to travel to Warsaw via Gdańsk and Poznań,[3] the main center of the Polish movement in the German state. Greater Poland regarded the Paris-based Polish National Committee as its representative and distanced itself from the left-leaning Piłsudski. The Polish population of Greater Poland was already well organized, fielded its own military units, and was governed by the Supreme People's Council and its executive body, the Commissariat, which brought together representatives of all Polish territories under Prussian rule. The route via Poznań was suggested to I. Paderewski by Władysław Sobański, a representative of the Polish National Committee in London.

2 W. Mazurczak, *Anglicy i wybuch powstania wielkopolskiego 1918–1919. Z dziejów genezy brytyjskiej misji płka H. H. Wade w Polsce*, [in:] *Polacy i Niemcy. Dziesięć wieków sąsiedztwa*, ed. A. Czubiński, Warszawa 1987, pp. 254–276.

3 See W. Mazurczak, op. cit., p. 260.

Initially, Balfour feared that it would cause political complications due to the fact that the region was still within German borders and jurisdiction.[4]

At the same time, the Foreign Office was working on the makeup and tasks of the British mission that was to accompany Paderewski on his journey to Warsaw. The delegation was to have a semi-official character, and consisted of Colonel Harry Herschel Wade (British military attaché in Copenhagen), his deputy Richard E. Kimens (former British Consul General in Warsaw), and Secretary Rowland Kenney of the Foreign Office. Paderewski with his wife and adjutant Major Zygmunt Iwanowski of General Józef Haller's Army sailed to Gdańsk on board of the British cruiser "Concord." On December 23, 1918, they were joined in Copenhagen by Colonel H. Wade and—at the last moment and their own request—Lieutenant Commander H. B. Rawlings and Petty Officer Roy G. Langford. Also joining the mission was Sylwin Strakacz, who served as Paderewski's personal secretary.[5]

As noted by Dariusz Jeziorny,[6] the route of the Paderewskis' journey and the British mission via Poznań was officially arranged at the Foreign Office as early as the first half of December 1918: "That this was to be Paderewski's route was first divulged by John D. Gregory, First Secretary in the FO's Northern Department, to his departmental colleagues as early as December 13, 1918. Three days later, Lord Kilmarnock, the British chargé d'affaires in Denmark, received word from London of Wade's intention to join the traveling Paderewskis (...) It was then that the FO advised that it was there [in Poznań, M. P.] that the Colonel's meeting with the rest of the members of his mission should take place." Such were the guidelines received by Colonel Wade from Sir Esme Howard.

The mission arrived in Gdańsk on December 25, 1918, welcomed by a delegation from the Supreme People's Council led by Commissioner Wojciech Korfanty. The first talks took place the same day, as reported by Colonel Wade. Wade related to his headquarters that the Poles feared a Bolshevik offensive and were awaiting the arrival of General J. Haller's Army to Poland at the earliest possible date, preferably in Gdańsk.[7] Colonel Wade stressed

4 M. Polak, *Brytyjczycy a powstanie wielkopolskie*, "Wielkopolski Powstaniec", 21/2015, p. 45.

5 Ibid.

6 D. Jeziorny, *Misja pułkownika Harry'ego Wade'a do Polski a wybuch powstania wielkopolskiego*, "Przegląd Zachodni", 2/2016, pp. 44–45.

7 As an aside to this report, one should mention the findings of Tadeusz Grygier, whose publications outlined the plan of the Polish National Committee and the Commissariat of the Supreme People's Council concerning the landing of General Haller's troops in Gdańsk.

that the Polish Army, supported by reinforcements from France, was able to halt the advance of the Red Army.

On December 26 at 11:00 a.m. the British delegation, accompanied by Paderewski and Korfanty, boarded a train to Poznań via Piła. The Germans attempted to divert the mission straight to Warsaw, first by telegram, then by direct intervention in Rogoźno. Their intentions were thwarted by the firm attitude of Paderewski and Wade. The train arrived safely in Poznań, and its passengers were met with an enthusiastic welcome.[8] The journey from the train station to the Bazar Hotel in the center resembled a Polish triumphal procession. The chief of the mission was surprised by the reception in Poznań, where the Commissariat of the Supreme People's Council, presiding over the local Polish community, welcomed them as representatives of the Allied forces. At the Bazar Hotel, mindful of the received instructions, Paderewski confined himself to thanking the local Polish community for their welcome. Meanwhile, the following day (December 27, 1918) saw a dramatic turn of events. In response to Polish independence demonstrations and manifestations and support for the coalition, the soldiers of one of the German regiments that had just returned from the eastern front staged a march through the city streets. Under unclear circumstances that remain unaccounted for as of yet, a fire exchange took place around 5.40 p.m., marking the outbreak of the uprising. After the outbreak of fighting in Poznań, the mission found itself in the center of events. At 6 p.m., Blankertz, the plenipotentiary of the Executive Department of the Workers' and Soldiers' Council in the Presidium of Police, came to the Bazar Hotel to suggest that the Poles lay down their arms. The negotiations took place at the General Headquarters of the 5th Army Corps. According to Professor Antoni Czubiński,[9] "In the course of the negotiations held at the General Headquarters, General Schimmelpfenig bluntly stated, "We're not in Poland, we're in Prussia," adding that "in Prussia, the flags of the Entente must not be displayed." In response to Commander Rawlings' demand that the German authorities ensure the safety of the Allied delegation, General Bock und Polach replied that, firstly, he knew nothing about the stay of any such delegation in Poznań, and secondly, he did not control the situation in the city and was therefore unable to give

8 See the National Archives, records of the Foreign Office (hereinafter: TNA FO) 371/3894/4329.

9 A. Czubiński, *Powstanie Wielkopolskie 1918–1919. Geneza – charakter – znaczenie*, Poznań 2002, p. 149.

any guarantees. As per Vogt's account,[10] the agreement was reached and the artillerymen from the 20*th* Artillery Regiment waited for the People's Guard units to relieve them. Meanwhile, instead of a peaceful changing of the guard, a fight for the building [hotel] ensued."

As early as the night of December 27–28, 1918, Col. H. Wade sent a dispatch on the situation in Poznań. He followed it up with a full version of the report, dated December 28. In the latter document,[11] he stated, among other things, that another attack followed at 6 p.m.. Wade sent Lieutenant Commander Rawlings to meet with the Commanding General of the 5th Corps and warn him that the British Government would hold him responsible for any violation of the integrity of the delegation. The Commanding General replied that he had received no official intelligence of the British mission and was in no position to control the reactionary troops. Wade added that at the time of writing (December 28) shots were still being fired in front of the hotel, which was essentially besieged.

It seems that Commander Rawlings's statement was not fully appreciated in the historiography of the Greater Poland Uprising. Although the German Chief of Staff of the 5th District stipulated that the situation in Poznań had slipped out of his hands, the following day the District Commander, General Fritz von Bock und Polach ordered to ensure the security of the British mission, threatening that "Any violation of these security regulations would cause the German nation to suffer the heaviest reprisals (...)."[12] This order certainly had an impact on the demoralization of the German troops in Poznań and facilitated the negotiations on the Germans' withdrawal from the city.

On December 30, Colonel H. Wade sent another report from Poznań, in which he outlined the current situation in the city and various difficulties encountered by the insurgent leadership. He also cited examples of German provocations and propaganda against the Poles, as well as reports of German forces advancing in the direction of Poznań.[13] In the meantime, the uprising was spreading dynamically; the insurgents were driving the Germans out and forming new armed units, while assuming full administrative power in the liberated areas. Soon, most of Greater Poland was in Polish hands, and

10 D. Vogt, *Der Grosspolnische Aufstand 1918/1919*, Marburg–Lahn 1980, pp. 52–53.

11 See TNA, FO 371/3894/4329.

12 See *Powstanie wielkopolskie 1918–1919. Wybór źródeł*, compiled and edited by A. Czubiński, B. Polak, Poznań 1983, file no. 44, pp. 114.

13 W. Mazurczak, op. cit., pp. 263–264. TNA, FO 371/3896/3959.

the Commissariat of the Supreme People's Council in Poznań began to act as an informal Polish government in the liberated areas, organizing a regular Polish armed force, dubbed the Greater Poland Army.

Although H. Wade's delegation and the Paderewskis left for Warsaw on January 1, 1919, the following months saw officers of the British mission participate in the meetings of the Allies' dispute commissions. H. Wade and his successors looked favorably upon the situation on the Greater Polish front. In addition to general rundowns on the political-military situation in Poland, they reported on the morale among the troops, the development of the Greater Poland Army, and the support it received from Polish society. The British visited specific front sections, as well as the units being organized in Poznań and Biedrusko. Unfortunately, it must be noted that direct observations of the British commissioners in Poland did not sway the policy of the Foreign Office, which remained highly unfavorable to the strengthening of the Polish state at the expense of Germany.

But what was the attitude of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs? Professor Stanisław Sierpowski accurately outlined the main reasons for the French interest in the fate of Greater Poland. Apart from the undeniably cordial relations between the Poles and the French throughout history, the primary factor was France's desire to weaken Germany as the culprit behind the greatest French losses in the Great War and the War of 1870–1871. It is worth noting that the declaration of support from France was strong, as evidenced by the conversation between Philipp Berthelot, Secretary General of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and R. Dmowski, held on November 27, 1918, during which Berthelot stated that the French government would not only resist President Woodrow Wilson's doctrinaire attitude but would also be willing to implement a policy of accomplished facts in the Polish territories under Prussian rule. Another pro-Polish signal was the memorandum submitted to the French Foreign Office on December 20, 1918, devoted to the mode of action in Poland and the need for a strong Poland. The memorandum argued for the restoration of Poland at the expense of Germany.[14]

Towards the end of January 1919, the Germans concentrated large forces on the Greater Poland Front and were preparing an offensive with the intention of suppressing the uprising. Both sides demonstrated great ferocity and

14 S. Sierpowski, *Francja wobec Powstania Wielkopolskiego*, "Wielkopolski Powstaniec", 24/2018, pp. 30–34; idem, *Aspekty międzynarodowe Powstania Wielkopolskiego 1918–1919*, "Przegląd Zachodni", 4/2008, pp. 73–102.

will to fight. At the beginning of February, the insurgent army went on the defensive, struggling to keep its January gains. The fights were dramatic and individual towns and villages were being passed from hand to hand. Overall, the Poles preserved status quo, while the Germans were unable to make any major breakthrough in Polish possessions. However, they were mounting another offensive.

Meanwhile in Poznań, from mid-January onwards, the members of the Commission of the Supreme People's Council—aware of the threat of German offensives and earing for the perception of the Greater Poland Uprising by the Entente states—were engaged in a lively exchange of messages with the Polish politicians sitting on the Polish National Committee in Paris. They realized that the beginning of the Peace Conference would determine the shape of Poland's post-war borders. It was hoped that an armistice would be concluded, thus securing the military accomplishments of the insurgent forces.

In several dispatches to the Polish National Committee, maintained in an alarmist tone, the commissioners argued the difficult situation of Poznania in the face of anticipated German actions. Unfortunately, an adjustment to the terms of the armistice, and thus the inclusion of Poznania, had not yet been considered in January. In their messages to the Entente governments, German politicians painted a biased picture of the events transpiring in Greater Poland. For example, in a letter to the British government of January 15, 1919, Ulrich Brockdorff-Rantzau described the Polish uprising as a "rebellion, crime against the Fatherland and high treason," depicting the objectives of the insurgents as "unbridled debauchery of Polish imperialism," and adding that "the German government sees in the present situation an immeasurable danger threatening permanent world peace."[15] In response to these confabulatory statements made by the German Foreign Minister, on January 21, 1919 the Commissariat of the Supreme People's Council sent an extensive letter to the Allied governments, which countered the German claims point by point, extensively addressing the lies, half-truths and manipulations.[16]

A mere day later, the question of the Greater Poland Uprising was raised at a meeting of the Supreme Council of the Allied Powers. During a discussion that ensued between Marshal Ferdinand Foch, Prime Minister Georges

15 *Sprawy polskie na konferencji pokojowej w Paryżu w 1919 r. Dokumenty i materiały*. vol. 1, Warszawa 1965, pp. 365–367.

16 Ibid., pp. 366–370; M. Polak, *Polityczne aspekty powstania wielkopolskiego 1918–1919 roku*, [in:] *Wielkopolanie ku Niepodległej – w stulecie zwycięskiego powstania 1918–1919 roku*, Poznań 2018, p. 72.

Clemencau, Prime Minister David Lloyd George, Minister Arthur Balfour, Italian Minister Sidney Sonnino and US President Woodrow Wilson (among others), it was noted that the Polish pro-independence aspirations in Greater Poland and other partitioned territories under Prussian rule on the one hand showed a lack of confidence in the Peace Conference, at the same time (in the opinion of the participants) destabilizing the concept of Poland's struggle against the Bolsheviks. As can be inferred from the above, the politicians of the Polish National Committee in Paris, acting in consultation with the Commissariat of the Supreme People's Council, faced a daunting task of persuading the Council of Ten to acknowledge the achievements of the Greater Poland Uprising. The future of Poznań and Greater Poland was at stake. As a result of the meetings held on January 22 and 24, 1919, an inter-allied mission to Poland was appointed under the leadership of Ambassador Joseph Noulens, a French politician and diplomat. The main objective of the delegation was to draft a report on the situation in Poland for the purposes of the Peace Conference. The British mission of Colonel H. Wade and the French mission of General Joseph Berthelemy, which had been staying on Polish soil until then, were to comprise a new mission, extended in composition. Its goal was to prevent the escalation of the Polish-German conflict.[17]

In a note to the Entente states dated February 10, and in Minister Ulrich Brockdorff-Rantzau's speech to the National Assembly on February 14, the German government strongly opposed the presence of the Allied mission on its territory, also rejecting the Allied Forces' ban on the use of force against Poles.[18] The inter-allied mission reached Warsaw on February 15, and its delegation arrived in Poznań to undertake observation activities in Greater Poland.

The last political act of the Greater-Poland-German War before the grand finale of the peace conference in Paris was the fierce round of negotiations held in Trier, Germany, on February 14–16, on the eve of the end of the armistice between the Entente states and the German Reich. The German side was represented by Minister Matthias Erzberger and Kurt von Hammerstein, Chairman of the German Armistice Commission. The Entente was represented by Marshal Ferdinand Foch and General Maxime Weygand, Chief of General Staff of the Allied Forces. A provision was added to the existing

17 For a detailed account of the Interallied Mission to Poland, see S. Sierpowski, *Działalność Misji Międzysojuszniczej w Polsce w 1919 r.*, "Dzieje Najnowsze", 3/2013, pp. 3–24.

18 Minister U. Brockdorff-Rantzau's speech dated February 14, 1919, *Sprawy polskie na konferencji pokojowej w Paryżu...*, pp. 378–379.

version of the truce treaty, which stipulated that Germany must cease all offensive actions directed against the Poles. It was not without dramatic protests from the German side, which noted Polish nationalist tendencies, rebellion, or unauthorized assaults on Prussian troops rightfully stationed in Greater Poland. On February 15, the matter reached the Council of Ten, which was well aware of the actual purpose of the German offensive. Among the active speakers was the Polish Prime Minister Ignacy Paderewski.[19]

On February 16, 1919, in the wake of the talks in Trier, with the help of the Polish National Committee and the Polish government, the truce between the Entente states and Germany was extended. At the same time, the Greater Poland Army was recognized as an Allied army. On the basis of the truce signed in Trier, the Germans were to refrain from any military action:[20] "(...) the Germans should immediately cease all offensive operations against the Poles in Poznania and all other districts."

Despite of the above, the situation in Greater Poland was still tense. The German forces did not leave the territories granted to Poland. In the second half of February 1919, German troops engaged in a number of provocations, launching attacks on localities in the Polish zone. The Poles paid them back in kind. These facts were related by General Dupont in a letter addressed to J. Noulens and General Nudant, dated February 25, 1919.[21] In their reports from the Greater Poland Front, British and French officers reported that the Germans staged provocations on a daily basis, including the shelling of civilian objects and positions of the Greater Poland Army, as well as patrol raids, etc.[22]

In the following months, the Germans were preparing a strategic offensive against Poznania. This met with the reaction of the French representatives of the Inter-Social Committee. After months of negotiations and difficulties with respect to the transfer of General J. Haller's Polish Army from France to Poland, an agreement was eventually reached in April 1919.

19 Ibid. For the aforementioned minutes of the meeting of the Armistice Commission and German-Allied correspondence from February 14–16, 1919, see pp. 380–385.

20 Ibid., p. 385.

21 TNA, FO 608/59/1. Letter from General Dupont, the then chairman of the Allied Mission for Prisoners of War in Berlin, to Ambassador J. Noulens in Warsaw and General Nudant in Spa, containing observations from a visit to the demarcation line. See also: S. Sierpowski, *Działalność Misji Międzysojuszniczej...*, pp. 14–15.

22 For more on the subject, see *Front przeciwniemiecki 1919 r. Wybór dokumentów wojskowych*, compiled and edited by B. Polak, Koszalin 1990. See also Z. Jóźwiak, *Walki na Froncie Wielkopolskim. 17 lutego 1919 – 28 czerwca 1918*, [in:] *Walki powstania wielkopolskiego*, eds. B. Polak, M. Rezler, Koszalin 2010, pp. 331–370.

The arrival of nearly 70,000 well-armed and equipped soldiers was to play a significant role in the battles for the borders of the reborn state of Poland.[23]

The struggle for Poland's borders also involved the newly formed Greater Poland Army. Its commander, General J. Dowbor-Muśnicki, agreed to send his troops to the relief of Lwów at the request of the central government in Warsaw.[24] In May 1919, in view of the mounting Polish-German tensions in Greater Poland, the Greater Poland Army was placed under the supreme command of Józef Piłsudski, who ordered a state of strategic alert. In June that year, the frontline clashes intensified again, and on June 2 the Commissariat declared a state of emergency. The efforts of Greater Poland's population and political decision-makers from Poznań, Warsaw and France were crowned by the signing of a peace treaty with the Germans on June 28, 1919.

* * *

The Greater Poland Uprising that broke out in Poznań on December 27, 1918 was an expression of will of the people of Greater Poland to rise against the detested German invaders. It tapped into the then-popular slogan of self-determination of nations. In the eyes of the Western powers, the Greater Polish insurrection manifested the seriousness and drama behind the situation in Poznania, at the same time raising the awareness of Polish expectations towards the lands remaining under Prussian rule. However, the uprising would not have been successful if it had not been for such circumstances as the weakening of Germany resulting from its defeat in the Great War, the abdication of Emperor Wilhelm II, and the communist revolution staged by the Spartacus League. Moreover, the fate of Poznań and Greater Poland, as well as other lands of the Prussian partition, depended to a large extent on the two powerful Allies competing against each other, i.e. France and Great Britain. It is difficult not conclude that the success of the Polish cause, not for the last time, became a bargaining chip in the European politics of the aforementioned powers.

23 For more on the British operations concerning General Haller's Army, see TNA, FO 608/56.

24 For a detailed account of the organization and operations of the Greater Poland Army, see B. Polak, *Wojsko Wielkopolskie 1918–1920*, Koszalin 1990.


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

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Przemysław Matusik

An academic revolution: the University of Poznań 1919–1939

The overthrow of German rule and the takeover of Poznań by Poles in the final days of 1918, followed by the incorporation of Greater Poland and its capital into the independent Polish state, marked the end of more than a century of Prussian rule and opened a new era in the history of Poznań.[1] This rectification of historical injustice—as seen from the Polish perspective—effected a radical change in the national makeup of the city, which saw the departure of some 50,000 Germans and several thousand Jews, reluctant to live under Polish administration. Thus, if before World War I Poles made up about 57% of the city's population, by 1921 their share in the local demographics rose to over 90%.[2] In fact, Poles constituted a diverse community: apart from born and bred Poznanians and residents of Greater Poland drawn to the region's capital, after 1918 the city also saw an influx of Poles from Germany, as well as newcomers from other parts of the country, including the territories formerly under Austrian and Russian rule, not least so from the eastern borderlands. It was primarily due to this migratory growth that the city experienced vigorous demographic development, with its population increasing from 150,000 in 1919 to over 270,000 in 1939. Nonetheless, migrations were not the only factor that turned Poznań into one of the largest and most important urban centers of the Second Republic next to the country's capital, Warsaw, as well as Cracow, Lwów, Wilno, and Łódź. Much like in the Prussian era, Poznań remained the capital of a large administrative unit—a voivodeship—and the headquarters of the 7th Corps District Command, a military district formed by the independent Polish administration.

1 This text draws on my prior publications: *Miasto i uniwersytet*, "Kronika Miasta Poznania" (hereinafter: KMP) 2019, no. 1, pp. 37–60; *Historia Poznania*, vol. III, Poznań 2021.

2 P. Matusik, *Historia Poznania*, vol. III, Poznań 2021, pp. 79–83, 226.

After the reunification of Poland, the importance of the Poznań as an ecclesiastical center clearly increased, too, for it was here that the seat of the Primate of Poland, i.e. the Archbishop of Gniezno and Poznań, was located,[3] a circumstance of both religious and state significance. The city was a draw thanks to its economic potential, modern industrial plants—to mention only its largest factory, the Hipolit Cegielski Plant—as well as its strong commerce, including Poznań's latest hallmark, the Poznań International Fair, the largest event of its kind in Poland, established in 1925.[4] It was the outstanding exhibition infrastructure that allowed Poznań to host the first General National Exhibition in 1929, which attracted several million visitors. This rapidly developing city, whose ambition was to become the "second capital of the Republic, after Warsaw, (...) a sign of civilizational progress shining far into in the west,"[5] could not do without one important institution that affected its image and stature: the university.

Historically, Poznań had been down on its luck university-wise. None was established in the Old Polish era, and after 1793 the Prussians were even less inclined to establish a higher education institution in the city. This was primarily caused by the belief that attracting Polish youth to a university in the capital of a predominantly Polish province would be adverse politically. It was also important to avoid creating competition to the nearby universities of Berlin and Breslau (Wrocław), where most of Greater Polish youth went to study throughout the 19th century.[6] This entailed dire consequences to the stature of the city, deprived of such an important metropolitan and culture-forming factor as a university school, which could not be replaced either by the Polish Poznań Society of Friends of Science (Poznańskie Towarzystwo Przyjaciół Nauk), established in 1857, or by the local German societies for natural and historical sciences. Thus, Poznań lacked an academic community that would influence the circles of the local intelligentsia; well-paid professors endowed with social prestige; or an intellectually vibrant student community, active in various fields, participating in and contributing to Poznań's cultural life. This was another factor lowering the rank of the city, which in the second

3 Established in the 15th century, the office of primate of Poland was vested in the archbishops of Gniezno. From 1821 to 1946, the archdioceses of Gniezno and Poznań were joined by a personal union. The main seat of the archbishop, however, remained in Poznań as the larger urban center.

4 Between 1921 and 1924, the Poznań Fair was an event of national stature.

5 A. Zarzycki, *„Pragniemy być drugą, po Warszawie, stolicą Rzeczypospolitej". Poznań u progu II wojnyświatowej*, [in:] *Raport o stratach wojennych Poznania 1939–1945*, eds. A. Sakson, A. Skarzyński,Poznań 2008, p. 44.

6 W. Molik, *Inteligencja polska w Poznańskiem w XIX i początkach XX wieku*, Poznań 2009, pp. 158–160.

half of the 19th century was already suffocating in the narrow confines of the Prussian fortress that rendered Poznań uncomfortable to live in and limited its prospects.

From the Prussian point of view, this situation was becoming increasingly troublesome, intensifying the exodus of the German population from the eastern provinces to the west in search of better jobs and living conditions (the so-called Ostflucht), which was detrimental to the interests of the state. At the same time, these circumstances strengthened the Polish element, whose share in the population which was steadily increasing. To impede this phenomenon, a program of "elevation" (Hebungspolitik) of the eastern provinces was undertaken, which was skillfully exploited by the distinguished Mayor (Oberbürgermeister) of Poznań in 1891–1902, Richard Witting.[7] Witting managed to convince Berlin to implement a bold program to raise the city's profile and turn it into an attractive center, comparable in status to other provincial capitals in the Reich, a plan that envisioned the strengthening of the existing institutions and the establishment of new ones, such as a German museum, library and, last but not least, a higher education institution.[8] This resulted in the expansion of the city's boundaries in 1900, followed by the dismantling of the fortifications of the polygonal fortress in 1902. In the space thus freed, a representative imperial forum was created in the center of the city, featuring a neo-classical theater, a stately headquarters of the Colonization Commission for the settlement of German colonists in Greater Poland, and a neo-Romanesque castle housing a residence of Kaiser Wilhelm II, in whose shadow the historical imagination of the young Ernst Kantorowicz was formed.[9] Designed with flair, the newly delineated quarter also made room for the edifice of the Royal Academy.

However, the Academy, whose inauguration took place on November 4, 1903, did not live up to the expectations of the local elite. Indeed, its curriculum was limited to four-semester academic courses without the right to confer degrees, which sparked spiteful comments on the Polish side. The

7 A. Kronthal, *Ryszard Witting. Szkic biograficzny*, KMP 1930, no. 4, pp. 343–344; K. Rzepa, *Richard Witting a powstanie Republiki Weimarskiej*, [in:] *Człowiek – naród – państwo wobec wyzwań XX w.*, ed. M. Mikołajczyk, Poznań 2016, pp. 15–16.

8 See M. Jaffe, *Die Stadt Posen unter preußischer Herrschaft. Ein Beitrag zur Geschider deutschen Ostens*, Leipzig 1909, pp. 357–358 (Polish edition: M. Jaffe, *Poznań pod panowaniem pruskim*, trans. J. Baron-Grzesiak, ed. P. Matusik, Poznań 2012, pp. 376–377); Z. Pałat, *Architektura a polityka. Gloryfikacja Prus i niemieckiej misji cywilizacyjnej w Poznaniu na początku XX wieku*, Poznań 2011, pp. 18–19.

9 W. Molik, *Ernst Kantorowicz' Schuljahre in Posen*, [in:] *Ernst Kantorowicz (1895–1963). Soziales Milieu und wissenschaftliche Relevanz*, ed. J. Strzelczyk, Poznań 2000, pp. 69–76.

first president of the Academy was philosopher and literary scholar Eugen Kühnemann (1868–1946), an excellent lecturer and expert on Kant and Schiller. Initially, classes were held in rented buildings before the opening of the new seat at a beautiful neo-Baroque edifice, erected specifically for this purpose in 1910 (today, the building is home to Collegium Minus of the Adam Mickiewicz University), which was crucial to the development of academic infrastructure in the city. The faculty of the Academy consisted of representatives of local academics, directors and personnel of the Poznań archives (e.g. Rodgero Prümers and Adolf Warschauer), director of the Kaiser Friedrich Museum, Ludwig Kaemmerer, and Professor Erich Wernicke of the Royal Hygienic Institute, which opened on April 1, 1899. Prominent roles were delegated to the faculty brought from German academic centers, however the status of the Academy caused incoming scholars to treat it as a mere stepping stone to their subsequent scholarly careers. Thus, for example, prominent economist Ludwig Bernhard spent as few as two years in the city (1904–1906), which resulted in a sound study on Polish organizational life, *Das polnische Gemeinwesen in der Provinz Posen. Die Polenfrage*, an important voice in the discussions concerning the Polish problem in Prussia at the time.[10]

Granted, to receive genuine education at the university level one had to move elsewhere, and yet the Academy satisfied the thirst for knowledge and intellectual development of the people of Poznań, including—a fact worth noting—women, who made up almost half of the students. Among them was Lotte Jacobi, a future prominent representative of New York's (and, by extension, global) photographic scene.[11] Although Polish opinion makers were critical of the Academy, the more astute Poles eagerly took advantage of the educational opportunities it provided, even if the student community was predominantly comprised of German and Jewish enrollees. As many as 1,139 students registered for the first semester at the Academy, and although this number declined over time, the Academy and the scholarly community around it began to play an important role in Poznań's intellectual life.[12]

In spite of the above, the credit for establishing a university in Poznań went to the Poles, thus defying the stereotype of their civilizational inferiority,

10 W. Molik, *Królewska Niemiecka Akademia*, [in:] *Dzieje Poznania*, vol. II, pt. 1, eds. J. Topolski, L. Trzeciakowski, Warszawa–Poznań 1994, pp. 458–461; see also: *Ch. Schutte, Die Königliche Akademie in Posen (1903–1919) und andere kulturelle Einrichtungen im Rahmen der Politik zur "Hebung des Deutschtums"*, Marburg 2008.

11 J. Kubiak, *Lotte Jacobi – Poznań, Berlin, Nowy Jork*, KMP 2011 no. 3, pp. 219.

12 W. Molik, *Królewska Niemiecka Akademia...*, op. cit., p. 460.

cultivated by the Prussians. The initiative came at the earliest conceivable moment, when the revolution brought about by Germany's defeat in World War I reached Poznań. One is reminded that although the foundations of the Polish state with its capital in Warsaw were already being laid in the territories of the Russian and Austrian partitions, the lands under Prussian rule were still part of the German Reich. From early November 1918 onwards, the latter was consumed by a disorganizing revolution in the state, which led to the abdication of Kaiser Wilhelm II on Saturday, November 9. The following day, the revolutionary wave reached Poznań, with the Polish elite jumping at the opportunity to force concessions on the Germans and establish their own civilian and military structures. On Monday, November 11, the day of the armistice at Compiègne, in the still turbulent and uncertain revolutionary atmosphere, the Organizing Committee of the Polish University of Poznań was formed on the initiative of the eminent physician Professor Heliodor Święcicki, president of Poznań Society of Friends of Science. The organizational efforts were not halted by the outbreak of the Greater Poland Uprising; on the contrary, they received the full support of the temporary Polish authority in the liberated areas of Greater Poland, the Supreme People's Council. Help was also extended by the central government in Warsaw, especially with respect to the hiring of new faculty, who were in short supply in Poznań. In spite of all the difficulties, the goal was reached in next to no time, with the ceremonial inauguration of the new university taking place as early as May 7, 1919. The honor of delivering the inaugural lecture fell to the thirty-two-year-old historian-medievalist Kazimierz Tymieniecki.

The establishment of the University of Poznań can be seen in the broader context of the changes occurring at that time not only in Poland but also across the politically and administratively re-organized Central and Eastern Europe. For the newly emerged states, one of the attributes of their independence was the establishment of new universities, designed to provide qualified human resources that were indispensable to the functioning of modern social organisms. Thus, in Czechoslovakia—in addition to the two universities in Prague (one Czech and the other German)—new universities were founded in Brno and Bratislava, while Yugoslavia saw the establishment of a new university in Ljubljana. In Cluj, the capital of Transylvania, now annexed to Romania, the once-Hungarian university was reorganized in 1919 under new Romanian identity. A genuine academic revolution took place in Poland. As of 1914, there were only two Polish universities in Polish territories, both in the main cities of the Austrian partition—Cracow and Lwów—with another

Russian university in Warsaw. By 1919, there were already six tertiary education institutions in the country, as the two Galician universities were joined by four new ones. The first among the new Polish-speaking universities was established in 1915 in Warsaw, with the permission of the German occupation authorities. The second was the privately-run Catholic University in Lublin, founded by the staff of the Clerical College in St. Petersburg; the third was the University of Poznań; finally, there was the University of Wilno, which drew on the glorious traditions of the local academia in first decades of the 19th century.[13]

In the course of this academic explosion, Poznań was able to make excellent use of all assets to attract quality faculty. The first asset was its reasonably good infrastructural potential (considering its long-time academic deprivation), which was in a way the result of over one hundred years of Polish-German rivalry. On the one hand, there were the resources of the Polish-speaking Poznań Society of Friends of Science, along with its library and museum housing art, archaeological and natural science collections. On the other, there were the collections of the German cultural institutions established in the 1890s, including the Royal Library and the Kaiser Friedrich Museum. Another great advantage was the existing building of the Royal Academy, as well as other edifices of the imperial district and—in the case of the Faculty of Medicine—high-standard hospitals operating in the city. Yet another asset offered by the city were the excellent living conditions offered to the incoming academic staff in the form of modern apartments fitted with bathrooms, or villas located in the best districts, such as the former imperial district, vacated after the departure of German officials and in the newly created housing estate for civil servants in Sołacz, which, thanks to the nearby Faculty of Agriculture and Forestry, became a veritable "professors' colony."[14]

The university was comprised of five faculties. The first two—the Faculty of Philosophy (renamed in time to that of Humanities) and the Faculty of Law and Economics—were soon joined by the Faculties of Agriculture and Forestry; Medicine; and Mathematics and Natural Sciences. The first president of the University of Poznań was the aforementioned Professoor Heliodor Święcicki, chair of the Poznań Society of Friends of Science the founding father of the university, whose term as president was described by the chronicler of the

13 See M. Jakś-Ivanowska, *Profesorowie Uniwersytetu Poznańskiego 1919–1939*, Poznań 2021, pp. 30–40.
14 P. Korduba, *Sołacz. Domy i ludzie*, Poznań 2009, p. 34.

university Adam Wrzosek as not only "providential," but also "wise and cordial."[15] Since the university president was elected for an annual term at the time, the fact that Święcicki held the office until his death on October 12, 1923 was the best testament to his authority and the esteem he enjoyed in the academic community. It was also a sign of respect for Poznań's scholarly community and its traditions. Święcicki's successor was a 43-year-old native of Cracow, an outstanding expert in Roman law, Professor Zygmunt Lisowski. In fact, the faculty of the University of Poznań comprised of scholars from all over Poland, as well as returning émigré scholars. This was due to the deficits of the local intelligentsia, which was made up by a relatively narrow stratum of representatives of the liberal professions and the clergy. Such a state of affairs was a consequence of Prussian policies, which from the 1830s onwards consistently prohibited Poles from taking up official positions and, subsequently, from taking up teaching jobs in the grammar schools operating in Provinz Posen. Thus, as demonstrated by Magdalena Jakś-Ivanowska, of the 166 professors at the University of Poznań between 1919 and 1939, as many as 39.2% were born in the territories under Austrian rule, 30.7% under Russian rule, with as few as 21.7% of the professors (36 individuals) hailing from the lands formerly under Prussian administration; the remaining 8.4% were born outside the Polish lands, in the hinterland of Russia, Germany and other countries.[16] Significantly, however, at the Faculty of Medicine, the most numerous group of professors, accounting for as much as 33% of its total personnel, were born under Prussian rule; such a high ratio stemmed from the fact that these faculty members were simply outstanding representatives of the Poznań medical milieu.[17] The vast majority of the University of Poznań professors were relatively young people, with almost 70% aged under 40 at the time they took the chair, which prompted Tomasz Schramm to refer to this phenomenon as the "youth offensive."[18] It is worth noting that the eminent ethnographer and sociologist Jan Stanisław Bystroń was not even 27 years old when appointed chair of the Department of Ethnology in Poznań as an associate professor in 1919, while the linguist Tadeusz Lehr-Spławinski

15 A. Wrzosek, *Szkolnictwo akademickie w Poznaniu*, [in:] *Księga pamiątkowa Miasta Poznania*, ed. Z. Zaleski, Poznań 1929, p. 357.

16 M. Jakś-Ivanowska op. cit., p. 155.

17 Ibid., p. 157.

18 T. Schramm, *Tworzenie uniwersytetów. Kadry profesorskie uniwersytetów w Warszawie, Poznaniu i Wilnie u progu Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej*, [in]: *Społeczeństwo, państwo, modernizacja. Studia ofiarowane Januszowi Żarnowskiemu w siedemdziesiątą rocznicę urodzin*, ed. S. Kieniewicz, Warszawa 1981, p. 140.

was only a year older at the time.[19] Given such a diverse environment, it was important that informed initiatives were undertaken to both integrate the academic community itself and to create bonds linking it to the Poznanian environment. Such a role was certainly played by the bi-weekly Thursday evenings held at President Święcicki's, accompanied by signature lectures delivered by invited speakers, followed by discussions and rounded off with culinary delights, including "doughnuts, mountains of doughnuts absorbed by the world of science and culture."[20] These meetings brought together the world of politics, the city intelligentsia, university professors and—a notable fact—outstanding students invited by "Mr. President" himself.[21] After Święcicki's passing, a similar role was played by meetings hosted (incidentally also on Thursdays) by the Mayor of Poznań, Cyryl Ratajski, in his villa in Chopina Street.[22] Regular meetings in a broad circle that extended beyond the academia were also held in the homes of some Poznanian professors.[23]

It was especially in the early days of the university that the opportunity to accelerate one's academic career was a factor behind the dynamic growth of Poznań as an academic center that quickly and unabashedly put itself on the academic map of Poland. The lack of established systems, structures and schools of thought was conducive to innovation. In 1920, Professor Florian Znaniecki, a world-class scholar who returned from the United States as the author of the newly published and now-seminal study co-authored with William I. Thomas, *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America*, was appointed chair of the Department of Sociology.[24] Znaniecki, who founded the first Sociological Institute in Poland (and fifth in the world) at the University of Poznań in 1921, maintained regular contacts with the American academic community, and in the 1930s divided his time between Poznań and New York, where he lectured at Columbia University. One should mention Znaniecki's innovative research on the self-awareness of Poznanians, based on an open survey circulated in 1928. Znaniecki subsequently presented his findings in a publication released in 1931, titled *Miasto w świadomości jego obywateli* (The

19 M. Jakś-Ivanowska, op. cit., p. 148.

20 W. Bartoszewicz, *Obrazki i anegdoty*, [in:] *Poznańskie wspominki z lat 1918–1939*, eds. T. Kraszewski, T. Świtała, Poznań 1973, p. 85.

21 M. Musielak, *Heliodor* Święcicki *(1854–1923)*, Poznań 2013, pp. 109–111.

22 K. Stecki, *Na Wydziale Rolniczo-Leśnym Uniwersytetu Poznańskiego*, [in:] *Poznańskie wspominki...*, op. cit., p. 317.

23 Zob. M. Jakś-Ivanowska, op. cit., pp. 344–349.

24 W.I. Thomas, F. Znaniecki, *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America. Monograph of an Immigrant Group*, vol. I-V, Boston 1918–1920.

City in the Consciousness of Its Citizens).[25] Poznań's economic thought rose to European standards under Professor Edward Taylor, who turned Poznań into a leading center of economic theory in Poland, rivaled only by Warsaw School of Economics (Szkoła Główna Handlowa). Poznanian medicine stood tall from the outset, as attested to by the names of such prominent physicians as one of the founding fathers of European laryngology Antoni Jurasz and his son, surgeon Antoni Tomasz Jurasz; pediatrician Karol Jonscher; and one of Poland's most prominent radiologists, Karol Meyer. Equally strong from the onset was also Poznań's legal sciences and humanities, to list only the aforementioned Professor Kazimierz Tymieniecki, one of the most outstanding Polish medievalists of the 20th century and originator of the Poznań school of medieval studies, or Professor Józef Kostrzewski, an archeologist, another among the founding fathers of the University of Poznań and discoverer of the Lusatian culture stronghold in Biskupin, one of the greatest scientific sensations of the 1930s. In natural sciences, notable names included one of the leading Polish botanists, Professor Adam Wodziczko, the initiator of the establishment of the Wielkopolski National Park; as well as zoologist Professor Tadeusz Vetulani, whose research on a relative of the extinct wild horse, the so-called Polish horse, helped breed the species in Bialowieża Forest.[26] It is impossible to mention all the significant figures at the University of Poznań occupying prominent positions in the history of science in Poland. One group that must be mentioned, however, are Poznanian mathematicians. In 1929, the chair of the Department of Mathematics at the University of Poznań, Professor Zdzisław Krygowski, selected three of his most talented students—Marian Rejewski, Henryk Zygalski and Jerzy Różycki—to participate in a special cryptology course. After completing it, the three joined the military Cipher Bureau in Kościuszki Street, opposite the Imperial Castle, where they worked on breaking the system of the German cipher machine Enigma. They eventually succeeded in December 1932, enabling the construction of a copy of the machine and breaking the system of its subsequent versions. This laid the groundwork for the final cracking of the Enigma during World War II.[27]

The quality of Poznań's scientific community was a factor in attracting students not only from Greater Poland. In the first academic year, a total

25 For more on this subject, see J. Ziółkowski, *Dwa konkursy o Poznaniu*, [in:] F. Znaniecki, J. Ziółkowski, *Czym jest dla ciebie miasto Poznań. Dwa konkursy: 1928/1964*, Warszawa–Poznań 1984, pp. 8–29.

26 J. Topolski, *Nauka*, [in:] *Dzieje Poznania*, vol. II, pt. 2, pp. 1171–1180.

27 See *Enigma. Poznańskie ślady*, ed. S. Mazur, Poznań 2021.

of 1,814 students studied at the University; in the most populous year of 1933/34, that figure rose to 5,353, including 1,529 female students; in the subsequent years, the student community invariably remained above 4,000, of whom about 20% were women. Throughout the interwar period, the University of Poznań produced a total of 8,647 alumni.[28] The vast majority here were Poles, with some Germans or Ukrainians in the fold, along with a very small number of Jewish students, who were discouraged from studying by the university authorities and harassed by the majority of their nationalistically inclined Polish peers, a dark page in the university annals.[29] The student community was host to vibrant organizations. The main form of student self-support was provided by the so-called Bratniak, an institutional powerhouse securing all matters of subsistence for the less prosperous academics. In addition, regional, religious or sports circles developed, along with the most vocal corporations bringing together supporters of various political options. Right-wing student corporations had a distinct social and political profile, cultivating their customs and donning their organizational emblems at university ceremonies. Student corporations were also famed for their respective carnival balls. The most intellectually keen students became active in academic circles, among which the Polish Studies Circle undertook literary and cultural activities that extended beyond the university premises.[30]

For Poznań, the establishment of the university marked one of the most important events in its history, a watershed that forged a new role for the city in the Polish and European cultural landscape.[31] No wonder, then, that from the very onset the university became one of Poznań's landmarks for its residents or, as one would say today, a true brand of the capital of Greater Poland (or, as it was fondly dubbed at the time, the capital of the Western Borderlands). According to the philosopher Władysław Tatarkiewicz, who lectured in Poznań between 1921–1923, the university "was a novelty and sort of a fad

28 Z. Dworecki, *Poznań i poznaniacy w latach Drugiej Rzeczpospolitej 1918–1939*, Poznań 1994, pp. 418–419; see also contributions by A. Czubiński, P. Hauser, T. Kotłowski and D. Mazurczak in: *Alma Mater Posnaniensis. W 80. rocznicę utworzenia Uniwersytetu w Poznaniu,* eds. P. Hauser, T. Jasiński, J. Topolski, Poznań 1999.

29 A publication on the subject is currently in print: "Wyparte historie. Antysemityzm na Uniwersytecie Poznańskim w latach 1919–1939", eds. M. Michalski, K. Podemski, Poznań 2022.

30 A. Rogalski, *Wspomnienia i przypomnienia. Z* życia *kulturalnego Poznania*, Poznań 1987, pp. 10–12; A. Kobelska, *Miasto. Uniwersytet. Literaturoznawstwo. Poznań lat dwudziestych i trzydziestych XX wieku jako przestrzeń działania członków Koła Polonistów*, Warszawa 2016.

31 See remarks by W. Łazuga, *Znany – nieznany prezydent Poznania. Rzecz o Jarogniewie Drwęskim*, Poznań 2005, pp. 154–155.

in Poznań, and lectures in art history and philosophy were also attended by ladies and maids from prominent houses."[32] The city's rank was also raised by the fact that, thanks to the scientific community, Poznań became a venue for various academic undertakings, conventions or congresses, such as the 1st General Meeting of Historians (1925), the 14th All-Slavic Congress of Physicians (1933), the 14th Meeting of Physicians and Naturalists (1933), the 1st Scientific Meeting of Agriculture and Forestry (1936), to mention just a few. Also important were the international contacts of the local faculty, with its representatives of the university sitting on various international scientific bodies and helping establish the image of the city as a vibrant center of modern research.

It goes without saying that the University of Poznań must have helped mold the local intellectual elites. First and foremost, every year it supplied the city with several hundred graduates, powering the local offices, judicial institutions, liberal professions, schools, newspaper and publishing editorial teams, and business enterprises. Improved access to higher education probably translated into an increase in the average education of Poznań's intelligentsia, bolstering their professional competence and expanding their intellectual horizons. The university significantly enriched the intellectual life of the city, which was reflected in numerous scientific publications, published primarily by Drukarnia UP (University of Poznań Printing House), established in 1920 and headed by Józef Winiewicz, but also by the Poznań Society of Friends of Science and other minor outlets. Between 1922 and 1937, over 3,500 academic studies were published in Poznań, which accounted for as much as 31% of the total local publishing output.[33] Perhaps more important for the general readership was the fact that representatives of the academic community—in particular (and rather understandably) those active in humanities—contributed to the local periodicals and daily press, including the biggest local titles "Dziennik Poznański" and "Kurier Poznański," both of which eagerly published texts on various social, cultural, historical or natural science problems.

One customary form of enriching the city's intellectual climate involved open lectures organized either by the Poznań Society of Friends of Science and the specialized scientific societies that emerged quickly after 1919, or by student organizations and various other entities taking advantage of the

32 W. Tatarkiewicz, *Zapiski do autobiografii*, [in:] T. and W. Tatarkiewicz, *Wspomnienia*, Warszawa 1979, p. 150.

33 P. Nowak, *Poznań jako ośrodek wydawniczy w dwudziestoleciu 1919–1939*, Poznań 1997, p. 105.

academic potential provided by Poznań's professors. A special university initiative was the General Lectures of the University of Poznań, organized since 1919 and subsidized by, among others, the authorities of the Poznańskie and Pomorskie voivodeships. The scale of this activity was extensive; according to the chairman of the Lecture Board, Professor Zygmunt Wojciechowski, in the academic year 1936/37, 177 lectures were held, including 45 in Poznań alone. At the same time, Wojciechowski noted that here "the reaction of the attending audience" was "the weakest," which he attributed to "the [over] saturation of the Poznań environment with cultural events." It is worth noting, however, that this underwhelming attendance still translated into an average of... about 77 people at each lecture, with as many as 100 and 114 attending similar lectures in Poznanian and Pomeranian small towns, respectively.[34]

The professorial community, which was extremely heterogeneous in terms of its background, inevitably exposed Poznań's elites to different experiences, sensitivities, worldviews, points of view, customs and, last but not least, cultural habits. At times, they blended perfectly with the worldview and ideological profile of the local elite, to mention such figures as the outstanding historian of modern history (including that of the papacy), Bronisław Dembiński, chairman of the 1930 International Eucharistic Congress in Poznań, or the lawyer Stanisław Kasznica, organizer of retreats for academics and author of, among other things, the deeply religious *Rozważania* (*Considerations*), published a total six times. Alongside these, however, there were also those who added a different, hitherto underrepresented tone to the intellectual life of Poznań, as was the case of professors with a free-thinking and anti-clerical attitude, led by the likes of the prominent Slavist, Professor Henryk Ułaszyn, member of the Polish Union of Free Thought, who came to Poznań from Kyiv; or the Podolia-born geographer Professor Stanisław Nowakowski. The few free-thinking circles in the city flocked around them.[35] This diversity also applied to the student community, prolific in various fields of organized activity. The variety of worldviews was also reflected in political divisions. Many professors arriving in Poznań, e.g. physician Stefan Dąbrowski or pedagogue Ludwik Jax-Bykowski, were associated with the

34 *Sprawozdanie przewodniczącego Zarządu Powszechnych Wykładów Uniwersytetu Poznańskiego prof. Z. Wojciechowskiego za rok szk. 1936/37*, [in:] *Kronika Uniwersytetu Poznańskiego za rok szkolny 1936/37*, Poznań 1938, pp. 83–85.

35 Z. Zakrzewski, *Przechadzki po Poznaniu lat międzywojennych*, Warszawa–Poznań 1983, p. 256; Z. Dworecki, op. cit., p. 158.

politically dominant National Democracy, which certainly made it easier for them to integrate into the new environment. Yet it was the newcomers, the aforementioned Ułaszyn and Nowakowski, who strengthened the left-wing currents that had hitherto been underrepresented in the city. Supporters of Marshal Józef Piłsudski's camp, the so-called Sanation, which had been in power since 1926, also formed a strong faction. Among the leading figures of this milieu was the prominent zoologist Antoni Jakubski, a native of Lwów and the first Polish conqueror of the Kilimanjaro in 1910, officer of the Third Brigade of the Polish Legions, defender of Lwów and veteran of the War of 1920, who retired from military service in the rank of lieutenant colonel.[36] In Poznań, Jakubski co-founded the local branch of the Legionaries' Union and was active in all political undertakings of Piłsudski's supporters, including the brawls between the Marshal's followers and his national-democratic adherents. Despite the declared apolitical nature of the University, both professors and students attended various events in the city, on the one hand lending them a distinctive flair, on the other transferring the heated timbre of political disputes to the university premises.

It is also worth noting that the establishment of the university re-hierarchized the urban space, contributing above all to the incorporation of the representative Imperial District, established in the early 20th century as a vivid symbol of German domination, into the image of Polish Poznań.[37] The new university took over not only the building of the Academy but also most of the representative edifices standing in its vicinity. Even part of the Imperial Castle, now serving as the residence of the President of Poland, was handed over to the University. Add to this the academic houses located nearby, as well as the monumental headquarters of the Higher School of Commerce—renamed the Academy of Commerce in 1938—erected in 1932. All of the above turned the former imperial forum into a university district, which it has largely remained to this day; it was also a highly symbolic fact, as the central and representative quarter of the city was now becoming a space of academic freedom and learning practiced under the auspices of the independent Polish state. Not without significance was the fact that for

36 R.W. Schramm, *Jakubski Antoni Władysław*, [in:] *Wielkopolski Słownik Biograficzny*, eds. A. Gąsiorowski, J. Topolski, Warszawa–Poznań 1982, p. 279.

37 For more on this subject, see A. Gulczyński, *Dzielnica Zamkowa w okresie międzywojennym*, [in:] *Odkryj Dzielnicę Zamkową*, Poznań 2011, pp. 63–78; for an extensive study on the Poznań University infrastructure, see M. Michalski, *Miejsce Uniwersytetu. Infrastruktura uniwersytecka w przestrzeni miejskiej Poznania i okolic (1919–2019)*, Poznań 2019.

those arriving in Poznań, it was the university district that served as a kind of gateway to the city and its showcase. After all, anyone heading from the train station to the city center on foot, by streetcar or in a carriage "with a taximeter that—as has been mentioned—was not in use in any of the other districts of our country," had to pass by the impressive edifices of Collegium Minus and Collegium Maius in the Imperial Castle.[38] This part of the city was also witness to the daily sight of students rushing to classes; in turn, on the day of the inauguration of the academic year, held on a Sunday in October, the university square was host to a procession of the university presidium, senate and student corporations, which after a mass celebrated in the university chapel at the castle headed for the auditorium, where the main part of the ceremony took place in the presence of the highest state, church, military and municipal authorities. The university quarter, with the Monument of Gratitude unveiled in its central part in 1932, was also the setting for most major state ceremonies, usually accompanied by parades eagerly attended by Poznanians. Thus, University Square largely assumed the function of a ceremonial center of the city. To a far greater extent than today, the needs of various public gatherings were met by the University Hall, where—in addition to strictly academic undertakings—various conventions, congresses, state academies on national holidays and, finally, concerts were held. Since the university authorities took care to ensure that the events held there were of a non-political nature, political gatherings held at the behest of university circles were held in the hall of the Evangelical House, which stood opposite the Collegium Minus. On certain occasions, these events were followed by various street clashes and brawls transpiring at the university square and along Święty Marcin Street.

The location of the main University campus in the center of the city also allowed the academic community itself to leave a stronger mark on Poznań than sheer numerical data would suggest, since in 1921 there were about 4,000 students per a total population of 170,000, while in 1938 Poznań was home to about 5,500 students enrolled in the University and the Higher School of Commerce, with the city's population at 270,000.[39] And yet, one recurring phrase in the memoirs of Poznanians written in the period is that "the life of university youth swept the city like a tide."[40] This impression was

38 T. Markowski, *W Zamku i nad „Esplanadą"*, [in:] *Poznańskie wspominki...*, p. 386.

39 See A. Kobelska, op. cit., pp. 67–68.

40 Z. Zakrzewski, *Wspominam Poznań. Fakty i refleksje*, Poznań 1986, p. 92.

favored by the custom of wearing academic caps, specific for each faculty, which made the students' presence easily noticeable. Thus, as one can read elsewhere, "The streets, cafes and restaurants were teeming with students. [The city] swarmed with the red-and-white cornets of lawyers, the brown caps of medics, and the fawn *maciejówka* hat worn by farming and forestry students."[41] On the other hand, the city itself enthralled the newly graduated students, perhaps especially those coming from the countryside, and the richness of urban life drew them in to the extent that, as recalled by Władysław Hańcza, a prominent actor who majored in Polish Studies in Poznań before the war, "I could not bring myself to normal studies, this enormous pressure of impressions knocked me completely out of balance, continued to make me wonder, constantly go out, attend [events], all the more so because I could be everywhere, all the doors were open..."[42] These experiences spurred a new relationship with the city, one that also found its expression in the works of a young generation of poets emerging in the academic milieu, a phenomenon that was new to Poznań, with some—like the most prominent among them, Wojciech Bąk—boldly marking their presence in Poznań's cultural life in the 1930s.

Thus, twenty years after the founding of the University, Poznań was a different city. It was not only a city of merchants, clerks, officers and priests but also that of professors and students, a center of flourishing academic reflection, a home to young, university-educated intelligentsia with creative potential that was revealing itself more and more dashingly. Not surprisingly, in the fall of 1939, one of the first blows dealt to Polish Poznań by the German occupiers was the liquidation of the university. Some professors were murdered early into 1940 at Fort VII, while most were brutally thrown out of their apartments and deported to the General Government, thus sharing the fate of 30,000 displaced residents of Poznań.[43] Carried out with cold consistency, this annihilation nonetheless failed in its purpose, since immediately after the end of hostilities in 1945, the University returned to life, revealing its institutional strength and the permanence of the academic community created during the interwar period. Expelled professors and other academics were returning to the city; the University

41 W. Bartoszewicz, *Obrazki i anegdoty*, [in:] *Poznańskie wspominki...*, p. 76.

42 W. Hańcza, *Student i aktor*, [in:] *Poznańskie wspominki*, p. 448.

43 For more on the fate of the university and the academic community of Poznań during World War II, see M. Franz, T. Janicki, A. Magowska, *Uniwersytet w czasie wojny 1939–1945*, Poznań 2019.

President, Professor Stefan Dabrowski, found himself in Poznań on March 18 and immediately took office, continuing his pre-war tenure. The first post-war academic year was inaugurated on April 23, exactly two months after the siege of Poznań, and by May as many as ca. 2,000 students were attending courses. One telling recollection of those days is that of Professor Jolanta Dworzaczkowa, who had just begun her studies in Poznań at the time: "I was even told that at Collegium Chemicum there were open books, desks with scattered notes, private correspondence, and formulas with German explanations still drawn on the blackboard in the lecture hall. Professor [Antoni] Gałecki ordered that they be left untouched, and when he entered the first lecture, he took a sponge and, without saying anything, began to wipe the blackboard. The students rose from their seats."[44]

The university was reborn, and in 1955 it was named after the great Polish Romantic poet, Adam Mickiewicz. Today, with more than 40,000 students, it is not only one of the largest universities in Poland but also ranks among the best in the country, routinely sharing the podium with the Jagiellonian University in Cracow and the University of Warsaw.[45] Without its university, Poznań would not have been the city it is today.

44 J. Dworzaczkowa, *Moje wspomnienia ze studiów historycznych w latach 1942–1947 i początków pracy na Uniwersytecie Poznańskim*, eds. J. Dobosz, W. Molik, T. Schramm, M. Zwierzykowski, Poznań 2013, p. 22.

45 In the 1950s, under the influence of the Soviet model, some entities were separated from the University and continue to operate as separate higher education institutions today: the Karol Marcinkowski Poznań University of Medical Sciences, Poznań University of Life Sciences, and Poznań University of Physical Education.

Anna Ziółkowska

"Musterstadt": Poznań under German occupation (1939–1945)

The first air raid on Poznań took place a mere few hours after the German attack of Poland on September 1, 1939. In the following days, authorities of various levels were evacuated, and the army withdrew to the east to engage the invaders in the great Battle of the Bzura and the defense of Warsaw. On September 10, a reconnaissance unit of the 138th Grenzschutz Regiment under the command of Major Moritz Ratibor entered Poznań, followed by other German units. It was the beginning of the most tragic period in the history of the city. The entering soldiers were enthusiastically greeted by representatives of the local German minority, and the flag of the Third Reich was soon raised in the town hall. As journalist Eugen Petrull reported in the local German daily "Posener Tageblatt," "Whoever was able to witness yesterday's entry, whoever saw the happy faces and eyes wet with tears, will not forget this day for the rest of their life. Sent by the Führer, our soldiers became the object of love and exuberant displays of joy."[1] Two days later, i.e. on September 12, the main Wehrmacht forces marched into the city, along with a 150-strong unit of security police and security service officers operating as part of Einsatzgruppe VI. On September 13, Arthur Greiser, the head of the civil administration (Chef der Zivilverwaltung) attached to the commander of the Poznań military district, arrived in Poznań. By October 26, 1939, the city was placed under military administration (Militärverwaltung).

The jubilation of about 6,000 local Germans was not shared by the 230,000 Poles (and about 2,000 Jews) living in Poznań. The ruthlessness of the German authorities, displayed as early as the first days of the occupation, quickly confirmed their worst fears. On September 11, 1939, contrary to international

1 "Posener Tageblat", no. 202, 10.9.1939, p. 1, quoted in P. Matusik, *Historia Poznania*, vol. III, Poznań 2021, p. 249.

regulations in force, German military authorities introduced the principle of collective responsibility, and took hostages—a total of 50 widely respected personages, including professors of the University of Poznań, clergymen, clerks, and merchants—who were to guarantee with their lives the safety of German civilians and Wehrmacht soldiers. They were detained until early December 1939. September 11 also saw the issue of the first announcement of the Military Commander of Poznań, regulating the occupational status of the Polish population and everyday life of the residents in 16 points. A curfew was introduced, cultural institutions were closed, and the printing of Polish newspapers was suspended. Polish residents were obliged to surrender their weapons, radio equipment, and pigeons. Resisting the invaders, but also failing to report to work by employees of city offices and public companies (including employees of the power plant, supply services, and waterworks) was punishable by death. On September 23, 1939, Leszek Kwaczewski, a grocer living at the Old Market, was sentenced to death by firing squad for illegal possession of weapons. It was then that the first red poster announcing an execution appeared on the walls of Poznań's buildings. The infamous "death bills" were posted almost daily and remained the only official prints in Polish that were published during the occupation.

The bitterness of the first weeks of the occupation was compounded by the sight of POW transports passing through the city. As Halina Warmińska-Rozmiarkowa recalled, "They looked so miserable, ragged, with no weapons, coats, bags, or even shoes. Crowded in a cramped space, they were hungry, humiliated, but held their heads high. We cast our Polish eyes at them with sorrow."[2]

Although the city was already festooned with Nazi symbols, on September 14 the newspaper "Posener Tageblatt" called on all Germans to fly national flags as an expression of joy at the liberation of the city from Polish rule, a plea that met with a zealous response.[3] Poznań's citizens looked on in disbelief at The Gentlemen, the city's largest and swankiest department store at the intersection of Szkolna and Nowa Streets (now Paderewskiego Street), now decorated with garlands, swastikas, the emblem of the Third Reich, and a huge inscription on the facade of the building, which read, "Wir danken unserem Führer."

2 Cz. Łuczak, *Dzień po dniu w okupowanym Poznaniu. 10 września 1939–25 lutego 1945*, Poznań 1989, p. 37.

3 "Posener Tageblatt", no. 204, 14.9.1939, p. 5.

Simultaneously with the progressive normalization of life expressed among others in the launch of communication and improvement of provisions, the occupation authorities started to systematically eliminate all traces of Polishness in the city. Under Greiser's ordinance of September 17, all Polish inscriptions and coats of arms were removed from buildings and streets. All districts, squares and streets were renamed, sometimes restoring their Prussian appellations (e.g. Wilhelmsplatz instead of Freedom Square) or renaming them after characters glorified by the new authorities, e.g. Horst Wessel or Leo Schlageter. In the fall of 1939, the demolition of Polish monuments began, and the city's coat of arms was changed by removing the eagle. It was replaced with a swastika and three dates: 1253 (the year Poznań received became a chartered town), 1793 (the date Poznań was incorporated into the Prussian partition) and, in the middle, 1939 (the date the city was seized by the Germans and incorporated into the Third Reich) appeared. All these changes were to complete the image of the "Germanness" of the city.

A peculiar summary of the first days of the occupation was a rally of the NSDAP (National Socialist German Workers' Party, Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei), held on September 21, 1939. The hall in the Chamber of Crafts, filled to the brim with the representatives of the highest military authorities and civil administration, received Greiser's words with enthusiasm and to the applause of the local Germans; Greiser touted Germans as the masters of the land and Poles as "mere servants" who were "subservient to Germans" (Die Deutschen sind die Herren und die Polen die Knechten). He also announced that "Poznania will be a model district of the Greater German Reich" (Posen wird ein Mustergau des Grossdeutschen Reiches werden).[4] These words not only entailed discrimination against the Polish population in all areas, but were also a harbinger of economic changes in the occupied territory. As per report of Einsatzgruppe VI of September 22, 1939, "of particular importance for the mood among the German and Polish population was (...) the Volksdeutsche demonstration in Poznań. (...). Poles were profoundly struck by the words of the head of the Civil Administration of the Province of Poznań, Senate President Greiser, that a Pole in the new German area will never be equal to a German in legal terms, and can only serve them (...). The demonstration noticeably strengthened the German character of Poznań."[5]

4 "Posener Tageblatt", no. 212, 22.09.1939, pp. 1, 3.

5 Biuletyn Głównej Komisji Badania Zbrodni Hitlerowskich w Polsce, vol. XXII, 1971, pp. 237–238.

Arthur Greiser was a figure who played a key role in the German occupation of Poznań. As a devoted member of the NSDAP, he assumed leadership of the Free City of Danzig as President of the Senate in 1934. His main objective—incorporating Danzig into the Third Reich—was realized upon outbreak of the war, which entailed a loss of his prominent position. However, at the behest of Hitler himself, Greiser was sent to Poznań, where, as we know, he was appointed head of the civil administration (Chef der Zivilverwaltung). His subsequent career resulted from the stabilization of the occupation system in the Polish lands under German occupation. As we know, the territory of the Polish state was divided between two aggressors: Germany and the Soviet Union. On the basis of Hitler's decree of October 8, 1939, the occupied western and northern territories were incorporated directly into the Reich, and the remaining territories formed the General Government (Generalgouvernement, GG), which included the cities of Warsaw and Cracow. The larger part of the incorporated territories, including the entire pre-war Poznańskie Voivodeship, as well as parts of the Łódzkie, Pomorskie and Warszawskie Voivodeships, formed a large administrative unit, which on January 29, 1940 was renamed Reichsgau Wartheland (Reich District Wartheland), with Poznań as its capital. The decree on the new administrative division of Poland came into force on October 26, 1939. On that day, the period of military administration ended. Authorities in the district were taken over by the civil administration led by Arthur Greiser, who became Reichstatthaler (governor of Wartheland) and leader (Gauleiter) of NSDAP. Greiser thus concentrated civil and party power in his hands in the largest administrative unit in the Third Reich, and reported solely to Hitler. This allowed him to issue directives to the police, the judiciary, the fiscal institutions, the post office, and the railroad.[6] As the capital of the district, Poznań not only hosted the administrative but also the judicial and military authorities, the lattermost in the form of the headquarters of military district No. 21 (Wehrkreiskommando XXI).

The system was reinforced by an intricated network of police formations: Order Police (Ordnungspolizei, OrPo), Security Police (Staatliche Schutzpolizei, Schupo), Criminal Police (Kriminalpolizei – Kripo), and Secret Security Service (Geheime Staatspolizei – Gestapo). The head of all police in Poznań was the senior SS and police commander (Höhere SS- und Polizeiführer), SS-Gruppenführer Wilhelm Koppe. The head office of the secret

6 P. Matusik, *Historia Poznania*, vol. III, p. 259.

security police, the Gestapo, had its headquarters at Dom Żołnierza (Soldier's House) at Ritterstrasse 21 (today Ratajczaka Street) since November 7, 1939. It occupied a special place in the topography of crime in the German-occupied Poznań as a venue of interrogations, torture, and death inflicted to the members of the resistance movement, persons suspected of sabotage, and all those who opposed the occupants' legislation.

Along with Greiser came the new government officials who were to occupy high positions, first with the head of the civil administration in the Poznań military district and then in the Reich Governor's office and other central district offices that were to be located in Poznań. These included his blindly obedient associates from Gdańsk, and experienced NSDAP activists from the Reich. As noted by Harry Siegmund, Greiser's cousin and collaborator from his Gdańsk days, who became his personal advisor (Referent) upon his arrival in Poznań, the fortnight after September 13, 1939 saw an "invasion of numerous officials from Danzig." These were loyal supporters of Senate President Greiser, the best qualified experts who saw no further career opportunities in Gdańsk under Gauleiter Albert Forster and who had taken up high positions in the administrative or judicial apparatus in Poznań. Also among Greiser's trusted collaborators from Gdańsk were his personal secretary Elsa Claaßen and... a cook. As noted by Siegmund, "in the end the invasion from Gdańsk included more than fifty people, which caused astonishment but also increased Greiser's prestige in the administration that was being formed in Poznań."[7]

Greiser's squad (Gefolgschaft), as he called it, consisted of thousands of subordinate officials. They were characterized by ruthlessness and brutality towards the Polish population. What was expected of German officials was explained, among others, by Richard Raatz, head of the Poznań office for NSDAP officials, who stated: "Whoever wishes to serve as an official in our district has to be a tough fellow. Extraordinary conditions require extraordinary deeds, they require people with a clear vision and strong will."[8] An amiable and humane approach towards Poles was rare; it was to be avoided

7 H. Siegmund, *Rückblick. Erinnerungen eines Staatsdieners in bewegter Zeit,* Kiel 1999, pp. 191–192; A. Ziegler, *Posen 1939–1945: Anfang und Ende einer Reichsgauhauptstadt*, Schönaich 2009, p. 35; C. Epstein, *Wzorcowy nazista: Arthur Greiser i okupacja Kraju Warty*, Wrocław 2010, pp. 142–144.

8 W. Porzycki, *Posłuszni aż do zbrodni. Rola niemieckiego personelu administracyjnego w realizacji hitlerowskiej polityki w Kraju Warty 1939–1945*, "Kronika Wielkopolski" no. 4 (63), 1992, pp. 27.

rather than manifested.[9] Hostility towards Poles was widespread, not only by official order. This was hardly surprising, given that Greiser had taught German youth that "Our strongest love for the fatherland is our hatred for the Poles, whom we hate like the plague."[10]

This was related to the obsessive efforts of Governor and Gauleiter Arthur Greiser to transform the territory of Wartheland "a model district (Mustergau) of the Greater German Reich," "a training ground for National Socialism" (Exerzierplatz des Nationalsozialismus), a stronghold of Germanness, a bridge between the Reich and the East and "the granary of the Reich" (Kornkammer des Reiches), a birthplace of a large number of children, and thus "a source of the demographic development of the German nation." These projections became Greiser's point of personal ambition, as he sought to turn the territory under his control a model administrative structure, create a new society, and transform Wartheland spatially. As the capital of the district, Poznań was to play a special role in Greiser's design. In order to realize the extensive plans to elevate its status, the city limits were expanded twice, increasing Poznań's area by a total of 14,900 ha.[11]

The city, as well as the whole of Greater Poland, was treated by the German authorities as "urdeutsche Ostgebiete," i.e., indigenously German lands that were "only" under temporary Polish administration from the end of World War I until the outbreak of World War II, and were now returned to the Reich at the behest of Adolf Hitler and in the name of historical justice. The "Germanness" of the city during the entire occupation was recalled by Nazi propaganda, proclaiming Poznań as the "Old German City in the East," the "Prussian Fortress and Soldatenstadt" ("Alte Deutsche Stadt im Osten" or "Preussische Festung und Soldatenstadt") or finally as a "deutscher Stadt

9 Muzeum Martyrologiczne w Żabikowie, Archiwum Historii Mówionej, Wspomnienia prof. Petera Bartrama, file no. 34. Bartram recalls that in his family house in Franowo, occupied by his parents and three schoolgirl sisters—in spite of the fact that his mother, as he put it, "was a determined Nazi"—meals were eaten together with a Pole named Marian (despite the legal ban thereon), who was ordered to work for the Bartram family.

10 W. Porzycki, *Posłuszni aż do zbrodni*..., p. 27.

11 On April 1, 1940, pursuant to Greiser's decision, the following settlements were annexed to Poznań: Chartowo, Fabianowo, Junikowo, Krzyżowniki, Ławica, Naramowice, Psarskie, Strzeszyn, Świerczewo and Żegrze, along with some of Nowa Wieś and part of the territories of the municipalities of Luboń, Kotowo and Żabikowo. Two years later, on April 1, 1942, Poznań was expanded again to include the right-bank towns of: Garaszewo, Krzesiny, Minikowo, Spławie and Starołęka.

im urdeutschen Wartheland!" (a German city in the eternally German Wartheland)."[12]

The vision of an exemplary capital of an exemplary district was also expressed in the projects of a thorough reconstruction of the urban space of Poznań, which was now to become the seat of many institutions of the "new" government. Already in the first issue of the "Ostdeutscher Beobachter," the NSDAP's news and propaganda outlet published on November 1, 1939, a wide-ranging program of construction works was announced in Poznań, which were to conclude with "the Germanization of the city's image" (Verdeutschung des Stadtbildes). According to the announcement, priority would be given to the construction of housing estates in Poznań, erected in accordance with the principles developed in the so-called "old Reich" and described as more socially-conscious.[13] It was also emphasized that "all buildings to be erected by Germans in Wartheland in the future must be a testimony to a better and more perfect sense of architecture and German communal spirit," as reflected in the inclusion of Poznań alongside Nuremberg, Linz, and Munich among the cities earmarked for the transformation in accordance with the plans designed in the spirit of National Socialism.[14]

The occupiers' attention focused on the city center in Św. Marcin Street, between today's Kościuszki Street and Niepodległości Avenue, i.e. the Wilhelmine Imperial Quarter. It was there, according to the plans of German architects and urban planners submitted as early as in 1940, that the greatness of the Reich was to be showcased to the fullest extent. The symbol of the new government's power was to be the former Imperial Castle, renamed the Deutsches Schloss (German Castle), which was to serve as the Führer's residence and the seat of the governor of Wartheland. The building of the Landespräsidentie (Landespräsidentium) opposite the castle was used as the headquarters of the Gauleiter, the NSDAP and other offices such as the Racial Policy Office (Rassenpolitischer Amt) and the Women's Community (NS - Frauenschaft). In accordance with Hitler's will, the castle was to be redeveloped in National Socialist spirit, thus becoming "a stone symbol of

12 H. Schwendemann, W. Dietsche, *Hitlers Schloß. Die „Führerresidenz" in Posen*, Berlin 2003, p. 95; *Führer durch Posen*, Posen 1940.

13 "Ostdeutscher Beobachter" no. 1, 1.11.1939, p. 8; ibid., no. 2, 11.1939, p. 6.

14 H. Grzeszczuk-Brendel, *Architektoniczne dokonania III Rzeszy na terenie Poznania*, KMP 2009, no. 2, p. 253; "Zentralblatt der Bauverwaltung vereinigt mit Zeitschrift für Bauwesen", vol. 60, no. 41/1940, p. 694.

the German claim to rule over Poland."[15] The planners' 1940 drafts envisioned a parade route that would run from the eastern areas of the city to the west. The route started at a large square in the newly planned district called Weststadt (which spanned the quarters of Łazarz and Jeżyce). On the square, a Meeting Hall (Festhalle) was to be built, with a wide avenue (today's Bukowska street) leading from the square to the plaza in front of the castle. The avenue was to be built up with five- and six-story buildings on both sides. The square between the castle and the expanded university building, called Platz an der Schloßfreiheit, was to be used for central celebrations and gatherings. It was there that Hitler was to greet crowds of welcoming Germans from his balcony and receive parades. A parade route through the first floor of the tower and the "Führer's Stairs" were to lead to Hitler's suites. South of Św. Marcin Street, renamed Adolf-Hitler-Strasse, the planners envisioned a complex of representative monumental buildings, including The Gauhalle, a district assembly hall whose architecture was reminiscent of the Walhalla near Regensburg, followed by a concert hall with 1,600 seats, a new railroad station, the House of the German Labor Front (DAF), railroad headquarters, and a luxury hotel.[16]

The architectural changes were envisioned with respect to the Old Town. It was only the town hall and the guardhouse that would remain in the Old Market Square, while all the buildings along the market frontage were to be demolished and replaced by three-story blocks with pitched roofs and arcades.

Out of the grand plans for the redevelopment of Poznań, the first construction works featured housing estates that were built in the western part of the city (in Szamarzewskiego, Dabrowskiego, and Przybyszewskiego Streets, respectively) and in its southern sections, including a housing estate (a textbook example of a National Socialist housing estate, i.e. the so-called NS-Mustersiedlung) in Opolska Street, intended for German workers of the DWM (Deutsche Waffen- und Munitionsfabriken AG). The imperial castle underwent a major overhaul, in the course of which the original Wilhelminian décor was devastated; in turn, the redesigned Rzymski Hotel (renamed Ostland Hotel) was considered "one of the best-furnished buildings in Greater

15 H. Schwendemann, *„Rezydencja Führera" na Wschodzie. Zamek Cesarski w Poznaniu 1939–1945*, "Kronika Miasta Poznania" [hereinafter: KMP] 2009, no. 2, p. 272.

16 H. Schwendemann, W. Dietsche, *Hitlers Schloß*..., p. 96.

Germany."[17] The large-scale construction of two artificial lakes (Rusałka and Maltańskie) involved Jewish forced laborers from the ghettos of Wartheland.[18]

The Germanness of Poznań was to be determined mainly by its inhabitants; however, as of September 1939, the city was inhabited by 230,000 Poles, 6,000 Germans and slightly over 1,000 Jews. Greiser saw it as one of the main tasks was to Germanize Wartheland and its capital as quickly as possible by strengthening the existing German element while weakening and, above all, eliminating the dominant, racially inferior Polish element, at the same time accounting for the needs of the German economy. At a meeting in Poznań on March 15, 1940, Heinrich Himmler envisioned that "all Polish specialists will be used in our armaments industry. Later on, all Poles will disappear from this world. It is a necessity that the great German nation considers the destruction of all Poles as its principal task."[19]

Preparations for the implementation of the plan to eliminate the Polish community involved first and foremost targeting the intellectual, social, and political elites in accordance with the action of "political land consolidation" (Politische Flurbereinigung) ordered by Hitler on September 12, 1939. The wave of terror, arrests and executions that swept over the whole Wielkopolska (Greater Poland) affected tens of thousands of individuals. The prison in Młyńska Street was bursting at the seams, and from October 3, 1939 onwards, prisoners were to be placed in Fort VII, which was originally built by Prussians. After October 10, the prison was under jurisdiction of security police, which turned it into a camp initially known as Konzentrationslager Posen (before it was renamed Staatspolizeileitstelle Übergangslager - Fort VII in mid-November 1939). Among the inmates and casualties of the Fort were not only those who were potential sources of resistance against the occupant but also those who fell victim to personal grudges held by local Germans against their Polish neighbors. The victims of executions carried out in the Fort and in the forests around Poznań (Dąbrówka, Palędzie, and Golęcin) included several hundred citizens of Poznań. Among them were professors of the University of Poznań, activists of cultural institutions, artists, politicians, and clergymen, including Catholic priests and the minister of the

17 Quoted in P. Matusik, *Historia Poznania,* vol. III, p. 265.

18 A. Ziółkowska, *Obozy pracy przymusowej dla Żydów w Wielkopolsce w latach okupacji hitlerowskiej (1941–1943)*, Poznań 2005, pp. 44–51.

19 Cz. Łuczak, *Zagłada*, Warszawa 1989, p. 18.

Polish Evangelical-Augsburg community, Rev. Gustaw Manitius.[20] Another tragic group of victims of Fort VII were the patients of psychiatric clinics in Owińska and Grobla Street, who were euthanized with carbon dioxide in one of the fort's bunkers in October 1939. The killings were carried out by Sonderkomando Lange stationed in the fort and commanded by SS-Obersturmführer Herbert Lange, who subsequently liquidated psychiatric institutions in Wartheland and exterminated the local Jewish population in the first German Nazi death camp Kulmhof in Chełmno nad Nerem.

However, the principal method for quickly changing the balance of population and at the same time eliminating the undesirable "leadership element" was through mass deportation, as described in a document issued on November 25, 1939 by Dr. Ernest Wetzel and Dr. Günther Hecht of the NSDAP Office for Racial Policy. Among other things, one may learn from the said document (which also reveals in full the criminality of the Third Reich's plans), that "the Polish intelligentsia must be deported in its entirety and without delay (...) The term Polish intelligentsia above all extends to Polish priests, teachers (including elementary school teachers), doctors, dentists, veterinarians, officers, higher officials, large merchants, large landowners, writers, editors, as well as all persons with higher or secondary education." The report also assumed the removal from the occupied territories of "decidedly Polish-thinking nationalist strata of the population (...) chauvinists, members of Polish political and cultural parties."[21]

Demographic relations were first changed by the mass deportation of the Polish and Jewish population. Formally responsible for carrying out the plan for the mass deportation of the Polish and Jewish population from Poznań to the General Government was Arthur Greiser; in reality, this task was delegated to the higher SS and police commander in Wartheland, Wilhelm Koppe. A special authority was created for this purpose, known as the Special Staff for the Resettlement of Poles and Jews (Sonderstrab für Umsiedlung der Polen und Juden) from November 11, 1939, onwards. The deportations were preceded by the so-called "wild" displacements carried out until November 1939, which involved a total of about 1,000 people, including merchants and

20 M. Rutowska, *Straty osobowe i materialne kultury w Wielkopolsce w latach II wojny światowej*, Warszawa–Poznań, 1984, pp. 87–109.

21 Biuletyn Głównej Komisji Badania Zbrodni Niemieckich w Polsce, Warszawa, vol. IV, 1948, p. 155. The document in question is titled *Sprawa traktowania ludności byłych polskich obszarów z rasowo-politycznego punktu widzenia* (*Die Frage der Behandlung der Bevölkerung der ehemaligen polnischen Gebiete nach rassenpolitischen Gesichtspunkten*).

craftsmen, whose property was routinely taken over by the local Germans who denounced them.

Mass deportations of Poles and Jews from Poznań began on November 5, 1939 and lasted until December 17 that year. The first deportees were the completely unsuspecting and unprepared residents of Za Bramką Street, located in the closest vicinity of the former Voivodship Office building, now occupied by the Germans. The deportations were usually carried out at night, which guaranteed that the people designated for transport would be in their apartments. They were allowed to take only the necessary hand luggage up to 30 kg per adult and 10 kg per child. The amount of cash they could carry was likewise limited to 200 złotys per person initially, a sum that was subsequently reduced to 20 złotys. The deportations were accompanied by brutal treatment of Poles and Jews, with the police resorting to beatings, shouting, and robbing of personal belongings. The non-German population was generally afraid and terrified of the deportations. Eugeniusz Talejko described those events on the pages of the calendar he kept during the occupation: "The resettlement operation has been conducted in a completely unpredictable fashion, which makes Poles even more nervous and uncertain about their future. It has not been uncommon for one tenement house to be visited several times, with one family being taken away at a time. In the evening, before curfew, the whole city becomes restless; people do not sleep."[22] In all apartments, there was a feverish atmosphere of anticipation for being thrown out. This is how Janusz Ratajczak, who was evicted from his apartment on Św. Marcin Street together with his family, described those moments: "Every evening, Mom would prepare food provisions, thermoses with drinks, and the necessary equipment for us... and then we waited! We waited every evening behind the darkened windows, to see when they would pick us up «the cabs»... Well, they did arrive, and within minutes we were inside the «cab»."[23]

Those thrown out of their apartments and deported in large German buses, which stood in the vicinity of the opera house during the day, in anticipation of the night action, were then taken to a camp in the suburb of Główna and placed in wooden barracks of the former military depot, with the

22 E. Talejko, *Z kart mojego kalendarza*, [in:] *Wysiedlenie i poniewierka 1939–1945. Wspomnienia Polaków wysiedlonych przez okupanta hitlerowskiego z ziem polskich "wcielonych" do III Rzeszy*, selected and edited by R. Dyliński, M. Flejsierowicz, S. Kubiak, Poznań 1974, p. 537.

23 M. Rutowska, *Lager Glowna. Niemiecki obóz przesiedleńczy na Głównej w Poznaniu dla ludności polskiej (1939–1945)*, Poznań 2008, p. 27.

temperature dropping to a freezing -40 centigrade. Transports of deportees were directed to the Kielce, Lublin and Zamoś? regions. The interruption of the resettlement operation was related, on the one hand, to the demand for Polish workforce in the city, and to resistance of the administrative authorities of the localities to which Polish Poznanians were resettled, on the other. ć regions. The interruption of the resettlement operation was related, on the one hand, to the demand for Polish workforce in the city, and to resistance of the administrative authorities of the localities to which Polish Poznanians were resettled, on the other.

According to Maria Rutowska, a total of 35,000 people passed through the camp on Główna Street, of whom 33,000 were deported to the General Government.[24] Most among those deported included clerks, teachers, university professors, policemen, and activists affiliated with various social organizations. The resettlement operation also included the Jewish residents of Poznań, most of whom (851 people) were deported to Ostrów Lubelski on December 13, 1939. Subsequent transports, whose destination is unknown, set out from Główna on April 2, 1940 (a rail transport), followed by two bus transports on April 6, 1940 carrying a total of 161 people. In some cases, Poznanian Jews were also identified among the names of those deported in other transports, bringing the total number of people who passed through this camp to 1,112. Also deported from the city were 450 Roma.[25] The deportation camp in Główna was shut down on May 22, 1940.

The Poles who lived in quality apartments in the city center were also subjected to the so-called "expulsion" (Verdrängung) operation, which involved relocations to sub-standard apartments on the outskirts of the city. It has been calculated that as of 1943, as a result of this measure 90.5% of the Poles remaining in the city lived in the outskirts. Such a concentration of Polish population in the outskirts necessitated the erection of an estate of barracks, called "the city of barracks" (Barackenstadt), at today's Opolska Street, which was reported by the "Ostdeutscher Beobachter."[26]

Poles could not be dispensed with as a workforce, however the German authorities applied a racist policy of ruthless segregation to those who remained in the city. Public areas became ridden with inscriptions

24 Ibid., p. 81.

25 Ibid., pp. 591–633; A. Ziółkowska, *Żydzi poznańscy w pierwszych miesiącach okupacji hitlerowskiej*, KMP 2006, no. 3, pp. 387–390.

26 H. Grzeszczuk-Brendel, *Faszystowska działalność mieszkaniowa na Dębcu*, KMP 2004, no. 1, pp. 330–332.

"Nur für Deutsche," "für Polen verboten," "nur für deutsche Kinder" ["Only for Germans, forbidden for Poles, only for German children"]; all contacts between Poles and Germans—apart from purely professional and economic ones—were forbidden. A number of these measures were intended to seal the cultural degradation of the Polish community. Polish and Jewish cultural property was ruthlessly confiscated and plundered, including all artifacts from museum, church, and private collections; Jewish community property was simply destroyed. The university, along with all Polish cultural organizations and institutions, museums, the opera house and theaters were liquidated. As Reich Minister Joseph Goebbels stated on October 31, 1939, during a conference in Łódź, Poles should have no access to theaters "so that they would not constantly remind themselves of what they have lost."[27] All schools were closed down except for the so-called Polenschule, a mere handful of them in the entire city, where students were taught to count to one hundred and learned basic German (so that even their primitive German could immediately betray them as Poles). No Polish books or magazines were published; churches were turned into storehouses, leaving only two to serve the religious needs of the more than 230,000-strong Catholic community. Poles were subjected to a number of severe daily restrictions: they had to observe a curfew, could not use streetcars in the morning, could only use bicycles for work-related purposes, and were only allowed to go shopping at designated times. They were forced to work from the age of 14 to 60, and economic hardships were expressed by both lower wages and smaller food rations. In order to weaken the demographic potential, the age at which marriages could be contracted was raised, and newborns were given officially established Slavic-sounding names to distinguish them more strongly from Germans. The everyday life of Poles under occupation was marked by a constant fear for their own lives and the lives of their loved ones, as well as pauperization, living on the verge of vegetation, and being exposed to humiliating treatment from the German occupiers, including taunts from the boorish Hitlerjugend.

Any attempt of resistance by the Polish population, and any disclosed conspiratorial activity ended tragically for its participants. Those who refused to yield to the German authorities were put to death at Fort VII, before its functions were delegated to the Żabikowo camp on the outskirts of Poznań in 1943. Members of the Polish underground, whose organizational structures began to emerge as early as late September 1939, were sent to Fort VII

27 S. Piotrowski, *Okupacja i ruch oporu w dziennikach Hansa Franka 1939–1945*, Warszawa 1972, vol. 1, p. 81.

and subsequently to Żabikowo. One underground group of national importance was the "Ojczyzna" [Fatherland] organization, which was the first to establish contact with the Polish government in exile in France. In 1940, the underground structures in the city were expanded. The year saw the founding of the Union of Armed Struggle (Związek Walki Zbrojnej), followed by the February 1942 - the establishment of the local unit of the Home Army, which suffered a major blow with the arrest of the commander of Poznań District of the Home Army, Colonel Henryk Kowalówka, who was captured at the main railway station and shot at the Żabikowo camp. About 1,500 members of the organization passed through the camp. As put by Professor Edward Serwański, member of the Ojczyzna organization, "all those arrested went through the usual path to martyrdom, from Soldier's Home via Fort VII and Żabikowo."[28]

The topography of German crimes in the city also comprised a network of forced labor camps for Jews (Zwangsarbeitslager für Juden), operating from 1941 to August 1943 and supervised by the City Board; the camps were located both in the central part of the city (city stadium) and on its outskirts. Contrary to Greiser's triumphant assurances that after the expulsion of Jews from Poznań to the General Government the city was free of Jews (Judenrein), a year later several thousand Jews found themselves in the model capital of the district. They were used to carry out various road and railroad works connected with the war effort of the Third Reich, with Poznań intended as an important railroad junction (hence the construction of a shunting station in Franowo) and freeway hub (including the construction of the Berlin-Poznań-Lódź freeway). The Jewish population was deported to Poznań from the largest ghetto in Wartheland, Łódź, and the so-called provincial ghettos situated in the eastern part of the district.

After the expulsion of some Polish and all Jewish residents, and following the relocation of the remaining Polish population to other quarters of the city, a space was created that began to be filled by "new" Germans. The first Germans to arrive in Poznań were the so-called Reichsdeutsche, people of various professions and education, delegated or newly employed to work in the city. By the end of 1940, 12,000 Reichsdeutsche had settled in Poznań and took up positions in the governor's office, city administration, and party authorities. Most of the Reichsdeutsche who took up employment in the eastern "incorporated territories" were motivated by material

28 E. Serwański, *Wielkopolska w cieniu swastyki*, Warszawa 1970, p. 370.

considerations, the possibility of rapid professional advancement, and financial gain; ideological motives were not uncommon, too. Each "newcomer" to Poznań treated this peculiar promotion as a war booty and a comfortable living arrangement. Upkeep in Poznań was also much lower than in the "Old Reich." This applied not only to the multitude of clerks, lawyers, managers of the factories and enterprises seized from their previous owners but also teachers of schools for German youth, employees of libraries and museums, telephonists, secretaries, stenographers, many of whom moved to Poznań with their families. "Stadt Posen" was supposed to provide comfortable living conditions and leisure activities for all of them. The city was to offer a rich cultural life with interesting exhibitions, theater performances, concerts, and recreation in parks and other green spaces. They guaranteed a safe life for the new "German community" isolated from Poles and Jews. Wiesław Porzycki notes that most Germans moving from the Reich to Poznań and Wartheland had previously resided in the Saarland and Westphalia. On the other hand, most officials were sent from Berlin, followed by Magdeburg and Dresden. Among those holding top managerial positions, virtually none belonged to the aforementioned resettled groups.[29] Most among the newcomers were rank-and-file clerks working for various institutions, as well as craftsmen, merchants, and farmers.[30]

A separate group of those resettled to Wartheland were the so-called Baltic Germans (Baltendeutsche), who arrived in Poznań in the aftermath of the agreement signed between the Third Reich and the Soviet Union and the ceding of the Baltic countries to the latter. As per Adolf Hitler's decree of 7 October 1939, the "repatriation" of the Baltendeutche, who came from the territory of Latvia and Estonia, began. At the turn of 1939 and 1940, the first 18,000 Baltendeutsche were directed to Poznań, and by the end of 1941, the city received a total of 19,682 displaced persons from the Baltic countries, which accounted for 96.4% of all the German arrivals in the city. Most among the newcomers were members of the intelligentsia with roots in Riga and Tallinn.[31] This group included, among others, teachers who were directed to public education, scientists (including a total of 140 scholars from Latvia and Estonia alone, of whom 59 who were eventually qualified to stay in

29 W. Porzycki, *Posłuszni aż do śmierci (niemieccy urzędnicy w Kraju Warty 1939–1945*), Poznań 1997, pp. 79–80.

30 Ibid., p. 82.

31 H. Zimniak, *Wartheland – kraj niespełnionych nadziei. Niemcy bałtyccy w „Kraju Warty" w okresie II wojny światowej*, [in:] "Poznański Rocznik Archiwalno-Historyczny", vol. VIII/IX, Poznań 2002, p. 147.

the city). The "Balts," as they were called, were generally considered highly qualified experts in their fields, which caused them to take over enterprises as trustees (Treuhänder) and sometimes resulted in the hostility of local Germans, who were thus deprived of the opportunity to acquire profitable businesses, medical and dental offices, and stores. The Baltendeutsche expressed their satisfaction with the seizure of Polish property, among others in the "Ostdeutscher Beobachter," as emphasized by Eugen Petrull in an article with a significant title "Die Umsiedler werden immer sasshafter."[32] At the same time, the Baltendeutsche assumed only a handful of managerial positions in the Governor's Office and the offices of the governing presidents (Regierungspräsidenten).

A much smaller group of 700 resettled persons, who arrived in Poznań in 1944, was made up of Germans from Bukowina, Eastern Galicia, Volhynia, and Białystok. A still smaller group of 400 individuals who came to Poznań were the so-called Schwarzmeerdeutsche from the Black Sea region.

An analysis of employment at various posts in Poznań shows that the predominant group among the resettled parties were the Reichsdeutsche, i.e., Germans from the "Old Reich" sent to the "incorporated territories." These included August Jäger, a Palatinate-born deputy to Governor Greiser, and Dr. Herbert Melhorn, a native of Chemnitz in Saxony, who was responsible for internal and financial affairs; from 1941 onwards, Melhorn was also in charge of Jewish matters and, consequently, the extermination of Jews in Wartheland. The situation was similar with the municipal authorities. Throughout the occupation, the Oberbürgermeister of Poznań was Dr. Gerhard Scheffer, a Berlin-based advisor to the communal department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The most important positions in his entourage were assigned to Reichsdeutsche, ands so as of April 1, 1940, out of a total of 1,295 employees in the Poznań Mayor's Office, 453 were Reichsdeutsche, 214 were local Germans, with 628 positions filled by Baltendeutsche.[33]

The governor's office under Greiser employed a total of over 1,400 officials. Of the staff delegated to work with Greiser, the largest group came from the cities of the Old Reich, mostly low-ranking clerks and personnel with a background in commerce and crafts. The resettled Germans held lower-level or auxiliary positions in the new administration. Most of the new male administrative personnel were between 31 and 50 years of age (this

32 H. Ziminak, *Wartheland*..., p. 148.

33 W. Porzycki, *Posłuszni aż do śmierci*..., p. 97.

situation would change in the latter years of the war, which saw the conscription of men to the army, on the one hand, and the assignment of retired men to work, on the other).

In line with Greiser's guidelines, the various German national groups arriving in Wartheland, above all the settlers from the eastern regions of Europe, were to create a uniform community (Volksgemeinschaft) in the spirit of National Socialism.[34] By the end of 1944, this community was already 95,000 strong, however its internal makeup was highly diverse. The Reichsdeutche looked with distrust at the local Germans (Volksdeutche). The latter, in turn, felt resentment towards the Reichsdeutche for holding the high-ranking positions in administration and treating the Volksdeutche as auxiliary force with no better career prospects in sight. On the other hand, the Germans resettled from the East from the fall of 1939 onwards were regarded as an ideologically and racially "unsuitable for pioneer activity in the East," yet they occupied better positions than the local Germans and were not very well-disposed towards them.[35] The Volks- and Reichsdeutsche also shared deep-seated stereotypes about their resettled compatriots, which boiled down to a higher opinion about Germans hailing from Bessarabia and a highly critical one about those resettled from Volhynia.[36]

In the meantime, Poznań offered the newcomers and their families a prosperous life, obviously in line with wartime conditions. Germans of various categories were assigned apartments that had been confiscated from the displaced Poles and registered in a special "quota of the governor's office."[37] Thus, the Germans took over the possessions of over 30,000 Polish residents of Poznań on an unprecedented scale. Both the inner-city villas, occupied by the highest-ranking officials headed by Greiser, and the apartments of various categories were fully furnished with furniture, tableware, works of art, and even children's toys, clothes, and bedding. Not infrequently those interested in obtaining housing themselves pointed to a particular apartment and demanded that the Polish owners or tenants still living there be removed. One such example was the stenographer Ruth Tolz, who made a direct request to the Reich Governor with the following wording: "I tried to find an apartment suitable for my conditions and I found one. It is an

34 H. Zimniak, *Wartheland*..., p. 161.

35 Cz. Madajczyk, *Faszyzm i okupacje 1938–1945*, Poznań 1984, vol. 1, p. 146.

36 C. Epstein, *Wzorcowy nazista*..., s. 174; W. Porzycki, *Posłuszni aż do śmierci*..., s. 87.

37 Archiwum Państwowe w Poznaniu, Reichstatthalter im Reichsgau Wartheland, sygn. 218, k. 102.

apartment at 14 Czesława Street, dwelling no. 17, consisting of two rooms with kitchen and other facilities. This apartment is currently occupied by the Polish family Chudy. Please empty this apartment of Poles and allocate it to the governor's quota (...). I would be grateful for a prompt resolution of this matter."[38]

Additional funds came from the looting of Polish and Jewish property. In the first days of the occupation, looting was carried out "from the bottom up" by local Germans, Wehrmacht soldiers, and SS functionaries. Starting from October 19, the plunder took an administrative form with the establishment of the Main Trust Office East (Haupttreuhandstelle Ost, HTO), followed by the founding of its Poznań branch (Treuhandstelle Posen) in December of the same year. The office dealt with the confiscation of not only the property of the Polish state but also that of its citizens, which was unprecedented in the civilized world. Among others, confiscations extended to all industrial enterprises, craft workshops, banks, goods wholesalers, stores, hotels, catering and tourist facilities administered by the so-called trustees (Treuhänder).[39] All Germans who arrived in Poznań, regardless of the time of their arrival, took full advantage of the seized goods. According to the data from the Poznań Trust Office, in mid-1940, the Baltendeutsche alone owned 167 industrial plants, 322 commercial buildings and 301 craft workshops in the city. They also took over 56 out of 67 drugstores, 30 out of 42 coffee shops, and 108 out of 118 pharmacies. The largest enterprises found new owners, too, such as the Hipolit Cegielski factory, which was sold to the Karlsruhe-based joint stock company Deutsche Waffen- und Munitionsfabriken (DWM), and the chemical factory "Stomil" taken over by the Hanover-based Continentalgumiwerke. Other companies acquired land or took over facilities for their companies such as Telefunken or Focke-Wulff.[40] The city also hosted branches and agencies of the major German construction companies such as Philip Holzmann A.G. Hoch- und Betonbau from Frankfurt am Main, Hochtief - Gesellschaft für Hoch- und Tiefbau from Essen and many others.

The standard of living of the German population in Poznań was expressed not only in the economic sphere but also in educational and cultural terms. In the 1943/1944 school year alone, there were 24 German primary and

38 Quoted in W. Porzycki, *Posłuszni aż do śmierci...*, p. 128.

39 B. Rudawski, *Grabież mienia w Kraju Warty 1939–1945. Działalność Urzędu Powierniczego w Poznaniu*, Poznań 2018, pp. 171–211.

40 Cz. Łuczak, *Pod niemieckim jarzmem. (Kraj Warty 1939–1945)*, Poznań 1996, p. 129.

22 secondary schools in the city, including a music school established with the cooperation of the Poznań authorities and the regional Hitlerjugend leadership. April 27, 1941 saw the official opening of the Reich University of Poznań (Reichsuniversität Posen), which taking over the infrastructure of the liquidated Polish University of Poznań. The Reichsuniversität was initiated by Greiser, who saw it as a National Socialist university that would help strengthen Germanness in the east and add prestige to his "Mustergau." A large part of the staff was comprised of scholars resettled from the Baltic countries, who had ties with the universities in Riga and Dorpat (Tartu). The first president of the university was Professor Peter Johannes Cartstens, who came from Holstein.[41]

One important element of cultural integration of the German population was the activity of the Reichsgautheater (Reich District Theatre), which took over the buildings of two theaters that had operated in Poznań: the Grand and Polish Theaters. Opera buffs were provided with a rich repertoire ranging from Mozart's *Cosi fan tutte* and *The Marriage of Figaro* to Wagner's *Tristan und Isolde* and *The Flying Dutchman*. In addition to music aficionados, the audience also included Germans who encountered the art of opera for the first time, and for whom it was a peculiar cultural advance.[42] All in all, a total of 491 performances were staged at the Reichsgautheater, including 26 operas by fourteen composers.[43] This picture must be completed with the musical activity, above all that of the "Orchestra of the Gauhaupstadt Posen," which was active from May 1940 onwards, which gave concerts to a total audience of 12,000 German listeners by the end of 1940 alone. As noted by H. Zimniak, "the activation of a very extensive musical life was the optimal instrument for the integration of German society... or, more precisely, three groups of displaced persons (mainly Baltic Germans, Reich Germans, and ethnic Germans)."[44] In turn, visual arts in the National Socialist style were promoted by the Society for Propagation of German Art in Wartheland (Gemeinschaft zur Förderung der Deutschen Kunst im Reichsgau Wartheland e.V.), which

41 B. Białkowski, *Uniwersytet Rzeszy w Poznaniu (1941–1945),* KMP 2009, no. 3, pp. 142–154.

42 Archiwum Muzeum Martyrologicznego w Żabikowie, Archiwum Historii Mówionej, Wspomnienia Józefy Ratajczak, file no. 35. As a teenage girl during the German occupation of Greater Poland, J. Ratajczak worked as a housemaid of the camp commander in Żabikowo, Hans Waler, who lived with his wife and two children in Poznań in today's Grunwaldzka Street. Ratajczak recalled that Walter's wife would always pack sandwiches when she went to the opera.

43 H. Zimniak, *Działalność muzyczna Reichsgautheater Posen (1939–1944)*, [in:] *Opera w Poznaniu: 75 lat Teatru Wielkiego im. Stanisława Moniuszki*, ed. K. Liszkowska, Poznań 1995, pp. 62–73.

44 Quoted in A. Ziegler *Posen 1939–1945*..., p. 77.

took advantage of the fact that a group of artists from the Reich and Baltic countries had settled in Poznań. In cooperation with the Office of Reich Propaganda of Wartheland (Reichspropagandaamt Wartheland), a series of exhibitions was organized under the common title "Maler in Wartheland" ("Painters in Wartheland"), during which artists from Wartheland and all over Germany presented their paintings. Between 1941 and 1942, a total of 120 artists presented their works under the society's aegis.[45]

All segments of the German population were to be united through parades, manifestations and festivals, which the Nazi propaganda organs strove to organize. Thus, from the beginning of the occupation, the center of Poznań became the scene of mass events, above all military parades, which were particularly intense at the turn of 1939/1940. The SS, SA, NSDAP, Hitlerjugend and Bund Deutscher Mädel troops marched in front of Greiser, who was often accompanied by the commander of the military district, General Petzel, and other district dignitaries. In addition to the Reich-wide holidays such as Seizure of Power Day on January 30 and Hitler's birthday on April 20, the most important holiday was Freedom Day on October 25, i.e. the anniversary of the founding of Wartheland. For the district authorities, its celebrations were an opportunity to present their political goals. During the 1943 festivities, Gauleiter Greiser, accompanied by Heinrich Himmler, gave a speech in which he supported the district's "uncompromising nationality policy."[46]

The last rally in the castle square took place on November 6, 1944, with Himmler, Chief of General Staff General Heinz Guderian and SS-Gruppenführer Heinz Reinefarth (who was responsible for crimes during the suppression of the Warsaw Uprising), in attendance at the celebrations of the Day of Freedom of Wartheland.

It was at least until the mid-1944 that the authorities of Wartheland were able to ensure a comfortable and safe life in Poznań for newcomers from the Old Reich and displaced persons. The city and the district were visited by dignitaries of the Third Reich, who were personally received by the Gauleiter: Himmler, Joseph Goebbels (Minister of Propaganda), Bernhard Rust (Minister of Science and Education), Alfred Rosenberg (Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories), and Wilhelm Frick (Minister

45 J. Mulczyński, *Na przeciwnych biegunach. Polskie i niemieckie życie artystyczne podczas okupacji hitlerowskiej w Poznaniu*, KMP 2009, no. 3, pp. 217–221.

46 "Ostdeutscher Beobachter" no. 295, 25.10.1943, pp. 1–2.

of the Interior). October 1943 marked the peak of Greiser's power and prestige. Reichsführer SS Heinrich Himmler, the Reich Commissioner for the strengthening of Germanness, made two speeches here that are considered to be his most important during World War II. In the first one, delivered on October 4 to senior SS commanders throughout the Reich, Himmler spoke openly about the Germans' attitude toward the Slavic peoples, their vision of a future state, and the mass killings of Jews. He said at the time: "I also want to speak to you here, in complete frankness, of a really grave chapter (...). I am referring here to the evacuation of the Jews, the extermination of the Jewish people. This is one of the things that is easily said: «The Jewish people are going to be exterminated» that's what every Party member says (...), «elimination of the Jews, extermination – it'll be done.»"[47] During the second meeting, held on October 6 and attended by gauleiters from across the Reich, Himmler reiterated the issues surrounding the extermination of the Jews.

German rule in Wartheland ended in January 1945. Facing the Red Army advance on Poznań, Greiser announced the evacuation of the German population of Posen on January 20 at 3 p.m. The operation was to conclude at 7 p.m. This meant that in just four hours between 60,000 and 70,000 people were to leave the city. The railway station descended into indescribable chaos. Others were leaving the city by all means of transportation available: on carts, bicycles, and even on foot. The roads in the western outskirts of the city became increasingly more crowded.[48] At 5.30 p.m., Greiser left Poznań for Frankfurt (Oder), where all the most important state offices had been moved. Joseph Goebbels, regarded the evacuation as "a disgrace to the party."[49] Captured by American troops, Greiser was handed over to Polish authorities and put on trial in Poznań. Found guilty of war crimes and sentenced to death by hanging, he was executed in front of thousands of people on the slopes of the Citadel in Poznań on July 21, 1946, in what became the last public execution in Poland.

47 *Poznańska mowa do gruppenführerów SS 4 października 1943 roku. Heinrich Himmler*, tłumaczenie i opracowanie P. Matusik, KMP 2009, no. 2, p. 273.

48 A. Ziegler, *Posen Januar 1945. Evakuierung und Flucht der Deutschen Zivilbevölkerung der Stadt Posen im Januar 1945*, Schönaich 1989, p. 56.

49 Cz. Łuczak, *Dzień po dniu*..., p. 479.

Adam Pleskaczyński

Poznań: the fortress that was to contain the Red Army

In January 1944, during a meeting with Hitler at the Wolf's Lair, General Heinz Guderian presented the Führer with a new philosophy of war on two fronts. This brilliant practitioner of maneuver warfare proposed grounding the defense of the Reich's eastern borders on old German and Russian strongholds, which were to be rebuilt and prepared for prolonged sieges.[1] According to the general, the concept of so-called 'wave-breakers' (*Wallenbrecher-Doktrin*), i.e. the creation of urban strongholds embedded in a system of rather poor defensive fortifications based on natural watercourses and earth fortifications, was supposed to counterbalance the numerical and equipment advantage of the Red Army. The main task of such fortified cities was to provide long-lasting defense and to tie up substantial forces of the enemy. Naturally, for this to happen it was essential to properly adapt the old fortifications and sturdy buildings inside agglomerations for defense purposes, provide sufficiently manned and adequately equipped defense crews, and ensure the presence of fanatically motivated defenders, ready to fight to the very end. The fate of Poznań was sealed on March 8, 1944, when Hitler issued Führer's Order No. 11 on the organization of the so-called fortified areas (*Feste Plaetze*). It was then that decisions were taken to fortify Königsberg, Gdańsk, Wrocław and Poznań, and prepare them for prolonged defense.

Poznań played a special role in these plans. It was located on the natural course of attack towards Berlin, 300 km west from the Vistula line, which the Soviets reached in early August 1944, and almost the same distance eastward from the capital of the Third Reich. It was also a very important transport junction, where many rail- and motorways converged, with several military airfields located in the immediate vicinity. In 1939, Poznań became

1 G. Guderian, *Vospominanija soldata, Rusicz*, Smolensk 1999, p. 266.

the capital of Reichsgau Wartheland, which was formed from a part of Polish territory incorporated directly into Germany. It would seem, therefore, that this most evident and probable area of confrontation with the Soviet forces would be prepared for defense by the Germans in a textbook manner. However, this was not to be the case. As the German command was not convinced of the need to reinforce this particular section of the frontline, the fall of 1944 brought a reckless reduction of the already sparse German forces in Wartheland in favor of strengthening the Army Group 'Upper Rhine' created by Reichsführer SS Heinrich Himmler, among others. This approach reflected a change in the general strategic concept of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (OKH) (and Adolf Hitler himself), who after September 1944 believed that the Poznań-Berlin direction would not be the target of the Soviet offensive. The priority during this period was to defend the Western Front threatened by the American and British forces. After the Soviets stopped on the Vistula line, the Germans predicted that the Red Army would be able to launch another attack around March 1945. According to the Germans, the attack was to be carried out in two strategic directions: to the northwest (in the direction of East Prussia and Danzig) and (primarily) to the southwest, into Lesser Poland and Silesia.

As a result of these decisions, Wartheland saw only three meridional lines of field fortifications erected, known as the *OKH-Stellungen* (OKH positions). The easternmost among them was fortification line B (consisting of two lines, B1 and B2, separated by a stretch of 25–35 km), with line C running through the middle of Greater Poland, an integral part of which was the Poznań Fortress (*Festung Posen*), which was to play the role of a 'wave breaker.' In addition, not far behind the prewar Polish-German border was another line of defense protecting the entrance to the territory of the 'Old Reich,' i.e. the Międzyrzecz Fortified Region (*Festungsfront im Oder-Warthe Bogen*).[2] While this lattermost defensive belt was fairly modern (it was constructed between 1934 and 1944), the first two perimeters appeared solid only on paper. They were based on a line of trenches, rivers and lakes, and a few bunkers. Even more scarce were the human resources available to the Nazis. There was not a single line division in Wartheland, and the only real reinforcements provided before the Soviets launched their winter offensive were two meager Wehrmacht battalions deployed by the High Command of the Army Reserves.

2 T. Rawski, *Niemieckie umocnienia na ziemiach polskich w latach 1919–1945*, [in:] "Studia i Materiały do Historii Wojskowości", vol. IX, pt. I, 1966, pp. 295–296.

The commander-in-chief of the 21st Military District—whose territory included Wartheland—was forced to rely only on his very modest local forces. In addition to the garrison of Poznań, which stood at around 10,000 strong, he had 12,000 additional soldiers at his disposal, whom he could direct to the defensive perimeters established within the district. These units were formed on the basis of the 192nd Reserve Division that was being reconstituted at the time, as well as soldiers from several military schools and school subdivisions. Given the circumstances, Petzel and his immediate political superior, Arthur Greiser, had to resort to the Volkssturm. In Wartheland, the action of organizing units of this formation started as late as January 14, 1945. It was the responsibility of NSDAP district chiefs, who were obliged to recruit at least one battalion (about 450–500 men each) from their respective districts. In the end, over 40 battalions were mobilized. Thus, although the total number of men mobilized was impressive, their combat value was next to none or marginal at best. Their equipment consisted of captured Soviet weapons, and sometimes also fuseless grenades and practice panzerfausts. The majority of Volkssturm soldiers were not trained to use more complicated equipment (mortars, machine guns) and did not demonstrate much will to fight.[3]

It was on the basis of such forces that General Petzel began to organize the defense of his district. Relying on a handful of regular army units and larger (albeit not battle-ready) conscripted battalions, Petzel deployed them along a 200-kilometer-long defensive perimeter of line B1. He ordered to position the military units in towns projected as the main points of resistance (mainly in the area of Działoszyn, Sieradz and Koło), and had the Volkssturm battalions fill in the gaps between them. Moreover, Petzel strengthened the section of the defensive perimeter in the area of Koło and Kłodawa that was most exposed to the Soviet attack, sending nearly 2,000 soldiers there who were recruited mainly from the school units in Bolechowo, Poznań and Kościan, accompanied by a strong battalion of armored grenadiers from Biedrusko. Moreover, he deployed a motorized company from Inowrocław and a class of students from the officer school in Gniezno to a vulnerable section of the perimeter in the vicinity of Sieradz. Eventually, on the eve of the Soviet attack, defensive lines B1 and B2 were manned by 11,000 soldiers from reserve

3 BA Abt. MA, Den Bericht des general Petzel über die militärischen Vorbereitungen, file no. RH-53–21/19, Petzel Walter, *Militärische Vorbereitung für des Warthegaues*, 15.06.1949, k. 4.

units of the 21st Military District, backed by about 3,500 Volkssturmists. In command of these forces was Lieutenant General Otto Matterstock.

The second defensive perimeter in Wartheland—defensive line C—spanned several hundred kilometers and included three fortress cities: Piła, Poznań, and Głogów. It was fortified with shooting trenches, defensive positions, and anti-tank ditches along its entire length. Moreover, three points of resistance were prepared along this perimeter across Wartheland (Oborniki, Kościan, and Leszno).[4] The German command assumed that at least eight divisions of regular troops were needed to effectively defend such an extensive perimeter, which was propped by a natural water barrier only along a short section of the Warta River (from Oborniki to Mosina). However, in this case, too, the German forces were very modest—even more meager than in the case of line B1—and amounted to as few as 2,500 regular soldiers. They represented various units, starting from well-trained and motivated Junkers from the SS school in Owińska and a battalion of armored grenadiers, to Azerbaijani collaborators, German policemen, a group of about three hundred soldiers assembled from various defeated Wehrmacht units, and over 1,000 Volkssturm soldiers of marginal value. The total force was therefore equivalent to an undermanned division with very few experienced and properly trained soldiers. They were distributed unevenly. The strongest garrison along line C, located in Leszno, stood at about 1,400 armed Germans. The Kościan garrison was 660 strong, and the one in Oborniki was manned by about 900 soldiers. The entire defense of line C was commanded by the legendary Lieutenant General Theodor Scherer.

In this situation, the most numerous and strongest German grouping in the whole Wartheland was the garrison of the Poznań Fortress (*Festung Posen*), led by Major General Ernst Mattern. The military value of the fortress itself certainly fell far short of the German command's expectations. The outer defensive line was not completed in time, let alone adequately manned, with field-type fortifications prevailing. Nevertheless, the Germans based the defense of Poznań on a system of forts and shelters that had been created in the previous century and that surrounded the city (which the Soviets, due to poor reconnaissance, had no idea about), as well as on the fortifications inside the city, with the main fort—the Citadel—at the forefront. Moreover, they adapted entire city quarters for effective defense, converting many

4 BA Abt. MA, Befehle, Meldungen und ähnliches auch Anlagen, sygn. RH-53-21/15, *Besetzung der C-Linie (auser Posen) bis zum 23.1.45*, k. 48–49.

solid public buildings and big-city tenements for this purpose. According to different sources, the crew of the Poznań Fortress consisted of anything between several thousand to as many as 28,000 defenders.[5] The German garrison, initially standing at as few as 10,000 men, was reinforced by soldiers from units sent from Berlin and other parts of the Reich, as well as servicemen who, as a result of various circumstances, were in the city when the alarm was sounded. Also among them were soldiers from the units that had been broken up in the east and retreating to the west under the impact of the Soviet attack.

Almost simultaneously, with the Germans no longer considering the Poznań-Berlin axis as the most probable target of the Soviet attack, Stawka (Headquarters of the Supreme Command of the Red Army) began preparations for a large-scale offensive, which would go down in history as the Vistula-Oder Offensive. The main attack was to be launched in January 1945, using the already captured bridgeheads on the right bank of the Vistula. Marshal Georgy Zhukov's 1st Belorussian Front was to strike in the direction of Warsaw and Poznań (as part of the Warsaw-Poznań Operation), while Marshal Ivan Konev's 1st Ukrainian Front was to strike in the direction of Wrocław and the Oder line (as part of the Sandomierz-Silesia Operation). The troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front commanded by Marshal Konstantin Rokossovsky were to attack East Prussia and, upon cutting off the German troops there from the rest of the Reich, continue through Pomerania towards Szczecin and the mouth of the Oder.[6] It was expected that the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front would enter the territory of Wartheland as early as on the eleventh or twelfth day of the offensive, reaching the Sanniki-Żychlin-Łódź line, and then pushing for Poznań.[7] Interestingly, German intelligence was unable to correctly estimate the Soviet forces concentrated on the right bank of the Vistula for several crucial months. The imbalance was striking. The Soviets had amassed an unprecedented military power. The 1st Belorussian Front of Marshal Zhukov, which was to attack in the direction of Poznań, consisted of sixty-eight divisions making up eight general armies, and two armored armies with a total of almost 800,000 officers and soldiers. Including the rear

5 A. Pleskaczyński, *Armia Czerwona w walkach o Poznań w styczniu i lutym 1945 roku. Analiza bezpowrotnych strat osobowych*, Warszawa-Poznań 2016, p. 56.

6 *Russkij archiw: Wielikaja Otieczestwiennaja: Stawka WGK. Dokumienty i matieriały*, vol. 16 (5–4), Moskwa 1999, pp. 20–21.

7 *Diriektiwa Stawki WGK № 220275 komandujuszczemu wojskami 1-go Biełorusskogo Fronta na razgrom Warszawsko-Radomskoj gruppirowki protiwnika, 28 nojabria 1944 g.*, [in:] Ibid., pp. 177–178.

units, this amounted to over 1,100,000 Red Army men. Artillery support was provided to the infantry by 6,526 cannons of 76 mm caliber and larger, and 2,374 anti-tank guns and cannons. Moreover, the frontline units had a total of 7.180 82 and 120 mm mortars, 1,117 anti-aircraft guns, and 1,114 rocket artillery launchers at their disposal. The armored and mechanized units were equipped with 1,975 medium and heavy tanks and 1,245 self-propelled guns of all calibers. The infantry attack was supported from the air by 2,190 aircrafts of various types.[8] The Soviets took advantage of the six-month strategic pause in Poland to mobilize thousands of new recruits (mainly from western Belarus and Ukraine), stockpile ammunition, fuel and spare parts, and organize hundreds of mobile and stationary military hospitals and medical evacuation points.

Finally, on January 14, 1945, the troops of the 1st Belarussian Front launched an attack on the German positions. The Soviets managed to break through the German front line on the Vistula so effectively that the German 9th Army, which according to operational plans was supposed to retreat to the defensive lines and hold back the ensuing enemy attack, was almost wiped out during the first four days of the offensive, with its command losing any control over the remains of their own troops, who retreated west in order to reach the Oder line within the shortest possible time. The outposts of the 21st Military District in Wartheland began to intercept the first retreating soldiers only once both perimeters of line B had already were breached by the Red Army, and used them to reinforce the crews stationed along line C and in the Poznań Fortress. However, the soldiers from the defeated units preferred to retreat to the Oder—which was considered to be the most difficult natural barrier for the enemy—thus avoiding Poznań whenever possible. For the majority, the defense of the besieged city presented itself as a hopeless task, whose best outcome was to be taken prisoner by the Soviets and deported to the east.[9]

Meanwhile, the Red Army offensive in Wartheland was developing favorably for the Soviet command. The Soviets were taking town after town without any major losses; they captured Łódź without any problems and

8 I. Moszczanskij, I. Chochłow, *Wpieredi Giermanija! Wisło-Odierskaja stratiegiczieskaja nastupatielnaja opieracija 12 janwaria – 3 fiewrala 1945 goda. 1-j Biełorusskij Front*, OOO 'BTW-MN', Moskwa 2005, Chart 1, p. 12.

9 Z. Szumowski, *Działania wojenne Armii Radzieckiej na obszarze Poznańskiego w 1945 r.*, Sesja Popularno-Naukowa Poświęcona XX Rocznicy Wyzwolenia Poznania i Wielkopolski w 1945 roku, Związek Bojowników o Wolność i Demokrację. Zarząd Okręgu w Poznaniu, Poznań 1965, pp. 27–28.

continued their push westward at an impressive pace. The Soviet steamroller was moving at between 30–60 km per day. All German attempts at organized resistance were eliminated in no more than 48 hours. On the evening of January 20, separate forces from General Nikolai Berzarin's 5th Shock Army and General Mikhail Katukov's 1st Guards Tank Army struck Koło, which was the strongest point of German resistance along defense line B. Several hours of fierce fighting ended in a decisive Soviet victory and paved the way to Poznań. On the same day, the Soviets broke through defense line B in several other sections and within hours reached defense line C and Poznań itself. Surprised by such a favorable turn of events, Stavka opted to extend the range of the offensive by another 200 kilometers, with the task of capturing the left-bank bridgeheads on the Oder, which would ensure a better starting position for the offensive on Berlin.

When on January 22 both corps of the 1st Guards Tank Army reached Poznań, the vanguard units engaged in a trademark battle reconnaissance of the enemy forces.[10] However, it turned out that the German garrison put up fierce resistance. In the following hours the Soviet made similar moves across several different locations on the eastern outskirts of Poznań, but they came up short in every case. And yet, these were not suicidal attacks (although some interpreted them as such), but rather targeted attempts provoking the Germans to show their strength and determination. Katukov quickly realized that attempts to capture the heavily fortified city with armored units would end in their decimation, so he almost immediately began flanking the fortress and blocking its garrison until the arrival of infantry units primed to fight in the city.

Meanwhile, the Soviet plans were exposed to unforeseen changes. Originally, Poznań was to be stormed by General Vladimir Kolpakchi's 69th Army. To the north of Kolpakchi's forces was the elite 8th Guards Army of General Vasiliy Chuikov, which was to bypass the city, cross the Warta, and head toward the border with the Old Reich, eventually seizing the bridgeheads on the right bank of the Oder. Chuikov, famed as the invincible defender of Stalingrad, was one of the most talented and well-known Soviet senior commanders. Ambitious and rather brutal in his demeanor, he had little regard for the lives of his subordinates, although he was probably no different from

10 This account of the siege of Poznań is based on studies by S. Okęcki, *Wyzwolenie Poznania 1945. Studium wojskowo-historyczne*, Warszawa 1975; Z. Szumowski, *Boje o Poznań 1945*, wyd. II poprawione i uzupełnione, Poznań 1985; and A. Pleskaczyński, op. cit.

most other Soviet generals in this respect. Chuikov's intention was to reach the Oder as soon as possible and perhaps even continue the attack towards Berlin: such was his phantasmagoria at the time. The general's ambitious plans were thwarted by the slow pace of the advance of his left wing neighbor, the 69th Army. With the vanguard of Chuikov's army approaching Poznań and the 69th Army falling far behind, the order came from the High Command for the 8th Guards Army to capture the city within two days! Not knowing how tough an opponent he would have to face, Chuikov assigned one of the three rifle corps at his disposal to the assault. This was the 29th Guards Rifle Corps (made up of the 27th, 74th, and 82nd Guards Rifle Divisions) commanded by General Afanasii Shemenkov.

On January 24, separated regiments from the Shemenkov Corps attacked the right bank of Poznań at several points simultaneously. The main assault was carried out parallel to Warszawska Street by two infantry regiments from the 82nd Guards Rifle Division. Launched using such modest forces, deprived of an in-depth reconnaissance and proper artillery support, such an attack was doomed to fail. The following day, Shemenkov renewed the attack, this time with the reinforcement of an additional regiment from the 74th Guards Rifle Division. Despite artillery support and the use of self-propelled guns and IS-2 heavy tanks, the 24-hour attack did not produce the desired effect. The Germans successfully blocked the Soviets and held their ground. Meanwhile, the forces of the 29th Guards Rifle Corps were flanking Poznań from the south (27th Guards Rifle Division and part of 74th Guards Rifle Division) and north (39th Guards Rifle Division, i.e. another division of the 8th Guards Army subordinated to Shemenkov). Eventually, the above troops were joined by the delayed divisions of the 69th Army, two of which (117th and 312th Rifle Division) were also subordinated to the commander of the 29th Guards Rifle Corps.

After unsuccessful attempts to break through the German positions in the east of Poznań, Shemenkov regrouped his forces to form a main battle group that would attack the city from the south. The 74th Guards Rifle Division was to advance towards the districts of Dębiec and Wilda, the 27th Guards Rifle Division towards Górczyn and Łazarz, while the 312th Guards Rifle Division would strike from the left flank towards Grunwald. The infantry operations were supported by the artillery units of the 29th Breakthrough Artillery Division and the armored units of the 8th Guards Army. On January 26, heavy fighting began in which the Red Army had to contend with a circular defensive perimeter leaning on old 19th-century Prussian forts. After

breaking through the German defenses at two points, the Soviet divisions engaged in fierce battles to capture the southern and western districts of Poznań and reach the city center.

For two days (January 27–28), the 74th Guards Rifle Division was engaged in heavy fights over Wilda and Łęgi Dębińskie. While the left-wing rifle regiments managed to reach the southern section of the downtown ring road (in the vicinity of the Gestapo building in today's Niezłomnych Street and near the former Królowej Jadwigi Embankment) as early as the night of January 28, the right-wing regiment was stuck in Dębina, exposing the right flank of its left wing regiments for a stretch of 2.5 km. The front was not leveled until January 30. In the meantime, the 27th Guards Rifle Division pushed the Germans out of a sizeable chunk of Poznań, including the areas of Górczyn and Łazarz, and fought their way into Grunwald and Jeżyce.

Having reached the very center of the city, the Soviets faced another daunting challenge, which involved breaking through the perimeter of the enemy's inner city defense line, buttressed by the solid buildings stretching along today's Królowej Jadwigi Street and Niepodległości Avenue. The German resistance consolidated here to the extent that General Chuikov, commander of the 8th Guards Army, who by that time had reached the Oder in the vicinity his two other corps, fighting for the bridgeheads on the left bank of the river, became personally involved in the battle for Poznań. Chuikov adopted the following solution: he decided to use four divisions of the 29th Guards Rifle Corps to capture the western part of Poznań up to the Warta, while two weaker divisions of the 91st Rifle Corps were to shut off the right bank of the river. Also brought in to Poznań was the elite 2nd Assault Engineering Brigade, which included hand-held flamethrower units and an independent tank flamethrower regiment. The Soviet withdrew their heavy IS-2 tanks operating in the city center, which became an easy target for Germans armed with panzerfausts in the tight urban development.

German resistance along the inner city defense line was finally broken by the Soviets on February 2, when the soldiers of the assault units of the 74th Guards Rifle Division managed to capture the Imperial Castle on Święty Marcin Street, as well as the ruined Gestapo headquarters, buildings on Królowej Jadwigi Embankment, and the convergence of Strzelecka and Garbary Streets. In the meantime, the 27th Guards Rifle Division captured all of Jeżyce. On February 3, the strenuous fights for the inner city began, which went on for two weeks. Although the city center was virtually taken by February 7, clearing the northern part of the city center (i.e. the area directly adjacent to the

Citadel) of the enemy forces continued for over a week. At that time, the two Soviet divisions operating on the right bank of the river showed relatively little combat activity. Moreover, they did not have much artillery support and were devoid of tank presence. Their role was thus limited to tying up the German forces in this part of the city. The situation changed on February 15, which saw the decisive strike of the 117th Rifle Division on the German positions in right-bank Poznań. Over the next two days, the Soviets managed to reach the line along the railroad tracks to Gniezno and Wągrowiec, pushing the Germans to the area of Zawady, Główna, and Nadolnik.

By mid-February 1945, the Citadel remained the last point of German resistance in Poznań. It was here that the few thousand survivors of the Poznań Fortress took refuge. The hopeless defense was to continue, even though the Red Army was already standing on the left bank of the Oder River, just two hundred and twenty kilometers away from Berlin. All attempts to induce the Germans to surrender failed.

After three weeks of fighting for Poznań, the Soviet forces were severely depleted. By the beginning of the assault on the Citadel, the Soviets had lost about 5,500 soldiers, along with around 15,000–20,000 wounded. At the beginning of February, the 39th Guards Rifle Division was withdrawn from Poznań and sent to the Oder together with some artillery and armored units. While preparing for the final push on the Citadel, the Soviet command, for the first and only time in the history of this war, turned to the local population for help. The Soviets recruited several hundred Polish civilians who took part in the attack against the fortifications, evacuated the wounded, delivered ammunition, and fought alongside the Red Army soldiers.

On February 18, just before the assault on the Citadel began, the Soviets conducted a concentrated heavy artillery barrage on the outskirts of the fortification complex and bombarded the area from the air. However, the Germans avoided major losses and retained their defensive potential. As it seems, the Soviets were surprised by this turn of events and did not take more vigorous action on the first day of the assault. On top of that, the following day the German troops launched a surprise counter-attack, although the Soviets eventually managed to regain the lost ground. Heavy fighting began on February 20. The Red Army managed to break into the fortress courtyard for a short while. Since then, a ruthless battle ensued, fought with different intensity in the southern part of the fortification complex. The breakthrough came with the construction of the first two makeshift bridges over the moat, which were used by the assault troops. In the end, the Soviets

succeeded in capturing the entire area by about 6 a.m. on February 23. This was the final chapter in the month-long battle for Poznań, which claimed the lives of some 6,000 Red Army soldiers, 3,000 German soldiers, and several hundred Poles.

The relentless defense of Poznań was not what the German war planners had hoped for. While it is true that it did tie up a considerable chunk of the Soviet forces for a longer period of time, it nonetheless failed to significantly affect the course of the entire January offensive. The Soviets managed to enter the territory of the 'old Reich', break through the Międzyrzecz Fortified Region, reach the Oder line and even capture the left bank bridgeheads. In January 1945, the Germans had no chance of stopping the advance of the 1st Belorussian Front in Wartheland. On the other hand, the siege of Poznań proved highly instructive for the Soviet sid, as it was a harbinger—*toutes proportions gardées*, of course—of what they would face during the battle for Berlin. Hence, a great many reports and analyses were drawn up at various tiers of command in the Red Army units. They were written during the fight for the city and afterwards, before the final Berlin Operation. It was on the basis of the Poznań combat experience that new rules for urban warfare were developed, especially with regard to the formation of assault troops, the use of tanks and armored guns in street fighting, and the ways of countering panzerfaust shelling. Chuikov was already no longer a mere 'academic' of urban defensive fighting, but also offensive urban warfare. However, the greatest price was paid by the city itself. A single decision taken by Hitler doomed it to destruction.


Winiary
Sołacz
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Boisko Admira
Boisko A.Z.S.
Boisko O.W.K.S.
Boisko Legia
DW. GŁÓWNY
Ogródki działk.
Park Wystaw. Poznańskie Targi
Stary Rynek
Rynek Łazarski
GRUNWALDZKA
KAROLA ŚWIERCZEWSKIEGO
JAROSŁAWA DĄBROWSKIEGO
MARCHLEWSKIEGO
Winogrady

Piotr Grzelczak

"The fire of the Polish Uprising": Jerzy Giedroyc, Albert Camus and the 1956 Poznań June

"Weary of dictatorship, hunger and forced labor. Facing Russian tanks with bare hands. The workers of Poznań demanded freedom. They paid for it with hundreds of dead and wounded, thousands arrested. The people of Paris will answer their call. They will express their solidarity [with Poznań]." Large, orange-tinted placards with the above words were posted on Parisian poster pillars in the first days of July 1956, announcing a gathering called by the French Socialist Party SFIO (Section Française de l'Internationale Ouvrière / French Section of the Workers' International) of the Seine department as a gesture of solidarity with the workers of Poznań who on June 28, 1956 refused obedience to the Communist dictatorship. The authors of the Polish-language placard (which lacked Polish diacritical marks) invited Parisians to the representative Salle Wagram, where the secretary general of France's co-ruling SFIO Pierre Commin, former SFIO minister of economy, finance and industry André Philip, well-known columnist and anti-communist activist David Rousset, anarcho-syndicalist Nicolas Lazarevitch, and representatives of Polish émigré community in France: Zygmunt Zaremba, representing the Polish Socialist Party in exile, and Edmund Stocki, miner and also a trade unionist from Nord-Pas-de-Calais, were to speak. Shining brightest on the brick-red poster, however, was the name of Albert Camus, one of Europe's foremost intellectuals of the 20th century, whose presence, as it were, was to guarantee appropriate attendance at the meeting itself, while also effectively focusing and sustaining the attention of the French and, by extension, Western European public opinion, around the rebellious Poznań and its blood sacrifice.

The Paris rally was part of a sequence of dozens of twin gatherings held throughout the free world in late June and early July 1956, triggered by the

news coming out of Poznań: from Paris and London to Melbourne and Santiago de Chile, Chicago and New York City. On the one hand, it was an expression of tribute to Poznanians dying in the streets of their city, and on the other, a protest against the measures adopted by the communist authorities of the People's Republic of Poland, who brutally suppressed the revolt of the Poznań workers. The latter went down in history as the Poznań June and was another mass revolt in Central and Eastern Europe (after the 1953 East German uprising in Berlin) against a political system of Soviet provenance, imposed by force and disapproved by the public. The reasons for the uprising included deteriorating working conditions, blatant exploitation of workers coupled with deceitful propaganda, as well as the failure of any negotiations with the authorities. In this situation, in the early morning of June 28, 1956, a strike was proclaimed at Poznań's largest enterprise, the J. Stalin Metal Industry Plant (ZISPO for short; before 1949 and after 1956, the factory was known the Hipolit Cegielski Plant); however, shortly thereafter at least 100,000 workers took to the streets and headed for the seat of the Voivodeship Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR) in the heart of Poznań, formulating openly anti-system demands, perfectly encapsulated on the banners carried by the demonstrators that read "Bread and Freedom!" In view of the lack of response from the authorities, the workers seized the headquarters of the city administration, located in the Imperial Castle, as well as the offices of the Provincial Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party, the Provincial Headquarters of the Citizens' Militia and the Central Prison in Młyńska Street. Around noon, with the demonstrators attempting to enter the building of the secret political police (the Voivodeship Office for Public Security in Kochanowskiego Street), an exchange of gunfire ensued that quickly turned the demonstration into a workers' uprising. The authorities in Warsaw had already determined that no talks of any sort would be held with the striking workers of Poznań. At an extraordinary meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Polish United

Parisian poster announcing the rally in solidarity between Parisians and participants of the 1956 Poznań June, July 1956, from the collection of the University Library in Poznań

ZMECZENI DYKTATURA

GLODEM I PRZYMUSEM PRACY
Z GOLYMI REKAMI PRZECIW ROSYJSKIM CZOLGOM

ROBOTNICY POZNANIA

ZAZADALI WOLNOSCI
ZAPLACILI ZA TO SETKAMI ZABITYCH I RANNYCH
TYSIACAMI ARESZTOWANYCH

LUD PARYZA

ODPOWIE NA ICH ZEW
DA WYRAZ SWOJEJ Z NIMI SOLIDARNOSCI

SALLE WAGRAM

39, Avenue de Wagram (Métro Etoile ou Ternes)

W CZWARTEK 12 LIPCA 1956

O GODZ. 21

ZABIORA GLOS :

ALBERT CAMUS
DAVID ROUSSET
N. LAZAREVITCH
EDMUND STOCKI
ANDRÉ PHILIP
Z. ZAREMBA
PIERRE COMMIN

Sekretarz Generalny Francuskiej Partii Socjalistycznej S. F. I. O.

La Fédération de la Seine du Parti Socialiste S. F. I. O.

Workers' Party (PZPR), it was decided that "KBW [Internal Security Corps] and army troops should be pulled up in Poznań," which implied party acquiescence to the military pacification of the revolted city. Thus, tanks rolled into Poznań, and the suppression of the protests after hours of street clashes took a tragic toll of at least 58 casualties, some 600 reported wounded, and between 800 and 1,100 detained and arrested. At the same time, the communist authorities launched a brutal propaganda campaign in the tightly controlled press and radio, blaming the dramatic course of the June 28, 1956 events in Poznań on "counter-revolutionary elements" or "enemy agents" who had schemed to take advantage of the discontent prevailing among the working class, which was itself completely unaware of these "provocations." This completely hypocritical narrative was a direct extension of the ruling ideology, under which any revolt by workers against the "working class" government representing their interests was simply unthinkable.[1]

The "free world" very quickly learned about what transpired in Poznań, not only through its secret services[2] but above all thanks to the numerous foreign guests and press correspondents who were present in the capital of Greater Poland at the time to attend the Poznań International Fair. Poznań, which immediately became a symbol of rebellion against communism, came to the attention of the world, especially the Polish émigrés west of the Iron Curtain, including their main political centers in London and Paris.[3] The internally divided London community, which was a direct successor to the Polish authorities in exile and the related political circles from the time of World War II, made appeals to the English and American political elites, however the effects of their overtures were underwhelming. A different path was

1 The literature on the Poznań June is quite copious. Some of the most prominent items on the subject include *Poznański Czerwiec 1956*, eds. J. Maciejewski, Z. Trojanowiczowa, Poznań 1990 (2nd revised and extended edition); E. Makowski, *Poznański Czerwiec 1956. Pierwszy bunt społeczeństwa w PRL*, Poznań 2006; P. Grzelczak, *Poznański Czerwiec 1956. Walka o pamięć w latach 1956–1989*, Poznań 2016. For publications in English, see among others *1956. European and Global Perspectives*, eds. C. Fink, F. Hadler, T. Schramm, Leipzig 2006; P. Machcewicz, *Rebellious Satellite. Poland 1956*, Stanford University Press 2009; S. Jankowiak, R. Kościański, R. Reczek, *28 June 1956 in Poznań. One of the first months of Polish freedom*, Poznań–Warszawa 2021.

2 See among others P. Grzelczak, *Poznan protests of June 1956 in the documents of the CIA*, https://przystanekhistoria.pl/pa2/tematy/english-content/68355,Poznan-protests-of-June-1956-in-the-documents-of-the-CIA.html [accessed June 12, 2022].

3 See P. Machcewicz, *Emigracja w polityce międzynarodowej*, Warszawa 1999, pp. 141–154. P. Ziętara, *Emigracja wobec Października. Postawy polskich środowisk emigracyjnych wobec liberalizacji w PRL w latach 1955–1957*, Warszawa 2001, pp. 99–140; R. Habielski, *Możliwości i oczekiwania. Emigracja wobec wypadków poznańskich*, [in:] *Poznański Czerwiec 1956. Uwarunkowania – przebieg – konsekwencje. Materiały z międzynarodowej konferencji naukowej*, Poznań 22–23 czerwca 2006, eds. K. Białecki, S. Jankowiak, Poznań 2007, pp. 81–96.

taken by the Parisian milieu, centered around the Literary Institute, established in 1946, and its own "Kultura" monthly, which quickly joined the ranks of the most influential cultural phenomena in Polish cultural and political thought of the 20th century. The editor-in-chief of "Kultura," publisher, columnist and politician Jerzy Giedroyc (1906–2000), who was also at the helm of the Literary Institute, believed that given the historic importance of the Poznań events for Poland and Central and Eastern Europe it was necessary to act not only through politicians but also through renowned personalities, including intellectuals, scholars, artists and writers whose voices would resonate strongly in the public space. A figure as prominent as Albert Camus more than met this criterion. It was in such circumstances that the idea of a "Poznań" rally with Camus in attendance was born; its initiators—contrary to the information on the brick-red poster cited above—should not be sought in the ranks of the French Socialist Party, but in Maisons-Laffitte near Paris, where the editorial office of "Kultura" was located.

Incidentally, Jerzy Giedroyc operated in two ways in early July 1956. His first Poznań initiative was the drafting of a special open letter signed by leading Western intellectuals.[4] Thanks in part to the extensive relationships of Józef Czapski—eminent painter, writer and contributor to "Kultura"—the group of signatories included artists of such stature as Albert Camus, Karl Jaspers, Jeanne Hersch, Arthur Koestler, François Mauriac, Jean Rounault, André Philip, Ignazio Silone, Stephen Spender, Manes Sperber and Alexander Weissberg-Cybulski.[5] The signatories of the letter, which appeared in "Franc Tireur" on July 4, 1956, and on the following day in "Le Monde," expressed their solidarity with the "victims of bloody suppression" in Poznań, demanded an end to violence, called for a public trial of those arrested, which they said should take place in the presence of independent observers enjoying the confidence of the free world, protested against the "portrayal of working-class

4 On July 1, 1956, J. Giedroyc wrote the following: "In the meantime, I am crafting a declaration of leftist intellectuals (Koestler, Silone), trying to spur the trade unions to hold a fundraiser in the working world in support of the victims, something along the lines of raising money for the English miners in the days of the Great Strike." J. Giedroyc, J. Stempowski, *Listy 1946–1969*, part one, selection, introduction and footnotes by A.S. Kowalczyk, Warszawa 1998, p. 380.

5 The editors of "Kultura" did not manage to reach all potential signatories of the appeal; one may also assume that some intellectuals may have refused to endorse its content. In a letter to an anonymous addressee dated July 2, 1956, J. Giedroyc writes that requests to support the declaration were also extended to André Malraux, Graham Greene and Pierre Monatte, among others. See *Redaktor organizuje petycję po wydarzeniach w Poznaniu*, https://kulturaparyska.com/fr/collection/letters/show/57804 [accessed June 12, 2022].

demonstrators as foreign agents," appealed for international proceedings to determine the "immediate needs of the Polish workers" and provide them with humanitarian aid as quickly as possible, and finally invited all democratic international organizations to do their utmost for Poznań.[6] The campaign was fairly successful and generated much broader media and information publicity than the rather sluggish actions taken by Western politicians with respect to Poznań. Jerzy Giedroyc was fully aware of this fact. In a letter dated July 5, 1956, addressed to Juliusz Mieroszewski, who resided in London and worked closely with "Kultura," Giedroyc wrote bluntly: "The declaration of the intellectuals backfired, and very impressively. Camus with Koestler, and Mauriac, and Jaspers were impressive, because they were a real tour de force. Did the English press post it? Over here, it has worked brilliantly and created a great commotion."[7] We should add that Albert Camus received the draft of the *Poznan* appeal, along with a letter addressed to his name and signed by Jozef Czapski, on July 2, 1956. Interestingly, just below the document he handwrote his comments and observations, putting them down in a miniscule and somewhat undecipherable way.[8]

Meanwhile, let us return to the "Poznań" demonstration at the Salle Wagram, mentioned in the opening paragraph. Admittedly, Jerzy Giedroyc, its main originator and informal co-organizer, must have worked exceptionally quick if he was able to write to J. Mieroszewski on July 1, 1956, using the following words: "In fact, I have already received a pledge of a protest rally from the French trade unions." As a result, as we know, the assembly was sponsored by the French socialists, which does not change the fact that the decision to organize it must have been taken by top officials at the cabinet of at the French Prime Minister Guy Mollet, and the event itself was to be held at a different venue. Indeed, four days later, the editor-in-chief of "Kultura" wrote: "I have already snatched the permission of Guy Mollet and the French Socialists for a large protest rally concerning Poznań, which will take place at the Mutualite, likely next week."[9] The initial venue was eventually abandoned, as the organizers opted for the more capacious Salle Wagram, booking it for the night of July 12, 1956. Giedroyc did not hide his

6 *Un groupe d'intellectuels européens demande un procès public pour les inculpés de Poznan*, "Le Monde", July 5, 1956.

7 J. Giedroyc, J. Mieroszewski, *Listy 1949–1956*, part two, selection, introduction and footnotes by K. Pomian, Warszawa 1999, pp. 321–322.

8 See C. Camus, *Le Monde en partage. Itinéraires d'Albert Camus*, Paris 2013.

9 J. Giedroyc, J. Mieroszewski, *Listy...*, pp. 314, 322.

excitement, at the same time indicating those whom he considered to be the most important guests of the announced rally: "The gathering on Thursday promises to be excellent. Camus will speak, as will the secretary general of the SFIO."[10] Elsewhere, he summarized the two Poznań initiatives of "Kultura" as follows: "We have arranged a proclamation of intellectuals, which has made a certain impression here, and of which I am rather proud; we have managed to persuade the French socialists to hold a large rally, which will take place on Thursday, featuring a speech by Camus, as well as the sec[retary] gen[eral] of the Soc[ialist] Party, which is all the more significant with a socialist government in power."[11]

On July 12, 1956, the Salle Wagram was filled with approximately two thousand protesters, who came here to demonstrate together under the banner of solidarity between Parisians and the workers of Poznań. According to the account of a direct participant in the rally, Janusz Laskowski, correspondent of the London-based "Dziennik Polski i Dziennik Żołnierza," about ninety percent of the participants represented the French side, while the rest of the audience was filled by the local Polish diaspora. Interestingly, there was an amusing misunderstanding at the outset, as it turned out that the demonstration was attended by... a group of Soviet tourists visiting Paris that day. One of the items on the agenda of their stay on the Seine included the screening of a film on a panoramic screen, which was projected right next door. However, the tourists from behind the Iron Curtain confused the rooms and "were sitting baffled as one speaker after another paid tribute to the workers of Poznań and condemned the communist government in Warsaw." Chaired by Pierre Commin, the rally was filled with speeches by pre-appointed speakers. Thus, André Philip drew attention to the poor situation of workers in Poland and the exploitation by the USSR of the subjugated countries of Central and Eastern Europe, stressing Poland's centuries-long connection with the Western world and Latin civilization, and demanding that the arrested participants in the June 1956 events be tried in public, preferably with the participation of representatives of the Western press. In addition, stressed Philip, the Poznań workers should be defended by French lawyers. Speaking on behalf of the émigré PPS (Polish Socialist Party)—In place of Zygmunt Zaremba, who had been announced earlier—was Jerzy Rencki, who

10 J. Giedroyc, J. Stempowski, *Listy...*, pp. 392.

11 J. Giedroyc, Cz. Straszewicz, *Listy 1946–1962*, selection, introduction and footnotes by M. Urbanowski, Warszawa 2018, p. 246; see J. Nowak-Jeziorański, J. Giedroyc, *Listy 1952–1998*, selection, introduction and footnotes by Dobrosława Platt, Wrocław 2001, p. 128.

disproved "the theses of the regime's propaganda that the riots in Poznań were provoked by foreign agents." In turn, David Rousset pointed out that although the Poznań workers were defeated, they won "a great moral victory by tearing away the veil of hypocrisy and falsehood with which the Communists covered their own reality." Edmund Stocki, a miner and union activist from the Nord department, assured those in attendance that the thoughts of all Poles in France were with the people of Poznań, while Nicolas Lazarevitch questioned the fairness of the announced trials of the June 1956 participants, whom the communist authorities intended to prosecute. Finally, Pierre Commin stated that Poznań proved to be "'a bloody contradiction" of the Russian Bolsheviks' affectionate assertions that the course had been softened after Stalin's death." Commin added that his party would demand that the arrested workers be duly defended, also stipulating that in the current political situation, the announced visit of the Polish Prime Minister Józef Cyrankiewicz to France had become highly undesirable.[12]

Meanwhile, one would look in vain for the one whose name headlined the colorful placards promoting the Poznań rally, namely Albert Camus. Contrary to much that has been written on the subject so far, especially in the journalistic and sometimes academic circles,[13] the famed writer was ultimately absent from the Salle Wagram. He excused himself on account of illness, although it is no secret that he spent July and August 1956 on a family vacation in Provence.[14] Nonetheless, Camus did not leave the organizers of the rally empty-handed and fulfilled his obligations to the protesters, albeit not directly. He sent a manuscript of a speech prepared especially for the occasion, which he labeled with the telling title *Poznan*, to the initiators of the rally, together with his permission to read it publicly. Thus, on July 12, 1956, Camus's words resounded strongly at the Salle Wagram, linking his

12 J. Laskowski, *W obronie robotników Poznania. Wiec socjalistów francuskich z udziałem (przez pomyłkę) turystów sowieckich*, "Dziennik Polski i Dziennik Żołnierza" (Londyn), July 14, 1956; see *Wielka manifestacja wolnego świata francuskiego potępia dyktatury i ich metody walki z masami pracującymi żądającymi chleba i wolności*, "Narodowiec" (Lens), 15–16 VII 1956; *Echa Poznania*, "Wiadomości Związku Polskich Federalistów", VIII 1956, https://argonnaute.parisnanterre.fr/medias/customer_3/periodique/immi_polonaise_lotmzreliquat_pdf/4P_05898/BDIC_4P_05898_1956_08.pdf [accessed June 12, 2022].

13 In 1990, J. Maciejewski and Z. Trojanowiczowa, editors of the second edition of the seminal monograph *Poznański Czerwiec 1956*, expanded its content to include Camus's *Poznan* speech, which they annotated as follows: "Speech delivered in Paris on July 12, 1956, at a rally in solidarity with the workers of Poznań" (*Poznański Czerwiec 1956*..., p. 381). The heading has induced a tendency to reproduce the erroneous thesis of Camus's personal participation in the demonstration at the Salle Wagram, especially among historians of the Poznań June.

14 See A. Camus, *Notatniki 1935–1959*, selected, translated and explicated by J. Guze, Warszawa 1994, pp. 252–255.

name forever with the context of the 1956 Poznań June. At the same time, it should be added that taking an unequivocal stance on the Poznań events was another installment of his protests against totalitarian oppression in the so-called Eastern Bloc countries, given his prior journalistic activity after the bloody suppression of the workers' uprising in Berlin in 1953, among others.[15]

Moving on to Camus's *Poznan* speech, it should be noted at the outset that, before sitting down to pen it, he made thorough preparations for the task, preceding the creative act with a rigorous research. In fact, the depth of Camus's analysis clearly indicates that he was familiar with, among other things, the propagandist portrayal of June 1956 reproduced in the pages of the regime press in Poland. His address was founded on several fundamental pillars. The first was a precise strike against the prime minister of the People's Republic of Poland, Józef Cyrankiewicz, hitherto depicted by the Western European press as a "benign liberal." In particular, Camus referred to the content of Cyrankiewicz's crude statement delivered on June 29, 1956, on the airwaves of the Poznań studio of the Polish Radio, in which the politician argued that Poznań had become a "site of criminal provocation" inspired by "imperialist centers," and threatened that "every provocateur or madman who dares to raise his hand against the people's government, let him be sure that his hand will be chopped off."[16] Without veiling his irony, Camus perversely noted that if one were to accept the Polish prime minister's interpellation and literally apply the suggested punitive measure, then in the Polish "state of workers and peasants," who in his view constituted "people's power" proper, most Communist Party politicians should immediately have one of their limbs severed. Another issue raised by Camus concerned the abolition of the right to strike in communist states. According to Camus's opinion, in any "normal country" trade unions should be guaranteed a "peaceful revindication of workers' demands," however if the working people were deprived of such a possibility, as had been the case in Poznań, they were left with no alternative but to "cry and revolt."[17]

15 W. Jung, *Albert Camus, Berlin-Est et l'Europe révoltée*, [in:] *L'Europe et ses intellectuels. Actes du colloque international organisé par l'Université de Varsovie, Varsovie, 30 mai – 2 juin* 2016, textes réunis et présentés par R. Forycki, Warszawa 2019, pp. 248–258; see also remarks by M. Kałuża, *Buntownik. Ewolucja i kryzys w twórczości Alberta Camusa*, Kraków 2017, pp. 544–550.

16 See P. Grzelczak, *„Nie żałuję tego przemówienia". Józef Cyrankiewicz w Poznaniu 28–30 VI 1956 r.*, "Kronika Miasta Poznania" 2012, no. 2, pp. 202–210.

17 A. Camus, *Poznań*, [in:] *Poznański Czerwiec 1956*, eds. J. Maciejewski, Z. Trojanowiczowa, Poznań 1990, pp. 381–383; see *Poznan. (Juin ou juillet 1956)*, [in:] A. Camus, *Oeuvres complètes III, 1949–1956*, éd. publiée

In the subsequent section of his speech, Camus slammed Yugoslavia, which "by hurling insults and calumnies at the victims of Poznań" took an unequivocally pro-Soviet stance toward the Polish revolt, thus disappointing the Western European elites and leftist circles impressed until some point by Josip Broz Tito and the Yugoslav "road to socialism." In a similar vein, the author of *The Plague* stressed that it was in the streets of Poznań that the myth of communism had fallen irrevocably: a communism whose sympathizers and followers could still be found in the West, where "it corrupted [the] consciences and minds of Europeans for years on end." According to Camus, it was only "the fire of the Polish uprising" in Poznań that had a chance to illuminate the "fall and misery of the corrupt revolution" bred in the USSR. The writer also paid respects to the victims of June 1956 and expressed his "complete solidarity with them," coupled with his desire to see their outcry and despair recognized in the West. At the same time, Camus concluded that one lesson should undoubtedly be drawn from the Poznań tragedy for the world sunk in Cold War chaos, namely that of "Freedom against the old and new barbarism."[18]

For the record, it should be noted that Camus's *Poznan* speech was read out as the first one at the Salle Wagram, which had its obvious significance and—if one were to trust the surviving testimonies—left a strong impression on the audience. The gathering itself ended late at night with the adoption of a resolution in which the French workers expressed their solidarity with their Poznań counterparts and demanded that French lawyers defend the arrested participants of the Poznań June. The event was crowned by the joint singing of the national anthems of Poland and France. It did not end there, however, as the atmosphere became so heated that the Paris rally was nearly followed by an epilogue in the streets. This is evidenced by a report in the "Dziennik Polski" daily, which reads: "Some French workers demanded that all participants in the gathering or a delegation thereof head for the [Polish] regime's embassy to protest the bloody suppression of the demonstration in Poznań."[19] Be that as it may, the rally turned out to be a considerable organizational triumph, as well as a successful publicity and image-building event, to use modern-day terms. At the same time, it was noticed and appreciated by the Western European public opinion and artists' circles at large. In a letter to Juliusz Mieroszewski, Jerzy Giedroyc also made no secret of his

sous la dir. de R. Gay-Crosier, Paris 2008, pp. 1137–1140.

18 Ibid.

19 J. Laskowski, *W obronie robotników Poznania*...

satisfaction, though not without a shadow of malice toward the Polish diaspora: "Yesterday's meeting at the Salle Wagram went perfectly. [Pierre] Commin, secretary general of the SFIO, spoke very firmly and well. André Philip did great, [Albert] Camus fell ill, so he had his v[ery] good text read out in his stead. [Zygmunt] Zaremba was tactful enough not to turn up, with [Jerzy] Rencki, a friend of [Jan] Pomian, whom you know, speaking for him. A smug, unimpassioned international official and miner from Nord [Edmund Stocki]. All in all, a considerable success. Rather understandably, everyone claims the credit. I am madly amused by this Polish confabulation, always with no legs in foreign territory outside the ghetto."[20]

Interestingly, in the summer of 1956 Jerzy Giedroyc even planned to publish a special pamphlet on bible paper, containing all the speeches delivered at the Salle Wagram, and smuggle it to Poland, however the idea ultimately failed to materialize.[21] Nonetheless, this did not spell the end of "Kultura"'s cooperation with Albert Camus. Just two years later, it was the émigré Literary Institute that published the first Polish translation of *The Rebel*, whose interpretation—not least because of June 1956—not only became more relevant but also acquired completely new meanings. When the great writer died in tragic circumstances in 1960, the "Kultura" community plunged into mourning, which was expressed in two consecutive issues of this primary Polish cultural monthly in features penned by Czesław Miłosz[22] and Józef Czapski respectively. It was especially the latter author who pinpointed those qualities of the Nobel Prize laureate that presumably did not allow him to overlook the Poznań events in 1956: "Although I have never once met a French writer more ready to help, and do so with a sense of urgency and without any theatricality, one had the impression that he never forgot that everything he did for others was faint and could never be sufficient, that human misery, human suffering, and human needs virtually prevent one from a moment's respite." Czapski then added that, "Camus was the first to react to the Poznań events, and then to Budapest. He stepped down from Unesco so as not to sit at the same table with the Francoists, he did not yield to the pressure of Sartre and his friends to keep silent about the Soviet camps, about Soviet terror."[23] Consequently, as aptly diagnosed by Jacek Trznadel, Camus was de facto

20 J. Giedroyc, J. Mieroszewski, *Listy...*, p. 343.

21 J. Gierdoyc, J. Stempowski, *Listy...*, p. 392.

22 Cz. Miłosz, *Diariusz paryski*, "Kultura" (Paryż) 1960, no. 3, pp. 3–12.

23 J. Czapski, *Śmierć na równej drodze*, "Kultura" (Paryż) 1960, no. 4, p. 107.

"banned [in the People's Republic of Poland] as far as his notable declarations were concerned, because *The Rebel* was never officially published in Poland [until 1989 and the fall of the People's Republic of Poland], nor were Camus's declarations after Berlin and Poznań in the aftermath of those uprisings and their suppression. An old formula applied here: *ad usum Delphini*. One does not put on display the claws of an intellectual, only their tail, subject to its prior coiffuring."[24] The fact that Albert Camus's Poznań speech was first published in enslaved Poland in 1983 in the so-called "second circulation," an alternative and "illegal" publishing movement flying under the radar of censorship,[25] would not have been possible had it not been for the revolt of millions born in August 1980 on the grounds of "Solidarity."

As appendices to this article, below we publish two documents that provide lasting evidence of the extensive activity undertaken in the summer of 1956 by Jerzy Giedroyc and Albert Camus on behalf of Poznań. The first is a hitherto understudied appeal by a group of Western European intellectuals on the issue of the Poznań June, referred to in this sketch, whose main originator (and, most likely, actual author) was the editor-in-chief of "Kultura" magazine, while one of its most prominent signatories was the future Nobel Prize-winning native of French Algeria. The second document is a translation of Albert Camus's famous speech entitled *Poznan*, read on his behalf on July 12, 1956 at the Salle Wagram, the contents of which I have analyzed in this study.

Annex

No. 1

July 1956, Paris, Open letter from a group of Western European intellectuals on the issue of the 1956 Poznań June

Un groupe d'intellectuels européens demande un procès public pour les inculpés de Poznan

MM. Albert Camus. Karl Jaspers, Arthur Koestler, François Mauriac, Jean Rounault, André Philip, Ignazio Silone, Stephen Spender, Manès Sperber, Alexandre Weissberg-Cybulski, Mme Jeanne Hersch, ont signé le texte de l'appel suivant:

24 J. Trznadel, *Hańba domowa. Rozmowy z pisarzami*, new extended edition, Komorów 2006, p. 258.

25 A. Camus, *Poznań*, "Krytyka. Kwartalnik polityczny" 1983, no. 16, pp. 203–205.

Depuis quelques mois des nouvelles catastrophiques de source officielle polonaise confirmaient la situation tragique des ouvriers polonais. Nul cependant n'imaginait le désespoir révélé par les événements de Poznan.

Quand les ouvriers ne peuvent plus supporter la condition qui leur est faite ils recourent à la grève, et ce droit leur est reconnu dans tous les pays libres. C'est l'absence de ce droit dans l'empire soviétique - l'U.R.S.S. et ses satellites – qui a entraîné à Poznan l'intervention de la troupe et des tanks contre les manifestants, dont on essaye de faire maintenant des criminels passibles de la peine capitale.

Les soussignés déclarent leur solidarité absolue avec les victimes de la répression sanglante. Ils demandent qu'aucune exécution n'ait lieu désormais et qu'un procès public se déroule en présence de témoins qui jouissent de la confiance de l'Occident démocratique.

Ils protestent contre la diversion, d'avance condamnée, qui veut présenter les manifestants ouvriers comme des agents étrangers.

Ils demandent en outre qu'une enquête internationale soit organisée afin que le monde occidental soit informé des besoins les plus urgents de la classe ouvrière polonaise pour lui venir en aide au plus vite.

Ils invitent en particulier les organisations ouvrières démocratiques à prendre l'initiative, internationalement, d'une vaste collecte permettant de témoigner aux travailleurs polonais, autrement qu'en paroles, leur solidarité fraternelle.

Source: "Le Monde", July 5, 1956

Group of European intellectuals demands public trial of defendants in Poznań

Messrs. Albert Camus, Karl Jaspers, Arthur Koestler, François Mauriac, Jean Rounault, André Philip, Ignazio Silone, Stephen Spender, Manès Sperber, Alexandre Weissberg-Cybulski, and Ms. Jeanne Hersch, signed the following appeal:

For several months, disastrous news from official Polish outlets have been confirming the dire situation of Polish workers. However, no one imagined the despair revealed by the developments in Poznań. Whenever workers can no longer bear the conditions imposed on them, they resort to strike action, and this right of theirs is recognized in all free countries. It was the absence of this right in the Soviet empire—in the USSR and its satellites—that led to the intervention of troops and tanks in Poznań against the demonstrators who are now made into criminals deserving of the death penalty.

The undersigned express their complete solidarity with the victims of this bloody oppression. They demand that executions stop and public trials be held in the presence of observers trusted by the democratic West. They protest against the misrepresentation and portrayal of worker demonstrators as foreign agents in order to condemn them presumptively. They also demand that an international investigation be held so that the Western world is informed of the immediate needs of the Polish working class, to come to its aid as soon as possible. In particular, they appeal to democratic workers' organizations to take international action to raise substantial funds so that their testimony of fraternal solidarity with Polish workers can extend beyond words.

No. 2

July 12, 1956 Paris, Speech by Albert Camus read out at the Salle Wagram during a Parisian rally in solidarity with the participants of the 1956 Poznań June protests

Poznan

(Juin ou juillet 1956)

Un chef communiste international, et qui se dit à l'occasion syndicaliste, a déclaré que le soulèvement de Poznan était le fait de meneurs inspirés par l'étranger. Jusque-là ce génie politique n'exprimait rien de plus en somme que n'importe quel journaliste bourgeois devant les soulèvements ouvriers ou coloniaux qui le dérangent dans son idée du bonheur. Mais l'argument invoqué par lui mérite au contraire notre pleine adhésion. Dans un pays normal, a-t-il dit, on n'attaque pas les postes de police pour satisfaire les revendications ouvrières. Il faut applaudir á cette remarque pertinente. Car dans un pays normal, en effet, les libertés syndicales autorisent la lutte pacifique pour les revendications ouvrières. Mais là où le droit de grève n'existe plus, ou la législation ouvrière annule d'un trait de plume cent ans de conquêtes syndicales, quand des ouvriers qui ne reçoivent que le minimum vital voient rogné par décision gouvernementale le salaire qui ne suffit même pas á leur vie, que leur reste-t-il donc sinon le cri et la colère ?

Non, ce n'est pas un régime normal que celui ou l'ouvrier se voit contraint de choisir entre la misère et la mort. Et ceux qui, de près ou de loin, avec ou sans précautions, calomnient ou critiquent les martyrs de Poznan, ceux-là se retranchent définitivement de la communauté des hommes libres et déshonorent la révolution qu'ils prétendent défendre. M. Cyrankiewicz, qu'une certaine presse nous présente comme un doux libéral et qui distribue

en effet de bonnes paroles pendant que ses services exécutent des ouvriers, a eu, lui aussi, un mot malheureux pour annoncer la répression. Quiconque, a-t-il dit, lève la main contre le peuple peut être sûr qu'elle sera coupée. Si cette sanction est aussi certaine que le dit le président du Conseil polonais, alors son pays et quelques autres, soyons-en sûrs, seront bientôt gouvernés par un état-major de manchots. Car ces gouvernants et ces bureaucrates ont fait mieux que lever la main contre le peuple : ils l'ont frappé, ils l'ont renversé dans le sang. Mais le sang ouvrier ne porte pas bonheur ! Ces tyrans effarés qui tirent et parlent à tort et à travers sont unis aujourd'hui dans la même complicité consciente. Ils savent, n'en doutez pas, ils savent qu'ils sont coupables !

C'est pourquoi on ne peut qu'accueillir avec indignation l'attitude, en cette affaire, du gouvernement yougoslave et de sa presse officielle. En insultant et en calomniant les victimes de Poznan, le gouvernement yougoslave vient de rendre un assez superbe hommage à Staline. Il a trompé l'attente de tous ceux qui lui faisaient, quand même, confiance et il s'est condamné pour longtemps aux yeux de la gauche libre. Mais, après tout, ces calomnies, comme les précautions de langage que nous voyons prendre, ici même, à nos hommes du progrès, ne nous apprennent que ce que nous savions déjà. Elles nous apprennent que la réaction, aujourd'hui, est aussi à gauche. Elle y serait du moins si les sacrifices des ouvriers polonais, et la solidarité qu'ils ont éveillée dans la monde, parmi tant d'hommes semblables à ceux qui sont dans cette salle, ne témoignaient encore pour l'honneur et la courage inlassable du mouvement ouvrier. Mais ceux-là se sont exclus du mouvement ouvrier, et de son honneur, qui, au spectacle de travailleurs avançant au coude à coude devant les tanks, pour exiger le pain et la liberté, n'ont d'autre réaction que de traiter ces martyrs de fascistes ou de regretter vertueusement qu'ils n'aient pas eu la patience de mourir silencieusement de faim, en attendant que le régime veuille bien, comme on dit, se libéraliser.

Certes je me garderai, quant à moi, d'encourager, si peu que ce soit, à la révolte et à la lutte des hommes dont je ne puis partager le combat. Mais, ces hommes s'étant levés, à bout d'humiliations, et ayant été assassines, je me mépriserais d'oser la moindre réserve et d'exprimer autre chose devant leur sacrifice que mon respect et ma solidarité absolue. Ils n'ont pas besoin, cela est sûr, que nous les félicitions. Ils ont seulement besoin que, partout où règne la liberté aux mille voix, leur cri soit répercuté, que leur détresse soit relayée, exposée aux yeux du monde, que soit connue et respectée leur volonté d'en finir avec cette mystification qui prétendait qu'ils avaient consenti

librement le sacrifice de leurs libertés afin d'obtenir le pain pour tous. La vérité, ils nous l'ont criée, est qu'ils n'avaient ni pain ni liberté, qu'ils ne veulent ni ne peuvent se passer ni de l'un ni de l'autre, qu'ils savent, comme nous tous, que les deux sont inséparables, et que prive de liberté l'esclave ne reçoit plus son pain que du bon plaisir du maitre.

Depuis quelques mois, un mythe s'écroule irrésistiblement devant nos yeux. Nous connaissons aujourd'hui la tristesse d'avoir eu raison en refusant de considérer les régimes de l'Est comme révolutionnaires et prolétariens. Tristesse en effet: qui se réjouirait d'avoir eu raison en annonçant que des millions d'hommes souffraient véritablement de misère et d'oppression ? Aujourd'hui la vérité, la terrible vérité éclate, le mythe vole en éclats. Mais nous savons que ce mythe pendant des années a perverti les consciences et les intelligences européennes. Même devant l'éclat du jour, ces aveugles diront encore qu'il fait nuit. Ils le diront plus malaisément aujourd'hui. Les ouvriers de Poznan viennent de porter le dernier coup à une mystification longtemps triomphante, longtemps cynique. Les feux de l'insurrection polonaise illuminent aux yeux de tous la déchéance et le malheur d'une révolution pervertie. Il ne peut plus y avoir d'aveugles, ou de naïfs, aujourd'hui, autour de cette déchéance. Il ne peut plus y avoir que des complices.

Nous se serons pas, nous ne serons jamais ces complices ! Nous ne serons pas non plus des pharisiens triomphants. Cette victoire de la vérité a été payée de trop de morts et de trop de sang pour que nous puissions l'accueillir autrement qu'avec une résolution douloureuse. Aujourd'hui encore, ces ouvriers désarmés qu'on fusille dans l'ombre, pour sauver ce qui reste de régimes mourants, ne nous font sentir que l'horreur et la peine qui ont accompagne ce long mensonge. Mais ces morts désespérés nous imposent une fidélité qu'il faut jurer une fois de plus. Fidélité au mot qu'ils ont crie devant la répression, au mot qui a converti des soldats jusque dans les rangs de l'armée, au mot qui a survécu à toutes le oppressions dont on l'écrasait, à toutes les mystifications dont on l'habillait, fidélité à la liberté inlassable, à la liberté invincible et sacrée. Oui, nous ne pouvons que répondre de loin à ce cri déchirant des ouvriers de Poznan et lui donner son écho à travers le monde. Mais nous devons le faire sans trêve, pour que le cri plus jamais ne s'éteigne. Liberté ou barbarie, voila ce que nous avons appris dans les longues années de l'histoire qui vient de passer, voila ce que nous apprenons dans cette nouvelle tragédie. Le choix alors ne sera pas difficile. Nous choisirons la liberté contre les barbaries anciennes et nouvelles et nous la choisirons une

fois pour toutes, jusqu'a la fin, pou ne pas déméritер un seul jour du sacrifice des militants ouvriers de la Pologne toujours opprimée.

Source: *Poznan. (Juin ou juillet 1956)*, [in:] A. Camus, *Oeuvres complètes III, 1949–1956*, éd. publiée sous la dir. de R. Gay-Crosier, Paris, Gallimard 2008, pp. 1137–1140.

Poznan

One of the leaders of the Communist Party, an internationalist and syndicalist at that, asserted that the uprising in Poznań was the result of the activities of provocateurs inspired by foreign centers. What this political genius has argued thus far is, in essence, no more than what any bourgeois journalist would say about workers' or colonial uprisings disrupting his hitherto idea of happiness. On the other hand, the conclusion of his speech merits our undivided support. "In a normal country," he stated, "police stations are not attacked to satisfy workers' demands." We can only applaud this apt remark. For indeed, in a normal country, trade union rights warrant a peaceful revindication of workers' demands. But where the right to strike is absent, where legislation imposed on the workers overturns in one stroke a century of trade union gains, where government decisions diminish workers' wages, barely sufficient as they were to meet their basic necessities, what is left for them but to cry and revolt?

No, a system where a worker must choose between misery and death is not a normal system. And those who, from near or far, bluntly or cautiously, hurl calumnies and criticize the martyrs of Poznań, open a clear chasm that separates them from the community of free people, and desecrate the honor of the revolution in whose defense they supposedly stand. Mr. Cyrankiewicz, portrayed by a certain faction of the press as a "benign liberal" and indeed dispensing kind words left and right while his troops open fire on the workers, likewise happened to make an unfortunate statement: "Anyone," he stated, "who dares to raise his hand against the people, let him be sure that his hand will be chopped off." If this punishment is indeed applied, as the Polish prime minister assures, it is only one-armed people that will soon be left to rule. For these governments and their bureaucrats have not only raised their hand against the people, but have dealt them a blow, knocked them down in a pool of blood. But workers' blood brings no happiness! These terrified tyrants hurling words and missiles today are united by the same consciousness of complicity. They know all too well—there is not a slightest about it—they know they are guilty!

Thus, the only answer to the stance adopted on this matter by the Yugoslav government and its official press can be indignation. By hurling insults and calumnies at the victims of Poznań, the Yugoslav government has paid a glorious tribute to Stalin. It has defied the expectations of those who, in spite of all, had put their confidence in it, and compromised itself for a long time in the eyes of the independent left. In the end, however, the said calumnies and cautious phrasing—another phenomenon noticeable even amidst ourselves, amidst our progressive activists—are no novelty to us. They are merely a lesson that today reactionaries can be found on the left, too. This is what one would be led to think had it not been for the sacrifice of Polish workers and the solidarity they inspired around the world, among so many people like those gathered in this room, which still testifies to the honor and tireless courage of the labor movement. But those who, faced with workers marching before tanks in tight-knit files, demanding bread and freedom, those whose only reaction is to call these heroes fascists and to nobly regret that they had no patience to die quietly of hunger, waiting for the regime to, as they say, become more liberal: those are the ones who, of their own accord, stepped out of the ranks of the labor movement, desecrating its honor.

As for me, I will always beware of encouraging in the slightest degree the struggle and rebellion of people in whose struggle I cannot take part. But now that these people, at the end of their humiliation, have revolted and then been murdered, I would feel contempt for myself if I dared to show the slightest restraint in my assessment of this murder and withheld any of my utmost respect for the victims of oppression and my complete solidarity with them. They most certainly have no use for our congratulations. All they expect is for their cry to reverberate wherever universal freedom is enjoyed, for others to acknowledge their despair, for the eyes of the whole world to open, for everyone to recognize and respect their decision to put an end to the mystification as per which they supposedly surrendered their freedom in order to get bread. The truth is—and this is precisely what their cry was meant to express—that they had neither bread nor freedom, that they cannot live without one or the other, that they know—as do we all—that the two are inseparable and that any slave, any human deprived of freedom, receives bread only if such is their master's wish.

For several months now, unstoppably, before our eyes, the myth has been collapsing. We are already familiar with the sadness that comes from the conviction that the system of the Eastern countries cannot be considered revolutionary and genuinely proletarian. Our sadness is sincere: who would

rejoice in the fact that they rightly predicted the oppression and misery of millions? Today this harsh truth has exploded, and the shards of the myth are still floating in the air, yet we know that it has corrupted the consciences and minds of Europeans for years on end. Even when faced with the light of day, these blind men will maintain that night reigns supreme. Today, they will be forced to make such statements with some embarrassment. The workers of Poznań have dealt the final blow to the mystification that has reigned triumphantly and cynically for so long. The fire of the Polish uprising has illuminated for all the downfall and misery of the corrupt revolution. In the face of this collapse, it is no longer possible today to speak of the blind or the naive. Whoever lingers on is an accomplice.

We will never, ever become such accomplices! Nor will we appear as triumphant Pharisees. This victory of truth has been earned with too many deaths and too much blood to cause us any feelings other than painful resignation. In the face of defenseless workers, shot surreptitiously to salvage the remnants of dying regimes, we feel today only the disgust and pain that have long accompanied this lie. But the desperate victims command us, once again, to swear our allegiance. An allegiance to the word cried out in the face of oppression, to the word that made soldiers switch armies, to the word that has proven more durable than all the stifling forms of oppression, all the mystifications in which it has been dressed: an allegiance to a freedom unbending, freedom invincible and most sacred. Yes, it is true, we can only respond from afar to this shattering cry of the Poznań workers and ensure that it reverberates throughout the world. But we must not fail to do so, we must do everything to ensure that this cry never dies out.

Freedom or barbarity: this is what centuries of history have taught us, this is what this latest tragedy teaches us. The choice will not be difficult. We will choose freedom against the old and new barbarity, and we will choose it once and for all, decisively, so that not a single day of the sacrifice made by the fighting workers of the still-oppressed Poland is lost.

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